FREEDOM OF SPEECH
AND
POLITICAL DISSENT
IN THE
EPISCOPAL CHURCH 1914 - 1918

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George and Ada Warren
who started me on my journey

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I. INTRODUCTION

AN OVERVIEW

On April 11, 1918, the Right Reverend Paul Jones was compelled to resign his jurisdiction as the Bishop of the Missionary District of Utah. While no canonical or other charges were pending against Bishop Jones, the House of Bishops accepted his resignation.

Bishop Jones was an ardent pacifist who spoke out forcefully against American participation in World War I. These statements aroused the ire of many prominent Churchmen in Salt Lake City, and the Council of Advice of the Missionary District voted unanimously to ask for the Bishop's resignation. Bishop Jones declined and asked the House of Bishops to investigate the matter thoroughly. The House of Bishops appointed a special committee to look into the matter. The commmittee could find no substantial evidence that Bishop Jones had associated with any seditious organizations; neither could they find any evidence that he had consistently promulgated unpatriotic doctrines. Nonetheless, the commmittee concluded that "due to the excited state of public opinion," Bishop Jones ought to resign.

In compliance with the recommendation of the committee, Bishop Jones tendered his resignation. The House of Bishops declined to accept the ominously worded report of its committee. It did, however, accept Bishop Jones' resignation.

With the "case of Bishop Jones" as its centerpiece, this dissertation will attempt to examine the permissible limits of political dissent within the Episcopal Church. This inquiry will proceed along several related avenues.

First, a brief introduction to the structure and polity of the Episcopal Church will be presented. Special attention will be given to those "offices" within the Church to whom freedom and responsibility to speak out on social, economic and political issues are given. The safeguards and limits of this freedom will also be examined.

Second, with this overview as a background, the chronological development of the attitudes of Episcopalians toward American participation in World War I will be examined. This survey will cover the years 1914 to 1918. In this study, three loose, informal groupings of opinion will emerge.

One, a large group of prominent clergy and laymen, primarily concentrated on the Eastern seaboard, argued forcefully and consistently for direct American involvement in the war. This group, supported by some of the Church periodicals, most notably The Churchman, encouraged the "Preparedness Movement," even though the official policy of the nation was that of strict neutrality. When America finally entered the war, this group tended to view that war as a holy crusade against Teutonic barbarism. This group may be called the "Crusaders." As part of their support for the war effort, they sought to refute any Biblical argument in favor of pacifism, and spoke out strongly and harshly against any fellow Churchman who opposed the war.

Two, there was an almost equally large group who, although they were conscientiously opposed to war, came to view it as a necessary evil. This group supported President Wilson's neutrality program, and once America entered the war, supported that policy, but also endeavored to mute the chauvinistic and self-righteous impulses of some Americans and insure a "just and lasting peace." These Churchmen were deeply troubled by the "Crusaders'" depiction of the war as a holy struggle against the enemies of Christian virtue. They pointed out that no nation was completely free from guilt and selfish motives. While this group did not support those who opposed the war, neither did they support the more drastic attempts to curtail their right of free speech. This group supported a theory of a just war.

Three, there did exist an extremely small group of pacifists within the Episcopal Church. This group included Bishop Jones and several other Socialists. They sought by all legal means to prevent American participation in World War I. They strongly believed that all nations, on both sides of the conflict, were morally responsible for the war and the tragedies which it spawned. They believed that the weapons of war and hatred could never bring about a world of peace and justice. By the end of the war, virtually all of these pacifists had been forced to leave the parochial ministry.

With this study of the attitudes of Episcopalians toward World War I as background, the third section of this paper will examine the "case of Bishop Jones." This investigation is intended to accomplish two goals; first, to present a full and complete chronology of the events which led to Bishop Jones' resignation; and second, to trace the development of the arguments raised by Bishop Jones' opponents against his taking a public stand in opposition to America's foreign policy.

The concluding chapters of this paper will offer a critique of these arguments raised by the Bishop's opponents. These arguments fell into three categories. First, it was argued that before Bishop Jones spoke out publicly in opposition to American involvement in the war, it

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was incumbent upon him to make it clear that these views reflected his personal feelings and ought not to be construed as "official" views of an Episcopal spokesman for the Church. Second, when America entered the war, other critics argued that if the Bishop could not conscientiously support American participation he should then remain silent. They believed that it was unpatriotic, and potentially disloyal for any citizen to be in opposition to the wartime policies of the government. Third, when Bishop Jones refused to remain silent, his opponents sought to force his resignation, for they believed that his opposition to the war was doing serious and irreparable damage to the work of the Church. Each of these arguments will be examined in some detail.

This inquiry will conclude with a brief "non-academic postscript." The final chapter will attempt to describe a context in which the debate over ethical issues can be fostered within the Church; to the end that the Church may fulfill her obligation to preach the Word of God and that tragedies such as the case of Bishop Jones may not arise again.

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WHO SPEAKS FOR THE CHURCH?

At the General Convention of 1901 the Episcopal Church authorized the appointment of a Joint Committee on the Relations of Capital and Labor.[1] With this action, the Episcopal Church took official cognizance of the duty of the Church to speak out and act responsibly on issues of social, economic, and political concern.

The preceding statement contains a certain irreducible ambiguity for, given the complex polity of the Episcopal Church, it is virtually impossible to identify accurately those individuals and groups who may speak with authority "for the Church." In theory, it is a relatively straightforward matter to outline schematically the structure of the Episcopal Church and to identify those official agencies, be they groups or individuals, who are authorized to speak on behalf of the Church on public issues. In practice, however, the willingness and ability of "the Church" to speak out depends largely upon the visibility and credibility of the person(s) holding the office, rather than upon the authority formally vested in the office itself.

The formal policy making structure of the Episcopal Church is relatively straightforward. It should be remembered, however, that the following description pertains to the Episcopal Church as it was organized during World War I.[1]

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[1] Journal of the General Convention of the Protestant Episcopal Church, 1901. (New York: The Abbott Press, 1901), p. 126. Hereinafter the Journal of the General Convention is referred to as JGC.

The basic unit of the Episcopal Church is the individual parish or mission congregation. The specific regulations covering the organization and governance of parishes and missions have been left, within certain general guidelines, to the determination of the several Dioceses. Certain broad generalizations are possible.

To an outside observer the difference between a parish and a mission congregation would be virtually imperceptible. The primary difference lies in the fact that a parish is a legally and financially independent entity, while a mission is a creature of either the Diocese or of a parish. In the former case it is referred to as a Diocesan mission, in the latter, a parochial mission. In a Diocesan mission the Bishop of the Diocese appoints the clergy of the mission, and they serve at his pleasure. The Diocese also retains legal title to the property and buildings of the mission. In a parochial mission these powers are vested in the rector and vestry of the parish of which the mission is a part.

During the period of World War I, particularly in the Missionary Districts of the Church, the number of mission congregations often greatly exceeded that of parishes.[2] As recently as 1961, Powel Dawley reported that of the approximately 7,000 Episcopal congregations in the United States, nearly 2,500 were missions.[1] Despite the large number of mission congregations, the majority of Episcopalians belong to, and the preponderance of the Church's work is carried out by, independent parishes.

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[1] All references to the Constitution and Canons are, unless otherwise noted, those appended to the Journal of the General Convention, 1916, for it is under these provisions that the Church operated for most of World War I.

For a more contemporary description of the policy making structure of the Episcopal Church, see M. Moran Weston, Social Policy of the Episcopal Church in the Twentieth Century. (New York: The Seabury Press, 1964), pp. 23-27. Also, Powel Mills Dawley, The Episcopal Church and Its Work. (New York: The Seabury Press, 1955).

[2] See "The Missionary District of Utah," following.

Parishes vary in size from less than one hundred members, to some which have several thousand. Despite this disparity in size, they all share certain common characteristics. Each parish is directed by a rector, in whom is vested the "Control of the worship and spiritual jurisdiction of the Parish."[2] He has complete control of the use of "the Church and Parish buildings."[3] The rector is called by the vestry of the parish, approved by the Bishop, and once he is "settled," usually after a period of approximately one year, he may be removed from his office in one of only three ways.

First, as all rectors are priests, a rector would be removed from his office if he were no longer a priest. Such an event might come about in one of three ways. One, a priest may choose to "renounce his ministry."[4] Two, the Standing Committee of a Diocese may certify to the Bishop that a priest has by his "open renunciation of the Doctrine, Discipline, or Worship of this Church," abandoned the communion of the Episcopal Church.[5] After the publication of notice to this effect, the priest would have six months in which to "transmit to the Bishop a retraction of such acts, or make declaration that the facts alleged in said certificate are false."[1] If he failed to do either, at the expiration of the six months, he would be deposed from the ministry of the Episcopal Church by the Bishop.

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[1] Dawley, The Episcopal Church, p. 119.

[2] Canon 16, Section II, paragraph 1.

[3] Canon 16, Section II, paragraph 2.

[4] Canon 33.

[5] Canon 35, Section I.

Finally, a priest may be deposed if he is tried and convicted of any of the following offenses: (a) Crime or immorality; (b) Holding and teaching publicly or privately, and advisedly, any doctrine contrary to that held by this Church; (c) Violation of the Rubrics of the Book of Common Prayer; (d) Violation of the Constitution and Canons of the General Convention; (e) Violation of the Constitution or Canons of the Diocese or Missionary District to which he belongs; (f) Any act which involves a violation of his Ordination vows; (g) Habitual neglect of the exercise of his Ministerial office; (h) Conduct unbecoming a Clergyman.[2]

If the rector of a parish remains a priest in good standing, there are only two other ways by which he may leave, or be forced to leave, his parish. He may, with the consent of the vestry, resign.[3] If a priest desired to remain as the rector of his parish, but the people of the parish desired his removal, there is a process whereby such a difference may be adjudicated. In such a case, either party may appeal to the Bishop to settle the disagreement. The Bishop, who may ask for the advice and consent of the Standing Committee, would then hear and decide the case. The judgment of the Bishop in the case "shall be either that the pastoral relation between the parties shall cease, and determine at a time and upon terms therein specified, or that the said relation shall not be terminated."[1] In either case, the decision of the Bishop is final and binding and there is no appeal.[2]

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Canon 25.

[3] Canon 39, Section I.

Very few cases of disagreement between a parish and its rector ever reach the point of a formal hearing before the Bishop. In most cases, either the storm which set off the disagreement blows over and the rector remains; or sensing a profound and general lack of support from the parish, the rector tenders his resignation. Either resolution depends upon the unique relationship between the rector and his parish and cannot be defined or governed by Canon.

To the extent to which this relationship can be defined by Canons, however, the Episcopal Church has sought to insulate the rector of a parish from vagaries of transient public opinion, and to thereby assure him a considerable latitude in speaking out on controversial issues.

In theory, the ultimate policy making authority of a parish resides in the annual meeting. Any communicant member "in good standing" of the parish is entitled to attend and vote at the annual meeting. The Canons of many dioceses, and/or the laws of many states, require that the approval of the annual budget and the election of vestrymen take place at the annual meeting. While such requirements confer great authority on the annual meeting, this authority is rarely exercised.

In reality, the congregational nature of the annual meeting is largely pro forma. Attendance is most often very light, and the budget is adopted without any significant discussion or debate. The same is true of the election of vestrymen.

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[1] Canon 39, Section II.

[2] Ibid.

> Nominations are usually "within the family," i.e., made by a committee appointed by the rector. While occasionally individual rectors have sought to make membership of the vestry representative of all groups in the parish, it is common knowledge that the vestrymen are usually picked from among the "solid citizens"- businessmen, lawyers, doctors, educators. The roster of the vestry of an established parish is likely to be a miniature "Who's Who" of the parish community.[1]

The effective policy making group of the parish is the rector and vestry. Most vestries meet monthly, and by Canon the rectors "shall preside in all the meetings of the Vestry."[2] Most vestry meetings are concerned primarily with the business of the parish financial reports, staff changes, parish program evaluation.

A vestry may, if it so desired, adopt a resolution on behalf of the parish taking a stand on some important public issue. Unless the parish has a long history of social activism, or unless there is a particular issue of immediate and vital concern to the parish, most vestries decline to consider or adopt such resolutions.

In summary, the Episcopal Church has by Canon and precedent, sought to guarantee to the rector of a parish a significant area of freedom in which to speak out on public issues. While a rector's guarantee of tenure is not absolute, he is well insulated from the transient winds of fleeting public sentiment. The annual meetings of most parishes rarely discuss questions of political concern; and most vestries, except in rare moments of public crisis, are content to deal with the "business" of the parish; and if the "business" of the parish is in good order, to leave the rector great latitude in speaking out on public issues.

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[1] Weston, Social Policy, p. 24.

[2] Canon 55, Section III.

The parish and mission congregations of the Episcopal Church are grouped geographically into a Diocese headed by a Bishop. In 1916, there were 68 "regular" Dioceses, and 35 Missionary Districts in the Church.[1] While both a Diocese and a Missionary District were similarly organized, there was a significant difference in the degree of autonomy granted to each.

A Diocese is a financially self-sufficient unit of no less than six parishes with at least six priests canonically resident in the Diocese for no less than one year.[2] In 1916, the Diocese of Lexington was the smallest in the Church with fourteen churches and nineteen priests.[3]

Each Diocese may adopt and amend its own Canons as long as they are in harmony with the Constitution and Canons of the national Church. Each Diocese elects its own Bishop, who is the chief executive and sacramental officer of the Diocese.

The Episcopal Church has left to each of its Dioceses considerable discretion in choosing the means by which its Bishop is to be chosen. The Constitution and Canons require only that the Bishop be at least thirty years old, and that his consecration be agreed to by a majority of the Bishops and Standing Committees of the Church.[4]

Most Dioceses elect their Bishops at the Diocesan Convention. The Diocesan Convention is composed of all priests (and in some cases, deacons), canonically resident in the Diocese, and representatives of each parish and mission in the Diocese. In some Dioceses, each parish and mission is allotted an equal number of delegates at the Convention, in others, delegates are apportioned according to the number of communicants in each parish or mission. In most Dioceses, the election of a Bishop is done by "orders." That is, the clergy and lay people vote separately, and the election requires that one candidate receive a majority of votes of both orders on the same ballot.

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[1] JGC - 1916, pp. 412-13

[2] Article V, Section 1.

[3] JGC - 1916, p. 412.

[4] Article II, Section 2.

Once elected and consecrated, a Bishop, under the Canons operable in 1916, was allowed to serve until his death or resignation. While the Canons do provide a system by which a Bishop may be charged, tried, convicted, and removed from office, this procedure is extremely complex and has rarely been used.[1] As with the rector of a parish, but to an even greater degree, the Episcopal Church has sought to protect its Bishops from shifting public opinion so that they may speak out boldly on important and sensitive issues.

The internal structure of a Missionary District is quite similar to that of a Diocese, but it lacks a Diocese's autonomy. Once a Diocese has been established and admitted to the General Convention, its boundaries can be altered only on the initiative of that Diocese and with the approval of the General Convention. The boundaries of a Missionary District, however, are established by the House of Bishops, and may be altered by the House as it deems advantageous to the work of the Church.[2]

A Diocesan Bishop is chosen by the Convention of the Diocese; the Bishop of a Missionary District is chosen by the House of Bishops. While such a selection must be confirmed by the House of Deputies, or if the Convention is not in session, by a majority of the Standing Committees of the Church, it does not require the consultation or approval of the people who live in the Missionary District.[1] Whereas a Diocesan Bishop enjoys tenure in his Diocese, the House of Bishops may transfer a Missionary Bishop from one Missionary District to another "at their discretion."[2] Both a Diocesan and a Missionary Bishop enjoy the same protections from rapid changes in public sentiment, but a Missionary Bishop may be viewed as an outside appointee and lacks the public support and constituency of a Diocesan Bishop.

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[1] Canons 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 34, 38.

[2] Canon 10, Section I.

There are several means available to a Bishop by which he may make known his views on public issues. The most obvious means is the right and responsibility of a Bishop to preach the Gospel. In so doing, the Bishop has a wide variety of platforms available to him. In addition to his use of the pulpit of the Cathedral parish, the Bishop is an ex officio member of most of the boards and commissions of the Diocese and may use any of these as a platform from which to speak.

By Canon, the Bishop is required to visit each congregation in his Diocese at least once every three years.[3] When visiting a congregation the Bishop is by Canon and Rubric the principal celebrant and preacher.[4]

The Bishop is also required by Canon to "deliver a statement" at every Annual Convention of the Diocese, and must "at least once every three years" deliver a "Charge to the Clergy" of his Diocese.[1] Both these requirements afford the Bishop an excellent opportunity to present his views on public issues facing the Church.

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[1] Canon 10, Section I, paragraph i.

[2] Canon 10, Section III.

[3] Canon 13, Section II, paragraph i.

[4] Ibid.

Finally, the Canons provide that the Bishop may, "from time to time, address to the people of his Diocese or Missionary District Pastoral Letters on points of Christian doctrine, worship, or manners, which he may require the clergy to read to their congregations."[2]

In the final analysis, however, the real authority and power vested in a Bishop to speak decisively on public issues does not derive from the Canons. The real authority of a Bishop lies in the tradition and prestige of the Episcopate, and in the character and wisdom of the office holder. Some Bishops have squandered this latent power, others have used it to great effectiveness.

For many Episcopalians and for most non-Episcopalians, the Bishop is the personification of the Church in the Diocese. His views on public issues are regarded as the teaching of the Church. This public identification of the statements of a Bishop with the teaching of the Church lays a heavy burden on the Bishops, but it also provides a tremendous opportunity for him to shape and mold public opinion on important issues.

The chief policy making body of the Episcopal Church is the General Convention which meets triennially. The Convention meets in two chambers, the House of Bishops and the House of Deputies. In 1916, the House of Bishops was comprised of "every Bishop of this Church having jurisdiction, every Bishop Coadjutor, and every Bishop who by reason of advanced age or bodily infirmity has resigned his jurisdiction."[1] Each Diocese of the Church was represented by "not more than four Presbyters, canonically resident in the Diocese, and not more than four Laymen, communicants of this Church, having domicile in the Diocese. . . .[2] Each Missionary District was represented by one priest and one layman.[3] The representatives of each Diocese and District were chosen by the Annual Convention of that Diocese or District.[4]

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[1] Canon 13, Section III and Section IV.

[2] Canon 13, Section III.

Decision and legislation by the Convention require a concurrent majority in both Houses. For most resolutions and Canonical changes a simple majority is sufficient. Amendment of the Constitution of the Church, however, requires a concurrent majority of both Houses at two successive General Conventions.[5]

While meeting in General Convention, there are several means by which the Church may speak out on public issues. First, the Presiding Bishop of the Church traditionally preaches at the opening service of the Convention. In 1916, the Constitution of the Church provided that "the Senior Bishop of this Church in the order of consecration, having jurisdiction within the United States, shall be the Presiding Bishop of the Church."[6] In that year, the Presiding Bishop was the Rt. Rev. Daniel Sylvester Tuttle, the Bishop of Missouri. Bishop Tuttle had been consecrated Bishop of Montana, Idaho and Utah in 1867, and had been the

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[1] Article I, Section 2.

[2] Article I, Section 4.

[3] Ibid. [4] Ibid.

[5] Article XI.

[6] Article I, Section 3.

Presiding Bishop since 1903. While the explicit powers vested in the Presiding Bishop are rather limited, the prestige of the office and the respect in which the occupant is held by the Church provide the Presiding Bishop with an excellent and potentially powerful position from which to speak. The opening sermon of the Presiding Bishop often serves to define the issues facing the Convention and to suggest the direction in which the Church ought to move. This is particularly true of the Presiding Bishop who enjoyed the respect and almost reverence accorded Bishop Tuttle.

Second, the House of Bishops may, at its discretion, issue a Pastoral Letter discussing the issues facing the Church and the world. This letter is usually drafted by a special committee appointed by the House of Bishops and then approved by the whole House. During World War I, the House of Bishops issued a Pastoral Letter during the General Convention in 1916, and at each of its Special Meetings in 1914, 1917 and 1918. Whenever the House of Bishops puts forth a Pastoral Letter, the Canons require that "it shall be the duty of every minister having a pastoral charge to read it to his congregation on some occasion of public worship on a Lord's Day, not later than one month after the receipt of same."[1]

Third, the General Convention is empowered to adopt by concurrent majority of both Houses, Resolutions on any issue facing the Church. Such Resolutions may be introduced by any Bishop or any delegate. They may also be received as a Memorial or a Petition from any Diocese or Missionary District. In 1916, 48 Resolutions were submitted by Bishops, 125 were offered by Deputies, and 25 were received from various

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[1] Canon 16, Section II, paragraph v.

Dioceses or other Church institutions.[1]

The General Convention has always regarded the debate preceding the adoption of Resolutions with great seriousness. They are often amended by each House, and then further revised before a mutually agreeable compromise can be worked out between the Bishops and the Deputies. The heated debate which Resolutions often engender is due to the fact that, although such Resolutions are not designed to be enforceable upon the conscience of individual members, they do represent the official consensus of the Church on important social and political issues.

Through the Pastoral Letter issued by the Bishops, and through the Resolutions adopted by the General Convention, the Episcopal Church as a body speaks out on public issues. The Pastoral Letter and the Resolutions are widely reported in the Church and secular press, and provide a means by which the Church may seek to shape public opinion.

The foregoing has been an attempt to describe the structure of the Episcopal Church, and to highlight some of the individuals and groups who may speak for the Church on important public issues. It must be remembered, however, that while the structure of the Church appears hierarchical in theory, it does not in fact often operate in that manner. The influence accorded to any individual who speaks out on social issues is more often a function of that individual's personal reputation than it is of the position which he occupies in the hierarchy of the Church.

One further ingredient needs to be added to this description. The Episcopal Church has long enjoyed the stimulus of a wide variety of Church publications and periodicals. These range from the weekly or monthly editions of parish newsletters, through Diocesan papers, to periodicals of national circulation. Each of these periodicals provides a lively forum for the discussion and debate of important public and Church issues.

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[1] JGC - 1916, pp. xix, xxvi, xxx-xxxii.

In 1916 there were five Church periodicals of broad national circulation. The Spirit of Missions, which began publication in 1836, was the official organ of the Domestic and Foreign Missionary Society. The Churchman, which was the lineal descendant of the Churchman's Magazine, was published weekly in New York. During the period of World War I, The Churchman was edited by Charles K. Gilbert, from July, 1913, until January, 1918, when he was succeeded by William Austin Smith. The Southern Churchman was published weekly in Richmond, Virginia, and was edited by Edward L. Goodwin. The Living Church was edited by Frederick Cook Moorehouse and published weekly in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. On January 6, 1917, the first issue of a new weekly entitled The Witness was published in Hobart, Indiana. The editor was George P. Atwater.

With the exception of The Spirit of Missions, which due to its official position sought to remain disengaged from the various controversial issues confronting the Church, each of these periodicals represented a relatively distinct segment of opinion within the Church. Despite the rather personal stamp imprinted on each of these periodicals by their editors, each remained remarkably open to articles and letters from spokesmen for opposing points of view. Taken together they provided an extremely valuable forum for the discussion of varying opinions on important issues facing the Church.

The preceding overview of the structure of the Episcopal Church has been designed to establish only two general points. First, it is virtually impossible to point with any assurance to any single document as representing the "official" teaching of the Episcopal Church on a given social, economic, or political issue. While Resolutions adopted by the General Convention would come the closest, these are not binding on the conscience of individual Episcopalians and often serve to increase, rather than end, debate.

Second, Episcopalians, both clergy and lay, have long enjoyed the freedom to speak out plainly on controversial public issues. As an institution, the Church has sought to further this discussion in two ways. First, by providing a broad variety of forums in which such issues may be discussed. These range from sermons and vestry meetings, to Episcopal addresses and Diocesan Conventions, and to Resolutions of the General Convention and Pastoral Letters from the House of Bishops. The Church periodicals have also provided a most valuable means of debating these issues. Second, the Church, by Canon, has sought to encourage such debate by insulating its clergy from the rapidly shifting winds of public opinion. By defining rather narrowly and strictly the offenses for which a rector or Bishop may be removed from his office, the Church has accorded them a great deal of latitude in their public statements.

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METHODOLOGICAL PREMISES AND RESERVATIONS

In his classic study of the attitudes of the churches toward World War I, Preachers Present Arms, Ray H. Abrams describes the response of the Episcopal Church in these words:

> And in the World War . . . the Episcopalians, having maintained a close connection with the English church and traditions, were so conditioned that they inevitably thought of the English ideals and civilization as par excellence and the English people as on the side of right. It is not surprising, therefore, that they took the lead among religious groups in hastening our entrance into the war to save what they considered the true culture. . . . Loyalties grow out of the soil.[1]

There is a good deal of truth in Dr. Abrams description, but it fails to do full justice to the wide range of attitudes within the Episcopal Church.

The survey of attitudes of Episcopalians toward World War I which comprises the following chapters is, of necessity, impressionistic rather than scientific. Some sixty years after the Great War, it is impossible to reconstruct accurately or portray statistically the attitude of the 1,080,531 communicants and 5,750 clergy who comprised the Episcopal Church in 1916.[2] With patience, however, it is possible to go beyond Dr. Abrams description and to offer a more complete and balanced account of the attitudes of Episcopalians toward World War I.

The breadth and detail of such a description is inevitably limited by the availability of sources. For instance, while one might fairly assume that almost all of the 5,750 Episcopal clergymen preached at least one sermon on some aspect of World War I, very few of these sermons were ever collected and published or have otherwise been preserved. The same is true with correspondence with the various Church periodicals. For the most part, those which were not published have been lost.

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[1] Ray H. Abrams, Preachers Present Arms, Revised ed. (Scottdale, Pennsylvania, Herald Press, 1969), p. 5.

[2] JGC - 1916, Appendix I, pp. 420-423.

The description offered in the following chapters is limited to published sources. The examples which will be offered attempt to portray representative attitudes held by various churchmen, they do not purport to offer a valid statistical sampling of the views of the Church as a whole.

The published sources used in these chapters fall into several broad categories: (1) Pastoral Letters adopted by the House of Bishops; (2) Resolutions adopted by the General Convention of 1916; (3) Pastoral Letters and other communications from Bishops to their dioceses; (4) published collections of sermons by prominent clergymen; (5) published public statements by prominent clergymen; (6) books of meditation or theological reflection by clergy and laity; (7) autobiographies of Bishops, clergymen and laymen; (8) biographies of Bishops, clergymen and laymen[1]; and (9) articles, editorials, and correspondence published in Church periodicals.

A description based upon a survey of such sources inevitably reflects a certain bias. First, it is slanted toward the clergy, rather than the laity, and especially towards a few particularly prominent priests and Bishops. These are the individuals whose articles were published, whose sermons were collected, and who commanded broad public attention.

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[1] Biographies and autobiographies are particularly unreliable because they are often written many years after the events, and some of the statements are somewhat anachronistic and self-serving.

It does, however, leave the laity of the Church under-represented. Their voices are heard almost exclusively through the correspondence columns of the Church periodicals. While this bias is unfortunately inevitable, it should also be noted that these same prominent clergy were those individuals to whom the Church looked for leadership. And it can be argued that their very prominence was due, at least in part, to the fact that they were perceived by a large group of the Church as speaking for them. While this group was small in number, it does appear reasonable to conclude that they represented a much larger number of people within the Church. Second, this impressionistic sampling of attitudes is heavily weighted toward those churches and individuals who lived in the geographical triangle whose vertices were Boston, Milwaukee, and Richmond, Virginia. There are two reasons which tend to account for this bias. First, although only 30 of the 103 dioceses and missionary districts of the Episcopal Church were located in this area, these dioceses contained approximately two-thirds of the Episcopalians in the nation.[1] Second, all of the five dominant national Church periodicals were published in this area: The Spirit of Missions and The Churchman in New York; The Witness in Hobart, Indiana; The Living Church in Milwaukee; and The Southern Churchman in Richmond Virginia.

Episcopalians living in this area, as Abrams points out, would be expected to feel strong cultural, intellectual and even family ties to England.

> . . . the Protestant Episcopal Church in this country, since its founding has been a thoroughly English organization, having many ties that bind it to the mother church in England. Its clergy are constantly passing back and forth between the two

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[1] JGC - 1916, Appendix I, pp. 422-23. Of the 1,080,531 Episcopalians, 726,679 lived in these Dioceses, that is 67.2%.

> countries. It is generally appraised as the church of society; it maintains an air of aristocracy, and has within its ranks those who parade their titles and English connections . . . . Hence, with a few notable exceptions, the Episcopalian clergy, steeped in English tradition and culture, and, in general on the side of vested interests, simply acted in accord with the conditioning and habit-patterns already well established.[1]

Because the most prominent spokesmen for the Church shared this common background, their published statements tended to reflect this bias. It should be remembered that this is a bias which they shared with a large number of people in the Church with whom they in turn shared a common heritage.

Based on this survey of the published sources, the following chapters attempt to portray the changing attitudes of Episcopalians toward American participation in World War I. It is not the primary purpose of this paper, however, to discuss or ethically evaluate these attitudes. The central concern of this paper is the freedom and responsibility of the Church to speak out on controversial issues of public policy, and as a corollary to that, the rightful protection which the Church ought to provide to those of her members who feel compelled by conscience to speak out against the policies of their government.

The attitude of Episcopalians toward American participation in World War I, and their tolerance for those who espoused opposing viewpoints, are related but separate issues. It is theoretically possible for the most "crusading" supporter of immediate American intervention in World War I to have also been the most staunch advocate and defender of free speech of those who felt compelled by their conscience to oppose American involvement.

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[1] Abrams, Preachers Present Arms, p. 31.

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Based on the evidence, however, it appears that militant support for the Allied cause in World War I correlated positively with an attitude of intolerance towards those who opposed American intervention, and a rather callous or indifferent attitude toward their right to dissent.

This is most particularly true in one specific area. When those Episcopalians who conscientiously opposed American participation in the War spoke out in support of their beliefs, particularly after America had officially declared war upon Germany on April 6, 1917, they were immediately criticized by those Episcopalians who supported American intervention. This criticism most often took one of three forms. First, the supporters of the war argued that since the Congress had, by a vote of 82 to 6 in the Senate and 373 to 50 in the House, constitutionally declared war on Germany, and that this was now the official policy of the government, all opposition should cease.[1] To continue to oppose American participation in the war after such an overwhelming expression of the will of the majority was viewed as unpatriotic and potentially disloyal.

If this argument did not prove persuasive, supporters of the war argued that political issues, such as a declaration of war, were beyond the legitimate purview of the Church. Against those Episcopalians who continued to oppose the war, they argued that the Church should stick to religion, most often defined in terms of saving individual souls, and steer clear of controversial issues of public policy.

If both these arguments failed to convince, those who favored the war argued that those clergymen who felt conscientiously bound to oppose

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[1] H. C. Peterson and Gilbert C. File, Opponents of War - 1917-1918 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1957), p. 8.

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the war should be allowed to do so only as private individuals. They maintained that any clergyman who opposed the war should preface his remarks by stating that these were only his personal views and did not, and should not, be regarded as reflecting the teachings of the Church.

These three arguments will be critically considered in some detail in the final section of this paper. What the following chapters attempt to demonstrate is that those who raised these arguments in opposition to those who conscientiously opposed the war had already rejected their own arguments, both explicitly and implicitly, in their own efforts to bring about American participation in the war.

The attitudes of Episcopalians toward American participation in World War I fall into three broad groupings. Using the titles developed by Roland H. Bainton in his book, Christian Attitudes Toward War and Peace, these three groups may be described as: first, the crusaders; second, the just war theorists; and third, the pacifists.[1]

Three of the most prominent clergymen who believed that American involvement in the war ought to be viewed as a holy crusade were: the Rev. William Thomas Manning, Rector of Trinity Parish, New York; the Rev. Randolph Harrison McKim, Rector of Church of the Epiphany, Washington, D.C.; and the Rev. Ernest Milmore Stires, Rector of St. Thomas' Church, New York.

These men and other crusaders held several views in common. First, they believed that the war should properly be viewed as the climactic struggle between the forces of justice, righteousness, and Christianity on the side of the Allies, versus the powers of injustice,

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[1] Roland H. Bainton, Christian Attitudes Toward War and Peace (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1960), p. 14.

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aggression, dictatorship, and materialism which they believed characterized the German nation. This belief was supported by a highly emotional emphasis on alleged German atrocities, especially in Belgium, France, and Armenia; as contrasted with the altruistic self-sacrifice of the Allies. This, in turn, led to an inability, or refusal, to distinguish between the policies of the German government and the German people themselves, who came to be viewed in terms of racial stereotypes and hatreds.

The crusaders came to view the war in very "spiritual" terms. They argued that while America was under no threat of imminent invasion, for her to abstain from such a noble moral endeavor would destroy her soul. They also maintained that American participation would serve to reemphasize the great Christian virtues of courage, self-sacrifice and discipline in her people. Universal military training was advocated as a particularly effective means of inculcating these virtues in young men.

With all of this at stake in the war, these crusaders became extremely intolerant of those who argued against American involvement. This intolerance showed itself in several ways. First, the crusaders drew an emphatic distinction between those who were willing to sacrifice their lives in defense of Christian morality and those who were not. Those who opposed American involvement were characterized as weak, effeminate cowards, who were morally insensitive to German atrocities and, therefore, had placed themselves beyond the bounds of Christian fellowship.

Second, the crusaders sought to eliminate any Biblical basis for pacifism. In an almost systematic method, they endeavored to show that all the Biblical passages which might appear to support an ethic of nonresistance were, in fact, evidence of the Christian's obligation to fight. Believing that there was no Christian basis for pacifism, the crusaders were insensitive to the plight of those who were sentenced to prison because of their pacifist beliefs.

Finally, the crusaders believed that once the United States had declared war on Germany, all dissent must cease. Those who continued to speak out in opposition were viewed as pro-German activists.

The second, and probably numerically the largest, group of Episcopalians were those who came to view American involvement in World War I as a just war. Three of the most prominent churchmen associated with this position were: the Rt. Rev. David Hummell Greer, Bishop of New York; the Rev. George Hodges, Dean of the Episcopal Theological School; and the Rev. Walter Russell Bowie, Rector of St. Paul's Church Richmond, Virginia.

This group viewed World War I as a universal tragedy for which all the nations involved must bear the responsibility. While deploring warfare as a means of settling international difference, they became convinced that the preponderance of evidence supported the Allied cause and that Americans should intervene to insure its victory.

These advocates of a just war made every effort to distinguish between the German government and the German people, and recognized the tragic fact that atrocities were an inevitable part of war. For them, peace rather than victory was the ultimate goal, and they were ready to consider any just proposals that might bring about this end.

Many of these advocates of a just war were prepared to admit that there was at least some Biblical evidence favoring pacifism and non-resistance. The disparity between the Gospel injunction of non-resistance and the necessities of international conflict made many of these churchmen quite uncomfortable, which often manifested itself in a far more sympathetic attitude, and at times even as strong support, toward those who felt conscientiously bound to oppose the War.

The four most prominent Episcopalian pacifists during World War I were: the Rt. Rev. Paul Jones, Bishop of the Missionary District of Utah; the Rev. Irwin St. John Tucker, a journalist in Chicago; the Rev. Arthur L. Byron-Curtiss, Secretary of the Church Socialist League; and the Rev. John Nevin Sayre, Rector of Christ Church, Suffern, New York. All of these clergymen were also members of the Church Socialist League.

Some Episcopal pacifists, such as Bishop Jones, believed that all wars were a violation of the Biblical faith. Others maintained that while some wars could be justified in theory, World War I could not.

They believed that warfare was the inevitable result of an unjust economic system. They drew a radical distinction between the government of the nations and their people. It was the people who were the victims of war and were forced to pay the price of governmental bungling and greed.

They urged America to remain neutral and to offer her services as an honest broker between the two sides. Even after America had officially joined the war, these pacifists continued to protest against what they regarded as an abandonment of the Christian faith. While others branded them as disloyal, they argued that they were the true patriots, remaining loyal to the principles upon which the nation was founded and which the Gospel message demanded.

This group comprised the dissenters within the Episcopal Church. They maintained that the Christian faith required that they speak out forcefully against governmental policies they believed to be unjust. They argued that the Gospel must speak to the whole man and his situation, not just to that compartment which could be conveniently labeled "religious.

The crusaders argued that once the nation had declared war, all dissent must cease in the name of patriotism. The pacifists argued that it was at precisely such times of national emergency that the continued vigilance and dissent were most needed to prevent the abuses of patriotic hysteria.

In this struggle for the right of dissent, the pacifists were the clear losers. Bishop Jones resigned his jurisdiction, A. L. Byron-Curtiss was removed from his pulpit, and Irwin St. John Tucker was convicted under the Espionage and Sedition Acts.

To summarize briefly, the following chapters are an attempt to describe the changing attitudes of Episcopalians toward American participation in World War I. It is the contention of this paper that there was a direct relationship between the degree of support for American intervention by Episcopalians and their lack of support and/or toleration for those who opposed American intervention; i.e., the more forceful and ardent the support of the war, the less their concern for the right of dissent. Further, it will be demonstrated that in their efforts to bring about American participation in the war, these Episcopalians repudiated, both implicitly and explicitly, the very arguments they used against those who continued to dissent.

II. THE EPISCOPAL CHURCH AND WORLD WAR I

THE OUTBREAK OF WAR IN EUROPE

By the summer of 1914, virtually all the nations of Europe had bound themselves, by a series of treaties, compacts or secret understandings, into one of two mutually suspicious and potentially warring camps. The treaties which created these alliances were drawn in such a manner as virtually to guarantee that if one nation were attacked, her allies would be morally and legally bound to come to her immediate defense and declare war upon her attacker. Such an "automatic" system was designed to guarantee the mutual security of the covenanting nations and to act as sufficient deterrent against any possible aggressor.

As the world tragically discovered in August, 1914, this mechanism of mutual defense and deterrence had been so finely tuned and so "automated" that it could not withstand the slightest jar or disruption. The murder of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir to the throne of Austria-Hungary, on June 28, 1914, in Sarajevo first inserted the key into the lock which held back the forces of war. With a tragic precision which seemed beyond the control of any man or nation, the tumblers each fell into place; and by the first week of August the continent of Europe was torn by war.[1]

The outbreak of war in Europe set off a wave of shock and disbelief throughout the world. These feelings were reflected in the Episcopal

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[1] During the course of World War I, sixty separate declarations of war were issued, and there were twenty-three severances of diplomatic relations. Francis A. March, History of the World War (Philadelphia: John C. Winston Co., 1918), pp. 73-74.

Church in America. No doubt reflecting the anguish of a great many churchmen, The Southern Churchman exclaimed:

> We believe that among the people of our own country, and doubtless to a large extent elsewhere, there exists a very general sense of humiliation and shame at this spectacle of war. The thing that many had hoped, and some had supposed, was no longer possible, has come to pass, and we stand not only aghast and dismayed, but indignant. It is felt that this war is a woeful crime against civilization, a tremendous wrong against the peace and happiness of mankind, an insult to the higher intelligence of the world, a slanderous denial of the religion which these warring nations profess.[1]

The Southern Churchman declared that it was "quite futile to attempt to discover who is to blame", or to maintain that the war started simply by accident.[2]

> The war would not have come unless each of several great nations had prepared for it to the full extent of its power. The cause of the war had been the unceasing jealousy and distrust on the part of each of the powers towards its rival powers, probably not without good reason.[3]

The editor could find only one slight glimmer of hope in the gathering gloom:

> Let us hope and pray that the conflict may be sharp and short; that in a few decisive battles the final issue will be made so obvious, and the cost of the struggle will prove so great that wiser counsels may the sooner prevail and the great lesson be the more readily learned.[4]

Within three weeks, however, The Southern Churchman had despaired of even this consolation, and had to concede that "it seems now as if the war will be prolonged for many months and perhaps for years.[5]

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[1] "War," The Southern Churchman, Vol.79 (August 22, 1914), p. 3.

[2] Ibid. [3] Ibid. [4] Ibid.

[5] "The War of Nations," The Southern Churchman, Vol. 79 (September 12, 1914), p. 3.

In the fall of 1914 the Church periodicals and their editorial correspondents were in almost total agreement that it would be a futile and pointless endeavor to try to assess the individual responsibilities of each of the European nations for the outbreak of war. They believed that the guilt and shame must be born by all the combatant nations. In an article in The Churchman, William Austin Smith who would in January, 1918, become the editor of that periodical, wrote:

> Would France know the cause of this war? For forty years she has nurtured vengeance in her heart. Jesus asked us to forgive. Would England, Germany, Russia seek to know? In the tangled, devious counsels of their hearts they will find the answer. Centuries of national jealousy, emulations, envyings, strife--each struggling for mastery, seeking her profit at the other's loss--this, not alone the militarism of Germany is responsible for the war. . . . The burden of the sin is on the conscience of the world.[1]

The acceptance of the almost universal responsibility for the outbreak of the war, and the consequent need for confession were themes which constantly recurred in the sermons and publications of the times. Even the Rev. William T. Manning, an early and constant supporter of the British cause,[2] took note of this theme in the first sermon he preached at Trinity Parish after the outbreak of the war. Manning said:

> We are not here in this place to pass any judgment, to express any view as to the measure of responsibility resting upon those who are involved in this strife, however deep our convictions may be, and I think should be, in this matter. We are here to confess our own sins, to stand in penitence and humility before God, to pray for all alike that God will bring good to the world out of this evil, and that these terrible sacrifices may end as speedily

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[1] William Austin Smith, "The Ethics of Patriotism," The Churchman, Vol. 110 (October 10, 1914), p. 471.

[2] Mr. Manning's entry in Stowe's Clerical Directory of the American Church has one interesting omission--no place of birth is given. William Manning was born on May 12, 1866, in Northampton, England. Clifford P. Morehouse, Trinity: Mother of Churches (New York: The Seabury Press, 1973), p. 208.

> as may be possible in the establishment of a just and lasting peace.[1]

He went on to say that he believed that the war ought to teach the world three great lessons. First, it would again demonstrate the "horrible, unmeasured wickedness of war." Second, it would show that war is as needless as "it is wicked." Third, Manning maintained that "through these fearful events God is showing us once again the need of true religion in the world."[2]

The need for penitence and contrition was one note which constantly recurred in the discussions of the war in the fall of 1914. The other dominant note was a general acceptance of the need for scrupulous neutrality on the part of the United States. Mr. Manning's reticence to further clarify his "deep convictions" about the war in his sermon of October 4, offers silent testimony to the virtual uniformity with which this conviction was held.

A more positive expression of the same belief may be seen in an article which appeared in The Churchman by the Rev. H. C. Robbins, Rector of Church of the Incarnation, New York:

> Our task is clear, our opportunity is glorious. It is the task of constructive optimism; ever to think the best and not the worst, ever to cover with the mantle of charity the nakedness of war's fierce passions, and by prayer, by patience, by sympathy which knows no limitation, to build in the beauty of the Lord our God the handiwork of peace.[3]

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[1] Quoted in: W. D. F. Hughes, Prudently With Power - William Thomas Manning, Tenth Bishop of New York (West Park, New York: Holy Cross Publications, 1963), pp. 91-92.

[2] Ibid.

[3] H. C. Robbins, "The Meaning of Neutrality for the United States," The Churchman, Vol. 90 (October 17, 1914), p. 502.

On October 8, 1914, The House of Bishops meeting in Special Session in Minneapolis, adopted a Pastoral Letter drafted by Bishop Lawrence of Massachusetts.[1] The central paragraph of that letter read:

> The war in Europe, which brings immeasurable and universal sorrow and distress, lays upon the Christian people of this country peculiar responsibilities and opportunities. Accepting in loyalty and with gratitude the leadership of the President of the United States in the cause of peace in both Europe and America, we urge you that, as brethren of the people of all nations, you sustain a spirit of forbearance, be careful in expressions of judgment, and while not unthoughtful, and still less unfeeling, encourage the exercise of honest neutrality.[2]

The letter went on to urge individual Episcopalians conscientiously to limit their own needs so that more food and aid would be available to the people of Europe, and to urge them to continue to support their church, "so that the benevolences and beneficences of religion, charity and missions may not suffer loss."[3] The letter concluded on a note of resolution and hope:

> Amidst the shakings of the powers of the earth stand the eternal forces of God's Spirit; under His providence these forces give protection and make for freedom, justice, and peace. Let our faith in them and the power of their might be strong; and when peace shall have been restored, may we with grateful hearts take up resolutely and cheerily the duties of Peace.[4]

This Pastoral Letter was "adopted unanimously by a rising vote," and a copy was ordered sent to the President of the United States.[5]

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[1] JGC - 1916, p. 393.

[2] Ibid. [3] Ibid. [4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid. The fact that the House of Bishops ordered a copy of the Pastoral Letter to be sent to the President is interesting. It would seem logical to assume that the House decided to send a copy to the President to demonstrate their support for his policy; and if it is permissable for the Church to openly support the policies of a Presidential administration, on what ethical basis could one logically argue that it is not permissable for the Church to publicly protest if it found itself conscientiously opposed to the policies of the administration?

Despite the official declaration of hope found in the Pastoral Letter, the outbreak of war in Europe had profoundly distressed the Church. This distress on the part of the Church was caused not only by the palpable suffering of millions of people in Europe, but also by a recurring question and doubt which could not be easily dismissed: Has Christianity failed?

Through the fall of 1914 and into the spring of 1915, many churchmen came forth to attempt to answer this question. An editorial in The Southern Churchman raised the issue plainly:

> Is this then a monumental token of the "failure of Christianity," as has been asserted? Are these solemn asseverations, not only in the formal deliverances of diplomats and politicians but on the lips of Christian leaders and teachers, but evidences of insincerity and self-deception? Has God anything to do with it, or will He be found, as Napoleon declared, on the side of the heaviest artillery? Can devout men on both sides pray for the success of their arms with equal consistency, and if so how can the Almighty answer the prayers of each?[1]

For The Southern Churchman these were extremely serious questions which could not be brushed aside with easy or flippant answers. They argued, however, that for men who truly sought to find the answers, they were beginning to emerge:

> They perceive that it is not Christianity that has broken down, but something worldly and quite alien thereto which was substituted for it. It is not men's hope in God that has failed them, but an easygoing self-complacency and trust in the stability of things that are, founded on human prudence and forethought.[2]

It was this smug self-reliance in the wisdom and prudence of men which had failed, not Christianity. The Southern Churchman expressed the hope that the war would come to be viewed as the final judgment upon this type of superficial thinking, and would lead people to return to the rigorous and demanding faith of Christianity. The editorial concluded with this affirmation:

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[1] "War and Christianity," The Southern Churchman, Vol 79 (October 10, 1914), p. 3.

[2] Ibid.

> In the long run beyond our ken, when every act and purpose has worked to its end and every prayer has been heard and answered, truth, justice and piety will be vindicated in the revelation of the righteous judgment of God.[1]

In his annual address to the Convocation of the Missionary District of Idaho, Bishop Funsten argued that Christianity could not rightfully be blamed for the present conflagration because Christianity had never really been tried. For Bishop Funsten, it was absolutely "unfair and illogical" to hold Christianity responsible for the actions of people who claim to be "Christians" but make no effort to "act in accordance with the teachings of Christ."[2]

> It is holding as it were the government responsible for the counterfeit. It is holding the sheep responsible for the conduct of the wolf. Christianity can only be held responsible for what follows when its teachings are observed and its creed honestly translated into human action.[3]

Bishop Funston, therefore, concluded:

> Christianity is not to be identified with modern civilization, that it must not be held responsible for the acts of nations or individuals who do not follow the teachings of Christ, that among all the things that the world has tried for the promotion of real peace and progress, at no time in its history has it ever made an honest experiment of trying Christianity as a State policy and as a rule of business and social life. And if Christianity had been followed, as a State diplomatic policy there would have been no war.[4]

Most of the articles and sermons which attempted to answer the question of whether or not the outbreak of war proved the failure of

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[1] Ibid., p. 4.

[2] "Bishop Funsten on the War," The Southern Churchman, Vol. 80 (May 29, 1915), p. 3.

[3] Ibid. [4] Ibid.

Christianity followed a similar line. They believed that the war did not demonstrate such a failure because, in fact, real Christianity had never been tried. The war did not discredit Christianity churchmen argued, rather it again demonstrated the inevitably tragic consequences of the world's abandonment of Christian moral standards.

An editorial in The Living Church took a more measured view. The editorial argued that it "is not enough for us now to deny the charge that Christianity had failed."[1] Clearly something had failed somewhere. The war which most people believed could not happen, had happened. In all honesty and candor, the Church must concede that "certainly Christianity has not prevented this outbreak of hostilities between nations that have professed the Christian religion for a thousand years, and there is therefore failure somewhere."[2]

The Living Church believed that part of the responsibility for this failure lay in the teachings of the Church:

> The failure in our Christianity has been that it was too individual in its conception. It made Christian people; it did not make Christian nations. Men and women have tried, in many cases with real success, to live personal lives of holiness. Nowhere have they tried to make nations holy in their dealings with each other, or even, perhaps, in their internal relations with their own people.[3]

The "failure" of Christianity lay not with the faith itself, but in the inability of the Church to apply that faith to the realities of the world. Christianity had allowed itself to be defined in almost solely personal terms, and had done nothing to challenge policies and actions of governments which were based primarily on "pagan principles."[4] This constriction of Christianity had rendered it incapable of preventing the war, and for that "specific failure" the Church must bear some of the responsibility for the war.

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[1] "The Wreck of Nations," The Living Church, Vol. 52 (January 16, 1915), p. 352.

[2] Ibid. [3] Ibid. [4] Ibid.

As long as the question of the culpability of Christianity in the outbreak of the war held the center stage, the Church remained largely united in its own defense. As this question began to slip into the background, as it did in the spring of 1915, divisions began to emerge. Judging by the evidence which has been preserved, by far the largest group of churchmen continued to believe that America should remain neutral and could best serve the goal of peace by offering her services as an honest broker in peace negotiations.

One of the most eloquent spokesmen for this position was the Right Reverend David H. Greer, Bishop of New York. On October 4, 1914, Bishop Greer preached at the "Peace Day Service" at the Cathedral of St. John the Divine. The sermon was entitled "The Midnight Cry", based on the text of Matthew 25:6. Bishop Greer began with this observation about the world's present situation:

> It is this: not only that good comes out of evil, which is a matter of common or not uncommon observation, that that it often comes, the very greatest good out of the very worst and blackest form of evil, when the evil is so great, so terrible, and so appalling, when it is midnight, and the lamps have gone out, and it is dark, very dark, and men's hearts are failing them from fear, because in the darkness they have lost their way; then it is that the cry is heard: "Behold the Bridegroom cometh:go ye out to meet Him!"[1]

For Bishop Greer the outbreak of war had signaled the approach of that dark midnight hour. The efforts of many people of goodwill who had struggled for years to banish the scourge of war from the face of the planet had collapsed in an instant. And in that instant the faith and hope and courage that made those dreams possible had fallen as well. As he put it, "it seemed as though the midday sun had been suddenly blotted out and that a midnight darkness had fallen on the earth."[1]

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[1] David H. Greer, "The Midnight Cry," The Living Church, Vol. 51 (October 10, 1914), p. 791. Also reprinted separately by The Church Peace Union.

"But civilization is not wrecked," the Bishop continued, "Christendom is not destroyed, Christianity is not dead. Something great and good, very great and very good, is coming from it all."[2]

Bishop Greer believed that a better future was possible, at least in part, because the present crisis had forced people to reevaluate the importance and applicability of Christianity in the real world. Before the war, the Bishop contended, people had looked upon Christianity in a very odd way:

> It is looked upon, His teaching, His religion, as chiefly a closet affair, or as something by the way, like those little stations of the Cross which the traveler meets in the European mountains, very appealing and helpful for personal devotion and pietistic use, but when it comes to great world affairs and the management of great world affairs, commercial, political, national, and international, when it comes to diplomacy and statecraft, then the teaching of Jesus Christ, however good and admirable, yea, and however true, cannot be made to work.[3]

The tendency of "modern practical" man to dismiss the teachings of Christianity as laudable but unworkable, was particularly true in regard to war itself.

> Many Christian people have the belief, the conviction, that war is not in accord with the spirit of Jesus Christ or the tenor of His teaching. Some of His words perhaps when wrested from their context seem to warrant or justify the use at times of the sword, and yet when His teaching is taken as a whole, and especially when interpreted not only by His Life, but also by His Death, the whole sublime story of His Passion and His Cross, it can hardly be disputed that the teaching of Jesus Christ, however

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid. [3] Ibid., p. 792.

> impracticable, unworkable, or Utopian, it may seem does not in itself give approval to war. That at least is the opinion of very many of us, that the kingdom of Jesus Christ is not only a kingdom on the earth of peace, but a kingdom to be established by peaceful means and methods.[1]

To those who still argued that to try to put such teaching to work in the real world would lead to "very disturbing and perhaps disastrous consequences," the Bishop had a three-fold reply.[2]

> First, that if it be true, if it be true, then we have nothing to do with the consequences. Second, that the consequences might indeed be other and better than we think. And third, that they surely could not be worse than what today they are in working the world without the teaching of Jesus Christ.[3]

For Bishop Greer it was the whole world which had disregarded the teaching of Jesus Christ and had brought the war upon itself. To try to determine which of the nations bore the slightly heavier burden for this worldwide shame was a pointless endeavor. He believed that this question must in time be determined, "and which in time will be determined, and which therefore, suspending for the present our judgment, we should leave time to determine."[4]

For the time being, Bishop Greer concluded, Americans faced two obligations. First, to acknowledge their own responsibility for the world's willful disregard of Christ's teachings,[5] and second, to observe the "neutrality which the President of this nation has asked us to observe, and which, out of loyalty to him in his hard and trying position, if for no other reason, we should observe."[6]

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[1] Ibid., p. 791. [2] Ibid., p. 792. [3] Ibid. [4] Ibid. [5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid. If Bishop Greer's support for America's policy of neutrality rested solely on a personal sense of loyalty to the President, it would rest on a rather slippery ethical rock. But as this and other articles by the Bishop make clear, his support for continued scrupulous neutrality was based primarily on substantive ethical considerations, not merely a personal sense of loyalty to President Wilson.

In March, 1915, Bishop Greer delivered an address to the Republican Club in New York, in which he continued his advocacy of American non-intervention and neutrality. The first line of his address stated: "War is contrary to the teaching of three enlightened creeds."[1]

Bishop Greer first argued that war was contrary to the teaching of the Christian creed. According to the Bishop the only force rightly recognized by the Gospels is "the greatest force there is, namely, the force of God, which Jesus Christ reveals as the force of love."[2] To those who still argued that the force of Christian love was too ideal a notion to really work in the everyday world, Bishop Greer urged them to look upon the results of a world built on physical force. He said: "We also see that it is breaking down with a fearful crash and making a sad mess of it."[3] Only the force of Christian love, the Bishop argued, could break this tragic cycle of war and more war.

Bishop Greer argued the war was also "contrary to the teaching of an enlightened twentieth century creed."[4]

> That is the enlightened twentieth century creed; not sectionalism or nationalism, but cosmopolitanism, affirming and declaring that human life is not many but one, with a common human kindred and a common human tie binding it all together. That is why we instinctively feel that the war which is raging in Europe now is not only a war of nations against nations, or races against races, but that it is a war against the twentieth century, with its great and growing consciousness of the solidarity of human life in all nations, kindreds, tribes, and tongues, with its great and growing consciousness that God has made of one blood, one human blood, all nations of men who dwell on the face of the earth.[5]

Finally, Bishop Greer argued that "war is contrary to the teaching of our enlightened American creed."[6] By this he meant the American vision of a land "whose foundation should be laid deep and strong in God."[1] While this vision had been dimmed from time to time, the compelling ideal of a more just and peaceful social order permeated the history of America, and became an essential part of her very nature. It was this shared vision of a better world which ought to underlie an American sense of patriotism, not the chauvinism which had led European patriots to war. America must guard this higher vision and not become entangled in the self-serving "patriotism" of Europe. To this end, he quoted with approval a letter which the widow of President Garfield had recently written to her son:

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[1] David H. Greer, "American Ideals," The Living Church, Vol. 52 (April 3, 1915), p. 752.

[2] Ibid. [3] Ibid. [4] Ibid. [5] Ibid. [6] Ibid.

> I am so desirous that Mr. Wilson shall hold firm to his purpose to allow no entanglements with any of the warring nations; that he shall be the high rock against which the wild passions of our countrymen shall beat in vain, that my thought becomes the "soul's sincere desire."[2]

Bishop Greer concluded by saying that this was the enlightened American Creed, and "if we have the courage to be true to it, [it] will help us to work out that high and noble destiny still undetermined which awaits us in the future."[3]

A lengthy editorial in The Living Church came to the same conclusion advocated by Bishop Greer. The editorial confessed the American neutrality at the outbreak of the war was tinged with a great deal of naïveté.

> We had our various views as to which party was the aggressor and as to what were the causes that had led to the war; but we were pretty confident that the relation of the United States to the issues was very remote, and most of us did not dream of any very pressing necessity for careful definition of the duties and rights of neutrals.[4]

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid., p. 753. [3] Ibid.

[4] "Neutrality," The Living Church, Vol. 52 (February 27, 1915), p. 575. There is a misprint on the masthead of this edition, which gives the date of February 27, 1914. The volume and page number make it clear, however, that the proper date is 1915.

The intervening six months in which "the war has gone from bad to worse," required that America reexamine her neutrality, and develop a more reasoned ethical justification for her policy.[1] The Living Church contended that there were three moral principles which undergirded American neutrality.

First, "A national government is primarily the trustee for the well-being of its own citizens."[2] While conceding that a situation could arise when a nation might be called upon to sacrifice the good of its own people for the good of others, The Living Church believed that such was not now the case.[3] They concluded: "That nation's duty to our own people demands peace for them."[4]

Second, "The policy of the United States has always been to keep out of European affairs."[5] The Living Church contended that there have been wars in Europe before and "we did not conceive it our duty to intervene for their redress."[6] To intervene now would be to "reverse the entire relationship of the new to the old world," and would "forfeit forever the peculiar power of the American democracy to develop on its own lines, without regard to European politics."[7]

Finally, The Living Church argued: "The United States could intervene in the war only if her whole population were a unit in support of that policy. And they are not."[8] Despite America's long and valued ties to Great Britain, "Americans are not a transplanted English people."[9] Americans are "a new race"; they are "cosmopolitan."[10] Further, approximately one-fifth of the population of the United States was of German descent, and "it would be as wrong as it would be impolitic to force these into a war which they would not approve."[1]

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[1] Ibid., p. 576. [2] Ibid. [3] Ibid. [4] Ibid. [5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid. [7] Ibid. [8] Ibid. [9] Ibid. [10] Ibid.

For these three "moral" reasons America should make every effort to maintain her policy of conscientious neutraltiy. The Living Church concluded:

> We have ventured to pen these considerations, not because we discern any desire on the part of any considerable faction of the American people to join in the war, but because we are wholly dissatisfied with many of the reasons that are being given for the preservation of peace, and feel that a much higher motive is our justification than that of preserving our pleasant ease and permitting our dollars to multiply as the result of the flow of blood on the other side of the globe.[2]

The Churchman also sought to observe and support President Wilson's policy of strict neutrality. As evidence of the success with which they had adhered to this policy, The Churchman reprinted two letters from disgruntled subscribers, one of whom charged them with being a mouthpiece for British propaganda, the other chastising them for not being sympathetic to the sufferings of the English people. Commenting on these two letters, The Churchman replied:

> The Churchman has faithfully endeavored to comply with President Wilson's wise request for strict neutrality in comment upon the war in Europe. The two letters which follow, taken together, encourage us in the belief that we have been measurably successful in this endeavor--and with the expected consequences.[3]

In the fall of 1914 and into the spring of 1915, it would appear that the clear preponderance of public opinion in the Episcopal Church supported President Wilson's policy of strict neutrality. In editorials and correspondence, in sermons and public addresses, this was the sentiment of most of the Church.

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid., p. 577.

[3] "The Churchman's Neutrality," The Churchman, Vol. 110 (December 19, 1914), p. 787.

This rough consensus did not, however, go completely unchallenged. There were voices within the Church who were coming to view neutrality as a form of moral escapism. As yet they were not prepared to advocate direct American involvement. Their first concern was to argue that despite the prevailing view, the responsibility and guilt for the outbreak of war was not equally divided among the combatants. They believed that some nations were more responsible for this tragedy than were others. Their second argument was that peace, laudable and Christian goal that it was, must sometimes be sacrificed for a higher good.

One of the first to publicly voice these arguments was the Rev. William Manning, Rector of Trinity Parish. In his 1914 Thanksgiving Day sermon, he began to carve out his own position on the issue of American intervention in the war. At this early date the differences between Manning's views and those of the majority of the Church seem quite minor--a difference only in emphasis and shading. Where Bishop Greer and others emphasized the universal responsibility which all nations must share for the tragic outbreak of war, Manning agreed in principle but he hinted that, in fact, some nations bore a heavier burden of guilt than others.

> We are witnessing the mighty judgment of God upon the nations of the earth for evil and wrongdoing, in which every nation has had its share. Direct and immediate responsibility for this outbreak rests more upon some than upon others, and terrible is the weight of it, but for the deeper and underlying causes of this war we are all responsible.[1]

In the same vein, Manning went on to say:

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[1] William T. Manning, "Thanksgiving Day Sermon," The Southern Churchman, Vol. 79 (December 12, 1914), p. 5.

> We cannot be, and we have no right to be, morally indifferent to such issues as those which this war presents. These issues affect vitally the welfare of our nation and of all the world. It is the duty of each one of us to form his judgment as clearly and fairly as he can, and to contribute his personal share towards that just and righteous public sentiment for which the world is rightly looking to us.[1]

Having begun to carve out for himself a distinct position on the direct responsibility for the war, Manning also began to argue that war is not necessarily un-Christian.

> We may give thanks for the fact that we have here in our own country no military caste, no war party and no war spirit. We are all for peace. "If it be possible, so much as lieth in us," we want peace with all men. And at the same time the peace sentiment among us is a sound and sober one. We recognize that there must be some ultimate appeal to force to control the lawless and the brutal. We do not deny the necessity of police. We know that situations may arise in which it is the clear duty of a nation or an individual to use force, but we are determined to do everything in our power to make these occasions as few as possible. We are in favor of every measure which will help to remove the causes of war, and to make it, so far as may be, impossible.[2]

To state that within this Thanksgiving Day sermon of 1914 lay a full justification for direct American participation in the war is not necessarily to imply that Mr. Manning was being disingenuous. Such an argument, however, might be developed along the following lines. If it could be demonstrated that one nation, Germany, for instance, had acted in a "lawless and brutal" manner it would, therefore, bear the "direct and immediate responsibility" for the outbreak of war. And if such responsibility, or guilt, could be demonstrated, it would become the moral duty of the United States to act as a "police" force to thwart such criminal behavior. It would then be the "clear duty" of the United States to use force in the defense of peace, and to create a world situation which would

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid.

"help to remove the causes of war, and to make it, so far as may be, impossible."

From a distance of sixty years, there is no accurate way of knowing just how far along this road Mr. Manning's thoughts had already traveled by the fall of 1914. It should be noted, however, that even by this very early date, the various elements were all in place for a militant and eventually persuasive argument that America ought to intervene forcefully in the war in Europe.

Nor was Mr. Manning alone in his contention that war was not necessarily un-Christian. In May, 1915, Randolf H. McKim, Rector of the Church of the Epiphany, Washington, D.C., put the issue quite bluntly: "I do not hesitate to say if it [the 'instinct' for self-defense] really were in conflict with the Christian religion, we could not accept the Christian religion as divine revelation."[1]

In his "Christmas Message," the Presiding Bishop, Daniel Sylvester Tuttle, added his voice to those who believed that war was not necessarily un-Christian.

> The question is, Can war ever be a righteous thing, or can it ever be right for Christian nations to go to war against each other? The answer is, Yes. Because national entity is a sacred thing, and the authority of civil government which embodies and safeguards it is a divine institution. An unselfish patriotism devoted to service of the country is, in its own sphere and way and degree, divine service, as much as a humble and earnest prayer in God's Holy Temple is, in its own sphere and way and degree, divine service.[2]

Not only did the Presiding Bishop argue that war was not necessarily un-Christian, he found some positively laudable aspects to the war.

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[1] Quoted in: Abrams, Preachers Present Arms, p. 43.

[2] Daniel Sylvester Tuttle, "Christmas Message from the Presiding Bishop," The Churchman, Vol 110 (December 19, 1914), p. 795.

> Sad at heart as all of us are for the dreadful carnage which is reddening the fields of Europe, we cannot withhold our admiration for the fervent patriotism which has sent and is sending thousands and even millions in quick response to the call to the colors; and for the self-sacrificing devotion with which each and every one of these millions is standing true to his country and to his flag.[1]

Despite the Presiding Bishop's enthusiasm over such fervent patriotism, the dominant trend in the Episcopal Church through the spring of 1915 was support for President Wilson's policy of neutrality. While the first tentative stirrings of a movement toward American intervention had been heard, strict conscientious neutrality expressed the consensus of the Church.

Even the sinking of the Cunard liner Lusitania by a German submarine on May 7, 1915, was not enough to upset this consensus. Despite the magnitude of the tragedy, in which 1152 lives were lost, including 102 Americans, the reaction of the Church press was quite restrained.

The Living Church editorialized that because of the "unspeakable horror" of the tragedy, it would be better "not to try to give expression to our emotions."[2] The editors contended that "it is better for us not to seek to force the hands of the President,"[3] and assured the President of the loyal support of his countrymen for whatever course of action he should deem appropriate.

The Living Church continued:

> But we want no war of mere reprisal. The question must be determined in the light of what service can best be given to mankind in this crisis. Let those who think war the only alternative, ask themselves what we should accomplish, whether for us or for others, by throwing ourselves into the war.[4]

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[1] Ibid.

[2] "The Lusitania Disaster," The Living Church, Vol. 53 (May 15, 1915), p. 80. The editorial was enclosed in a black border of mourning.

[3] Ibid. [4] Ibid.

While calling for official restraint, The Churchman did not hesitate to point out the morally outrageous nature of the incident.

> Our horror and condemnation would be no less had the Lusitania been a German boat sailing under the German flag. We can see but the deliberate and wanton destruction of defenseless humanity--premeditated and cold-blooded murder of the most staggering sort. For it there can be no conceivable justification.[1]

Despite this disclaimer of ethical non-partisanship, The Churchman went on to make this curious statement:

> It is not for us to repay in kind the contemptuous hatred against the English-speaking race which has been increasingly manifest of late and to which it is difficult not to attribute this latest outburst of war-madness.[2]

The Churchman's editorial concluded with an appeal for continued support for the policies of President Wilson.

> However great the provocation, we, as a nation, are fortunate in being able to rely upon the righteous wisdom and cool judgment of the man whom the providence of God has set over the affairs of our country at this very critical time. We look to him in full confidence that whatever is right for the Nation to do in this new embarrassment will be done effectively and in accordance with those Christian principles for which, thank God, this Nation still stands.[3]

Well into the spring and summer of 1915, the Episcopal Church maintained a virtually united front in calling for the support of President Wilson's policies and the maintenance of American neutrality.

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[1] "War's Latest Madness," The Churchman, Vol. 111 (May 15, 1915), p. 631.

[2] Ibid. Emphasis added. Perhaps the term "English-speaking race" was meant solely as a generic reference to the passengers and crew of the Lusitania. It seems at least equally probable, however, that The Churchman had come to the conclusion that the war was no longer between England and Germany, but between Germany and all "English-speaking people," which would include America.

[3] Ibid., pp. 631-632.

AMERICA PREPARES FOR WAR

Although the broad consensus within the Episcopal Church which supported scrupulous American neutrality had been able to weather the storm unleashed by the sinking of the Lusitania, the theological and pragmatic assumptions which underlay this consensus were coming under increasing attack.

First, where Manning and Tuttle had been content to suggest that war might not necessarily be completely un-Christian, new voices were being raised which proclaimed that, at least under certain circumstances, war might be not only ethically proper, but positively enjoined by Christ and the Gospel.

Second, for those not yet prepared to advocate direct American intervention in the war, a more "moderate" position became acceptable. Loosely grouped under the banner of those advocating "preparedness," this contingent of churchmen really consisted of two distinct groups. These two groups held certain basic tenets in common. They believed that the outcome of the war in Europe would have a decisive effect on the future of the United States and the world. Therefore, while the United States might well remain neutral politically, she had a moral obligation to do all in her power to shape the subsequent peace. These advocates of preparedness contended that America could best fulfill this obligation if she negotiated from a position of political, economic and military strength. They, therefore, argued that America must bend all her resources to prepare for war. This included a substantial increase in the Army and the Navy, and a system of universal military training.

While almost all of those Episcopalians who advocated some form of national preparedness would have agreed on these simple tenets, they were sharply divided on the question of to what end America ought to prepare. For some, preparedness was an end in itself, for they believed that by being adequately prepared for war, America would avoid being forced into it. For others, preparedness was the mid-point in a campaign to lead America away from neutrality and into direct intervention in the war.

During the period of 1915 to 1916, the press in America was filled with accounts of alleged German atrocities. The list of crimes included: the destruction of the Cathedral at Rheims, the sinking of the Lusitania, the "rape" of Belgium and the deportation of her people to "slave-labor" camps, and the terrible sufferings inflicted on the Armenians by Germany's ally, Turkey.[1] For many churchmen, these purported atrocities came to be viewed as the natural manifestation of an anti-Christian German philos ophy and ethic based on the writings of Marx, Trietschke, General Bernhardi, and Nietzsche.[2] Therefore, even if America chose to

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[1] For a detailed examination of the influence of Allied propaganda on the formulation of American policy see:

George G. Bruntz, Allied Propaganda and the Collapse of the German Empire in 1918, Hoover War Library Publications, No. 13 (Stanford University Press, 1938).

Harold D. Lasswell, Propaganda Technique in the World War (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd., 1938).

Abbott Lawrence Lowell, Public Opinion in War and Peace (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1923).

Walter Millis, Road to War - America 1914-1917 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1935).

[2] Randolph H. McKim, "Has Christianity Broken Down?", The Southern Churchman, Vol. 80 (February 27, 1915), p. 4.

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remain, at least for the time being, militarily neutral, these churchmen contended that her moral sympathies must lie with the British.

During late 1915 and throughout 1916, those Episcopalians who felt compelled by their conscience to advocate prompt and effective American intervention in the war faced several difficult obstacles. Not the least of these obstacles were several sayings attributed to Jesus himself, especially in the Sermon on the Mount, which appeared to require that Christians observe an ethic of complete pacifism and non-resistance.[1]

One carefully argued attempt to overcome this apparent contradiction between the teachings of Christ and the perceived need for American intervention was offered by the Rev. Raymond C. Knox, Chaplain of Columbia University. Mr. Knox conceded that war was a terrible thing which "is not God's will, that it disgraces in the eyes of mankind the nations that call themselves civilized and Christian."[2] Yet, as Mr. Knox pointed out, "the world does not live according to the teachings of Christ,"[3] and the war which was raging in Europe had forced American Christians to re-address the issue of whether Christ permits the use of force.

Mr. Knox argued that men had given two differing answers to this question: "both are held in honesty and sincerity; they are both given today; both make their appeal to the Master Himself."[4]

> The one we see illustrated in the lives of thousands now engaged in conflict. . . . Their liberties, safety, and honor were threatened. What nobler devotion, what higher exhibition of those very qualities which Christ Himself praised, could be shown

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[1] See Bainton, Christian Attitudes, chapter 4.

[2] Raymond C. Knox, "Does Christ Permit the Use of Force?", The Churchman, Vol. 113 (June 24, 1916), p. 833.

[3] Ibid. [4] Ibid.

> than that a man should be willing, if need be, to lay down his life and his all? "Greater love hath no man than this," says Jesus, "that a man lay down his life for his friends."[1]

This was one of the answers that had been given to this urgent question.

> But again, there is that other company, not of weaklings but of heroes, of men willing to endure all manner of misunderstanding and abuse for the sake of conviction. They have believed, as some believe today, that under no circumstances should there ever be the resort to force. "Thou shalt not kill", is God's first law. If then no man dare slay, by what right is a nation ever justified when it destroys not one man but thousands? To use force at all, are not Christ's words against it? "Resist not evil," "turn the other cheek," "do good to those that despitefully use you and persecute you." Men may slay us, they have said, but "fear not them that kill the body," the mark of Cain shall never be on our brow.[2]

To resolve this apparent contradiction, Mr. Knox argued that "we must go deeper than merely to cite separate texts and sayings, some given under one set of circumstances, some given in quite another."[3] The answer lay in studying the life of Christ as a whole. By so doing, Mr. Knox believed that it would be obvious that the aim of Jesus was to teach men to live "according to principle, to give men purpose, the highest purpose, one with God's."[4] Jesus, he argued, did not come to lay down "little dictates," but to teach men to live as the free sons of God. Jesus points out the direction in which men should move and live, and said, "Now then, decide, like a man."[5]

Viewed in this, its proper perspective, there was no real conflict within the teachings of Jesus.

> See His one purpose to do the Father's will and you will find it dominating in every act and in every word. His purpose was love. But the love that cannot be indignant at wrong, that permits without protest human life to be trampled on, is not of Christ! His sayings "to resist not evil," that it is better indeed

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid. [3] Ibid. [4] Ibid. [5] Ibid.

> to go without strict recompense for injury than to seek it in a vindictive spirit, "to turn the other cheek" if thereby you can change foe into friend, surely do not mean, and were never intended by Him to mean, that we are to ignore the teaching of His whole life, step aside, allow evil a free field, and hand the world over to the devil![1]

Mr. Knox could, therefore, conclude that a Christian was not forbidden to use force in the defense of Christian ideals and human dignity.

> The safeguard today against injustice and wrong is not found in surrendering to them. Weakness is not righteousness, nor is strength wickedness. The safeguard is love, which alone is entrusted to make the right use of strength.[2]

Mr. Knox went on to argue that Christian love, rightly understood and diligently applied, would obviate the necessity of a resort to force in the long run. He believed that the real cause of war was not economic greed and territorial ambition, but fear. Love alone could assuage this fear and would prevent future wars. In the present war situation, however, the clear implication of Mr. Knox's exegesis was that there was no real contradiction between Christian principles and active intervention by America on the side of justice and human dignity, that is, on the side of England and her allies.[3]

The Rev. James Thayer Addison, a Lecturer at the Episcopal Divinity School, developed an argument favoring American intervention similar to that of Mr. Knox.[4] Like Mr. Knox, Mr. Addison was concerned that Christians must "come to a clear understanding as to the attitude of

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid. [3] Ibid.

[4] James Thayer Addison, "Christianity and Non-Resistance," The Churchman, Vol. 113 (January 15, 1916), pp. 73-74.

For an interesting account of Addison's war-time experiences see also: James Thayer Addison, The Story of the First Gas Regiment (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1919).

Christ toward resistance and non-resistance."[1] To attain such a clear understanding, Christians must go beyond the mere words which Jesus spoke, because "words by themselves, with their shades of meaning and their varied context, may sometimes leave us in doubt."[2]

The Christian, Addison argued, must study not only the words of Christ but his actions. He believed that all Christians can agree "that whatever Jesus said or whatever He did, His deeds always squared with His words. He acted out what he preached."[3] Addison maintained that "words interpreted by deeds, when the speaker and doer are the one Christ, these give us sure guidance."[4]

Based upon this premise, Addison set out to examine two, apparently contradictory, incidents in the life of Jesus. The two he picked were: the story of the cleansing of the Temple in John 2:13-16, and the story of Jesus before Pilate in John 19:5.

Addison described each scene with great care and feeling. After depicting the commercialism and corruption of the Temple court and Jesus' horror and the profanation of this sacred place, Addison went on:

> And what does He do? Does He retire hastily, blushing with shame that such a thing could happen, and resolve never to go to the temple again as long as such disagreeable sights are possible? Or does He make an indignant little speech to His disciples, telling them that there ought to be a law against such infamous practices, and appointing a committee to talk it over with the high priest? Or does He start to preach to the traders, to persuade them, to appeal to their better natures, to "secure an amicable adjustment of existing difficulties?" Thank God, He did none of these things. If He had, He would be dead and forgotten now. What He did was this: He took in the situation with one glance; His righteous anger fired Him and broke into action. He seized the first forceful weapon that came to hand; and, followed,

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[1] Addison, "Christianity and Non-Resistance", p. 73.

[2] Ibid. [3] Ibid. [4] Ibid.

> and perhaps assisted by His somewhat startled and far more peaceably-inclined disciples, He smote the traders right and left, knocked over their tables, scattered their money and their goods, drove them headlong from the courts; and, as St. Mark adds, He held the place against all comers for the rest of the day. By physical violence He had inflicted pain and injury. That is one blazing act in history and one beautiful example of Jesus' attitude toward non-resistance. That avenger with the knotted cords was the Prince of Peace, the Lamb of God.[1]

In contrast, Mr. Addison offered an equally moving description of Jesus before Pilate: the taunts, the torture, the crown of thorns. He described Jesus' response in these words:

> We know that He did not rail at them; we know that He did not fling taunt against taunt; that he did not strike back; that from first to last He made no resistance. And we know that had he done otherwise, His life would have been a failure. A struggling and protesting Jesus is unthinkable. *He* had chosen His time; His time had come; and knowing that only by a willing sacrifice could victory be won, He went to His death--the one heroic figure in that tragic drama.[2]

Addison maintained that these two disparate pictures of Jesus are in no way contradictory. Rather they are the logical and compelling result of a life led in accordance with one very simple principle: "Christian *living means the spending of self in the service of others*.[3] Based on a proper understanding of the application of this one principle: "neither resistance or non-resistance is infallibly Christian in itself."[4]

> No word or act of Christ urges us to non-resistance when we see in peril the institutions we honor, the traditions we revere, or the safety and welfare of those we love. In their service and for their sake He calls us to exert ourselves, to spend ourselves, to sacrifice ourselves. When non-resistance means the deliberate purpose of yielding ourselves that through our sacrifice others may gain, then non-resistance is at once noble and Christian.[5]

Addison offered two theoretical illustrations. First, if someone you love insults you, you ought to patiently accept those insults so "that you may be in a position to serve him, doing nothing in retaliation that will hinder you in your saving effort to straighten and restore your friendship."[1] In such a situtation, non-resistance is clearly the Christian response.

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid. [3] Ibid. [4] Ibid. [5] Ibid.

> But when you see someone insulting your wife or trying to corrupt your children and you resist him to his face by force, if force serves best, till you have crushed his purpose, what are you doing but this: to spend yourself that you may serve those whom you love by securing their safety and honor? To do otherwise would be to sacrifice them in the effort to save yourself. But as it is, you have vindicated the principle of love.[2]

Addison then applied this principle to America's current policy of neutrality.

> During the dark year that has just passed, we, as a nation, have witnessed the murder and dishonor of those committed to our care. We have been watching at the same time a gigantic attempt to crush every ideal upon which our nation was founded. If we have stood by inactive because, though strong of arm and high of spirit, we still held ourselves in leash, through a deep desire to spend ourselves in the service of others, then I trust that God will one day reward a restraint so salutary and so rare. But if we have stood by inactive because we dreaded the pain of sacrifice and effort, because we wanted to be comfortable at the expense of the lives of those committed to our care and of the ideals that for generations we have proclaimed, then in the name of the Christ who fought the traders for the honor of the temple and equally in the name of the Christ who went to His death for the cause we held dear, let us not try to glorify our littleness by calling it Christian.[3]

Mr. Addison's article should not necessarily be viewed as a call to arms and to American intervention. It did, however, directly challenge the existing consensus favoring neutrality in four vital areas. First, Addison challenged the assumption that non-resistance was the only Christian response to the war in Europe. Second, he believed that the war ought not to be seen as a mere economic and territorial squabble in Europe, but rather as an effort by one nation--presumably Germany--to "crush every ideal upon which our nation was founded."[4] Third, his description of America's policy of neutrality assumed that neutrality was not, and ought not to be an end in itself, but that neutrality was a temporarily expedient policy until America's full forces could be marshaled and unleashed. Fourth, Addison introduced an interesting and provocative distinction between the morality of self-defense and the defense of those committed to our care and protection. Addison appears to imply that acts which might not be justified in the defense of our own person or honor, might well be ethically mandatory in defense of others. Addison may not have been arguing for immediate American intervention, but his arguments would certainly put those who advocated continued strict neutrality on the defensive. He had, in effect, put them on notice that their assumption that Christianity required continued neutrality was no longer beyond question or challenge.

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid. [3] Ibid. [4] Ibid.

A far more bold appeal for direct American intervention in the war came from the Rev. Randolph H. McKim, the Rector of Church of the Epiphany, Washington, D. C. Where others sought ways to overcome the apparent conflict between Christ's counsel of non-resistance and the exigencies of the present world situation, Mr. McKim saw no such conflict at all.

In his sermon of May 17, 1915, entitled "The National Crisis," Mr. McKim offered the following exegesis of John 18:36:

> Jesus said to Pontius Pilate, "If my kingdom were of this world then would my servants fight." But his kingdom was not of this world, it was a spiritual kingdom, and therefore they would not fight to establish it. On the other hand, if it had been a worldly kingdom, a civil government, His servants in that case would not hesitate to employ the agency of war. This surely is a recognition that in the worldly sphere, in the sphere of the governments of this world, war may sometimes be necessary.[1]

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[1] Randolph H. McKim, "The National Crisis," in For God and Country (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1918), p. 3.

For two contrasting exegeses of John 18:36, see:

The rather startling implications of Mr. McKim's bold exegesis are almost breathtaking. For Mr. McKim, the decision for war was not a decision for the lesser of two evils forced upon the Church by the tragedy which had befallen the world, it was a positive choice to participate in the establishment and preservation of Christ's Kingdom on earth.

Mr. McKim sought to further buttress his defense of war as a Christian obligation by arguing:

> Once more I urge that if war were never justifiable and a Christian man could not draw his sword in defense of his country without disloyalty to Christ--the inspired writers of the New Testament would not have selected the terms of war and the armor of the soldier as symbols of Christian life and of Christian virtues.[1]

Mr. McKim repeated these same arguments in an article entitled "Christianity and the War," published in the September 18, 1915, edition of The Churchman.[2] In its laudatory editorial introduction to Mr. McKim's article, The Churchman signaled its departure from the ranks of those who believed that Christianity required continued American neutrality.

> Events of the last year have opened our eyes to the fact that there are certain elements still active in our world-life against which, for the very security of those things upon which the true welfare of mankind depends, we must still be prepared to contend, employing, if need be, the one force which these elements will recognize.[3]

It was inconceivable that Christianity could proscribe the only effective

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Raymond E. Brown, The Gospel According to John, (XIII - XXI), The Anchor Bible, Vol. 29A (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1970), pp. 843-872.

William Temple, Readings in St. John's Gospel (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1959), pp. 351-357.

[1] McKim, "The National Crisis," p. 5.

[2] Randolph H. McKim, "Christianity and the War," The Churchman, Vol. 112 (September 18, 1915), p. 375.

[3] "The Embarrassment of the Peace Movement," The Churchman, Vol. 112 (September 18, 1915), p. 371.

means by which these forces of evil could be contained and eventually destroyed.

> Stranger still would it be if our religion forbade us to resort to arms when no other instrumentality would enable us to preserve, for the high purpose for which God has designed them, those institutions and traditions of our national life that have been built upon the struggles and sacrifices of our fathers.[1]

On this basis, The Churchman concluded:

> Better that the bodies of men be torn and tortured and homes blighted with grief for those who will never return than that the spirit's life be choked with the too present riches of peaceful prosperity.[2]

This last sentence marks another significant transition in the debate over American policy. For The Churchman at least, the debate was no longer between the virtues of honest neutrality and Christian non-resistance, on the one side, and the virtues of heroic and sacrificial action on the other. The debate was now seen as between heroic action on behalf of the Allies, and slothful, self-indulgent selfishness.

By December, 1915, The Churchman had not only adopted Mr. McKim's conclusions, but his argument as well. An editorial rebuttal to three articles by Dr. Edward L. Parsons, in which he advocated continued strict American neutrality,[3] argued its case. The Churchman interpreted Dr. Parson's articles as saying that "the teachings of Jesus Christ require His followers to refuse to have anything to do with war under any and all circumstances."[4] The Churchman continued:

> We regret that we cannot thus construe the teachings of our Lord. We know of no one of His deliverances, which when rightfully wieghed with all, can be said to set aside that fundamental

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid.

[3] See below, page 65ff.

[4] "The Attitude of Christian Men Toward National Armament," The Churchman, Vol. 112 (December 25, 1915), p. 814.

> principle of human nature, for example, in accordance with which the parent will defend its offspring with any available force. Religion must be taught in terms which men can understand and follow. Any religion which goes counter to that which a man knows in his heart will fall on deaf ears. Any Church which teaches such a religion will have little influence on the world.[1]

To ascertain the proper Christian response to the world crisis, The Churchman pointed to John 18:36.

> But there is one declaration of His, made when He was on trial for His life before Pilate, which is sometimes quoted with the emphasis so placed on the wrong words as, in our judgment, to pervert His meaning, but which, when the emphasis is rightly given, throws a flood of light on the subject. Thus read, it sums up His life: it sums up His teachings, it sums up His purpose in coming into the world. Thus taken, it is a plain and clear recognition on the one hand, that if all men were peaceable there would be no occasion to fight; and, on the other, that as some men are not peaceable, other men may have to fight. "My Kingdom is not of this world. If my Kingdom were of this world, then would my servants fight, that I should not be delivered to the Jews." To advance the Kingdom of Heaven, His servants were not to fight; but in matters of the kingdoms of this world, even His servants might fight.[2]

A detailed exegetical study of this passage and the history of its interpretation is beyond the scope of this paper. From an ethical standpoint, however, The Churchman's interpretation creates a dualistic interpretation of the world. In matters pertaining to the Kingdom of Heaven, an area of concern never clearly defined, Christians are bound by an ethic of non-resistance. When dealing with the affairs of this world, however, these strictures do not apply. This dualistic interpretation of the world, taken in conjunction with The Churchman's earlier statement that any religion which does not conform its dictates to the morality of what men already "know in their hearts," would severely limit the ethical and prophetic mission of the Church. In that potentially very narrow, and certainly nebulous, field of heavenly concerns the Church may speak with power and authority. In all other matters, which would seem to include the vast majority of life's real situations, the Church must conform herself to that level of morality which people can easily accept.

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid.

Based on this interpretation of the Christian's responsibility in the "real" world, The Churchman concluded:

> So, if the barbarous hordes of central Europe, the lineal descendants of the ancient Goths and Vandals and Huns, win in their declared purpose to put weaker peoples out of their places under the sun, and then, lured by the lust of conquest, should cast acquiring eyes on America's free and peace-loving shores, we Christians, followers of Him who in matters pertaining to the Kingdom of Heaven was the meek and lowly Jesus, but who in matters pertaining to the kingdoms of this world, recognized the place of force, may obey with good conscience the clarion cry of the patriot Bozzaris; as given in the words of the poet:
>
> "Strike, till the last armed foe expires,
> Strike for your altars and your fires;
> Strike, for the green graves of your sires,
> God and your native land."[1]

While this was not yet a call to intervention and war, it certainly was a clarion call to arms. The Churchman had concluded that "the lineal descendants of the ancient Goths and Vandals and Huns" must be defeated, and that American intervention to bring about this end was not only inevitable, but our Christian responsibility.

This interpretation of John 18:36 offered by The Churchman and by Mr. McKim did not go unchallenged.[2] Its publication is, however, deeply significant, for it demonstrates that the broad consensus favoring strict American neutrality which had dominated the Episcopal Chruch from the outset of the war was, by the beginning of 1916, rapidly collapsing.

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[1] Ibid., pp. 814-815.

[2] Romilly F. Humphries, "Letter to the Editor of The Churchman," The Churchman, Vol. 113 (January 8, 1915), p. 59.
The same issue contained letters from George Foster Peabody and G. S. Southworth, which also opposed The Churchman's opinions.

As these articles symbolically mark the end of one period, they also act as a portent of things to come. A new consensus was beginning to emerge in the Church during 1916.

This consensus may be summarized in four propositions. First, Germany and her allies represented a direct attack on the fundamental values and institutions of Christian civilization. Second, Christian civilization could be preserved only by the military defeat of Germany, Third, that to secure Germany's defeat, America would have to take a more active role in the war. Fourth, while the time might not yet be right for direct American military intervention, America must begin to prepare for such a possibility so that her efforts would be decisive.

Before examining these propositions in some detail, it would be well to point out that not all Episcopalians shared these beliefs. One particularly striking dissent came from Edward L. Parsons, Rector of St. Mark's Church, Berkeley, and later to become Bishop of California. In a series of three articles published in the December issues of The Churchman, Dr. Parsons argued passionately for continued American neutrality. Dr. Parsons believed that in the terrible distress of war, more and more people were searching for moral leadership, and that they were finding it in "the figure of Christ."[1] The growing acceptance of Christs's moral pre-eminence was due in large measure to the congruence of His words and actions. Christ's moral leadership rested upon solid moral grounds.

> He won it, His place of pre-eminence as we all know, because He appealed to moral and spiritual forces alone, based the dominion

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[1] Edward L. Parsons, "The Cost of Moral Leadership," The Churchman, Vol. 112 (December 4, 1915), p. 747.

> which He would hold over men's wills upon their response to truth alone and refused to appeal to force though it cost Him His life. . . . The price Jesus pays for His leadership is the surrender of every support which physical or material power could give.[1]

Dr. Parsons lamented that while many people would accept the principle that "moral leadership should rest upon moral grounds,"[2] few were prepared to accept "the equally true corollaries of that principle: that moral leadership becomes suspect when it begins to appeal to force and is heightened as it surrenders it."[3]

To illustrate his point, Dr. Parsons offered two contemporary examples: Belgium and Germany. In her suffering and devastation, Belgium had become the focus of the world's attention and admiration.

> Belgium fighting for national existence, beaten, wrecked, devastated, her King in exile, her army driven almost to her last landmark, Belgium has become a world-power. Her tragedy, like Christ's, is a triumph.[4]

In her weakness, Belgium found moral strength; Germany had squandered her moral leadership in the pursuit of military power.

> She had bartered away her real world-power. Luther and Kant and Goethe and Beethoven are imperishable; but the tragedy is that not only has modern Germany lost her leadership, she has put these, her noblest sons, under suspicion. The world that gladly followed them seeks other leaders.[5]

The present world crisis presented a great opportunity for moral leadership to America. For centuries, the world had looked to America as the world's best hope for freedom and peace, which are "merely translation of Christianity into political terms."[6] The great power of these American ideals was due in large measure because America had offered them to the world "with the backing of reason and righteousness alone."[1]

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid. [3] Ibid. [4] Ibid. [5] Ibid.

[6] Edward L. Parsons, "The Nation's Opportunity and the Nation's Peril," The Churchman, Vol 112 (December 11, 1915), p. 779.

> Out of such tradition springs the great opportunity presented to her today. A world in mortal agony, a world of wrecked hopes and crushed ideals looks to her to lead in reconstruction. Helpless slaves of the war system, men are crying for some nation big enough and brave enough to crush it by faith in humanity, by friendship and sanity of counsel, some nation great enough to ask the world to join it in a new system giving form to a new international conscience. Thus men cry and turn to America for answer.[2]

Herein lay America's opportunity for great service to the world. Ironically, herein also lay her great peril. If America sought to buttress her moral leadership by force of arms and military might, her moral leadership would crumble totally. In this light, Dr. Parsons viewed the "defense movement" as a deadly peril to the nation.

The defense movement weakens the moral power of the nation in three ways. First, Dr. Parsons argued, "unity of purpose is necessary for moral effectiveness."[3]

> A nation giving its countless millions of dollars and the brains of its ablest men to the building of vast armaments cannot put full moral power into the effort to make international friendship real.[4]

Second, he argued that the defense movement "drives us steadily toward that attitude of suspicion which makes real friendship impossible."[5] No nation can prepare for war against a purely abstract enemy. It must compare its forces against those of other nations. It must plan and study potential strategies against would-be aggressors. And the very process of planning and comparing helps to create a climate of suspicion and mistrust which contributes to the possibility of war.

Not only would the defense movement tend to make America suspicious of potential enemies, it "would destroy our moral leadership and make us faithless to our great duty because it must make us an object of suspicion to the world."[1] The sword cuts both ways. Increased preparation would tend to make us suspicious of other nations, and the increased military might of America would cause them to become suspicious and wary of us.

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid. [3] Ibid. [4] Ibid. [5] Ibid.

The defense movement would thereby squander America's most powerful resource - her moral leadership in the world. Faced with this great peril, Dr. Parsons argued passionately that the Church must finally and definitively speak out on the issue of war.

> And today in the face of the awful breakdown of the preparedness system in Europe and of the unutterable agony of a world which proclaimed that all its armaments were to preserve peace, men still tell us that we can have peace only if we are ready for war! Is it not time for ministers of Christ to stop uttering platitudes about the justification of war? Is it not time for the Church to cry out to the nations, "You have tried the system of force and it is destroying you. Try now that of Christ?" Is it not time for Christian men to say to the world, "Your civilization is tottering. You know that only friendship and mutual trust and faith in the brotherhood of man can build it strong again. It was to win those things for men that Christ lived and died. Are you not now to try Christ's way of winning them? The devil's way has failed. Try Christ's."[2]

For the Church to accept, let alone sanction, any position other than that war is "not only wasteful, barbarous, destructive, but utterly un-Christian" is to deny her Master, the Prince of Peace.[3] This is the message and the truth, with which "all the Christian pulpits of the land must ring."[4] The Church must proclaim finally that war is evil, and that moral leadership can rest only on moral means.

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Edward L. Parsons, "The Church's Duty," The Churchman, Vol 112 (December 18, 1915), p. 813.

[3] Ibid. [4] Ibid.

> That is no "peace-at-any-price" Gospel. It is a Gospel of justice and righteousness. But it is likewise the Gospel of Him who would not build the kingdom of justice and righteousness upon the power of the legion of angels but upon the power of these very ideals over men's lives.[1]

Despite the eloquence and sincerity of the arguments, the debate over the morality of war was being quickly submerged by the discussion of "preparedness". As an issue, preparedness had several advantages which helped it to supplant the issue of the morality of war.

Preparedness was a "limited" issue. It was difficult, if not impossible to debate whether or not war was un-Christian without debating and calling into question the very basic ideas of Christianity, such as the mission and ministry of Christ and the Kingdom of God. Preparedness could be discussed in far more pragmatic terms, which rarely touched on the moral teachings of Christianity at all.

Preparedness could be approached gradually. The debate about the morality of war seemed to demand a definite "yes" or "no" answer. Preparedness could be discussed in small steps--a moderate increase in the Army and Navy, a slightly sterner diplomatic note, or arming certain types of ships. This incremental approach to preparedness made it a far less threatening issue than the debate over war itself.

Where the debate about war tended to be divisive, the discussion of preparedness tended to promote consensus. A great many extremely diverse groups could find a comfortable home under the tent of preparedness. Those who still maintained that America should remain neutral so that she might act as an honest broker could advocate preparedness as a tactic to increase America's leverage. Those who wanted America to intervene forcefully on behalf of England and her allies could advocate preparedness as a step in that direction. Those who wanted America to remain un-entangled in European politics could advocate preparedness as a means to strenghten America's neutrality and protect her independence and her rights. People who advocated any of these potentially conflicting goals, could, at least agree on the need for a strong and prepared America.

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[1] Ibid.

For an equally spirited and well-written article in the same vein, see also Addison A. Ewing, "Christian Patriotism," The Churchman, Vol. 112 (October 16, 1915), pp. 509-510.

To The Churchman's credit, while it often took issue on its editorial page with authors with whom it did not agree, it did provide a forum for the dissemination of a wide variety of opinions concerning American policy and its future.

Preparedness could also be advocated as a positive moral good in itself. The virtues of discipline, self-sacrifice, and mutual interdependence which a strong program of national preparedness would require were viewed as a great moral antidote to the vices of indolence, hedonism, and profiteering which threatened the nation. The process of preparation came to be regarded as a good in itself.

Because the policy of preparedness was limited, gradual, and appeared to offer the basis of a new consensus, and emphasized traditional Christian virtues, it gained a ready hearing and rather rapid acceptance in the Church.

In a speech delivered to the Manhattan Club on November 4, 1915, President Wilson, who faced a stern challenge to his re-election in the following fall, formally announced his conversion to the cause of preparedness. President Wilson said:

> Force everywhere speaks out with a loud and imperious voice in the titanic struggle of governments, and from one end of our dear country to the other men are asking what our own force is,

> how far are we prepared to maintain ourselves against any interference with our national action or development. . . . We have it in mind to be prepared, but not for war, but only for defense; and with the thought . . . that the principles we hold most dear can be achieved only in the kindly and wholesome atmosphere of peace, and not by the use of hostile force.[1]

According to one account, "the word 'prepared' brought down the house."[2] President Wilson went on to describe a program calling for half a million trained troops and the second most powerful navy in the world. Despite these specific proposals to increase America's armed forces, President Wilson was rather vague as to the uses to which these increased forces would be put.

> No thoughtful man feels any panic haste in this matter. This country is not threatened from any quarter. . . . There is no fear amongst us. . . . The only thing within our own borders that has given us grave concern in recent months has been that voices have been raised in America professing to be the voices of Americans . . . but which spoke alien sympathies, which came from men . . . who were partisans of other causes than that of America.[3]

President Wilson's address marked the formal adoption of a policy of preparedness by the United States. This was a policy which many members of the Episcopal Church had been advocating for some time. In June, 1915, the Rev. Ernest M. Stires, Rector of St. Thomas' Church,

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[1] Quoted in Millis, Road to War, p. 237.

[2] John Dos Passos, Mr. Wilson's War (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1962), p. 151.

[3] Quoted in Millis, Road to War, p. 238. This is the speech which brought about the break between President Wilson and William Jennings Bryan. Bryan attacked Wilson's plan, saying:

> "The plan which he proposes . . . is not only a menace to our peace and safety, but a challenge to the spirit of Christianity. The European rulers . . . thought they were contributing toward the maintenance of peace when they were making elaborate preparations for defense. It is a false philosophy, and being false it inevitably leads into difficulties. . . . If we are not threatened by any nation . . .if there is no fear among us, why is this time chosen to revolutionize our national theories and to exchange our policy for the policy of Europe?" (Ibid.)

New York, had written an article for The Churchman in which he advocated a strong program of civil and military preparation. He defended the morality of such a policy by saying:

> We are not talking of war, though our Lord did make war in the Temple and began it Himself; we are speaking of being prepared to secure our national peace, and to defend our American ideals, which are inspired not by physical might, nor by the power of human wisdom, but by the Spirit of the Living God who is the real Ruler of the American people.[1]

One of the most forceful and dynamic advocates of a strong preparedness movement was the Rev. William T. Manning of Trinity Parish. In an address entitled "Preparedness - Our Christian Duty," which he delivered to the Conference of Mayors on National Defense, Manning argued:

> Every true American would rather see this land involved in war than see her flag dishonored, or her name stained with disgrace. We would rather see America take up the sword than see her bow down in fear before the infamous doctrine that might makes right. We would rather face war if we must do so than prove false to those principles of justice, freedom and humanity for which our fathers had the manhood to fight, and which are the foundations upon which our life is built.[2]

Mr. Manning believed that the Churches had devoted too much of their time to the discussion of the Christian virtues of "gentleness and forbearance," which he characterized as "the feminine side of its teachings."[3] The times now clearly demanded a countervailing emphasis: "The God in whom we believe is a God of love, but He is also a God of justice and might."[4] Mr. Manning maintained that "under present conditions in this world, it is our duty to use force if need be to protect the weak, to curb the lawless, and to restrain the brutal."[1] For these reasons, Mr. Manning concluded: "Preparedness against lawless aggression and invasion is our plain Christian duty."[2]

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[1] Ernest M. Stires, "Preparation for Peace," The Churchman, Vol. 111 (June 26, 1915), p. 835.

[2] William T. Manning, Sermons Preached Chiefly During the World War, Archives, Union Theological Seminary, New York, p. 1.

[3] Ibid., p. 2. [4] Ibid.

To attain a state of adequate preparedness, Mr. Manning advocated a system of universal military training. He said that he advocated such a system not only for its military value, "but I believe in it also for its moral and spiritual value."[3] In one sentence: "If our young men are taught to stand straight and walk straight, it will help them to think straight and to live straight."[4]

In a sermon delivered at Trinity Church a few months later, Mr. Manning went on to enumerate the advantages which would accrue to the nation from such a program:

> I advocate universal training because of its military effectiveness. It will make our land practically secure against invasion.
>
> I advocate it because it is the only military system that is truly democratic. It puts all men on one common footing. Its effect is a people trained and prepared for their own defense.
>
> I advocate it because it will weld our nation together and help make our many races one united people.
>
> I advocate it because of its moral and spiritual value. It will give us needed discipline. It will help develop in us those high qualities of orderliness and system, of respect for authority, of obedience to law, which are not the strongest points in our national character. It will tend to make our young men better Americans, better citizens and better Christians.[5]

While Mr. Manning was certainly one of the most forceful advocates of preparedness, he had many allies. A theological defense of preparedness came from De Berniere Waddell, the Archdeacon of Eastern Mississippi. Mr. Waddell was particularly concerned to correct what he believed to be the "foolish and unreasonable faith in God, which is being largely preached throughout this land today."[1] Mr. Waddell described this faith as the mistaken belief, . . . that all one has to do is just trust blindly in God, and He will take care of you, forgetful of the fact that He has gifted us with powers to take care of ourselves; and that a failure upon our part to use these powers for the purposes for which they were given is disobedience, and want of real faith.[2]

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid., p. 1. [3] Ibid., p. 2. [4] Ibid. [5] Ibid., p. 7.

Mr. Waddell supported his argument by referring to the relationship between God and ancient Israel. He conceded that God "gave them victory over the enemies while they were faithful to him," but he added, "they always had armed and well-drilled troops to fight the battles which gave them victory."[3]

Mr. Waddell, therefore, concluded:

> As Christians, we all should be as harmless as we can be, but we should be wise enough to protect ourselves against any wolves that may take a notion to destroy us, and who would take that notion if we were unwise enough to leave our doors open for their entrance, while pretending to trust in God. Preparedness is an evidence of wisdom, sustained by the dealings of God with His ancient people, and demanded by the powers God has planted in man's breast.
>
> None of us want war, especially the present President of the United States, and to prevent war we want to show to the world that we are able to defend ourselves against any assaults that may be made against us.[4]

While Mr. Waddell argued the merits of preparedness from a theological basis, the Rev. Randolph H. McKim offered an historical defense. Mr. McKim contended that America's situation in the summer of 1916 was fully analagous to the situation in which Great Britain found herself in 1912.

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[1] De Berniere Waddell, "Peace and Preparedness," Letter to the Editor of The Churchman, Vol. 113 (January 29, 1916), p. 153.

[2] Ibid. [3] Ibid. [4] Ibid.

> England was full of pacifists, and anti-war men who did not hesitate to launch violent attacks upon the one man in the nation who discerned the national peril and pointed out the only adequate protection against it.[1]

That lone voice belonged to Lord Roberts, "the hero of the South Africa War."[2] According to Mr. McKim, Lord Roberts "had thoroughly studied the question; he had informed himself of Germany's plans; he discerned her purpose to attack England when the right opportunity arrived.[3] In a speech which he delivered in Manchester on October 22, 1912, Lord Roberts warned:

> War will take place the instant the German forces by land and sea are, by their superiority at every point, as certain of victory as anything in human calculation can be made. Germany strikes when Germany's hour has struck.[4]

Lord Roberts' speech set off a torrent of objections. The speech was described as "diabolical" and Lord Roberts was characterized as a "mere jingo." His warnings were discounted by all parties.[5] But, Mr. McKim continued:

> The damning fact of all this story was that the government knew all the while that Lord Roberts spoke nothing but the truth, yet members of the government were allowed to attack his Manchester speech as "viscious and dangerous." . . . Thus, in the opinion of well-informed men, the British government sacrificed the interests of the empire to the exigencies of party, or to personal ambition.[6]

According to Mr. McKim, the implications for present American policy were absolutely clear:

> Our pacifists in America at the present time are never-weary of declaring that preparation for war is an invitation and incitement to war; and yet the recent history of England shows beyond the possibility of doubt, that had England's rulers heeded the voice of Lord Roberts and increased the British army to even the moderate size of 500,000 men, and had they let it be known that

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[1] Randolph H. McKim, "A Lesson in Preparedness from Recent English History," The Living Church, Vol. 55 (July 1, 1916), p. 316.

[2] Ibid. [3] Ibid. [4] Iibd. [5] Ibid. [6] Ibid.

> Britain thus strengthened would stand by her allies, there would have been no war in 1914 - the world would have been spared all the horrors of the last two years.[1]

Based on this evidence, Mr. McKim concluded that a vigorous program of preparedness was America's best defense against being drawn into the war.

One of the political advantages of the preparedness movement was that its measured and apparently limited commitment allowed it to appeal to both militants like McKim and Manning, but also to more "moderate" individuals as well. The Southern Churchman gave the movement its grudging support. The Southern Churchman believed that:

> The law of non-retribution and of neighborly kindness as laid down by our Lord in the Sermon on the Mount is an exemplification of the Beatitudes, inculcating the spirit which must obtain in those who would have fellowship with God."[2]

These requirements are also "seminal principles" of the Kingdom of God which is slowly being brought to reality in this world. Progress toward this goal is, however, extremely slow, and mankind does not yet live in the Kingdom of God.

> The individual Christian must do what in him lies to further the coming of that Kingdom by his active influence and agency in the propagation of those principles, but especially by their cultivation and expression in his own character, in a world and under circumstances in which they are not yet fully recognized or adopted, but whose outward sway he must acknowledge and within lawful bounds, must submit to.[3]

The Southern Churchman contended that the New Testament counseled submission "to the powers that be," not because they are good in themselves, but because "under conditions existing these were ordained by God."[1] In time, they believed, these conditions would be eliminated and God's complete sovereignty would be recognized and acknowledged; in the meantime, "they were not to be resisted in the obligations they imposed."[2]

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[1] "On Preparedness," The Southern Churchman, Vol. 81 (February 19, 1916), p. 4.

[2] Ibid. [3] Ibid.

One such institution which would be abolished by the advent of the Kingdom of God was war itself. War was the expression of a "certain world-spirit" which was doomed by God, but not yet dead.[3] And while this "world-spirit" continues to exist, its demands must be recognized.

> We will refuse it the allegiance of our approval or our hearts and will supplant it in God's good time with a better spirit, but by the appointment of His providence we must live now under the circumstances which it has created. Under the law of the New Testament we must comply with its exactions even while we cultivate and practice the opposite spirit of the Beatitudes. It has its dues which we must righteously render, however unrighteous in themselves.[4]

Under the present conditions, therefore, The Southern Churchman was compelled to conclude that an adequate program of preparedness was a moral necessity.

> If therefore these world-conditions created by their dominant world-spirit, demand of us a much larger naval and military establishment, or preparation for possible war, or even war itself, we must submit as unto the present ordinance of God; being in the meantime the more careful, as under more difficult circumstances, that we ourselves are governed and actuated by the spirit which is of God.[5]

The Living Church added its qualified support to the preparedness movement. The Living Church pointed out emphatically that the preparation which they advocated was not preparation for war.

> Few, we trust, desire preparedness for war; the present anxiety is lest, as a nation, we be unprepared against war. The preparedness which is right for a nation is a preparedness to protect the nation and its wards in the event of war, and to make it possible, in the last analysis, for the nation to fulfill its legal and moral obligation to its own citizens and to other nations and to obey the

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid. [3] Ibid. [4] Ibid. [5] Ibid.

dictates of the national conscience.[1]

The Living Church did not view the preparedness movement as a radical departure from America's traditional policy of non-intervention in European affairs. Rather, preparedness was viewed as the appropriate and necessary means by which this policy could be defended and continued.

> But though every American ought rigidly to discountenance the libels, sometimes approaching treason, that are being uttered against our American government for its maintenance of the historical principle of non-interference in European affairs, which every President from Washington to Wilson has maintained, and which is reiterated in the very Hague conventions which some have tried to press into an obligation to intervene in this present war, it must yet be recognized that almost any day may bring events in which the duty of this nation to protect its own people, or to make good on its guarantees to others, may require it to meet war with war, German lawlessness on the high seas cannot be tolerated indefinitely. To enable our government, therefore, to fulfill its national obligations, preparedness against war has become a grave pressing national duty. It ought not to have been so long delayed. It must not be delayed longer.[2]

The Living Church conceded preparedness might well open the gates to the dangers of a militaristic mentality: "A nation than can make war unnecessarily or unjustly is, no doubt, more likely to do it than a nation that cannot."[3] Nevertheless, The Living Church concluded, "as a nation, the contrary danger, of being physically unprepared for duties that may suddenly be thrust upon us, seems the more imminent at the present time."[4] Against the abuses of a militaristic spirit, "religion must be our chief preventive. . . ."[5]

During 1916, the preparedness movement gained in popularity and support throughout the Church. Each of the major church periodicals, The Churchman, The Southern Churchman, and The Living Church, endorsed the program in one form or another. On March 27, 1916, a lengthy petition appeared in the New York Times advocating a comprehensive and vigorous program of national preparedness.[1]

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[1] "Preparedness and Religion," The Living Church, Vol. 54 (April 8, 1916), p. 803.

[2] Ibid. [3] Ibid, p. 804. [4] Ibid. [5] Ibid.

The main thrust of the petition lay in a quotation from Mr. Darwin P. Kingsley's address to the New York Chamber of Commerce, which the petition cited with approval and support:

> First, we should arm, and arm adequately; not because we believe in that theory of government, we do not, we hate it; nor because we believe in that method of settling international difficulties, but because we must at all hazard protect this home of democracy from the Satanic brood, which, driven from heaven, apparently fell in Flanders and Poland. . . . If now we arm--as we should--and do only that, we shall show ourselves a nation of ingrates. If we arm and say to Europe that we are ready at any time to disarm, ready with them to create an international state, . . . we shall show ourselves morally at least to be worthy descendants of the intrepid men who signed the Declaration of 1776, worthy successors of the great democrats who fashioned the charter of our liberties in 1887.[2]

This petition advocating a vigorous program of national preparedness was signed by 83 ministers of varying denominations and prominence, many of whom were Episcopalians. The Episcopalians included: George William Douglas, William T. Manning, the entire clerical staff of Trinity Parish's chapels, Charles Slattery, Ernest M. Stires, Raymond C. Knox, C. K. Gilbert and W. L. Bevan.[3]

This petition marked an interesting and important transition in the continuing debate over American intervention in the war. From the outbreak of the war and continuing through most of 1915, those who favored a more militant and forceful policy than that of President Wilson were extremely circumspect in their criticism. Time and again, they seized every opportunity to proclaim their loyalty to him personally, and to the policies which he as the President had set for the nation.

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[1] Reprinted as "The Clergy and Preparedness" in The Churchman, Vol. 113 (April 1, 1916), p. 44.

[2] Ibid. [3] Ibid.

Randolph McKim's Thanksgiving Day Sermon, 1915, provides an excellent example. Mr. McKim protested: "God forbid that I should utter a word that could add a feather's weight to the heavy weight that rests on the President's shoulders."[1] Even where Mr. McKim felt conscientiously compelled to differ with the President, he proclaimed his continuing loyalty.

> We are confident that a courageous course of action, just in line with his [President Wilson's] strong and patriotic utterances last spring and summer, would lighten this burden and clear out of his pathway many of the difficulties and dangers that now beset it. It is our friendliness to him--our sincere loyalty--our earnest wish that he should overcome the difficulties that face him, and triumph over the people who are at once his enemies and the enemies of our country, that moves us to urge upon him a different course from that which he is now pursuing--to seize the opportunity that again presents itself to take bold and decisive action in vindication of the honor of our country.[2]

To support the President and his policies, on the one hand, and at the same time urge a radical change in these policies, demanded that a rather interesting distinction be drawn. The distinction which seems to have been developed was that as long as a person began his remarks with a declaration of continued support for American policy, he was free to hold whatever private conviction he desired, and to use whatever means were available to win increased public support for this position, even though it differed radically from the announced policy of the government.

Mr. McKim's Thanksgiving Day sermon offers a clear example of this distinction in action. After averring his continued loyalty to the

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[1] McKim, For God and Country, p. 22.

[2] Ibid., pp. 22-23.

President, and protesting his desire not to "utter a word that would add a feather's weight" to the President's already heavy burden, Mr. McKim went on to advocate a radical change in American policy.[1] In his article "A Lesson in Preparedness from Recent English History," Mr. McKim went even further:

> And should they [the American people] not, if necessary, in defiance of the counsel of the politicians, demand that thorough and adequate preparation be made by land and sea against any possible foreign invasion?[2]

Mr. Manning of Trinity Parish had made a similar point in his Thanksgiving Day sermon of 1914:

> We cannot be, and we have no right to be, morally indifferent to such issues as those which this war presents. These issues affect vitally the welfare of our nation and of all the world. It is the duty of each one of us to form his judgment as clearly and fairly as he can, and to contribute his personal share towards that just and righteous public sentiment for which the world is rightly looking to us.[3]

Those who in 1914 and 1915 found themselves in opposition to President Wilson's neutrality policy appeared to believe that once they had offered a verbal endorsement of the present policy, they were free, and in fact obligated by their conscience, to use whatever means were available to oppose and alter that policy.

By 1916, however, the policies of the Wilson administration had changed markedly. While America was still officially neutral, she was preparing for war on behalf of England and her allies. Now the dissenters of 1914 and 1915 had become the staunch defenders of the new policy of 1916. Now that the nation had adopted their platform as national policy, they became increasingly less tolerant of those who opposed the new consensus. The new majority now argued that opposition to the policies of the government must cease.

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[1] Ibid., p. 22.

[2] McKim, "A Lesson in Preparedness," p. 316.

[3] Manning, "Thanksgiving Day Sermon, 1914," p. 5.

The petition, cited earlier, which appeared in the New York Times, advocating a strong program of national preparedness, concluded with this paragraph:

> Perhaps our fellow-ministers who have signed the appeal of the Church Peace Union will pardon us for believing that the decision as to what form our preparedness shall take may, as Dr. Stimson says, best be left to the responsible officers of our Government, and to those whose own lives in case of war will be first involved; and that the rest of us will best fulfill our duty as ministers by earnest prayer and spiritual counsel, and our duty as patriots by abstaining from profitless addresses to the Government.[1]

In its editorial introduction to this petition, The Churchman went further in its demand that all opposition to the preparedness policy of the administration be stilled:

> The duty of the Nation at the present time is obvious to the public mind. National existence must be protected at a time when all international life is in a process of cataclysm, not by declarations and notes alone, but by an adequate military and naval preparation. Christian ministers are bound to uphold the State, because the State under present conditions is, among other things, the highest expression of social morality on an organized basis.[2]

This petition, therefore, represents a basic turning point in the debate. When those who advocated American intervention found themselves in the minority at the outbreak of the war, they felt conscientiously bound to express their convictions and seek to mold the policy of the government in terms of their objectives. Due in part to their efforts, and in part to factors beyond their control, they had been successful.

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[1] "The Clergy and Preparedness," p. 441.

[2] "The Question of Preparedness," The Churchman, Vol. 113 (April 1, 1916), p. 432.

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The Wilson administration had for the most part adopted their policy. Now these former dissidents began to adopt the opposite tack. They argued that under the present dangerous situation, the prime duty of a citizen, be he clergy or layman, was to support the policy of the government, regardless of his own personal moral convictions. If he could not publicly support the administration's policy, the least he could do was to remain silent.

Despite the growing consensus favoring preparedness, and the growing intolerance of those who supported this policy, there were still those who continued to voice their opposition. One of the most radical challenges to the preparedness bandwagon came from the Rev. John H. Yates, Rector of St. Mark's Church, Durango, Colorado.

For Mr. Yates, the real issue at stake in the debate over preparedness was religious, not political. "I have read some sermons by some of our clergy in favor of preparedness," he said, "and found them full of logic but not full of faith."[1] He posed the following questions:

> Do we believe, today, what Isaiah believed and taught in the seventh century before Christ, that God is "high and lifted up"? Do we believe that in God's hands are the affairs of the nations? Do we believe that God is righteous as well as all powerful, and that He will direct the course of this world righteously?[2]

If we do not believe these things, Mr. Yates felt that there was good cause to be afraid of "Japanese ships and German big guns."[3]

> But if, on the other hand, we do believe with Isaiah, then we will know that if, as a people, we seek to do justly, that if we purge our land of injustice, unrighteousness, and oppression of every sort, then no harm will happen to us, for Jehovah of Hosts will keep our land inviolate as He kept His sanctuary at Jerusalem

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[1] John H. Yates, "God and the Nation," Letter to the Editor of The Living Church, Vol. 54 (March 18, 1916), p. 709.

[2] Ibid., p. 710. [3] Ibid.

> inviolate in the days of First Isaiah.[1]

As one who held this belief, Mr. Yates felt "there is no reason for preparedness. Either God will punish or He will save."[2] Mr. Yates concluded:

> The teaching of nearly all the prophets, to say nothing of our Lord, as it bears on the matter in hand, may be briefly summed up in this way; (1) Not chance, nor material forces, nor kings, nor politicians, but God directs the course of history. (2) The nation that puts its trust in God, and walks in His ways, will dwell in security and peace. (3) (Conversely) The nation that abandons faith in God and walks not in His ways will suffer judgment, armies or no armies.[3]

In a letter to The Churchman, the Rev. Howard C. Robbins, Rector of the Church of the Incarnation, New York, voiced his concern about the growing momentum of the preparedness movement. Mr. Robbins was prepared to support "a normal growth" in the Army and Navy to insure that they would be able to protect the nation in the future as they had in the past.[4] And if this was all that the preparedness movement advocated, Mr. Robbins, and he believed almost all Americans, were prepared to support it.

> But preparedness as I have been hearing it advocated, does not mean that. Preparedness means compulsory military service. Preparedness means a navy equal to that of England, and a cause of bad blood between us and England. Preparedness means militarization, or it would mean it, if one were not sure that the heart of the country is true to American ideals, and is not subject to faintness and hysteria.[5]

Mr. Robbins believed that it was in the direction of such hysteria that the preparedness movement was forcing the nation, and that this constituted the greatest threat to the nation.

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid. [3] Ibid.

[4] Howard C. Robbins, "The Clergy and Preparedness," Letter to the Editor of The Churchman, Vol. 113 (April 22, 1916), p. 541.

[5] Ibid.

> What we are really in danger of is not an invasion of Prussians, but of Prussianism. There is no question whatever that in certain influential quarters an attempt is being deliberately made to stampede this country into a degree of military and naval preparedness utterly foreign to our whole history, to our American traditions, to the genius of our institutions, and to common sense.[1]

Despite the protests of men like Messrs. Yates and Robbins, by mid-1916 the preparedness movement had come to dominate American policy. In the fall of that year, the Episcopal Church met in General Convention in St. Louis. The Convention issued a Pastoral Letter, drafted by Bishop Brent of the Philippine Islands, Bishop Lawrence of Massachusetts, and Bishop Anderson of Chicago.[2]

The Pastoral Letter was quite moderate and even conciliatory in its tone. While the letter accepted the necessity of national military preparedness, and perhaps even for war itself, it did so with resignation rather than patriotic fervor.

The Bishops maintained that the realities of the world made it impossible for any nation to isolate itself from the rest:

> America is involved today in worldwide confusion which finds its most acute expression in the battlefields of Europe. No self-isolation on our part is possible. The fortunes of the nations of the world are interwoven as the threads of a tapestry. To ignore this fact is folly; to reckon with it frankly is to give due recognition to the fundamental unity of the human race and to hasten the dawn of that day in which the armaments of war shall be beaten into the implements of peace.[3]

The fact that America was not yet directly involved in the fighting should afford "no grounds for smugness, much less for self-applause."[4] Rather, it should impel the nation to reexamine the "true ideals of peace and incorporate them in our national life."[1]

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[1] Ibid.

[2] JGC - 1916, p. 49.

[3] Ibid., p. 401. [4] Ibid.

To this end, the Bishops applauded the work of those groups which were seeking to bring about a peaceful resolution to world conflicts.

> So far as war is a discipline which man has imposed upon himself, he must look to himself to get rid of it. Movements and associations to promote peace are not to be ignored or undervalued, especially those which emphasize the deep likenesses, and give second place to the surface differences of the race.[2]

Nonetheless, in the face of the present world crisis, America's survival could not be left to chance. In such a situation, America must be able to expect that each citizen will do his duty to defend the nation and her high ideals.[3]

> She must expect of every one of her citizens some true form of national service, rendered according to the capacity of each. No one can commute or delegate it; no one can be absolved from it. National preparedness is a clear duty. If this service assumes the form of more military defense, such can easily become a menace and will surely fall short of the pacific effect, unless all the productive forces of manhood are at the same moment developed and shaped into social order and righteousness. The only thorough preparedness is that exemplified and taught by Christ--the preparedness of character based upon life with God.[4]

Despite this heavy emphasis on the spiritual side of preparedness, the Bishops felt compelled to concede that there were situations in which force alone could prevent the victory of the forces of unrighteousness. While deploring such a resort to force, the Bishops conceded that it was sometimes unavoidable and necessary.

> We well know that force, be it physical or moral, cannot by itself uproot evil; nevertheless, we have no right to place in the same class all the belligerents, aggressive and defensive in this or any war. There are even occasions when the cleansing of the temple of human life must be begun with courage and driving power.[5]

The Pastoral Letter ended on a note of hope and optimism:

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid., p. 402. [3] Ibid. [4] Ibid. [5] Ibid.

> With the Incarnation as the cornerstone of the Faith, our common humanity contains in itself God's assurance that we have the capacity for universal brotherhood. God's executive agency for bringing in His Kingdom and His righteousness is the Church of Jesus Christ.[1]

Within a few weeks of the close of the Convention, Woodrow Wilson, running on the slogan "He Kept Us Out Of War," won reelection to the Presidency of the United States. The slogan was true, but would not remain so for long. And as America was militarily preparing for war, the Episcopal Church was preparing to support that effort.

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[1] Ibid., p. 403.

AMERICA GOES TO WAR

By the close of 1916, America was rapidly preparing for war with Germany. On November 18, 1916, President Wilson offered a series of proposals to the belligerents designed to bring about an immediate cease-fire and the beginning of peace negotiations. The chances that Mr. Wilson's proposals would be accepted by the belligerents were problematic at best; and his continued inference that the war aims of Germany and the Allies were on the same moral plane virtually insured that the proposals would be rejected by the British.[1]

While Mr. Wilson may have been partially responsible for the failure of his attempts to negotiate a "peace without victory," efforts were under way in America designed to insure that any resolution short of total allied victory would be deemed unacceptable by the American people.

The German deportation of Belgian workers set off a flood of angry protest which greatly aided those efforts. On November 29, the American government officially protested against these "illegal and inhuman" actions.[2] The official action notwithstanding, this latest "atrocity" served as a catalyst to create a new alliance between the moderate and militant groups in the Episcopal church who were now united in a common demand for more forceful action against Germany. The response from both camps was virtually identical: an open-ended commitment of support for the President in whatever course of action he might judge necessary and effective to halt this atrocity.

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[1] Millis, Road to War, pp. 355-382.

[2] Abrams, "Preachers Present Arms," p. 40.

The Living Church, whose editorials concerning the war had been consistently moderate and temperate, published an open letter to President Wilson as its lead editorial on December 16. The letter stated:

> The Living Church feels that no expression of the horror of the American people can be over-stated. We have carefully read the German defense. It is such a defense as used to be made for the African slave trade. Humanity rejected that defense more than a century ago. We are not interested in promises that efforts will be made to ameliorate the conditions under which deportation shall proceed. We demand, in the name of humanity, that DEPORTATION CEASE ABSOLUTELY and that men who have been kidnapped by military authority be immediately returned to their homes.[1]

The editorial expressed the continued desire of the American people to be friends with the German people, and therefore felt justified in going "to the farthest limit in pressing this view as the urgent plea from friend to friend."[2] If this plea was rejected by Germany, The Living Church declared its support for whatever additional actions President Wilson might deem necessary:

> Most earnestly do we promise our support to you, Mr. President, in such steps as you shall deem it proper to take in presenting the SOLEMN PROTEST OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE to the German Nation.[3]

A mass meeting held at Carnegie Hall on the night of December 15, 1916, to "Protest the Enslavement of the Belgians" offered even more strident support for any effective actions the President might take. The Honorary Vice-Presidents of the rally were: Bishop Charles Sumner Burch, Suffragan of New York; Bishop David H. Greer, Bishop of New York;

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[1] "To the President of the United States," The Living Church, Vol. 55 (December 16, 1916), p. 287.

[2] Ibid. [3] Ibid.

the Rev. Charles Lewis Slattery, Rector of Grace Church, New York; and Ernest Milmore Stires, Rector of St. Thomas' Church, New York.[1] Bishop Gailor of Tennessee was also present and read letters and telegrams of support.[2] The President and principal speaker of the rally was the Rev. William T. Manning of Trinity Parish.[3]

In his address, Mr. Manning was careful to distinguish between the German people and their leaders:

> We have not come here to speak the language of hate. We do not condemn indiscriminately the whole German people. We know that they have been misinformed, misled and cruelly betrayed by those in whom they have too blindly trusted. We believe that there are many Germans who condemn these infamous acts as strongly as any of us do.[4]

Such a betrayal of trust could not diminish the enormity of the atrocity which Germany had committed. The magnitude of this outrage must be apparent to anyone with the slightest moral sensitivity: "The man who, knowing the undisputed facts, is neutral or unmoved, with regard to Belgium, has suffered some insidious weakening both of his moral sense and of his manhood."[5]

Mr. Manning, therefore, pledged the enthusiastic and unlimited support of the American people to whatever action the President might take.

> We call upon our President to speak, and we pledge to the President the unqualified support of all right thinking people of every party, creed, and race, if he will now demand in the name of America, in the name of Humanity, and in the name of God, that these unheard of outrages against the brave people of Belgium shall immediately cease, and that those who have already been carried into slavery shall be set free, and allowed at least the poor comfort of returning to their broken families and to their devastated homes.[6]

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[1] Manning, Sermons Preached Chiefly During the World War, p. 1.

[2] Ibid. [3] Ibid. [4] Ibid. [5] Ibid., p. 3 [6] Ibid., p. 5.

Such an outpouring of public outrage at German atrocities made it extremely unlikely that the American people would accept any peace settlement which fell short of total victory. On January 1, 1917, a petition appeared in the New York Times and many other newspapers throughout the country which addressed itself directly to this issue. The petition was drafted by Mr. George Wharton Pepper, an extremely prominent Episcopal layman from Philadelphia,[1] and was signed by sixty-five influential clergymen and laypeople. Among those Episcopalians who endorsed the petition were: Bishop Nelson of Atlanta; Bishop Lawrence of Massachusetts; Bishop Rhinelander of Pennsylvania; Bishop Gailor of Tennessee; Bishop Brent of the Philippines; Bishop Whitehead of Pittsburgh; Bishop Anderson of Chicago; the Rev. Messrs. Manning, Stires, Slattery and Douglas of New York; and several laymen such as W. J. Schieffelin, Judge Packard and George Zabriskie.[2]

The letter, entitled "A Plea for a Lasting Peace," to which The Living Church added the subtitle, "A Protest Against Any Propaganda for Peace Apart from Justice,"[3] began:

> When war drenches Europe in blood, it is natural that we Americans should shudder at the sight. To call upon the combatants to stop the carnage is an impulse so strong that it even tends to displace judgment and distort values. We are apt to forget, at any rate for the time being, that there are conditions under which the mere stopping of warfare may bring a curse instead of a blessing. We need to be reminded that peace is the triumph of righteousness and not the mere sheathing of the sword.

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[1] Reprinted as "A Protest Against Any Propaganda for Peace Apart from Justice," in The Living Church, Vol. 56 (January 13, 1917), p. 357.
See also: George Wharton Pepper, A Voice from the Crowd (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1915); and Philadelphia Lawyer - An Autobiography (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1944).

[2] "A Protest," p. 357.

[3] Ibid.

> To clamor for an ending of the present war without insuring the vindication of truth, justice, and honor is not to seek peace, but to sow disaster.[1]

The letter continued by listing a whole series of purported German atrocities, including: "the ravage of Belgium and the enslavement of her people," "the massacre of a million Armenians," "the desolation of Poland and Serbia," "the destruction of life through the sinking of the Lusitania and other merchant ships," "the intimidation of small nations and the violation of international agreements."[2]

In the presence of these pending and as yet unsettled issues,

> We feel impelled to warn our brethren against those who cry "peace, peace," when there is no peace. The just God who withheld not His own Son from the cross, could not look with favor upon a people who put their fear of pain and death, their dread of suffering and loss, their concern for comfort and ease, above the holy claims of righteousness and justice and freedom and mercy and truth. Much as we mourn the bloodshed in Europe, we lament even more that supineness of spirit, that indifference to spiritual values, which would let mere physical safety take precedence over loyalty to truth and duty. The memory of all the saints and martyrs cries out against such backsliding of mankind. Sad is our lot if we have forgotten how to die for a holy cause.[3]

In its own editorial welcoming this appeal and lauding its author and co-signers, The Churchman added:

> We venture to believe that these men, and the many other distinguished Christian leaders who signed this protest, would be, were it possible, among the first to share any sacrifice in loyalty to those great divine ideals which can never be replaced by considerations of mere expediency.[4]

By the close of 1916 the momentous shift of opinion within the Episcopal Church regarding the war was obvious. The "just war" moderates had begun by expressing the conviction that war was un-Christian.

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid. [3] Ibid.

[4] "Peace," The Churchman, Vol. 115 (January 13, 1917), p. 37.

In time, however, they had become convinced that if America were adequately prepared militarily she would be better able to bring about a peaceful resolution to the war which would at the same time insure the goals of justice and peace which they espoused. This contention was at least theoretically compatible with the continued belief that war was un-Christian. The unsuccessful diplomatic efforts to bring about a peaceful resolution of the conflict and the continued reports of German atrocities forced a radical reexamination of this basic belief. They were now prepared to conclude that although war was evil and un-Christian, there were other evils which posed a more grave and immediate threat to Christianity and the world. To prevent the victory of these forces, they were prepared to support whatever actions were necessary, even if this included going to war. While they still hoped that a peaceful diplomatic solution could be found and that America would not have to enter the war, they were prepared to support American involvement if this were the only means by which justice, freedom, and a lasting peace could be obtained.

Those who hoped that America would come to the aid of the Allies had become far more emboldened as the years passed. At first they were content to merely imply that all the warring nations might not bear an equal moral burden of guilt for the outbreak of the war. This implication matured into the public conviction that Germany was the guilty and responsible party. Having come to this conclusion and argued it publicly, these militant churchmen were content for a time to accept President Wilson's policy of official neutrality. Meanwhile they sought to create and nurture a climate of public opinion which would demand a more forceful and partisan American policy. By the end of 1916, they had come to represent a large portion of the American people who were convinced that the only effective means by which justice and freedom could be established was through the military defeat of Germany. To secure this end, they firmly believed that direct American military intervention was indispensable, and that it was America's moral duty and high calling to assume the burden of this "holy cause."

From the distance of sixty years, it is impossible to assess accurately the numerical strength of these two groups. It is the clear implication of Ray Abrams' study of the churches and World War I that the militant "crusaders" in the holy cause of an Allied victory were the dominant element in the churches. Based on this review of the existing literature, Mr. Abrams' certainty seems somewhat unwarranted.[1]

The essential point is, however, that by the end of 1916 these two groups were both prepared to accept the fact that America might soon become directly involved in the war and the fighting. The "just war" camp viewed this as regrettable but necessary to attain the goals of justice and peace. The "holy war" camp viewed this as a positive opportunity for heroic Christian service. The first group saw war as the necessary, although regrettable, means by which peace and justice could be established. The second group saw an Allied victory as the vindication of Christian principles.

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[1] It is difficult and probably presumptuous to offer any criticism of Dr. Abrams' excellent study of the churches and World War I. His analysis and documentation of the attitude of the Episcopal Church, however, does appear to be somewhat slanted towards the more militantly pro-British elements in the church. For example, Abrams cites nine articles and editorials which appeared in The Churchman, which was the most militantly pro-British church periodical. He offers no references to The Living Church, The Southern Churchman, or The Witness, each of which represented a far more moderate approach to the war. By the same token he has eight references to statements made by Manning, three to statements of McKim, three to statements of Stires, all of whom were spokesmen for the militant wing. While he does offer six references to statements by the more moderate Bishop Greer, he makes no references to Dean Hodges, Edward L. Parsons, or W. Russell Bowie. While these few samplings certainly do not invalidate or discredit Dr. Abrams' study or conclusions, his sampling of attitudes of the Episcopal Church does appear somewhat less than fully balanced.

While these two groups displayed some basic differences, they both had concluded that American intervention was inevitable, and were prepared to offer their support. America was now, not only militarily, but ethically and spiritually prepared to go to war.

On January 22, 1917, President Wilson tried again to find a diplomatic resolution to the war. His proposals, which were designed to bring about a "peace without victory," proved unacceptable to all the belligerents. On January 31, Germany announced that she would immediately resume unrestricted submarine warfare against vessels of any nation, neutral or not, which sailed into British waters. In response to this declaration, the United States, on February 3, severed diplomatic relations with Germany and sent her Ambassador, Count Von Bernstorff, home. War between the United States and Germany was rapidly becoming inevitable.

Whatever doubt remained was finally dispelled with the publication of the infamous "Zimmerman telegram" on February 28. The telegram was from the German Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Arthur Zimmerman, to the German Legation in Mexico City. It was transmitted on January 19, and was intercepted and decoded by the British on the same day. For reasons best known to themselves, the British decided against the immediate public release of this document. They held on to the telegram until February 25, when in the midst of the Senate filibuster over the Armed Ships Bill, a copy was given to the American Ambassador in London, Walter Page. Mr. Page conveyed the telegram to President Wilson who leaked it to the press. The text of the telegram read as follows:

> We [Germany] intend to begin unrestricted U-boat warfare on February first. Efforts will be made notwithstanding this to keep the United States neutral. In the event that we shall not be successful in this, we propose alliance to Mexico upon the following basis: To make war together; make peace together; generous financial support; and agreement on our part that Mexico shall reconquer the formerly lost territory of Texas, New Mexico, Arizona. Arrangement of details to be left to your honor. You should disclose the following to the President [of Mexico] in strict secrecy as soon as outbreak of war with the United States is certain and add the proposal to invite Japan to immediate spontaneous concurrent effort and at the same time use his good offices between us and Japan. Please call the President's attention to the fact that the ruthless employment of our U-boats affords the prospect of forcing England in a few months to peace.[1]

In the public outcry which followed the publication of this document, the Armed Ships Bill passed Congress. It also set off new demands for immediate war with Germany.

On March 4, the front pages of every newspaper in Boston carried an open letter from the Bishop of Massachusetts, the Rt. Rev. William Lawrence, to President Wilson. While the Bishop avoided using the word "war," the implications of his demands would have been abundantly clear to his readers.

> We citizens of the Commonwealth now demand that he [Wilson] stand to it; and we call upon him in this juncture to use the full powers with which the Constitution invests him to protect the citizens of this country on sea and land; to prepare the nation to meet every emergency which may endanger its liberties; and to lead the people to defend at all costs the integrity of the nation.[2]

Three days later, speaking at a meeting held to honor the Most Reverend Cosmo Gordon Lang, Lord Archbishop of York, the Rev. William T. Manning, speaking in his capacity as the Chaplain of the 302 Engineers, was even more blunt and to the point.

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[1] Millis, Road to War, p. 404.

[2] William Lawrence, Memories of a Happy Life (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1926), p. 382.

> Any man who now talks of peace, whatever his disguise or camouflage, is no real friend of peace, no true friend of freedom, no loyal son of America. Because we want peace, because we believe in righteousness, we will listen to no word or suggestion of peace with an undefeated and unrepentant Prussia.[1]

Mr. Manning went even further:

> Our danger today is not from the Germans who are in the trenches. Our boys "Over There" and those beside whom they fight will take care of them. Our danger is from the so-called Pacifists, the American Bolsheviki, who are seeking to break down the morale and fighting spirit of our people by their poison gas from the rear. We want no talk of peace by negotiation; we want no new statement of our war aims. We have only one war aim and all the world may know what it is. It is the complete overthrow of the Prussian military machine by crushing defeat upon the field of battle. Until this is accomplished, any talk of peace is dangerous fanaticism or thinly disguised treason.[2]

On April 2, 1917, President Wilson addressed a Special Joint Session of the Congress to ask for the adoption of a Resolution of War against Germany. On April 4, the Senate adopted the Resolution by a vote of 82 to 6. On April 6, the House of Representatives concurred--the vote was 373 to 50.[3] The United States was finally and officially at war with Germany.

With the nation at war, the Episcopal church rallied together in support. Yet while the church was virtually unanimous in its support of the war effort, marked differences still existed. Many churchmen were convinced that America was fighting a "just war," but their support was tinged with regret and deep sadness that no other means had been found to prevent this cataclysm. The crusaders supported the war with fervor, and almost with joy, viewing it as a unique opportunity for heroic Christian service for the betterment of the world.

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[1] Manning, "Speech to a Meeting in Honor of the Most Reverend Cosmo Gordon Lang," in Sermons Preached, p. 7.

[2] Ibid., p. 8.

[3] Millis, Road to War, pp. 453 & 456.

To the first group belonged Bishop David H. Greer of New York. In his biography of the Bishop, Charles Lewis Slattery described Bishop Greer's position:

> He probably stood, among the clergy of the diocese, quite alone as a man of peace before our nation entered the war; and after America was identified with it, he was made to feel quite alone in many a company where bitter words which seemed to him words of hate were flung against the Germans. He did not for one moment minimize the atrocious deeds which had ample evidence; but he believed that Christ's command to forgive enemies was without exception and literal. He feared the consequences of a bitter and unforgiving spirit more than he feared the sorrow and penury which comes to those afflicted by war. He could not share the rosy dreams of men who prophesied that a hideous war would create a new world. Love, especially that love which is reflected from the perfect love of Christ, was the conly constructive force in which he had faith.[1]

Bishop Greer's letter to his clergy on August 17, 1917, fully reflects this attitude:

> As long as this country had not entered into the conflict, I felt it my duty as a Christian man and minister to seek peace and pursue it, with the hope that some arrangement might be made for securing and establishing such a peace. When it did however actually and officially enter into the conflict and declare war on Germany, I then perceived and decided that it was my duty as an American citizen to obey the law, and to give the American government a staunch and loyal support. That is my present attitude.
>
> I must confess, however, that I do not share the hopes of those who think the suppression or destruction of Prussian militarism will put an end to war. That will not be done until human nature here and everywhere shall have been born again and that as I understand it is the aim and purpose of Jesus Christ and should also be of the Christian Church.[2]

Another member of this "just war" group was Dean George Hodges of the Episcopal Divinity School. Dean Hodges had examined the records of the wars which had transpired through the ages and characterized war as "the great selfishness, the great endeavor of the strong to subjugate the weak, destructive, ruthless, cruel. . . ."[1] Yet, despite the cruel ravages of war, Dean Hodges conceded that some wars were, or could be, justified.

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[1] Charles Lewis Slattery, David Hummell Greer: Eighth Bishop of New York (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1921),p. 268.

[2] Ibid., p. 270.

> It is true that history contains the record of just and necessary wars. Out of a hundred thousand pages stained with folly, and ambition, and tragic error, and the passions of wild beasts, and exhibiting war as the blind enemy of mankind, the destroyer of art and industry, the wanton hinderer of the progress of the race, there are chapters which shine with the splendor of heroism and martyrdom, and with the glory of permanent achievement. There are wars which have won decisive victories for humanity, for truth, for liberty.[2]

Dean Hodges believed that these "just wars" were the very rare exception, and for that reason, war should be the very last resort. Every other possible avenue by which the conflict may be resolved must be fully and completely explored first. Only when there is absolutely no other alternative may war be justifiably undertaken.

> Up to the moment when that condition is made plain beyond mistake, a Christian nation will maintain a patience proportioned to the solemn and tremendous importance of the event. It will preserve a patience which shall stir up in the souls of irresponsible people a very storm of abusive indignation--and will still be patient. It will wait, not till there is an excuse for making war, nor till some act is committed which seems to call for the reply of war, but till the situation is such that it is plain that no processes of peace can solve it.[3]

Dean Hodges had concluded sadly that such was now the case. America had no alternative but to go to war "with Germany in defense and protest against a manner of fighting which defies the ideals of humanity."[4]

In a sermon delivered at St. Paul's Church, Richmond, Dr. Walter Russell Bowie counseled resolution, patience and humility. In his view, there were two great dangers confronting the nation now that she had embarked upon the war. The first was the "danger of Spiritual Despair."[1] Dr. Bowie described this spiritual despair as a sense of futility and a "stunned sense of fatality."[2] Such despair cannot be escaped by "shallow evasion."[3] Dr. Bowie believed "one must face it and think and live it through."[4] In so doing, a person would come to the conclusion that war is "a tragedy, but not a fatality."[5]

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[1] George Hodges, Religion in a World at War (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1917), p. 33.

[2] Ibid., pp. 6-7. [3] Ibid., pp. 11-12. [4] Ibid. p. 6.

> And the mark of tragedy, as distinguished from fatality is that though it is poignant with all the anguish of human failure and human suffering, it can be worked through to heroic and holy human ends. It is in order that this may be so that we need in America today the thought, the meditation, the prayers, of those best and most conscientious spirits on whom the burden of this war falls at first with most crushing weight. We need their consecrated will to make it sure that the entrance of America into this tragedy of the world shall contribute to it that element which out of its dark confused plot shall bring some measure of redemption.[6]

The second great threat Dr. Bowie perceived was the danger of impetuousness. As he described it,

> It is the danger of the mob spirit which rushes into the passionate excesses it miscalls patriotism, and under the guise of serving the country may trample under its feet the most precious values which the country possesses.[7]

As an example of this impetuousity, Dr. Bowie referred to the incident which had taken place in Baltimore just before the Congress had adopted the declaration of war. In a last minute attempt to swing public sentiment against the war, Dr. David Starr Jordan held a rally in Baltimore. Shortly after the rally had begun it was broken up by a mob led by "university professors, lawyers and prominent men of affairs" who stormed the meeting hall, broke down the doors and "drowned out the speaker's voice in the tumult."[1]

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[1] Walter Russell Bowie, "A World Made New," The Southern Churchman, Vol. 82 (April 21, 1917), p. 4.

[2] Ibid. [3] Ibid. [4] Ibid. [5] Ibid. [6] Ibid. [7] Ibid.

It was against this type of impetuous "patriotic" action that Dr. Bowie warned:

> The thing those men did was not from any ignoble motive; on the contrary, in their hot impulse, they thought they were showing their devotion to their country when they set out to break up the meeting whose point of view they thought the country should repudiate. They carried the United States flag at the head of their shouting and turbulent procession. Yet that symbol only threw into deeper contrast their disastrous forgetfulness of what the real meaning of the flag should be. They brought reproach upon it in the very act of appearing to honor it; for if in the name of patriotism, and under the shadow of the flag, any more fundamental indignity can be done to the high and holy realities which the flag should safeguard, it is difficult to know what it would be.[2]

Dr. Bowie believed that the incident in Baltimore was not an isolated event, rather, this spirit was rampant throughout the country and threatened to undermine the very values and freedoms for which the nation was now fighting.

Despite this very real danger, Dr. Bowie saw four positive opportunities. The first was the need and opportunity to develop a "keener consciousness of sin."[3] He believed that no redeeming value could come from the tragedy of this war "until beneath all the immediate and accidental events which brought it on, we recognize and seek to atone for those deeper failures which we, and all the rest of the people must confess."[4] Dr. Bowie argued:

> It is only from a sense of sin, and the complex relationships of sin, that we can hope to gain the wisdom which shall wage this war with holy purpose, and achieve out of it results which shall be permanent and constructive. When we are clothed with the garments of our pride and our resentment, our sense of sin becomes falsely simplified. We ascribe all the sin in the world to the enemy. We think that if we have conquered him we conquered wrong.[5]

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid. [3] Ibid., p. 5. [4] Ibid. [5] Ibid.

The second opportunity which Dr. Bowie saw in the war was that it might bring about the end of America's spiritual isolation from the rest of the world. He believed Americans must come to realize "the wider human brotherhood of our rightful service and responsibility."[1] Third, the war provided an opportunity for "that enoblement of spirit which recognizes and accepts the sacrifices which great loyalties call for."[2]

Finally, Dr. Bowie expressed the hope that America would seize this opportunity to "begin to see the triviality of many of our false distinctions, and the supreme importance of the realities that lie beneath."[3]

> Would it not be a glorious thing if not for the years of war alone, but for all time thereafter, we might learn in ways that never should be forgotten to judge ourselves, and to rank others, not according to their worldly accidents, but according to the real manhood and womanhood which their deeds show? Worthwhile would the flames of these fierce days have been, if they should burn the fogs of convention and shallow conceit from before our eyes, and make us see life with God's vision, and treat it with His justice.[4]

Dr. Bowie concluded on a note of hope and resolution:

> Greatly are we called upon to keep the faith. We must believe that this war must be made the end of war. We must believe that it shall be carried through to an end that is not to feed the pride nor gratify the revenge of any people, but to shape on earth conditions under which all may live in honor, in happiness and in self-respect.[5]

The Southern Churchman, which published Dr. Bowie's sermon, adopted a very similar view. In its editorial entitled "The Spiritual Side of the War," The Southern Churchman proclaimed its belief that the greatest need in the world was for "repentance towards God."[6] Such a spirit of contrition and repentance was necessary on the part of all the nations, for all the nations bore the burden of responsibility for the outbreak of war.

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[1] Ibid., p. 12. [2] Ibid. [3] Ibid. [4] Ibid. [5] Ibid.

[6] "The Spiritual Side of the War," The Southern Churchman, Vol. 83 (June 29, 1918), p. 4.

> It did not come causeless. It had its source, not in the maddened brain of a single war-lord or the ambitions of a dominating caste in a single country. These were but the obvious outlets of a deeper, darker pool of ungodliness, of pride and presumption, of greed and self-seeking and mammon-worship, of which no nation is guiltless and no heart is wholly clean.[1]

The Southern Churchman argued that only as a result of true repentance could any good possibly come from the war.

In the same vein, The Southern Churchman commented upon two types of patriotism:

> One nerves itself in a spirit of hate and ruthless revenge against the foe. The other has ableness of soul to pray for a vulgar and cruel enemy, and to have its very praying increase its uncompromising determination to "carry on."[2]

The Southern Churchman believed that Christians must pray for their enemies, and that they must adjust their patriotism to their religion, "they interpret the demands of country in terms of the commands of Christ."[3] In the final analysis, "Christian intercession is not a question of pacifism, but of redemption."[4]

Many other Episcopalians viewed the war in similar terms. Bishop Sanford of the Diocese of San Joaquin said:

> The Church has no sympathy with the fanaticism which would exclaim, "Right or wrong, my country." True fealty to the nation is always to be identified with devotion to national righteousness and with nothing else."[5]

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[1] Ibid.

[2] "Prayer for Enemies," The Southern Churchman, Vol 83 (August 24, 1918), p. 4.

[3] Ibid. [4] Ibid.

[5] Louis Sanford, "The Church and the Nation," The Witness, Vol. 1 (June 9, 1917), p. 1.

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Bishop Lines of Newark "begged that no 'hymns of hate' should find a place among us."[1]

In sum, there were a great many Episcopalians who felt that America was fully justified in going to war against Germany. They viewed the war as necessary, but also as a sad and tragic comment upon the sinfulness of human nature. The war needed to be fought and won, but they fought with no sense of joy or exhilaration. Their hope was that a spirit of repentance would enable the world to find some measure of hope and redemption amidst this awful tragedy.

If many churchmen viewed the war as a tragic necessity, there were many others who viewed America's participation with a great deal more enthusiasm.[2] Among these "crusaders" was the Presiding Bishop, the Rt. Rev. Daniel S. Tuttle. In a letter to the Church, published in both The Living Church and The Witness, the Presiding Bishop characterized America's position in these words:

> We of America are now involved in the gigantic European War. We could not help going into it. For, on the one side the cry is--Might makes Right. We are irresistibly constrained to join the rallying cry of the other side--Right makes Might.[3]

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[1] "The Bishops on the War," The Southern Churchman, Vol. 83 (August 24, 1918), p. 4.

[2] Some Churchmen just simply cannot be classified. One such was Robert Lewis Paddock, Bishop of Eastern Oregon. Bishop Paddock is quoted by his biographer as saying: "What a wonderful privilege it is to take part in this holy crusade" (Maria Sheerin Minor, Portrait of a Rebel: The Story of Robert Lewis Paddock [New York: Seabury Press, 1965], p. 108. Yet at the same time, Bishop Paddock was a loyal supporter of the pacifist Bishop Jones. In a telegram to Jones, Paddock said: "Wrote you weeks ago. Hear your troubles increase. Though aggressively patriotic and believe earnestly that we must fight, yet have absolute confidence in you and would count it a privilege to have you help in Eastern Oregon, if such humble work would be acceptable. Command me if I can do anything. (Ibid., p. 109.)

[3] Daniel S. Tuttle, "The Presiding Bishop's Message on the War," The Living Church, Vol 57 (July 14, 1917), p. 3; also in The Witness, Vol. 1 (July 21, 1917), p. 1.

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To buttress his case, the Presiding Bishop quoted from the Gospel of John: If My Kingdom were of this world then would My servants fight." Based on this text, he concluded that "the implication is that in such case the Master Himself would think fighting right."[1] And since America is a "kingdom of this world," "we may, therefore, reasonably conclude that we have the Master's sanction for our fighting."[2]

With this Biblical warrant as his basis, the Presiding Bishop called the Church to national service.

> It is a time, it seems to me, when we of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States should "gather to the colors" equally with our young men who are pressing to the firing line; and, in our degree and kind and way, with thought and act and sympathy and prayer, as God may appoint, should respond as they to registration and conscription that, under Him, Right may indeed prevail as might for the safety of nations and for the protection of the sons of men in ways and works of peace.[3]

The war-time program of the "crusaders" was comprised of four related elements: first, the redefinition of the role of the Church primarily in terms of the service which it could render to the State; second, a heavy emphasis on the supposed savagery and brutality of the enemy; third, the demand that no peace be concluded short of total German surrender; and fourth, total and unremitting hostility towards anyone who continued to advocate pacifism or non-resistance.

The Rev. Charles Slattery, Rector of Grace Church, New York, called for the consecration of the Church to the service of the nation.

> It is because the opportunity before the Church is stupendous that those who love both Church and country should ask the Church to serve the nation with the best in its power, and should ask the nation to expect from the Church a help which is real.[4]

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid. [3] Ibid.

[4] Charles Slattery, "The Church Can Help the State," The Witness, Vol. 1 (October 27, 1917), p. 7.

Mr. Slattery believed the Church could serve the nation in several ways. First, the Church ought to continually remind the people of the goals for which the nation is fighting and "permit no shrugging of shoulders when the object of the nation in this war is mentioned."[1] Second, the Church can provide a valuable service by "stimulating the national conscience."[2] The conscience which Mr. Slattery hoped the Church would stimulate was not such as ought to call for repentance at the horrors of war, it was a conscience which would prevent the people from giving anything less than their full support to the war efforts of the nation.

> So the nation today has most to fear from the soft-hearted, not quite clear-headed advocates of half-measures. The Church once more may send out the Divine call, "Repent!" Gentleness without strength is as far from Christ as force without love.[3]

The Church ought also to serve the nation by "the fixing in the mind of the soldier the dignity of his task."[4]

> By words, by glance, by homage, the Church can send the soldier across the sea lighthearted and joyful, because there awaits him a work to do for which the longest and most crowded life, giving its utmost, could give no more than he will give, even if he die on the morrow. The nation, taught by the Church, shall have happy warriors.[5]

Finally, Mr. Slattery contended that "the greatest boon which the Church today bestows upon the world is to give it fresh conviction of immortality."[6]

> If the Church can, with an unimpeachable authority, tell these mothers that their sons sink not even to sleep (not to speak of forgetfulness), but rise again from their earthly warfare to a yet more glorious warfare in the nearer consciousness of the Divine Leader--then the Church may be giving spirit and faith to those whose courage is the deep essential of a righteous and enduring peace.[7]

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid. [3] Ibid. [4] Ibid. [5] Ibid. [6] Ibid. [7] Ibid.

While many Church leaders sought to strengthen the nation's war effort by the use of the Church and its faith, others sought the same end by a heavy emphasis on the evil and devilish nature of the enemy against whom the nation was fighting.

Mr. Manning of Trinity Parish took the opportunity offered by a Memorial Service called to commemorate the third anniversary of the sinking of the Lusitania to present his views as to the proper Christian attitude toward Germany. He began his remarks by reviewing briefly the story of the sinking of the Lusitania, the shooting of Edith Cavell and Captain Fryatt, "the dastardly spy system and secret propaganda carried on in all lands by the Prussians, the hideous cruelties practiced on prisoners of war, the unspeakable treatment of women" and the "enslavement" of Belgium which together "have revealed to us the Prussian mind and soul."[1]

Based on this description, Mr. Manning took serious issue with those who felt that Christians ought not to hate the Germans. Mr. Manning said:

> We are told that we must carry on the war without moral passion, that we must forgive the red-handed murderer who is still exulting in his crimes, that we must refrain from any harsh judgment of his crimes because we ourselves also are sinners.
>
> The people who say this will bear watching. If loyal to their country, they are not loyal to justice and righteousness. This teaching has a Christian sound and is accepted as such by the unthinking. In reality this vapid sentimentality and spurious charity is as far off from Christianity as light is from darkness. It is essentially unrighteous and thoroughly immoral.[2]

The Rev. Ernest Stires, Rector of St. Thomas' Church, New York, offered a similar characterization of America's enemy:

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[1] "Anniversary of the Sinking of the Lusitania Observed," The Witness, Vol. 1 (May 25, 1918), p. 1.

[2] Ibid.

> The powers of darkness [Germany] breathing mephitic cruelties hitherto undreamed, descended upon a too-trustful world, making murder and shame incidental to the theft of the hard-won freedom of mankind. But civilized man had a priceless possession of vast power--his spirit. He fought the enemy almost with his naked soul while slowly he gathered and trained his physical force.[1]

In the same sermon, Mr. Stires went on to proclaim his belief that America should accept no peace short of total victory.

> Shall we propose or consent to restatement of aims, or discuss peace with an unbeaten, unrepentant Prussia? By our debt to all the heroic dead, by the strength of America, by our prayers for our children, we pledge ourselves to "stand fast in the spirit, with our mind striving for faith," and never to restrain America's vast power until the enemy of God and man is utterly defeated.[2]

Mr. Stires was not alone in his demand that Germany be totally vanquished, Bishop Brent concurred as well:

> The Germans ask for peace pour-parlers and immediate armistice. They are not as clever as they think. They do not know that the whole world can see through their flimsy trick. They are defeated and on the verge of collapse. They want to claim peace on the score of humanity instead of defeat. But it cannot be so and God would not have us allow it.[3]

An entry in the Bishop's diary was even more blunt:

> Met by Maj. Earp and Capt. Kirkland who informed me that Germany, Austria, and Bulgaria had asked for an armistice. I do not see how we can grant it. Germany will do as her soldiers have done, throw up their hands and cry "Kamerad" and then shoot us in the back. She is a bully and a coward, unable to stand reverses. She should be offered terms dictated to her at the muzzle of a gun, and should give hostages--the two Emperors.[4]

The final element in the "crusaders" program was unremitting hostility towards any pacifists who opposed American participation in the war and anyone who sought peace before victory. The "crusaders'" opposition to pacifism or conscientious objection developed along two parallel tracks. The first consisted of a systematic attempt to undercut any potential Biblical warrant for pacifism. Having demonstrated that pacifism was not Christian, they were then free to attack the character and loyalty of the pacifists and to suggest some rather ingenious methods with which the "problem" of conscientious objectors could be dealt.

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[1] Ernest M. Stires, The Price of Peace (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1919), p. 51.

[2] Ibid., p. 53.

[3] Alexander C. Zabriskie, Bishop Brent - Crusader for Christian Unity (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1948), p. 130.

[4] Ibid.

The most systematic effort to destroy any Biblical basis for pacifism came from the Rev. Ernest Milmore Stires. Mr. Stires began his sermon, "When Christ Approves of War", with the statement that "Christ gave clear declarations upon the problems of justice, government and war, admitting no doubt concerning His attitude is the conclusion to which all reasonable students must come."[1]

Mr. Stires moved one by one to examine each New Testament text which might bear on the question. He first studied John 18:36: "My Kingdom is not of this world; if my Kingdom were of this world, then would my servants fight." Stires found in this passage "a clear recognition of the fact that justice, law, government, in the political affairs of mankind are rightly defended by armed force."[2]

Mr. Stires dealt with the injunction of non-resistance found in the Beatitudes, by saying "there is no evidence that our Lord offered the Beatitudes as a substitute for national law and order."[3] Rather, Mr. Stires argued that the spiritual law is like leaven "which will improve the quality of the bread, but is not offered as a substitute for bread."[4]

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[1] Stires, Price of Peace, p. 105.

[2] Ibid., p. 106. [3] Ibid. [4] Ibid., pp. 106-107.

He believed that further support for this contention could be found in the proper understanding of Jesus' famous injunction: "Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and unto God the things that are God's" (Matthew 22:21). This statement, Mr. Stires believed, demonstrated again that there "was no essential conflict between patriotism and faith, between duty to country and duty to God."[1] He maintained that these two loyalties were, in fact, complimentary: "Indeed the Master frequently implied that thorough-going loyalty to one almost certainly tends to sincere devotion to the other."[2]

Next, Mr. Stires proceeded to a discussion of Jesus' actions and statement when Simon Peter drew his sword to attack those who had come to arrest Christ, ". . . for all who take the sword will perish by the sword" (Matthew 26:52). He contended that these words "furnish no argument for the pacifist." On the contrary, they are "the strongest declaration possible for the necessity and the righteousness of defending law and justice by force of arms."[3]

Mr. Stires then moved to a consideration of Luke 14 and the parable of the wise king who calculates the cost of the war before embarking upon it. This parable showed Jesus' acumen as a diplomat: "The Master's attitude here is not that of a teacher condemning war as wrong, but rather that of a statesman who considers whether the sacrifices of war will accomplish the purpose, or lead to greater disaster."[4]

Next, Mr. Stires turned to the parable of the wicked tenants who killed the landlord's son in the hope of acquiring the vineyard (Matthew 21). Mr. Stires contended that the righteous action of the landlord who killed the wicked tenants and gave the land to other husbandmen was fully justified; and that "the Master's acceptance of this answer, with no suggestion of forgiving the thieves and murderers and permitting them to continue to steal and kill, proves again His firm support of law and justice."[1]

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[1] Ibid., p. 107. [2] Ibid. [3] Ibid., p. 108. [4] Ibid., p. 109.

Having examined these texts and found in them no support for pacifism, Mr. Stires turned his attention to the positive side of his argument.

> It is not strange that in the twenty-one Epistles of the New Testament, there are about ninety uses of similes suggested by war or military life; the disciples caught their Master's vision both of the necessary laws of earthly kingdoms, and of the divine principles which must rule in the souls of men.[2]

To further buttress this argument, Mr. Stires pointed with satisfaction to numerous incidents which he believed showed Jesus' approval of soldiers and their work: the centurion whose servant Christ healed; the centurion who first proclaimed "truly this is the Son of God"; Cornelius, St. Peter's first Gentile convert; and the Roman soldiers who rescued St. Paul in Jerusalem.[3]

Based on this examination of the New Testament, Mr. Stires felt fully confident in concluding:

> Our examination of the teaching and attitude of our Lord and His disciples upon the subject of war has been necessarily limited. But we find no basis for the philosophy of pacifism. Such a philosophy can be explained only by confusing our Lord's spiritual teaching with His firm advocacy of law and justice in political states.[4]

If these arguments proved insufficient, the pacifists' opponents were prepared to argue on other grounds. In this they could find a great deal of support from the House of Bishops. The Pastoral Letter adopted by the Special Meeting of the House of Bishops in 1917 declared:

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[1] Ibid., p. 110. [2] Ibid. [3] Ibid., p. 111. [4] Ibid., p. 112.

> Our nation is at war in behalf of justice, liberty and humanity. When these are in danger, the Church's station is at the front. When the nation has with solemn deliberation entered war, voices which have spoken for neutrality, non-resistance or pacifism are silenced. We hate war, and shrink from its horrors, but we who enjoy the privileges of civil liberty won by the blood of our fathers must, when they are endangered, defend them at the cost of our blood. In the overthrow of injustice and inhumanity is the only hope of permanent peace. Loyalty demands of every citizen unconditional consecration to the service of the nation.[1]

Bishop Lines of Newark developed this argument more completely in an article in The Churchman:

> All of which translated into modern American means this: that any man who has been willing, with a perfectly cheerful conscience, to sit down and enjoy the blessings of liberty, peace, and prosperity in a free and reunited country--blessings which have been won for him by previous wars and blood of others--has no ground for conscientious objection to a succeeding war necessary to preserve these very blessings for him and the rest of mankind.[2]

At the next Special Meeting of the House of Bishops, they adopted a Resolution as part of the "Jones Case," which declared their belief that "the Government of the United States had obeyed the law of moral necessity in seeking to stop a war of deliberate aggression by the only means which are known to be effective to such an end.[3]

In the minds of the "crusaders" these arguments left the pacifists without any acceptable defense for their position. Therefore, the pacifists must either be fools or traitors. In a sermon delivered on October 21, 1917, Mr. McKim described the pacifists in this way:

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[1] JGC - 1919, p. 503. The authors of the Pastoral Letter were the Presiding Bishop, Daniel S. Tuttle, Bishop Lawrence of Masachusetts, and Bishop Hall of Vermont.

[2] Edwin S. Lines, "The Conscientious Objector," The Churchman, Vol. 116 (August 18, 1917), p. 211.

[3] JGC - 1919, p. 497.

> There has been a sudden recrudescence of the spirit of opposition to the war manifesting itself in various forms. Some of this opposition is open and above board; some of it is secret and underground. Some of it comes from honest but misguided men, some of it from traitors and friends of our enemy. It is in fact a motley crew. There are pacifists of various hues--the timid pacifist; the blind and stupid pacifist; the wrong-headed pacifist; the honest conscientious objectors (a very small tribe); the sham conscientious objectors (much more numerous), who are really cowards, or disloyal. Some of these who openly or secretly oppose the war are weak-kneed, chicken-hearted, white-livered individuals; some are disloyal men, some are out and out pro-Germans, men who apologize for the Hun and all their works, some are actually Germans, the subjects of the Kaiser, secretly plotting against America.[1]

Not only were the pacifists depicted as fools and traitors, but many Churchmen, such as Mr. Manning were concerned lest their pacifist philosophy undermine the morale and conscience of the nation. In a sermon delivered on February 4, 1917, Mr. Manning pointed out:

> If you watch carefully the results of the Pacifist teaching, you will see that its tendency is to dull the conscience, to weaken moral judgment, to make people disinclined to take a clear position between right and wrong, and to lead them to put their desire for peace above the supreme claims of righteousness and justice.[2]

Mr. Manning felt that it was the duty of the Church to help create a climate of public opinion that would "overwhelm with indignation and scorn" the beliefs and teachings of the pacifists.[3]

The Rev. George William Douglas, Lecturer at Union Theological Seminary, had a more imaginative idea. Mr. Douglas believed that the conscientious objectors ought in no way to be considered as passive. He believed that whether they knew it or not, the conscientious objectors were working "hand in hand with German agents all over the world who are trying to accomplish by intrigue within the nations what German arms cannot accomplish on the battlefields."[1] He argued that in this hour of national emergency, the very inaction of a pacifist was another form of "fighting", and "with his chosen weapons he is actually killing men--thousands of men."[2] Mr. Douglas believed that the fact was "that the Conscientious Objector is not merely registering a protest; he is encouraging the Germans in their war for the religious, moral, social and political standards of the Hun."[3]

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[1] McKim, For God and Country, pp. 102-103.

[2] Manning, "Our Present Duty as Americans and Christians" in Sermons Preached Primarily During the World War, p.1

[3] Ibid.

With this as his background, Mr. Douglas offered an innovative answer to the question of what should be done with conscientious objectors:

> So, as a preliminary of our treatment of him, I think he should be drafted to the front as part of our Red Cross contingent. And, to test his genuineness and hold him up unmistakably to all concerned, as he stands between the living and the dead in hamlets where the Hun has been indulging himself in rape and rapine, the Conscientious Objector should be obliged to wear conspicuously on his breast a button with the letters, C.O. If his conscience is not seared with a hot iron, I think that then and there his objections to military service against Germany will melt away. He will seize a sword, and as he fights with brain and brawn against the wickedness of men that would be mere brutes if they were not spirits possessed of evil, I am sure that the Objector will see that Jesus Christ is blessing him for his change of mind.[4]

Such was the attitude of many of the "crusaders" towards those who continued to advocate Christian non-resistance.

Despite these often scurrilous attacks, there were Episcopalians who continued to voice their objections to the war. They were extremely few in number and represented a very mixed lot.[1] Some were theologically opposed to all wars; the greater number, however, were not opposed to all wars, but believed that this particular war could not be ethically justified. Virtually all the dissenters were members of the Church Socialist League.

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[1] George William Douglas, "The Treatment of Conscientious Objectors," published privately. (Library, Union Theological Seminary, New York), p. 5. It is interesting and ironic that this sermon was first preached at Holy Trinity Church, Brooklyn, the Rector of which was J. Howard Melish. Mr. Melish had been temporarily disabled by a fall and asked Mr. Douglas to preach.

[2] Ibid. [3] Ibid., p. 13. [4] Ibid., pp. 15-16.

The most famous of the dissenters was the Rt. Rev. Paul Jones, Bishop of the Missionary District of Utah. Bishop Jones was a socialist and a thoroughgoing pacifist. His statements opposing American participation in the war enraged the power structure of the Episcopal Church in Salt Lake City. Despite Bishop Jones' broad support throughout the rest of the Missionary District, the House of Bishops agreed to investigate the situation in Utah. After a lengthy, if incomplete, examination, the committee recommended that Bishop Jones should tender his resignation. At the April, 1918, Special Meeting of the House of Bishops, the Bishops reaffirmed this request for Bishop Jones' resignation and he complied.[2]

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[1] It is difficult, if not impossible, to identify all the Episcopal dissenters. In one place Abrams says there were seven Episcopal pacifist clergymen, of whom five occupied pulpits (p. 196). On the next page he says there were three pacifist clergy in New York, and one each in Illinois, Maryland, New Jersey, and Utah. The only ones that I have been able to identify are: The Rt. Rev. Paul Jones of Utah, the Rev. Irwin St. John Tucker of Illinois, the Rev. Richard Wallace Hogue of Baltimore, A. L. Byron-Curtis of New York, Leigh R. Urban of New York; and John Nevin Sayre of New York. Another pacifist may have been the Rev. Wythe Leigh Kinsolving of Richmond, Virginia. Wythe Kinsolving was the brother of the Rt. Rev. Lucian Kinsolving, Bishop of Brazil. For his views on preparedness and the war, see Wythe L. Kinsolving, "Preparedness," The Southern Churchman, Vol. 81 (April 15, 1916), p. 5; and "Taking the Sword," The Southern Churchman, Vol. 81 (February 19, 1916), p. 6. Another Episcopal clergyman who objected to American participation in the war was James L. Smiley, an Assistant at St. Anne's Parish, Annapolis, Maryland. See James L. Smiley, "The War Can Be Stopped with Justice and Honor," The Southern Churchman, Vol. 82 (July 28, 1917), p. 6.

[2] For a more complete examination of the "Jones Case," see the following section of this paper.

Another Episcopal dissenter was the Rev. Richard W. Hogue of Baltimore, Maryland. Mr. Hogue began the war as the Rector of the Church of the Ascension, and while there "he interested himself in several reform movements and exerted himself actively to bring about better conditions in the life of the community."[1] These activities included founding the Open Forum, which met weekly to discuss "problems of labor and social service."[2] This program was so successful that it was moved from the church to the Academy of Music, "the largest theatre in the city, which is filled by those who attend it every Sunday afternoon."[3]

Among his other endeavors, Mr. Hogue "organized and conducted a workshop for the unemployed,"[4] and worked with other churches to help alleviate the suffering of the poor. Mr. Hogue was ecumenical in spirit as well as works, "he has taken the ground that the Church should be liberal and inclusive, not narrow and exclusive, and has fraternized with people of various religious views and has welcomed them to the Church of the Ascension."[5]

The Churchman described the ultimate result of these efforts:

> These things having given offence to some members of the congregation, and opposition to some of his works having developed, although the great majority endorsed his policy, Mr. Hogue thought it best to resign rather than allow the parish to become divided.[6]

After his resignation, Mr. Hogue remained in Baltimore and continued to lead the Open Forum. He also published a small book, The Church and the Crowd, in which he explained his attitude toward the responsibility of the Church in the world, and his views on the war.

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[1] "The Rev. R. W. Hogue Resigns," The Churchman, Vol. 113 (March 4, 1916), p. 304.

[2] Ibid. [3] Ibid. [4] Ibid. [5] Ibid. [6] Ibid.

Mr. Hogue contended that there were three great motives which must move the Church to "lead and mold the coming era of brotherhood and justice."[1] The first was "to maintian her own honor and insure her own power."[2] He believed that if the Church did not speak out promptly on behalf of those who were presently suffering, "then when the change comes, our message will be rejected and our efforts despised."[3]

Second, Mr. Hogue believed that the Church must speak out in order to further "the essential welfare of humanity."[4] He believed that a great change was coming regardless of what anyone might do. What was important and essential was that the change be truly radical.

> Without the Christian message of love infused into the very heart of this mighty coming change, the forces of labor and the people of poverty may get what they want, but it will be bred by a violence and born of a hatred whose bitter fruits will be the heritage of children yet unborn.[5]

Without a radical change in peoples' hearts and minds which only the Christian Gospel of love could provide, the change would only amount to supplanting one group of "haves" with another. The basic causes of social unrest and oppression would remain and the struggle and violence would continue.

The third compelling reason why the Church must speak out was "the simple motive of loyalty to her Founder."[6]

> The Friend of publicans, sinners and outcasts; the Champion of the lowest and the least; commanding us to love our neighbor as ourselves, zealous for the bodily well-being of all who suffered, full of human compassion, unashamed to do the lowliest work and unafraid to die the lowest death, Jesus the world's Redeemer is our Challenge, our Example, our Power.[7]

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[1] Richard Wallace Hogue, The Church and the Crowd (New York: Fleming H. Revell, 1917), p. 31.

[2] Ibid. [3] Ibid. [4] Ibid. [5] Ibid. [6] Ibid., p. 32. [7] Ibid.

Mr. Hogue believed that these three great motives compelled Christians to "reject the exploded theory that the surest road to peace is that guarded by the biggest army and the best navy."[1] He believed that Christianity must challenge all its adherents to "make a choice between God and Caesar, if need be between Christ and Country."[2] He described that nature of this challenge in this way:

> Not to the frantic fervor that would turn our Democracy into a military camp. Not to false philosophy that might makes right, that God is on the side of the physically strongest. It is not the white book of diplomacy but the red blood of human suffering that makes its appeal to us as Christians. It is not English King or Prussian Emperor who should have a hearing in America today. It is the cause of humanity against the cause of inhumanity. It is the call of the people who belong to life and to whom life belongs. It is the hosts of men marshalled to wholesale murder, mistaking the rhetoric or passion for the majesty of patriotism. It is the multitude of happy and united homes broken beyond recognition and restoration. We shall learn that war cannot be idealized, since it is the substitution of the primeval instinct of beast and savage for the ideal of reason and law and love. We shall learn that there is nothing necessarily heroic in shooting a human being, whether under the contagious fervor of battle or the private motive of revenge.[3]

If the war represented a challenge to Christianity, Mr. Hogue was willing to bring that challenge directly to the doorstep of those who advocated American intervention. He put the issue succinctly: "Let those who comment on the loss of life in war think of the thousands in their city, perhaps in their employ who have lost all of life save drudgery and poverty and ill-paid labor."[4] Or to put it another way: "We Americans talk of the suffering which challenges us to war. Do we forget the tragedy and suffering for which we are responsible at home, under the very spires of our churches?"[5]

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[1] Ibid., pp. 40-41. [2] Ibid. [3] Ibid., pp. 41-42.

[4] Ibid., p. 59. [5] Ibid., p. 58.

Mr. Hogue summarized his Christian challenge to those who would go to war:

> We are called to search our own hearts, to face conditions in our own land, to name no man a patriot who is ready to go to war but not ready to pay honest taxes, who stands for the rights of his country and evades the laws of his commonwealth, who will fight the danger of oppression from across the seas and feeds on the oppression of those under him in business, who prates for justice in the abstract and practises daily injustice.[1]

Mr. Hogue did not again hold a parochial cure. He led the Open Forum in Baltimore, and in 1919 he became the Executive Secretary of the Church League for Industrial Democracy.

Another Episcopal pacifist was the Rev. Leigh Roy Urban, the Rector of the Church of the Redeemer, Astoria, New York. Accounts of the sequence of events which led Mr. Urban to tender his resignation vary, but it centered around an incident involving the American flag. Apparently, on the night of April 13, 1918, someone brought a large American flag into the church and hung it in the sanctuary.[2] The next morning, after the early service, Mr. Urban, in the presence of at least one vestryman, took the flag down "carefully and put it away."[3] The vestryman who was present averred that Mr. Urban had removed the flag in such a manner that not the "slightest disrespect was shown."[4] One of Mr. Urban's supporters went on to point out, "As a matter of fact, to show that Mr. Urban has only honor and regard for the national standard, for some time past, two flags have been and are now displayed in the parish house."[5]

Despite the fact that Mr. Urban was totally within his canonical rights in taking this action, it was widely reported in the press, and set off a furor in the parish.[1] While it is impossible to reconstruct the debate which took place within the parish, a letter to the Editor of The Churchman may well be representative. The author, the Rev. Edward L. Stoddard of St. John's Church, Jersey City, New Jersey, believed that Mr. Urban's actions had demonstrated his complete inability to provide spiritual leadership.

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[1] Ibid., p. 43.

[2] Charles E. Hill, "Mr. Urban's Resignation," Letter to the Editor of The Churchman, Vol. 117 (May 11, 1918), p. 631.

[3] Ibid. [4] Ibid. [5] Ibid.

> The call to "put down the mighty from their seats" and to "scatter the proud in the imagination of their hearts" awakes no echo in his soul. Is it not patent that for a time at least this man's usefulness is gone? One who, when blind, should discourse on the beauty of the Louvre Gallery, a soul empty of harmony that should seek to describe Debussy's Pelleas and Melisanda, would be in no worse plight than this man, deaf and blind to the splendid, the immortal inspirations of this war, should he attempt to lead his people anywhere but into a moral fog-bank. That may be the only trouble with a man like Mr. Urban, but, like Mercutio's wound, it is enough.[2]

Mr. Urban submitted his resignation to the Vestry, and it was accepted on April 21. In announcing Mr. Urban's resignation to the congregation, the Clerk of the Vestry read a statement in which the Vestry testified to their regard for Mr. Urban, and bore witness to these facts,

> (1) that never once since the Nation declared war had he spoken of the war controversially in the pulpit; (2) that he had taken no part in any pacifist propaganda; (3) that he had at every service read prayers for those at war and for peace; (4) that he had spoken with great sympathy and regard for one of the parish who had been killed in the service.[3]

At the same service, Mr. Urban explained his views to the parish:

> I do not like to be called a pacifist, because that includes me in a large class of men with some of whose opinions I do not agree. I

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Edward L. Stoddard, "Another View of Mr. Urban's Resignation," Letter to the Editor of The Churchman, Vol. 117 (June 15, 1918), p. 792.

[3] Hill, "Mr. Urban's Resignation," p. 631.

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> love my country, as every citizen should, and I desire to be of whatever service I can for its highest and truest welfare. But in this tremendous world crisis, which involves issues far beyond the comprehension of any man, I have through careful study of the life and teaching of our Lord, and through earnest prayer, been driven to the conclusion that war is not the way in which our Lord would have us overcome evil.
>
> Much as I regret to be compelled to differ from the majority of my brethren and fellow countrymen, personal loyalty to Jesus Christ prevents me from participating in any way in the prosecution of the war, and from committing my parish in any way to the war policy, in so far as I am responsible for the parish.[1]

Despite Mr. Urban's avowal of loyalty to the country, the feelings of the Vestry were summarized by one of its members who said: "Although all the members of the parish respect him as a man, they are so opposed to his beliefs that his usefulness as our Rector is over."[2]

After leaving Astoria, Mr. Urban became a relief worker with the Friends Reconstruction Unit in France. In 1919 he was called to be the Rector of Christ Memorial Church, North Brookfield, Massachusetts.

Another Episcopal pacifist was John Nevin Sayre. During the war Mr. Sayre served as the Rector of Christ Church, Suffern, New York.[3] While in Suffern, Mr. Sayre became a member of the Emergency Peace Federation, the Civil Liberties Bureau and the Fellowship of Reconciliation; and "continued to preach pacifism unflinchingly, and without alienating his flock, from which there were only a half a dozen withdrawals."[4] Aside from Mr. Sayre's academic training and manifest pastoral skills, another factor which may have rendered him somewhat unassailable was that while serving in Hankow, China, he "made a flying trip to America to officiate at the White House wedding of his brother, Francis Bowes Sayre, to Jessie Wilson, the daughter of the President.[1]

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[1] "Rector Who Ordered Flag Taken from Church Resigns," The Witness, Vol. 1 (May 11, 1918), p. 8.

[2] Ibid.

[3] For an exposition of Mr. Sayre's views concerning the war, see John Nevin Sayre, "The Way That Is Better Than War," The Social Preparation, Vol. 5 (April, 1918), pp. 22-29.

[4] Devere Allen, Adventurous Americans (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1932), p. 296.

A more strident voice defending pacifism was that of Arthur L. Byron-Curtiss. A. L. Byron-Curtiss served as the National Secretary of the Church Socialist League from 1916 until the League was disbanded in 1924. He was also the editor of The Social Preparation, the official organ of the League which was published quarterly.

The Church Socialist League came into existence in 1911 when the Rev. Bernard I. Bell invited interested churchmen to a meeting in Chicago.[2] Among those who responded to the invitation were: the Rt. Rev. Franklin Spencer Spalding, Bishop of Utah; the Rev. G. Israel Brown; the Rev. W. M. Gamble; and the Rev. A. L. Byron-Curtiss. In 1912 the League began publication of The Social Preparation. The affairs of the League were conducted solely on a voluntary and part-time basis and its efforts languished for want of funds.[3]

In 1916, the League held a large meeting coincidental with the General Convention being held in St. Louis. Membership reach a high point of something less than one hundred. Bishop Jones, Spalding's successor in Utah, was elected President, and the Vice-Presidents were the Rt. Rev. Benjamin Brewster, Bishop of Maine; the Rev. G. Israel Brown; Mr. E. M. Parker; Mr. William F. Cochran and Miss Vida D. Scudder.[4]

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[1] Ibid., p. 294.

[2] Spencer Miller, Jr. & Joseph F. Fletcher, The Church and Industry (New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1930), p. 93.

[3] Ibid., p. 94. [4] Ibid.

The League was convinced that the real causes of the World War were economic, and, therefore, opposed American participation. This policy proved extremely divisive with the League, as many members decided they were in favor of American intervention.[1] The divisions caused by this disagreement were never fully resolved.

During its brief life, the League became directly involved in two significant issues confronting the Church. The first was its spirited defense of its President, the Rt. Rev. Paul Jones. An entire issue of The Social Preparation was devoted to the Jones "case" and petitions were circulated in an effort to persuade the House of Bishops to refuse to accept Bishop Jones' resignation.

At the General Convention of 1919, the League sponsored a series of open-air forums to discuss various economic issues. The League also joined with the Society of the Companions of the Holy Cross in presenting a Resolution to the Convention to urge the United States government to grant clemency to political prisoners who had been imprisoned for their opposition to the war.[2]

In 1924 the League disbanded. Many members of the League went on to play an active role in the Church League for Industrial Democracy, but the Church Socialist League had a very limited impact upon the Church.

Mr. Byron-Curtiss was one of the most outspoken defenders of

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[1] Ibid., p. 95.

[2] Miller and Fletcher are a little misleading on this point. They say: "The memorial was adopted in a resolution." (p. 95). The Memorial was adopted by the House of Bishops, the House of Deputies defeated the Resolution. As the adoption of a Resolution requires the approval of both Houses, the Resolution failed.

Bishop Jones. He edited the "Bishop Jones issue" of The Social Preparation, and was the author of the petition which was circulated on the Bishop's behalf.

Perhaps the most radical of all the Episcopal dissenters was the Rev. Irwin St. John Tucker. Mr. Tucker's entry in Stowes Clerical Directory says only "Non-parochial, Editor, Chicago, Illinois."[1] He held no parochial cure during the war, but he was extremely active in many socialist and pacifist organizations as a leader and propagandist. He was a member of the American Socialist party, the Emergency Peace Federation, the Conference for Democracy, the Church Socialist League, and the Peoples' Council.

From the very outset of the war in Europe, Mr. Tucker opposed it. For Mr. Tucker the war was simply the inevitable manifestation of the failures of capitalism.[2] Mr. Tucker believed that the war "basically was a struggle between Germany's Berlin-to-Bagdad railroad and England's Suez Canal, with no more idealism in it than a battle of cash registers."[3]

Much of Mr. Tucker's protests took the form of poems and songs. One which he wrote in 1916 was entitled "The High Priests of Moloch," the first two stanzas of which read:

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[1] Stowe's Clerical Directory, 1917 ed., s.v. "Tucker, Irwin St. John." Despite the extremely similar names, Irwin St. John Tucker was not directly related to Beverly Dandridge Tucker, the Bishop of Southern Virginia, Irwin St. John Tucker's father was the Rev. Gardiner Chilson Tucker. He had two brothers who were also Episcopal priests: Gardiner Leigh Tucker and Royal Kenneth Tucker. See also Who's Who in America, 1916-1917 ed., s.v. "Tucker, Irwin St. John."

[2] Irwin St. John Tucker, A Minstrel Friar, His Legacy of Song (Chicago: R. F. Seymour, 1949), p. 174.

[3] Ibid.

With flaunted flag and rolling drum
    And lying "patriot" cry
They lure the frightened babes to come
    Where slaughtered victims lie.
For twice two million victims slain
    And wounded three times more
Lie heaped in Moloch's butcher-fane
    Across his blood-soaked floor.

We know them, through their altered guise,
    These Moloch-priests of old;
The harlot judge who rules by lies,
    The thieves that guard our gold;
Rulers who trade their treason is,
    Writers for hire like bawds,
The priests who live by blasphemies,
    The prophets fed on frauds.[1]

Mr. Tucker soon broke company with the Christian Socialists, whom he believed had capitulated totally in the face of the growing war sentiment. He obtained a position with the national office of the Socialist party as their literature director. In that capacity, he composed various pamphlets and broadsides, the most notorious of which was entitled "The Price We Pay." The pamphlet was only eight pages in length, but each page was filled with Mr. Tucker's passionate opposition to capitalism's war. The following are some brief excerpts:

> Conscription is upon us; the draft law is a fact!
>
> Agonies of torture will rend their flesh from their sinews, will crack their bones and dissolve their lungs; every pang will be multiplied in its passage to you.
>
> You cannot avoid it; you are being dragged, whipped, lashed, hurled into it; your flesh and brain and entrails must be crushed out of you and poured into that mass of festering decay. It is the price you pay for your stupidity--you who have rejected Socialism.
>
> Food prices go up like skyrockets, and show no sign of bursting and coming down.
>
> The Attorney General of the United States is so busy sending to prison men who do not stand up when the Star Spangled Banner

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[1] Ibid.

> is played, that he has no time to protect the food supply from gamblers.
>
> Pound on, guns of the embattled host; wreck yet more homes, kill yet more husbands and fathers, rob yet more maidens of their sweethearts, yet more babies of their fathers.
>
> That is the price the world pays for believing the monstrous, damnable, outrageous lie that Socialism would destroy the Home![1]

This pamphlet led to the indictment of Mr. Tucker, Victor L. Berger, William F. Kruse, Adolph Germer, and J. Louis Engdahl for violation of the Espionage Act of 1917. The Espionage Act was adopted on June 15, 1917,[2] and was amended by the Sedition Act, which was passed on May 16, 1918.[3] Between these two laws, they created twelve new offenses. The Espionage Act provided that:

> (1) Whoever, when the United States is at war, shall willfully make or convey false reports or false statements with intent to interfere with the operation or success of the military or naval forces of the United States or to promote the success of its enemies; (2) and whoever, when the United States is at war, shall willfully cause or attempt to cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty, in the military or naval forces of the United States; (3) or shall, willfully obstruct the recruiting or enlistment service of the United States, to the injury of the service or of the United States, shall be punished by a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than twenty years or both.[4]

To this the Sedition Act added the other nine possible crimes:

> (4) saying or doing anything with intent to obstruct the sale of United States bonds, except by way of bona fide and not disloyal advice; (5) uttering, printing, writing, or publishing any disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive language, or language intended to cause contempt, scorn, contumely or disrepute as regards the form of the government of the United States; (6) or

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[1] Pierce et al v. United States, 252 U.S. 239. The entire pamphlet is reprinted in the dissenting opinion of Justice Brandeis.

[2] Act of June 15, 1917, c. 30 Title I, section 3.

[3] 40 Stat 553 (1918).

[4] Zechariah Chafee, Jr. Free Speech in the United States (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1942), p. 39.

> the Constitution; (7) or flag; (8) or the uniform of the Army or Navy; (9) or any language intended to incite resistance to the United States or promote the cause of its enemies; (10) urging any curtailment of production of anything necessary to the prosecution of the war with intent to hinder its prosecution; (11) advocating, teaching, defending, or suggesting the doing of any of these acts; and (12) words or acts supporting or favoring the cause of any country at war with us, or opposing the cause of the United States therein.[1]

It is beyond the scope of this inquiry to examine in any detail the two thousand prosecutions brought under the provisions of these acts.[2] However, two points need to be made. First, the prosecutors and the Federal Courts interpreted these statutes in the broadest possible manner, and they were "rapidly turned into laws under which opinions hostile to the war had practically no protection."[3] Second, and most importantly for this study, a careful examination of all the national Church periodicals found not one article, editorial, or letter which voiced any opposition to these laws until well after the war had ended and the "crisis" had passed. Even then the articles and editorials advocated only clemency for those previously convicted; they did not challenge the wisdom or morality of the laws themselves.

Mr. Tucker and the other four Socialists were indicted for violation of the Espionage Act, but they did not come to trial until after the war was ended. They were charged with conspiracy in writing and circulating seditious and pro-German literature. They denied any conspiracy and argued that they all simply held traditional Socialist views of war.[4]

The trial was held in Chicago before Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis.

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[1] Ibid., pp. 40-41. [2] Ibid., Appendixes I-V. [3] Ibid., p. 63-64.

[4] H. C. Peterson and Gilbert C. File, Opponents of War: 1917-1918 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1957), p. 165.

The defendants alleged that Judge Landis was prejudiced against Socialists and asked that he remove himself from the case. Judge Landis denied any bias and refused to remove himself. Mr. Tucker felt that from that point on the whole trial was slanted against them. As he put it:

> I lost in this trial when the second day was half through. No good sportsman cares to play a game where the dice are loaded and the deck is cold, and the opponent neither knows or cares nothing [sic] about the rules of the game and even the ordinary rules of decency and honor.[1]

All five were found guilty and Judge Landis sentenced each of them to twenty years in a federal penitentiary. They were released on bond, pending their appeal to the United States Supreme Court.

On December 9, 1920, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in the case of Berger et al v. United States.[2] With two dissenting votes the court agreed with the plaintiffs that Judge Landis was in fact biased and should have disqualified himself from hearing the case. The convictions were overturned and the charges were officially dropped in February, 1923.

While Mr. Tucker had not been forced to spend a night in prison, he had paid a very high price for his dissent. But so had Bishop Jones, Mr. Hogue and Mr. Urban. When America decided to go to war, she exacted a high price from those who could not and would not agree. Very few people in the Episcopal Church dared to come to their aid. One voice which was raised publicly on their behalf was that of Dean Hodges of the Episcopal Theological School. Dean Hodges not only defended those who felt compelled by their consciences to object to America's war policy, he also offered a prophetic insight into the reasons for their travail and persecution:

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Berger et al v. United States, 255 U.S. 23.

> They who are persecuted for righteousness' sake are not submissive persons. They would not be persecuted if they were. They are the obstinate souls who will not yield, who pay no heed to the voice of the majority in error, who block the way which leads to falsehood and wrong, and are persecuted because nobody can go that way without encountering them.[1]

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[1] Hodges, Religion in a World at War, pp. 45-46.

PEACE

At the eleventh hour of the eleventh day of the eleventh month, 1918, the fighting stopped and the killing ended; the war was over. The costs had proved staggering almost beyond comprehension: total casualties ran to more than 27,000,000, of whom more than 7,000,000 had died; in money the cost exceeded $249,000,000,000.[1]

With the victory safely won, the Church rejoiced. Yet, amidst the celebration, there was the realization that the world would never quite be the same. An era had ended in the flames of war, and the beginnings of the new world were now being forged. As The Living Church put it: "When Germany surrendered, an era in history--a long, long era--ended. Overnight a new era began. It is the Christian era, Second Series, Year one."[2] Mr. Stires made the same point in a sermon entitled "Faith and Victory":

> Victory is a joyous word, but few of us are using it without a sense of the responsibility it brings. But let no one be depressed by this sense of responsibility. All ancient tyrannies are dead or dying. All the deferred hopes of mankind are blossoming in the sunshine of freedom. What a challenge to the wisdom of the world![3]

The long and acrimonious debate over the terms of the peace, and even more lengthy debate over American participation in the League of Nations were vital ingredients in this "challenge to the wisdom of the world." To pursue either of these topics would lead far beyond the scope of this inquiry.

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[1] March, History of the World War, p. 32.

[2] "Dies Irae, Dies Illa", The Living Church, Vol. 56 (November 16, 1918), p. 68.

[3] Stires, Price of Peace, p. 176.

There was, however, one piece of unfinished business which directly confronted the Episcopal Church and is crucial to this discussion: what was to be done with those who had been imprisoned for their conscientious objection to America's participation in the war? This group included both those who were "conscientiously opposed" to war and those who had been imprisoned as "political prisoners" under the provisions of the Espionage and Sedition Act.[1]

On January 16, 1919, the first one hundred and thirteen conscientious objectors were released from Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.[2] These releases were arranged on an individual basis and did not represent a general amnesty. The plight of the political prisoners and conscientious objectors rapidly gained sympathy within influential circles of the Church. Even The Churchman leant its support. While admitting that the problem of conscientious objectors was "pretty thorny," the editors expressed their concern and perplexity as to "just why America should have gone to such lengths of severity and cruelty in the treatment of political prisoners . . ."[3]

The General Convention of the Episcopal Church met in Detroit, Michigan, in October, 1919. Bishop Brewster of Maine offered the following Resolution:

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[1] Chafee, Free Speech, Appendices. See also Norman Thomas, The Conscientious Objector in America (New York: B. W. Huebsch, Inc., 1923).

[2] Peterson & File, Opponents of War, p. 267.

[3] "Conscientious Objectors," The Churchman, Vol. 119 (January 18, 1919), p. 70.

> WHEREAS, The House of Bishops has received from the Society of the Companions of the Holy Cross a Memorial, asking that the General Convention present to the President of the United States, and other authorities, a request for the immediate release of men and women described as "political prisoners"; and
> WHEREAS, In the execution of laws enacted in war-time to promote military effectiveness, persons innocent of criminal intent, but conscientiously opposed to military service, have been incarcerated; and others have been sentenced for the expression of opinions contrary to public policy in time of war; and
> WHEREAS, The continued imprisonment of such persons, however small their number, after the cessation of hostilities, is calculated to breed discontent; and
> WHEREAS, In spite of the generally humane purpose of commandants and other officers of the military prisons, or "disciplinary barracks," military discipline is inadequate to deal in a satisfactory way with the class of persons known as "absolutists," namely, conscientious objectors who refused, the alternative of non-combatant service of whatever kind under military orders,
> Therefore,be it RESOLVED, the House of Deputies concurring, That this Convention respectfully urges upon the civil authorities discriminating executive clemency for those persons who are still imprisoned for declining to do what their consciences forbade, or who have been sentenced under war-time legislation for the expression of their opinions.[1]

This Resolution was adopted by the House of Bishops.[2] It should be noted, however, that this Resolution was already much weaker than that requested by the Society of the Companions of the Holy Cross.[3] They had asked for an immediate general amnesty; what the House of Bishops adopted was a request for executive clemency on an individual basis. Even this weakened version was unacceptable to the House of Deputies who voted not to concur.[4]

In an editorial, The Churchman lauded the Bishops and chastised the Deputies for their action:

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[1] JGC - 1919, p. 229.

[2] Ibid., p. 230.

[3] For a brief history of this Society, see Miller and Fletcher, The Church and Industry, pp. 90-93.

[4] Ibid., p. 479.

> It is always a pleasure to find the House of Bishops getting the start on the House of Deputies in human liberation. They did the obviously right thing when they passed the resolution recommending discriminating clemency toward the political prisoners and especially conscientious objectors in America. The House of Deputies shouted down the resolution, shouted it down in a manner that left no doubt that their convictions on such matters would stand the best newspaper test of patriotism. We are proud of the House of Bishops that in their action they measured up to the standards set by the leaders of the English Church. We regret exceedingly the temper of the House of Deputies in this matter.[1]

Despite the inaction of the Church, the government continued slowly to release the political prisoners and conscientious objectors. On November 23, 1920, the last thirty-three conscientious objectors were released, and on Christmas Day, 1920, Eugene V. Debs and twenty-three other political prisoners were released.[2] This left one hundred and thirteen still in prison, the last of whom were not released until December 15, 1923.[3]

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[1] "General Convention - Looking Back," The Churchman, Vol. 120 (November 15, 1919), p. 8.

[2] Peterson & File, Opponents of War, p. 279.

[3] Ibid., p. 284.

AFTERWORD

At the Special Meeting of the House of Bishops in 1933, the Bishops adopted a Pastoral Letter which included the following statement of principle:

> We are bound by every solemn obligation to wage unremitting war against war. An excess of nationalism or an attitude of detached unconcern for the ills of other nations, together with the building up of an armed force beyond reasonable national needs, deprives us of any opportunity to be a conserver of the world's peace. Love of country must be qualified by love of all mankind; patriotism is subordinate to religion. The Cross is above the flag. In any issue between country and God, the clear duty of the Christian is to put obedience to God above every other loyalty.[1]

These solemn obligations were ratified by concurrent resolution of both the House of Bishops and the House of Deputies at the General Convention of 1934.[2]

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[1] JGC - 1934, p. 80.

[2] Ibid., pp. 329-334.

III. THE CASE OF BISHOP PAUL JONES

THE MISSIONARY DISTRICT OF UTAH

The Journal of the Special Meeting of the House of Bishops, which was held on April 10 and 11, 1918, at the Cathedral of St. John the Divine, contains the following brief entry:

> "April 11, 1918
>
> "Right Rev. D. S. Tuttle, D.D.,
> "Presiding Bishop
>
> "Right Rev. and Dear Sir:
>
> "I desire to present to you my formal resignation as Bishop of the Missionary District of Utah.
>
> "Faithfully yours,
> "Paul Jones"
>
> The Bishop of Vermont offered the following Resolution:
>
> > RESOLVED, That with full recognition of the right of every member of this House to freedom of speech in political and social matters, subject to the law of the land; nevertheless, in view of Bishop Jones's impaired usefulness in Utah under present conditions, recognized by himself, the House of Bishops accepts the resignation of the Bishop of Utah as now presented.
>
> Which was adopted.
>
> The Presiding Bishop, taking the Chair for that purpose, pronounced the resignation of the Right Rev. Dr. Paul Jones, as Bishop of the Missionary District of Utah, to be complete in accordance with Canon 13, Section V.[1]

At the time of his resignation, the Rt. Rev. Paul Jones was thirty-seven years of age, and in sound physical and emotional condition.

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[1] Journal of the General Convention of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States of America, 1919. (New York: The Abbott Press, 1919), pp. 497-98.

(Hereinafter, the Journal of the General Convention is referred to as the JGC.)

He had been charged with neither any crimes nor the mismanagement of his Missionary District. Yet, both he and his fellow Bishops had come to the inescapable conclusion that he could no longer continue as the Bishop of the Missionary District of Utah.

Behind these few lines in the Journal lies the intricate history of a series of events which are virtually without parallel in the history of the Episcopal Church. To fully understand these events, they must be put into the proper perspective.

The vast westward migration which began in the early 1880's, found the Episcopal Church organizationally unprepared. Addison describes the existing situation and outlook:

> So inflexible was the Church then organized as a mere federation of highly independent dioceses that it was baffled by existing conditions. A state meant a diocese, and a diocese meant a state, and that was all that could be said. That a diocese might comprise more than one state or a state more than one diocese was then a proposition too novel to be considered. Consequently the policy of General Convention was to leave each state or western territory to qualify as a diocese if and when it could, through the use of its own resources. The Convention assumed no responsibility for helping it to grow. It simply waited for it to appear with a signed certificate proving that it had grown.[1]

With such a "wait and see" attitude, the growth of the Episcopal Church lagged badly. However, beginning at the General Convention of 1820 and continuing through the Convention of 1835, the necessary steps were taken to create the "Domestic and Foreign Missionary Society of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States of America". Once founded, properly organized--after a few false starts--and adequately funded, this Society provided the needed financial and spiritual impetus to project the Episcopal Church into the missionary field.[1]

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[1] James Thayer Addison, The Episcopal Church in the United States, 1789-1931 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1951), p.128.

The General Convention of 1835 adopted the significant constitutional and canonical changes to facilitate this growth. As Addison has mentioned, the prevailing attitude had been that once the Episcopalians in a state were sufficiently strong in terms of numbers and finances to constitute themselves as a diocese, they would do so and then apply for recognition as a new diocese of the Church. Under such a system, the initiative and responsibility lay solely with the people in that state. At the Convention of 1835, the Church seized the initiative by creating the office of Missionary Bishop.

While constitutional and canonical changes which created this office are not particularly complex, they do warrant examination. First, the House of Bishops was authorized "to establish Missionary Districts in States and Territories or parts thereof not organized into Dioceses. It may also from time to time change, increase, or diminish the territory in such Missionary Districts. . . ."[2]

Second, the House of Bishops was empowered to nominate and the the House of Deputies to elect, Missionary Bishops to serve in these Districts.[3] Between Meetings of the General Convention, the House of Bishops might elect a Bishop for a Missionary District. Their choice would then require the consent of a majority of the standing committees of the several dioceses. If it became desirable, the House of Bishops also had the power to transfer a Missionary Bishop from one Missionary District to another; and in the case of the permanent disability of the Bishop in charge, to declare the Missionary District vacant, and to elect a new Bishop.[1] All Missionary Bishops elected under these provisions were entitled to a seat and vote in the House of Bishops.[2] Missionary Bishops were to be paid by the Domestic and Foreign Missionary Society and their compensation could not be diminished without their consent. Monies collected within the Missionary District for the support of their Bishop would be "counted contributory" to the salaries of the Bishop.[3] In return the Bishop was required to make an annual report to the Board of Missions of all funds received for the work of his District "together with a specification of all disbursements thereof made by him or under his direction."[4]

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[1] Ibid., p. 133.

[2] Constitution and Canons for the Government of the Protestant Episcopal Church, 1916. Article VI, Section I. (Hereinafter,all references to the Constitution and Canons are, unless otherwise noted, from those appended to the Journal of the General Convention, 1916, for it is under these provisions that the "case" of Bishop Jones evolved.

[3] Canon 10, Section II, Paragraph i.

The Canons further provided that:

> Every Missionary Bishop shall appoint annually a Council of Advice, to be composed of not less than two or more than four Presbyters, and an equal number of Laymen, communicants of this Church, resident within his Missionary District, who shall perform the duties of a Standing Committee for such district, . . .[5]

Finally, the Canons stipulated that the House of Bishops "may accept the resignation of a Missionary Bishop at any session of the House by a vote of not less than two-thirds of those present."[6] In such a situation, or in the case of the Bishop's absence from his District, the

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[1] Canon 10, Section III. [2] Canon 10, Section IV.

[3] Canon 57, Article V, Section I. [4] Canon 57, Article V, Section III.

[5] Canon 14, Section IV, Paragraph ii.

[6] Canon 13, Section VII, Paragraph iii.

Council of Advice of the District was empowered to act as "The Ecclesiastical Authority thereof. . . ."[1]

These changes in the organizational structure of the Episcopal Church went a long way toward the accomplishment of several goals. First, the Church took the initiative in the missionary field. Rather than simply waiting for the Church to organize itself in the West, the national Church created the mechanism by which it would actively evangelize these areas. Addison quotes Bishop Doane to excellent effect in this regard, "A missionary bishop is a bishop sent forth by the Church, not sought for of the Church; going before to organize the Church, not waiting till the Church has partially been organized; a leader, not a follower."[2]

Second, the structures created contained adequate flexibility to allow the Church to respond with alacrity to changing conditions. The size of a Missionary District could be altered. This was important particularly in the West where the cycle of "boom and bust" was quite often repeated, with vast migrations of people running after the latest gold or silver strike, then moving on leaving ghost towns behind. The system was also flexible in that the House of Bishops could move a Missionary Bishop from one District to another to most appropriately match the man with the task.

Third, by paying the Missionary Bishop from the funds of the Missionary Society, the Church sought to insulate, at least partially, the Bishop from the vagaries of rapidly changing public opinion in his District. The requirement that he report annually and specifically on the progress of his work served to tie him directly to the national Church and reinforced his awareness that he was a missionary of that larger and more inclusive body.

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[1] Canon 13, Section V.

[2] Addison, Episcopal Church, pp. 133-134.

Operating under these provisions of the Constitution and Canons, on October 5, 1866, the House of Bishops chose Daniel Sylvester Tuttle to be Missionary Bishop of Montana with jurisdiction in Idaho and Utah. At the time of his election, the Rev. Mr. Tuttle was the Rector of Zion Church, Morris, New York. He was only twenty-nine years old, so his consecration had to be delayed until after his thirtieth birthday on January 26, 1867. The consecration took place on May 1, 1867, at Trinity Chapel, New York; Bishop Hopkins presided, and Bishops Potter, Neely, Randall, Odenheimer and Kerfoot assisted.[1]

The District for which Bishop Tuttle assumed Episcopal responsibility covered 340,000 square miles with 155,000 inhabitants, of whom 100,000 were in Utah. In this whole vast expanse of land, Episcopal services and a church existed in only one place: St. Michaels, Boise, Idaho; and the Missionary there, the Rev. St. Michael Fackler, had left Idaho in October, 1866, for a trip to New York, and died there three days after his arrival.[2] So, while one church building existed in his new District, Bishop Tuttle had not one clergyman.

Bishop Tuttle's first priority, therefore, was to recruit clergymen to go with him to his District. Three men agreed to go: the Rev. D. B. Miller, the Rev. E. N. Goddard, and the Rev. George W. Foote. Mr. Foote, in turn recruited a young Deacon, the Rev. T. W. Haskins.[3]

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[1] W. F Bulkey, "The Episcopal Church in Utah," in Utah's Who's Who - 1948-49. (Salt Lake City, Utah, n.a., 1949), p.75.

[2] Ibid. [3] Ibid., p. 76.

Foote and Haskins left New York on April 5, 1867, and headed for Salt Lake City, which was the largest city in the District and the focal point of the stage coach lines which covered the Territory. They arrived in Salt Lake City during the first week of May.[1]

On May 23, 1867, Bishop Tuttle, his wife and eight month old son, and Mrs. Foote and her daughter, started west from Albany, New York. They arrived in Salt Lake City on July 2, 1967.[2] At the time of their arrival, Utah was still a Territory (it would not become a State until 1896), and nine-tenths of its inhabitants were Mormons. With the exception of some sporadic services conducted at Independence Hall by the Rev. Norman McLeod, an Army Chaplain stationed at nearby Camp Douglas, the services conducted shortly after the arrival of Bishop Tuttle and his party were the first non-Mormon services in the Territory.[3]

One of Bishop Tuttle's first priorities was the founding of schools. The first, St. Mark's Day School, was begun by Foote and Haskins two days before his arrival. Other schools followed: School of the Good Shepherd in Ogden, 1870; St. John's School in Logan, 1873; St. Paul's in Plain City, 1873; St. John's in Layton, 1886; and Rowland Hall in Salt Lake City, 1881. When Utah gained statehood all of these schools, with the exception of Rowland Hall, were turned over to the state.[4]

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid. This fact further supports the sagacity of the General Convention of 1835, and the new impetus which it gave to the missionary efforts of the Church. For the next three years, the Episcopal services were the only non-Mormon services in Utah. In 1870, the Methodists arrived, followed in order by the Roman Catholics, the Presbyterians, the Congregationalists, the Lutherans and the Baptists.

[4] Bulkey, Episcopal Church in Utah, p. 76.

On July 30, 1870, Bishop Tuttle laid the cornerstone of St. Mark's Cathedral, Salt Lake City. In September of the following year, services were moved from Independence Hall to the new church.[1] In March 1870, the Rev. Mr. Haskins held the first church services in Ogden, Utah.[2] The third church in the District, St. Paul's in Salt Lake City was built in 1880.[3]

In 1872 Dr. John Hamilton and Mr. Warren Hussey launched St. Mark's Hospital in Salt Lake City. From the outset, St. Mark's was "entirely under the auspices of the Episcopal Church, and the Church is responsible for its proper management."[4] In 1879 St. Mark's was moved from its quarters in a rented adobe house to its permanent facilities, and it became the first hospital between Denver and the Pacific coast.[5]

In 1886, for the second time, Bishop Tuttle was called to be the Bishop of the Diocese of Missouri. This time he accepted, and on September 1, 1886, took charge of his new diocese. During his twenty-year episcopate, Bishop Tuttle had laid the solid foundation on which the Church could continue to build in Utah. When he arrived, there had been one Episcopal church and not a single clergyman in the whole District. When he left, the District could boast two parishes, thirteen organized missions, twelve clergymen, and nearly a thousand communicants.[6]

With the departure of Bishop Tuttle, the District of Utah, or as it was then constituted, the Missionary District of Utah and Nevada, was without Episcopal supervision until 1888 when the Rev. Abiel Leonard was consecrated Bishop.

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[1] Ibid., p. 77. [2] Ibid. [3] Ibid. [4] Ibid., p. 78. [5] Ibid.

[6] Journal of Convocation - Episcopal Missionary District of Utah and Idaho, 1885, p. 25. (Hereinafter the Journal of the Convocation is referred to as JC. For later comparisons, six parishes and missions with 465 communicants were in Utah. In these churches 208 were baptized and 100 were confirmed in 1885; and their total giving amounted to $10,652.10.

During his twenty-five year episcopate, Bishop Leonard concentrated on two areas of opportunity. First, in 1896 the Congress allocated the responsibility for religious work in the Uintah Reservation to the Episcopal Church. Bishop Leonard opened churches at Randlett and Whiterocks. The facilities at Whiterocks included both a chapel and a small hospital.[1] Another church was built in nearby Vernal.

Bishop Leonard's other concern was that of church out-reach to the various mining camps which had sprung up in the District. At first the work went well, missions were opened in Park City and Eureka; and there was a feeling of cooperation between the churches and the mine-owners, who often provided the buildings for the church and helped to underwrite the cost. However, by 1900 most of the mines had been incorporated and their stock sold all over the country. The owners moved into the cities and their place was taken by resident managers whose loyalties were to the stockholders and not to the residents of the mining towns. Financial assistance from the mines dwindled; and while the missions continued to exist, this work fell upon hard times.[2]

Despite these difficulties, Bishop Leonard's work in Utah grew steadily. By 1901 he could report that the Episcopal Church was present and organized into 31 parishes and missions in the District, with 1630 communicants. During that year, 199 people had been baptized and 195 confirmed. Total contributions in the District exceeded $27,000.[1]

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[1] Bulkey, Episcopal Church in Utah, p.79.

[2] Ibid., p. 78.

In 1903 Bishop Leonard died, and the following year the Rev. Franklin Spencer Spalding was elected as Bishop of Salt Lake, which then consisted of the state of Utah, part of eastern Nevada, a corner of Wyoming, and western Colorado. At the convention of 1907, these boundaries were again re-aligned and the Missionary District of Utah became co-terminus with the state of Utah.[2]

Aside from the continued growth of his District, Bishop Spalding's primary interest lay in education. He was particularly committed to the establishment of a permanent Episcopal presence at the growing colleges and universities in the state. To this end, in 1906, he established St. John's Mission in Logan and recruited the Rev. Paul Jones and the Rev. D. K. Johnston to lead it. The mission was a great success and became the center for most "gentile" activities at the college.[3] To the same end, St. Mary's mission was established at Provo, the site of Brigham Young University, and the Rev. W. F. Bulkey was made Priest-in-charge.[4]

In Salt Lake City Bishop Spalding secured a gift from Mrs. Emery to establish Emery House on the campus of the University of Utah. Emery House was a college residence which provided room and board for approximately fifty men. Under the leadership of the Rev. Maxwell Rice, Emery House became a center of Christian life at the predominantly Mormon university.[5]

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[1] JC - 1901, p. 43. There were now thirteen parishes and missions in Utah. In these churches 188 people were baptized and 130 confirmed in 1901; and their total giving amounted to $14,377.53.

[2] Bulkey, Episcopal Church in Utah, p.79.

[3] Ibid. [4] Ibid. [5] Ibid.

Another concern of Bishop Spalding was to establish a dialogue between the Episcopal Church and the Mormon Church. Under Bishop Tuttle, relations between the two churches were personally cordial, and he had hoped that through continued fraternal contact the rough edges of Mormonism might be worn off. Bishop Spalding's approach was more direct. He became an avid student of the history and life of Mormonism, and published books and pamphlets on the subject. John Howard Melish describes Bishop Spalding's efforts this way:

> His aim was to avoid the spirit of hostility and to confine the efforts of the Church to positive and constructive service to Mormonism. By this method he hoped to accelerate the natural process of Mormon evolution from the state of mind which accepts blood atonement and polygamy up to that which is only satisfied with Christian standards. Mormonism during the past fifty years had been changed, developed, and uplifted by outside influences; it was gradually assuming the likeness of an ordinary Christian sect. Bishop Spalding, realizing the transformation and welcoming it, sought to push it to its consummation.[1]

Like most Missionary Bishops, Bishop Spalding made periodic trips to the East to report on progress, to solicit funds with which to carry on and expand his work, and to recruit priests to work in the District. In the winter of 1906, Bishop Spalding's travels took him to the Episcopal Theological School in Cambridge, Massachusetts. His particular concern was to find two men whom he could send to work at the mission he wanted to create in Logan, Utah; which would minister to the students at the State Agricultural College and at Brigham Young University. He wanted these men to take up residence in Logan and to establish a community house and to exert what influence they could among the college students. Building a church was secondary to the establishment of direct relations with the future leaders of their state. The two men whom he recruited for this task were Donald K. Johnson and Paul Jones.[1]

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[1] John Howard Melish, Franklin Spencer Spalding: Man and Bishop (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1917), p. 165.

Paul Jones was born on November 25, 1880, in the rectory of St. Stephen's Episcopal Church, Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania; where his father was the Rector.[2] He was educated at the Harry Hillman Boys' Academy in Wilkes-Barre, and in 1898 followed two of his brothers in matriculating at Yale.[3]

Paul Jones originally desired to major in forestry, but his father persuaded him to prepare for the ministry.[4] His days at Yale were uneventful, and he held down a succession of part-time and summer jobs to help finance his eduction. Only two episodes require further notice. The first is the fact that he spent one summer vacation working as a strike-breaker in a Pennsylvania coal mine, and this adventure caused a good deal of discomfort to the conscience of a future socialist. The other summers he spent working in the tax office of Wilkes-Barrre, and the knowledge of accounting which he acquired while there was of great value to himself and Bishop Spalding in their work in the District.[5]

In the fall of 1902 Paul Jones enrolled in the Episcopal Theological School at Cambridge. During his career at Cambridge he traveled extensively through Scandinavia and Europe; and also spent a summer in California, where he met Mary Elizabeth Balch, who would later become his wife.[6] Paul Jones graduated in the class of 1906 and left for the Missionary District of Utah. For eight years Paul Jones carried on the Church's work in Logan. For the first seven years he was paid $75 a month, and when it was raised to $90 a month he felt he could afford to marry. On June 14, 1913, he and Mary Balch were married, and they honeymooned in a covered wagon in Utah Canyon, then returned to continue his work at Logan.[1]

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[1] John Howard Melish, Paul Jones: Minister of Reconciliation (New York: The Fellowship of Reconciliation, 1942), p.21.

[2] Ibid., p.15. [3] Ibid. [4] Ibid. [5] Ibid., p. 16. [6] Ibid., p. 17.

The church in Logan had grown to contain a gymnasium, club, classrooms, and a small chapel. Activities of various kinds were held throughout the week, and on Sunday, Jones and Johnson would preach. Attendance grew steadily, and Mormons came in large numbers to listen. In a letter of October 13, 1906, Bishop Spalding described their success:

> Jones and Johnson are doing splendidly. They are very happy and the people all like them. They gave me a reception in the rectory; at least one hundred people were out, and we had a grand time. They are encouraged and I really believe will do a lot of good. I think they appreciate that it is to be slow, hard work, but they see the need and are full of enthusiasm and they propose, too, to get other men from Cambridge. It is wonderful what an impression they have made on the town. It's the first time really well-educated gentlemen have been sent there. I'm hoping great things for Logan.[2]

Bishop Spalding believed in giving his priests a great deal of responsibility and authority. He wrote to Paul Jones: "You must be the Bishop in that section of the District. Let me come in and help you when I can be of any help."[3] When Bishop Spalding delivered a lecture on Mormonism that Jones and Johnson felt had hindered their work in Logan, they wrote the Bishop and asked him not to lecture again on that topic in Logan for at least a year. He replied: "Of course I will, you are the Bishop here."[4]

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[1] Ibid., p.22.

[2] Melish, Spalding, p.174.

[3] Ibid., p. 261. [4] Ibid.

When the Church was divided into "Departments", each with an Executive Secretary, Bishop Spalding nominated Paul Jones for the Eighth Department. In a letter of January 8, 1911, Bishop Spalding said: "I'm sure Paul Jones would make a splendid secretary of the Eighth Department. I'm going to nominate him, but I would hate to lose him."[1]

The Department selected another man, however, and Bishop Spalding transferred Jones to Salt Lake City to be priest-in-charge of St. Peter's and St. Paul's Churches. Bishop Spalding also appointed Paul Jones, who had been serving as the Secretary of the Convocation of the District since 1907, to be Archdeacon of Utah.[2] In this position, Paul Jones was able to use his background in accounting and management to free the Bishop of most of these responsibilities, so that he could travel and evangelize more widely in the District. In September 1914, Bishop Spalding happily reported that: "Jones is certainly taking hold splendidly in Salt Lake."[3]

From all this it is quite evident that Bishop Spalding had the highest regard for Paul Jones' professional competence. But their relationship was much more than that. They shared a common understanding of the world and its problems, and a commitment to social justice and peace. They also had a deep personal relationship. The Jones' daughter was christened Barbara Spalding Jones.

Bishop Spalding was a Socialist, and this philosophy deeply influenced and eventually won Paul Jones. Bishop Spalding delivered his first lecture on Socialism in his District in April 1907 in Rhyolite, Nevada. The next day the Rhyolite Herald reported: ". . .the brand of socialism championed by him is the safe and sane kind, that would work injustice to no one and be the means of uplifting the whole human race."[1]

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[1] Ibid., p. 270. [2] Ibid.

[3] Melish, Jones, p. 24.

Bishop Spalding's sympathetic biographer, Howard Melish, recounts that:

> In Lent, 1908, Bishop Spalding gave a series of lectures in St. Paul's Church, Salt Lake City, on "Christianity and Social Reform", three of which were entitled, "The History of Socialism", "Karl Marx and Scientific Socialism", and "The Great Cooperative Commonwealth." In these lectures, before a congregation that filled every seat and crowded the aisles, he avowed his belief in straight Marxian Socialism. The reception of these lectures on Socialism was a mighty encouragement to Spalding.[2]

In 1913 Bishop Spalding took his philosophy to the General Convention of the Episcopal Church, and preached on "The Church and Democracy". The reception was rather hostile, as Melish describes it: "This bishop, like him of Tekoa, was told by the Church in General Convention assembled, to go back to his sheep."[3]

While Bishop Spalding was an avid and committed socialist, he was not insensitive to the criticism which he received. He did not back away from his beliefs, but he was careful that they not do unnecessary damage to the work and continued growth of the Church.

> I'm convinced that it is a clergyman's duty to speak his mind frankly on all matters social and political which have a moral side, though I believe he can often do it more usefully outside his pulpit than in it. I am a socialist, but I think I can get in my work for socialism elsewhere and as a special lecturer more usefully than in a pulpit.[4]

As well as being a socialist, Bishop Spalding was also a pacifist. When World War I broke out in 1914, his first sermon upon his return from vacation was on peace.[5] And when his visit to the Uintah Indian

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[1] Ibid., p. 242. [2] Ibid., p. 244. [3] Ibid., p.235.

[4] Ibid., pp.278-79. [5] Ibid., p. 285.

Reservation took him by a fort at which soldiers were busy drilling, he wrote: "What a waste of money it is, learning to kill."[1]

Bishop Spalding's socialism and his pacifism, and his willingness to speak out on issues of conscience were all accepted and adopted by Paul Jones. He was truly the spiritual son of Bishop Spalding.

On September 26, 1914, a young girl of eighteen lost control of her speeding car on a Salt Lake City street, and the accident instantly took the life of Bishop Spalding.

A brief notice of Bishop Spalding's death in the Southern Churchman concluded: "His episcopate in Utah has been very successful in the upbuilding of the Church in that difficult field, and his untimely death is a sad blow to the missionary work of the Church in the great West."[2] The statistics for the Missionary District of Utah for the year 1914 support this assessment. There were now twenty-four parishes and missions in the District with 1426 communicants. In 1914, 160 people had been baptized and 62 confirmed, and $16,513.68 had been collected for the work of the Church.[3]

In the editorials and articles which eulogized Bishop Spalding, one begins to feel the stature of the man whom Paul Jones would succeed. During his episcopate in Salt Lake City, Bishop Spalding had won the respect of virtually all groups in the community. The Living Church reported:

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[1] Melish, Jones, p.24.

[2] "Death of Bishop Spalding", The Southern Churchman, Vol. 79 (Oct. 3, 1914), p.4.

[3] JC - 1914, p. 67.

> It would be impossible for more general sympathy to be expressed by a community than that which has been drawn out by Bishop Spalding's death as the daily papers of Salt Lake City bear witness.[1]

The Salt Lake Herald Republican praised him particularly for his successful efforts to retire the debt and expand the facilities of St. Mark's Hospital, and for his work with Emery House and Rowland Hall.[2] A subsequent edition of the same newspaper contained a eulogy by the Roman Catholic Bishop of Utah, Bishop Scanlan.[3] A "prominent labor leader of Utah" was quoted by the Herald Republican as saying:

> In the death of Bishop Spalding the working people of Utah and the entire country lose a warm friend, an intelligent adviser, and a faithful and untiring supporter. He has known and held the implicit confidence of laborers of all classes.[4]

The universally high regard in which Bishop Spalding was held, was due as much to his personality and style as it was to the causes for which he stood. He was a man of humility. In an article in The Churchman, the Rev. James Sheerin recounted Bishop Spalding's semi-humorous response when an enthusiastic visitor from another land knelt and begged his Episcopal blessing: "'I didn't know just what an Episcopal blessing was,' he protested, 'but what I had I gave!' A stricter Churchman could have done no more!"[5]

In addition to his humility, Bishop Spalding seems to have personified Thomas Buchanan Read's maxim: "I hate the sin, but I love the sinner." As was mentioned above, one of the signal events of Bishop

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[1] "Death of Bishop Spalding", The Living Church, Vol. 51 (Oct. 10, 1914), p. 793.

[2] Ibid. [3] Ibid. [4] Ibid.

[5] James Sheerin, "Bishop Spalding of Utah: An Appreciation," The Churchman, Vol. 110 (Oct. 17, 1914), p. 515.

Spalding's life was his address to the General Convention meeting at the Cathedral of St. John the Divine. Bishop Charles Williams described the scene he witnessed that day:

> The storm of the Rockies was in that pulpit clothed in lawn sleeves. The words uttered were flames of lightning and crashes of thunder, men and women gripped the pews in front of them. The Bishops, prominent divines, and eminent laymen were portrayed as a capitalistic convention, class conscious and strangely indifferent to wrongs, injustices, distress and oppression all about them, which cried to God and broke the heart of Christ. That class consciousness and indifference stultified their very Christian name and profession. It was Amos again, come from the sheepfolds and sycamore trees of the far-off wilderness of Tekoa, to the king's chapel at fashionable and wealthy Bethel, to denounce king and court to their faces.[1]

Yet, Bishop Williams continued:

> He was the prophet of conscience and heart alike. . . . His great, loving heart went out to all alike, to those he denounced as well as to those he championed. He realized that the capitalist was often as much a victim and product of the circumstances that surrounded him and the system in which he was forced to live and work as the proletariat. And his tenderness and charity embraced them all.[2]

Even Bishop Spalding's socialism, which could have proven divisive, was a singular blend of socialist analysis and Christian love. His was not the socialism of an ideologue, but that of a Christian pastor. Bishop Williams put it this way:

> But his Socialism was of a unique kind. It was not the Socialism of mere economic determinism or materialism, the Socialism that is interested chiefly, if not exclusively, in the mere question of the distribution of wealth, of creature comforts--bread and meat and clothes and money. It was a spiritual and moral socialism, the Socialism of justice and righteousness; above all, the Socialism of love, a tender, passionate, Christian love for all the weak, the disinherited and oppressed. He was called a Christian Socialist, and that is true in the sense I have just described it. And yet

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[1] Charles D. Williams, "Bishop Spalding: An Appreciation", The Living Church, Vol. 52 (Jan. 9, 1915), p.334.

[2] Ibid.

> I would transpose the words and call him a Socialist Christian. The adjective should become the substantive, the substantive the adjective.[1]

From Howard Melish's biography, especially from the Bishop's correspondence contained within it, and from the eulogies which mourned his death, a picture of Bishop Spalding emerges. He was a man of great energy and commitment, who brought great growth to the Church in Utah. He was a man of principle and conviction who was neither intimidated by his adversaries nor overly impressed with his own righteousness or high office. He was a humble and sincere man with whom people of all stripes and means could identify as an empathetic friend and compassionate pastor, whether or not they agreed with his socialist and pacifist principles.

In this, The Churchman agreed:

> Bishop Spalding was a Socialist. Many of us could not follow him in his very radical political and economic views; but there was none who did not recognize that his Socialism was a thing laid upon him by fervent and whole-souled devotion to the truth as he saw it in Jesus Christ. If he was ruthless at times in his denunciation of what he regarded as the injustice of the existing social order, it was his passion for humanity, and his zeal for the Church of his allegiance which prompted his speech. It is such extreme radicalism as that which characterized the late Bishop of Utah which the church needs in order to preserve the balance against the overweight of ultra-conservatism.[2]

J. Howard Melish eloquently summarized the character of Bishop Spalding:

> Of heroic mold, with a spirit brave and gentle; clean cut in his thinking, and forceful in his speech; with a heart that beat in

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[1] Ibid.

[2] "Bishop Spalding, "The Churchman, Vol. 110 (Oct. 3, 1914), p. 432.

sympathy with the poor and the oppressed, and with a vision of an economic order wherein the poor were to possess the full product of their labor, Frank Spalding lived in his time and place, a man among men, and a Bishop such as we shall not see his like again.[1]

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[1] J. Howard Melish, "Rt. Rev. F. S. Spalding, D.D.: An Appreciation," The Churchman, Vol. 110 (Oct. 10, 1914), p. 470.

BISHOP JONES OF UTAH

On October 7 and 8, 1914, the House of Bishops convened for its Special Meeting in the Parish House of St. Mark's Church, Minneapolis, Minnesota. The Journal reports the proceedings:

> The Bishops deposited their ballots; and the Rev. Paul Jones a Presbyter of the District of Utah, was found on the first ballot to have received a majority of the votes and was thereupon declared by the Chairman to have been chosen Bishop of the Missionary District of Utah. The Chairman appointed the Bishop of Western Colorado and the Bishop of Olympia a Committee to inform the Bishop-elect of his election."[1]

Paul Jones was the obvious candidate to succeed Bishop Spalding; his long and eminently successful service in the District, his demonstrated administrative abilities as Archdeacon, and his deep personal relationship with his predecessor all worked in his favor. There was no opposition.[2]

The selection of Paul Jones to be the Missionary Bishop of Utah was uniformly well received by the church periodicals. The Living Church cited the training which Bishop Jones had received from Bishop Spalding and opined that "promotion is the right policy in such cases and we have no doubt it is here. . . ."[3] The editor went on to send "its congratulations to each of these Bishops-elect and also to the respective fields to which they are called to work."[1] The Churchman concurred in the wisdom of the Bishops' selection, and added:

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[1] JGC,-1916, p. 392. Bishop Benjamin Brewster of Western Colorado and Bishop Keator of Olympia were given this honor because it was they who had nominated Paul Jones.

[2] Melish, Jones, p. 26.

[3] "The New Bishops-Elect," The Living Church, Vol. 51 (Oct. 14, 1914), p. 817.

> In the choice of the Rev. Paul Jones as Bishop of Utah, a man was chosen who has given his whole ministry of nearly ten years to that diocese, a man very closely associated with Bishop Spalding, and having his confidence. Mr. Jones has been steadfast in his devotion to the work in Utah, declining many opportunities to take work elsewhere.[2]

The consecration of Bishop Jones, and Bishop George C. Hunting, the newly chosen Bishop of Nevada, was held on December 16, 1914, at St. Mark's Cathedral, Salt Lake City. Bishop Jones was presented by the Rt. Rev. Robert L. Paddock, Bishop of Eastern Oregon, and the Rt. Rev. Nathaniel S. Thomas, Bishop of Wyoming. Along with the Presiding Bishop, the Rt. Rev. Daniel Sylvester Tuttle, his co-consecrators were the Rt. Rev. William H. Moreland, Bishop of Sacramento, and the Rt. Rev. Benjamin Brewster, Bishop of Western Colorado.[3]

At the luncheon which followed, Dean Colladay, speaking for Utah, assured Bishop Jones of the "loyal love and support of his clergy and workers."[4] The Dean then presented Bishop Jones with a Bishop's Agenda which had originally been given to Bishop Leonard, and at his death to Bishop Spalding, and now to Bishop Jones. He also remarked that this book and the presence of Bishop Tuttle, the first Bishop of Salt Lake, gave "evidence of the unbroken Episcopate in Utah."[5]

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[1] Ibid.

[2] "The Meeting of the House of Bishops," The Churchman, Vol. 110 (Oct. 24, 1914), p. 532.

[3] "Consecration of Two Missionary Bishops," The Southern Churchman", Vol. 80 (Jan. 2, 1915), p. 7.

[4] Ibid. [5] Ibid.

If there were those in Utah who felt that the demise of Bishop Spalding meant the end of a commitment to economic radicalism in the episcopate of Utah, the consecration sermon of Bishop Nichols of California should have disabused them of this notion. The Southern Churchman reported that Bishop Nichols,

> . . . did a bold thing in departing from the well beaten paths along which consecration sermons are wont to move so smoothly and orthodoxly. He preached a long and confessedly "radical" sermon on money, if you please from the texts "The fellowship of the ministering," 2 Cor. 8:9 and, "The love of money is a root of all kinds of evil," 1 Timothy 6:10.[1]

Bishop Nichols defined radicalism as going to the real root of matters. For the Bishop, the root issue for modern man was the use or misuse of money. He said:

> Or to use a phrase of the stirring voice, alas now stilled! that from this See spoke so ardently and so rousingly upon modern phases of human interest, there loomed up the choosing between "dollars and men." The money test was to be a character test. It was to signify not a little how the individual or the age of the new manhood in Christ Jesus was to find the "real root of the matter." It was only another way of using Christ's clarifying question by the bidding of "Show me the tribute money"--that coin current--is it a tribute to your love of it in itself? Or a tribute to your use of it to prove your Christian sense that your fellowman is your neighbor and your brother?[2]

Bishop Nichols defended this type of radicalism as "both apostolic and apt," and it is a "radicalism to which all really progressive followers of Jesus Christ can give intelligent and loyal adherence."[3] And if the just use of money is the radical test by which we are to judge the modern world, the Bishop found the world and its leaders to be sadly lacking.

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[1] "Conscience-Money Radicalism," The Southern Churchman, Vol. 80 (Jan. 16, 1915), p.4.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

Bishop Nichols' "radical" sermon provided a symbolic link between the episcopate of Bishop Spalding and his successor, Bishop Jones.

During the first week of August 1914, war had broken out in Europe, and has been noted earlier, Bishop Spalding spoke out in favor of pacifism and against the "preparedness" movement in the United States. Throughout 1915, however, the war in Europe had little effect upon the Church in Utah.[1]

On May 26 and 27, 1915, the Convocation of the Missionary District of Utah met at St. Paul's Church, Salt Lake City. In his Annual Address, Bishop Jones reported that because of the solid foundation laid by Bishop Spalding and the short time in which the District was without a Bishop, "that the District has suffered no setback in its work."[2] The report of the Committee on the State of The Church bore out Bishop Jones' conclusions.[3]

He went on to say that the "primary need of the District . . . is for more intensive work, that the foundation may be strengthened rather than the boundaries be enlarged."[4]

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[1] Rather than continually repeating the changing views of members of the Episcopal Church to the war in Europe, the reader is encouraged to refer to the previous chapter.

[2] JC - 1915, p. 21.

[3] "Report of the Committee on the State of the Church,. JC - 1915, p. 45. The report concludes:

"The esprit de corps of the clergy and workers is seen in the loyalty with which we greet our new Bishop and with splendid cooperation on the part of the laity have endeavored to advance our cause in Utah."

In 1915 there were 23 parishes and missions in Utah with 1434 communicants, a gain of 3%. In 1915, 197 people were baptized, a gain of 23%; and 99 were confirmed, a gain of 60%. $19,838.85 was raised for the work of the Church, a gain of 20%.

[4] JC - 1915, p. 23.

> To this end I would recommend to the clergy constructive preaching. Interpret present day life in terms of religion, show how the ways of the Church meet human needs, point the way out of present evils, hold up for emulation the good, and never preach a sermon unless you believe that someone will be the better and stronger for it.[1]

This highly veiled reference to "present evils," which may or may not have included the war in Europe, is the only reference to political or economic issues in the record of the Convocation.[2] The year 1915 was quiet and marked a steady growth in the Missionary District of Utah.[3]

In the early fall of 1916, "An Appeal for Peace" appeared in The Churchman[4] and The Living Church.[5] The appeal appeared over the signatures of the Rt. Rev. Charles D. Williams, Bishop of Michigan; the Rt. Rev. Paul Jones, Bishop of Utah; the Rev. Mercer Green Johnston of Trinity Church, Newark; the Rev. Irwin St. John Tucker, Editor, the Christian Socialist; and the Rev. Lyford P. Edwards of the University of Chicago. The authors sought the signatures of other clergy and laymen "for its presentation to the delegates to the General Convention."[6]

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[1] Ibid.

[2] One interesting exception: The District changed its Canons to read: "Every lay-worker, whether man or woman, having official appointment from the Bishop, shall have a seat and vote in Convocation."

[3] See also, S. R. Colladay, "Perpetuating a Ministry of Good Works: A Memorial to the Late Bishop Spalding," The Churchman, Vol. 113 (April 1, 1916), pp. 438-9.

[4] "An Appeal for Peace," The Churchman, Vol. 114 (Sept. 9, 1916), pp. 430-41.

[5] "An Appeal for Peace," The Living Church, Vol 55 (Aug. 19, 1916), p.569.

[6] Ibid.

The appeal began:

> At a time when the world is crashing to its ruin in flame and blood, the Episcopal Church in the United States is engaged in a family quarrel which brings upon us the contempt of all men.[1]

They argued that the issues which presently divided the Church, the battle over its Catholic or Protestant heritage, and the fight over loyalty to the Prayer Book, had distracted it from the real concerns of the Church. The common enemies of Christ and his Kingdom--war, hunger, and injustice--were being ignored while the Church fought over in-house issues. "It is as though two divisions of an army in the field were to turn their guns on one another, because of differences regarding historical tactics and the proper cut of uniforms, forgetful of the foe which conquered by their dissension."[2]

The authors concluded:

> Here in this nation, poverty stretches its blackness across a land gifted with natural riches surpassing the imagination. In a country dedicated to equality of opportunity and universal justice, injustice rules our lives. Our courts and justice are all too frequently estranged; our industrial order is built upon greed; our nation is constantly upheaved with internal strife; our political life is full of corruption, our municipal households are full of violence and uncleanness. We have made no serious effort to obey the command, "Wash you, make you clean!"
>
> Let us who are in earnest about our Christian profession demand that these noisy disputants cease their wrangling, and join for the salvation of the world. Let the dead bury their dead; but let us come and follow Him, to preach the good news to the poor, and bring to pass the kingdom of God upon earth, to the destruction of the kingdom of sin, Satan, and death which rules it now.[3]

The Churchman reprinted the appeal without comment, The Living Church, however, did offer its assessment of the situation. First, they expressed their "sympathy with the evident purpose of the manifesto

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid. [3] Ibid.

. . . while yet regretting that it should have seemed to them desirable that it be cast in its present form."[1] The Living Church contended that while some divisions did exist within the Church, these divisions were significant only in small areas, such as New York and Philadelphia, and that on the whole the Church had not been significantly diverted by this partisan squabbling.

The Living Church agreed wholeheartedly with the need for the Church, and specifically the House of Bishops, to speak out on the subject of the war. In 1914 just after the outbreak of the war, The Living Church had published an editorial calling upon the Bishops, who were about to meet in Special Session in Minneapolis to speak out pastorally about the war. Their appeal had gone unanswered. In 1915, the editors continued, they had sought with others to urge the Bishops to call a Special Session to deal with the issues.

> In this emergency about half the bishops arose to the occasion, and the number who consented to the call was within something like a half dozen, if we remember rightly, of enough to ensure the special session; but just enough bishops refused their help to prevent the session from being held.[2]

The urgent appeal for a Special Session failed, and "among those who refused to help in the quieting of the disputation were the two bishops who have signed this manifesto."[3]

In a note of exasperation, The Living Church concluded:

> And we cannot resist wondering whether our friends who have given their names to this extraordinary document are sufficiently

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[1] "An Appeal for Peace,", The Living Church, Vol 55 (Aug. 19, 1916), p.562.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

> in touch with the real thought of the Church to enable them to draw satisfactory inferences concerning it. Will they not do their fellow Churchmen the honor to abandon a position of critical aloofness, which some of them have long seemed to enjoy, and throw themselves more heartily into the living movements in the Church? Perhaps by thus rubbing up more frequently against their fellow Churchmen, by pursuing a greater degree of the spirit of fellowship by trying to do justice to the thought of other Churchmen, and by receding from that position of self-satisfied contempt for the sensibilities and the opinions of other men and women with whom they disagree, they would find that we also who live on lower spiritual planes than they are really trying in our poor, halting way, with many failures and with many perplexities, to "bring to pass the Kingdom of God upon earth."[1]

With the exception of this brief foray into the politics of the national Church, and the slap in the wrist which it received, Bishop Jones' attention in 1916 was directed almost exclusively to the work of his District.

The Ninth Annual Convocation of the Missionary District was held on September 6 and 7, 1916 in Vernal, Utah. Traditionally, the Convocation met in May, but Vernal was one hundred and fifty miles from the nearest railroad line, and could only be reached by automobile, which in turn required a later date because the muddy road would have been impassable in spring.[2] The reports presented to the Convocation by the various Church organizations were quite positive and optimistic.

The statistical report was somewhat less glowing.[3] There were now 26 parishes and missions in the District, and the number of baptized and confirmed members both increased. There was, however, a small decline in the number of confirmations, and total disbursements. The Committee on the State of the Church suggested that the small decline in confirmations was due to the fact that two parishes and one mission had scheduled their confirmations to take place after the deadline for the reception of their annual reports; and that the small decline in disbursements from 1915, although the figures were still an improvement over 1914, was "perhaps . . . due to a relapse after stimulated energies had raised the Emergency Fund and large gifts for war sufferers."[1] The Committee concluded its report by saying that it "is most optimistic over the condition of the District, and is gratified to see signs of healthy growth in the vigorous work of the Bishop and Archdeacon in new places."[2]

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[1] Ibid.

[2] "Convocation of Utah," The Living Church, Vol. 55 (Sept. 23, 1916), p. 748.

[3] JC - 1916, p. 67.
In 1916 the 26 parishes and missions reported 1445 communicants. During the year, 175 people were baptized and 69 confirmed. $18,855.21 was raised for the work of the Church.

In his address, Bishop Jones expressed his deep hope that the Convocation would "see fit to express itself decidedly on the advisability of Prohibition for Utah."[3] To this end, the Convocation adopted two resolutions. The first stated:

> Resolved, That we are in hearty favor of National Constitutional Prohibition and will do all within our power to secure the adoption of an amendment to the Constitution forever prohibiting the sale, importation for sale, and exportation for sale of intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes in the United States. . . .[4]

The Journal reports that "after hearty comments in favor of this move, it was unanimously adopted."[5]

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[1] "Report of the Committee on the State of the Church," JC - 1916, p. 50.

[2] Ibid.

[3] "Bishop's Annual Address - 1916," JC - 1916, p. 22.

[4] JC - 1916, p. 8.

[5] Ibid.

A further resolution calling on the Legislature of the State of Utah to adopt laws "as would guarantee the prevention of the sale, manufacture and importation of liquor within the State,"[1] was also adopted. The vote on this resolution--11 in favor and 8 opposed--was closer for two reasons: less lay delegates were present at the time of its consideration; and second, because some members believed that the stand of the Convocation in favor of Prohibition was already sufficiently manifest in the previous resolution calling for national Prohibition, rendering this motion redundant.[2]

These resolutions concerning Prohibition are significant because they established a precedent for the Missionary District. With these resolutions, and one calling upon the state legislature to outlaw the Peyote cult among Indians, the District showed its willingness to take a definite stand on political issues, and to petition the government for action to attain these goals. If, as some churchmen in Utah would later argue in opposition to Bishop Jones' statements in favor of neutrality and pacifism, that the Church ought not to become involved in political issues, these resolutions stand in evidence that the Church in Utah had done so in the past.

In his Annual Address previously cited, the Bishop went on to say:

> . . . and I also hope that Convocation can record its belief in a policy of aggressive good will toward other nations as a more effective method of preparedness, than the policy of fear and suspicion and armament that is being entered upon at present.

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[1] Ibid., pp. 11-12.

[2] Ibid.

> Never before has the church had such a magnificent opportunity of holding up before the world its belief in love and service as the all-conquering powers in the world.[1]

Bishop Jones's "hope" was not realized. The Committee on the Bishop's Address, while praising the rest of his report, concluded:

> While your Committee is in entire accord with the Bishop's belief expressed in his address in a national attitude of good will towards other nations, yet we are unanimously agreed that we do not care to recommend to Convocation that it express disapproval of the recent action of Congress in respect to national protection."[2]

Despite the refusal of the Committee to endorse the Bishop's stand, the Rev. W. F. Bulkey of St. Mary's, Provo, offered the following resolution:

> Be it resolved, that we, in Convocation assembled, do hereby declare that we are utterly opposed to preparedness for war; to all military and naval training, and to all movements that make for the strengthening and furtherance of the spirit of war. That we do also hereby declare ourselves unqualifiedly in favor of an active and energetic movement for the promoting and advancing of a real preparedness for peace, founded upon the divine principles of love and brotherhood, and that we believe it to be our solemn duty to preach and act, so that the life of the world shall become based upon the Gospel of the Prince of Peace.[3]

The vote on the resolution was four in favor, ten opposed. The motion failed.[4]

For Bishop Jones, therefore, 1916 was, with one significant exception, a year of continued growth and progress. Bishop Jones could report to the Board of Missions that the "outlook is decidedly encouraging."[1] New missions had been opened, new converts made, and the many diocesan institutions were growing well.

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[1] "Bishop's Annual Address - 1916, JC - 1916, p. 22.

[2] "Report of Committee on Bishop's Address,", JC - 1916, p.49. The Committee consisted of J. H. Dennis, chairman, and S. Augusta Maison, and J. Wesley Twelves.

[3] JC - 1916, p.12.

[4] Ibid.

He had also been successful in leading his district to take a stand on two social issues. First the Convocation had adopted resolutions supporting Prohibition, and calling for the government in Utah to suppress the Peyote cult among the Indians. On both these issues, the District had responded favorably to the Bishop's leadership.

Only on the issue of the war had Bishop Jones been unsuccessful. Despite his efforts, the Convocation had decisively rejected taking a stand against preparedness and American involvement. Despite this set-back, his District continued to prosper. Bishop Jones summarized the year by telling the Board of Missions: "We have a loyal enthusiastic staff of workers among whom entire harmony prevails. The people in the missions respond to the leadership of the clergy. New fields are being developed."[2]

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[1] Paul Jones, "Annual Report 1916," Report to the Board of Missions (Salt Lake City, Utah, 1916), p. 7.

[2] Ibid.

BISHOP JONES AND WORLD WAR I

On January 31, 1917, the German government announced that it would resume unrestricted submarine warfare beginning the very next day. This announcement and the threat to the very survival of Great Britain which it contained made American participation in the war virtually inevitable.[1]

On Monday night, March 26, 1917, a patriotic rally in support of American participation in the war was held at the Mormon Tabernacle in Salt Lake City. According to one reporter, the rally "touched the very depths of the souls of the thousands who participated."[2] The reporter hailed the rally as having "kindled the patriotic impulses of the people as nothing else had done in all the history of the state. . . ."[3]

The following night, March 27, a group of approximately five hundred people met at Unity Hall under the auspices of the Socialists of Salt Lake City to demonstrate their support for continued American neutrality. The principle speaker was Bishop Jones. Referring to the "patriotic" rally of the previous night, he said:

> The speakers at the Tabernacle Monday night put democracy, loyalty, and truth in terms of guns, fighting and bloodshed; terms that this new world, if not the old, have grown beyond.[4]

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[1] See pages 32-129 above for chronology and details of changing American and Episcopal attitudes towards the war.

[2] "Straight Talk," Goodwin's Weekly, March 31, 1917, p. n.a.

[3] Ibid.

[4] "Bishop Jones' Speech Causes Stir in Church," Deseret News, March 28, 1917, p. 2.

He continued, that although he had been called upon to refute the arguments of Monday night's speakers, "he had found no arguments to refute."[1]

> No adequate reasons were presented by any of the representatives of the state or federal governments for entering into war. There was nothing but an emotional appeal and the people were carried off their feet. There was no appeal for democracy or for suffering humanity in Europe.[2]

Bishop Jones concluded:

> I believe that we should stand by the President. But we should not forsake the high ideals we have always held. The President is still in a position to keep us out of war. There is still time to appeal to him with sentiments other than those fostered by hot-headed psuedo-patriots of today.[3]

The meeting continued with other socialist and pacifist speakers, and at the conclusion a resolution was adopted "protesting against the entrance of the country into war unless the matter be determined by a referendum of the people."[4]

Reaction to Bishop Jones' remarks was swift in coming. Goodwin's Weekly editorialized:

> The very next night a sorry bunch of Socialists led by the Bishop of the Utah Diocese of the Episcopalian church, the Rt. Rev. Paul Jones (what a travesty of the illustrious name of the Paul Jones of old), got together and pulled off a one horse opposition meeting of their own. That would have been bad enough at best, but the white-livered outfit didn't stop there. After attempting to ridicule the proceedings of the great meeting in the Tabernacle, and after the simple-minded bishop undertook to cite the character of George Washington in justification of their cowardly action, they adopted a resolution aimed to belittle and offset the ringing reso-

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[1] "Bishop Denounces Big Mass Meeting," Salt Lake Tribune, March 28, 1917, p. n. a.

[2] "Bishop Jones' Speech," p. 2.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

> lutions of the night before, and to create a wrong impression of the sentiment in Utah.[1]

Prominent Episcopalians in Salt Lake City seized the first opportunity to disavow and disown Bishop Jones' remarks. Hugh A. McMillin, vestryman of St. Mark's Cathedral and managing director of the citizens' military training camp committee, issued a statement to the Deseret News for immediate publication in which he said:

> It should be thoroughly understood by the people of Salt Lake that Bishop Paul Jones, who addressed a session of Socialist-pacifists last night, that the bishop was speaking merely as an individual, and not in any way as a bishop of the church. . . . I wish the people of this community to know that the thinkers and loyal Americans in the church do not stand behind him in his remarks and would like the Bishop, for the good of the church whom he has been sent to guide, through no choice of its members, to publicly acknowledge over his signature, that his remarks were made as a private individual and that they were intended to cast no insult to the members of the church which he is supposed to have ordained his life to serve.[2]

That afternoon, March 28, a special meeting of the Vestry of St. Mark's Cathedral was held in the office of J. Walcott Thompson, the Junior Warden. Present at the meeting were the Dean of the Cathedral, William W. Fleetwood; the Senior Warden, Morris L. Ritchie; the Junior Warden, J. Walcott Thompson; and vestry members, F. A. Pyke, C. P. Overfield, W. F. Adams, George F. Wasson, Hugh A. McMillan, W. T. Gunter, T. W. Boyer, E. B. Heisler, and Causten Browne.

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[1] "Straight Talk," p. n.a.

It is interesting to note that this editorial denouncing Bishop Jones and the rally immediately followed a very strongly worded editorial criticizing those in the community who were questioning the patriotism and willingness to fight of some prominent "German-Americans" in the community. The editorial concluded with an interesting sentence, the irony of which must have been lost on its author: "We cannot afford to tolerate the character assassins any longer. Bad blood is brewing about the city, and it's high time that the dirty tactics be abandoned."

[2] "Bishop Jones' Speech," p. 2.

Following the meeting, the Dean, Wardens and Vestry issued a unanimous statement. The major point of the statement was to disavow any connection with the sentiments expressed by Bishop Jones. They argued their case on two levels. First, they contended that Bishop Jones' statement was purely personal and did not represent the views of most Episcopalians. To substantiate this contention, their statement quoted at length from a statement by Bishop Lawrence and the clergy of the Diocese of Massachusetts, which had been adopted on March 4, 1917, expressing their support for whatever actions President Wilson might deem necessary to protect American rights.[1]

To add further weight to their belief that Bishop Jones' statements were not in accord with the views of most Episcopalians, the St. Mark's statement quoted from the Pastoral Letter adopted at the General Convention of 1916. Despite the fact that they were able to quote four very brief statements from the Pastoral Letter to support their case, the Pastoral Letter, taken as a whole was not the ringing endorsement of preparedness which they depicted it to be.[2]

On another level, the statement tried to demonstrate that although Bishop Jones held the highest office of the Episcopal Church in Utah, his views were not binding on the Church and should not be attributed to the Church as a whole or to any of its individual members. Their statement read: "We assert that the expressions used [by Bishop Jones] were only, and could only have been the views of an individual."[3]

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[1] "Churchmen Avow Loyalty - Decry Bishop Jones' Views," Salt Lake Tribune, March 29, 1917, p. n. a.

[2] Ibid. For a more complete discussion of the 1916 Pastoral Letter, see chapter "America Prepares for War."

[3] Ibid.

Having thereby separated themselves from the public stand of their Bishop, the statement closed with a pledge of support:

> We call upon our President to use his lawful powers to protect the rights, the lives and the liberties of our people on land and sea, and we pledge him thereto our loyal support.[1]

In addition to this statement which was released to the press, the Vestry also adopted a unanimous resolution which it sent to Bishop Jones, asking him to support their contention that the Bishop's views were purely personal. The resolution read:

> Resolved "That the Vestrymen having noticed with keen regret your recent utterances in reference to the present national crisis and particularly the fact that the public press largely attributes your opinions to the Episcopal Church, respectfully request that you issue a statement over your signature to the effect in substance that your opinions are those of an individual and should not by reason of your official position in the Church, be attributed to the Episcopal Church nor to any member thereof."[2]

Bishop Jones' reply to the resolution, which took the form of a letter to Mr. H. A. McMillan, Secretary of St. Mark's Vestry, was to the point, but also somewhat curt. Bishop Jones first stated that he believed that the statement issued by St. Mark's and the wide publicity it received should have been sufficient to make clear "to the general public the fact that you do not share my ideas, so that no further statement from me on that point is needed."[3]

Bishop Jones went on to express his regret that the expression of his views on the issue of the war had been the cause of any pain to any members of the Church. Not content to leave the matter there, however, the Bishop went on to remind St. Mark's that: "the 'keen regret,' or even cordial approval, of St. Mark's Vestry in regard to anything which I am called upon to say . . . is scarcely an adequate reason for expecting me publicly to dissociate my opinions from my office."[1]

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Vestry of St. Mark's Cathedral to Bishop Jones, March 28, 1917, Archives, Diocese of Utah, Salt Lake City.

[3] Letter from Bishop Jones to H. A. McMillan, March 30, 1917, Archives, Diocese of Utah, Salt Lake City.

Bishop Jones' reply closed with this paragraph:

> At the time of my consecration, I promised to exercise myself in the Holy Scriptures, and call upon God by prayer for the true understanding of the same. No mention was made of calling upon St. Mark's Vestry for guidance. I also promised to banish and drive away from the Church all erroneous and strange doctrines contrary to God's Word, not necessarily those contrary to the preferences of St. Mark's Vestry. As my stand in the matter of war is based upon what I believe to be the clear teaching of the Scriptures, you can understand that I feel no necessity to make the statement you request.[2]

With this exchange between the Vestry of St. Mark's and the Bishop, the real issue which would dominate the course of the future relationship between Bishop Jones and his Missionary District had been raised. The issue was not Bishop Jones' socialism, nor his pacifism. The real issue centered upon the right, and/or, the authority of a Bishop to speak officially on controversial issues when his views were at variance with those of the members of his Church. To put the same question from an oppositive angle: Is a Bishop, whose beliefs on a controversial issue are not supported by a majority of his people, obligated to preface his public statements on such an issue, with the disclaimer that he is speaking only as an individual, and not as an official of the Church? The Vestry of St. Mark's Cathedral believed that the answer to the last question should be affirmative. Bishop Jones disagreed, and it was on this issue that the ensuing battle would be fought. The depth of passion which this issue would engender found prophetic expression in the closing lines of the editorial that week in Goodwin's Weekly:

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid.

> We do not wonder that the vestrymen and other prominent and patriotic members of the bishop's congregation are all astir over his actions. They have good reason to be, and the chagrined churchmen ought to do more than simply jack him on the carpet--he should be drummed out of the diocese.[1]

On April 3, 1917, Bishop Jones published a brief pamphlet entitled "Christian Loyalty", which was circulated among the church people of Utah. In this pamphlet, Bishop Jones sought to explain the reasons for his resistance to the preparedness movement and American involvement in the war, or, as the Bishop put it, to answer the question:

> What should a Christian man do when his country is threatened by another, when long established rights are invaded, or when some weak nation is ruthlessly oppressed by a hostile power?[2]

In answer to this question, Bishop Jones argued that the Christian must first seek divine guidance through prayer, "and then go to the source book of Christian teaching, The New Testament, and try earnestly to find from it what Christ would have him do."[3] Loyalty to Christ and his Gospel must come first. To try to determine what one ought to do from any other perspective will "risk a wrong decision."[4] Should any other loyalty, such as to business, expediency or nationality, conflict with this loyalty to Christ?--"so much the worse for that other thing."[5]

> Duties to country, to home, and to family must always give way to that larger loyalty which alone is capable of taking them up and giving them full significance.[6]

In search of an answer to his original question, Bishop Jones investigated the New Testament. For him, the outstanding feature of the New Testament was the idea of the Kingdom of God.

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[1] "Straight Talk," p. n.a.

[2] Paul Jones, "Christian Loyalty," (April 3, 1917), p. 1.

[3] Ibid. [4] Ibid. [5] Ibid. [6] Ibid.

> By that Kingdom, Jesus meant "an ideal (though progressively approximated) social order in which the relation of men to God is that of sons, and (therefore) to each other, that of brothers."[1]

When one understands the Kingdom of God and its call upon men, all the other teachings of Jesus fall into place. And from this perspective "it seems clear that one's personality, possessions, and even life are of secondary consideration compared with the welfare of others and the progress of the Kingdom."[2]

Therefore, in relation to others "the only conduct that is allowed or recommended is that of active love and kindness toward both the evil doer and the righteous man, in order to transform them all into proper members of the Kingdom."[3]

> As I read it, then, the attitude of the Christian is to be one of not harboring bitterness, hate or ill-will on the one hand, and on the other is to be one of putting forth goodwill and love and forgiveness without limit, and thereby breaking down the opposition of evil doers. It is not a passive attitude, but one that is essentially active and aggressive, standing and working for the right against all odds no matter what the immediate consequences might be.[4]

On this basis, Bishop Jones was forced to conclude:

> I find it quite impossible to believe that people can be true to the things which He taught and the example which He gave and at the same time take part in war; for war is the organized destruction of our enemies and it is always accompanied by hatred and bitterness, thus necessitating an attitude of mind and course of conduct opposite to that enjoined by Christ.[5]

In the final paragraph of his pamphlet, Bishop Jones again responded to his critics who demanded that he distinguish between his personal views and those of his Episcopal office. Jones maintained that as a Bishop, the obligation to speak his conscience was particularly binding.

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid., p. 2. [3] Ibid. [4] Ibid. [5] Ibid. p. 3.

> As a Christian Bishop charged with the responsibility of leadership, I would be deserving only of contempt did I remain silent in the present crisis, when the Christian standards of judgment are apparently being entirely ignored . . . . Only when Christian men and women and churches will be brave enough to stand openly for the full truth that their consciences are beginning to recognize, will the terrible anachronism of war between Christian nations be done away.[1]

On April 6, 1917, the United States declared war on Germany and her allies. Despite the somewhat unfortunate timing of Bishop Jones' pamphlet, it seems to have done little to increase the passions or discontent within his diocese. It received little or no publicity or comment in the Utah press, and the only comment in the national Church press was quite mild. In an editorial in The Southern Churchman, the author disagreed vigorously with Bishop Jones' belief that Jesus would have opposed American involvement in the war. However, he prefaced his disagreement by saying:

> Undoubtedly, however, Bishop Jones has a right to his views as a Christian Socialist and as an interpreter of the mind of our Divine Lord, and to publish them as well; and they will serve an excellent purpose if they compel men to think out the moral and religious grounds of their own position and make sure their patriotic zeal and sentiment in favor of war under present conditions are founded upon the eternal principles and laws of righteousness, justice and love as taught by Christ Himself.[2]

During the same period Bishop Jones published another pamphlet, this one entitled, "The Christian Soldier." In this essay, Bishop Jones attempted to describe what ought to be the "Christian attitude" toward the present crises in the world.

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[1] Ibid., p. 4.

[2] "Editorial" The Southern Churchman, Vol. 82 (May 5, 1918), p. 4.

Bishop Jones said that "it needs no demonstration that Christianity represents an aggressive approach to the evil in the world."[1]

> There is no room in it for indifference to sin, evil, injustice or suffering. The good shepherd going out to seek the lost sheep, the parable of the good Samaritan, the parable of the talents, the call and sending forth of the apostles, etc., all indicate the active campaign that was in the Saviour's mind for winning the world from evil and producing a kingdom of brotherhood and righteousness.[2]

In this aggressive campaign against evil, the principal weapon of the Christian soldier is love.

> It is that alone which will give him victory over the enemies of the kingdom. His defensive armor of prayer and faith may protect him from being overcome, but it is only a love which hopeth all things and endureth all things that will reach out to call forth the same spirit in others. Gates locked and barred against every approach finally yield to the continual pressure of loving good-will, and to that alone. We may frighten men into obedience or force them to do our will, but it is only when we have won their hearts by love that the victory has been won for the kindgom.[3]

The power of this love must be applied to all the facets of men's lives. It is equally crucial in business, social work, politics, and in the relations between nations. The obligation of the Christian to reach out in love overrides all other loyalties:

> To the Christian at this time then, as at others, the primary question, before those of national honor and the protection of the weak, is how he can win to Christ those who are crucifying Him afresh. He feels that instead of engaging in war, a method that however highly conceived, undoes the work of love, he should be about his Father's business in the one best way that the Son has taught. . . .[4]

Bishop Jones concluded:

> Until we try to deal with people and actions in that spirit of love, so different from the jealousy, suspicion and antagonism that have

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[1] Paul Jones, The Christian Soldier, (Publication information not available), p. 2.

[2] Ibid., p. 3. [3] Ibid. [4] Ibid, p. 7.

> characterized our dealings in the past, we can in no sense claim that we are putting Christianity into our international relationships, no matter what tremendous sacrifices we may undergo.[1]

Rather than following the unsuccessful and unchristian stratagems of the past, "it is time for the true Christian soldier to set his face forward and follow the banner of sacrificial love wherever it may lead him."[2]

In April 1917, the Rev. Maxwell W. Rice of All Souls', Garfield, circulated the following petition among the Episcopal clergy of Utah:

> We, the undersigned clergy of the Episcopal Church in Utah, wish to correct a current impression that the Bishop of Utah was using more than his proper rights in speaking officially in public on the question of war. While we may not agree with Bishop Jones in regard to his view on this subject, we do emphatically assert that he is not only within his rights but that it is his duty as bishop to speak his convictions on subjects of such vital moral and spiritual consequences to the welfare of our country. We hereby record our disapproval of any attempt to curtail this privilege which the Episcopal Church grants at the consecration and ordination of its bishops and clergy.[3]

This statement was signed by a "majority of the clergy of the District, but there did not appear as signers any of the clergy in Salt Lake City."[4]

After the initial outburst following Bishop Jones' address at Unity Hall, things had quickly calmed. The publication of Bishop Jones' pamphlet, Christian Loyalty, elicited no great response or outcry; and a majority of the clergy appeared to solidly support their Bishop.

This calm carried over to the Convocation of the District of Utah which was held at St. John's Church, Salt Lake City, on June 7 and 8, 1917.

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid., p. 8.

[3] Quoted in Homer Neville Tinker, "The Case of Bishop Jones, Christian," The Churchman, Vol. 148 (July 15, 1934), p. 11.

[4] Ibid.

In attendance at the Convocation was the Rt. Rev. Daniel Sylvester Tuttle, Bishop of Missouri and Presiding Bishop of the Episcopal Church. Bishop Tuttle had returned to Utah to help mark and celebrate the fifty years of Episcopal ministry in Utah.

The year preceding the Convocation had been a good one for the District. While the number of baptisms had slipped a little, confirmations had almost doubled, and the District budget had decreased by only $1,004.[1] When one considers the plethora of appeals for money for war bonds and war charities during that year, such a small decrease seems not unreasonable.

Much of the work of the Convocation was devoted to housekeeping matters concerning District Canons, the establishment of the Corporation of the Episcopal Church in Utah, and the Church Pension Fund.[2] The Social Service Commission did recommend three resolutions. The first called for the maintenance of educational and industrial standards which prevailed during peace, which passed; the second called again for National Prohibition, which also passed. The third resolution read:

> The Church protests against any war-finance system which directly or indirectly taxes the necessities of life, but rather it is fair and just to conscript the profits of industry and business during the period the country is at war.[3]

This was the only resolution or discussion which touched on the war. It did, however, set off a minor controversy. As the Journal records:

> Judge Ritchie moved that the second clause beginning "but rather" be stricken out. Lost. Mr. Scholefield moved that the words

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[1] J.C. - 1917, p. 66.

[2] "Utah," The Living Church, Vol. 57 (June 23, 1917), p. 260.

[3] J.C. - 1917, p. 13.

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> "the profits of industry and business" be stricken out and the words "all forms of wealth" be substituted. Carried. In this amended form the third section carried.[1]

The only direct mention of the controversy which had swirled around the Bishop's pacifist views came from the Bishop himself in his address to the Convocation. While the penultimate paragraph of that address is somewhat lengthy, it deserves to be presented in its entirety, for it presents the fullest explanation of the Bishop's views and his reasons for his continued public statements on the issue of the morality of the war.

> Aside from the special problems of the District we all are facing a situation that calls for deep searching of hearts. Absorbed in our work for mankind we cannot be insensible to the demands that come upon us in our loyalty to our homeland and the ideals for which it stands, in the midst of the world crisis in which it is immersed. To some there is no question at all as to duty at the present juncture. They believe that war, terrible as it is, is a necessary and inevitable means of settling human difficulties, that at the present time we are called upon to go down into hell if necessary for the sake of the greater good that will be achieved, and that our readiness to follow the way of war is parallel to following the way of the cross in our Saviour's life. Believing that, they have no hesitation as Christians in throwing all their strength into aiding the work of war. But there are others who feel that engaging in war is a definite turning aside from the Christian way, no matter how exalted the ends in view may be, that it is a step down from the moral plane on which a Christian should act, and that we are rather called upon to win the world by the use of the triumphant power of Christian love against all odds and by giving ourselves even to death if need be. Consequently such people feel very keenly that the Church had no business to encourage the prosecution of destructive warfare. To try to harmonize those two points of view would probably be an impossible or at any rate thankless task; but the fact that sincere Christian people are represented on both sides brings before us all the great necessity for tolerance in judgment, caution and consideration in expression, and restraint in action. It will not do for those militantly inclined to question the motives or restrict the liberty of expression of those who see the problem from a different angle, nor is it fitting for those who feel that war is unchristian to discredit the sincerity or question the Christianity of those who think that our armies are fighting the

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[1] Ibid.

> battles of Christ. Christian men and women have always differed in regard to what the gospel implies as to certain phases of personal conduct, and, whether clergy or laity, they have been weak in living up to even their ideal of Christian life. But always, whatever their ideal, or whatever their strength of character, it has been expected that the clergy would try to preach sincerely their highest understanding of the gospel of Christ and quicken the consciences of the people in their congregations so they would try to live accordingly. The Episcopal Church has been divinely guided, I believe, in placing the large emphasis on conscience. It has made no rules for its members and it does not expect its priests to tell the people what they must do; but it has rightly felt that real character can be achieved only when the individual conscience is stirred to seek the attainment of a certain ideal. That puts the burden on the priest of striving to stir the sluggish consciences, and leaves it to the layman to respond or not to the impulse given. It means, too, that the earnest priest will often preach unpleasant things, hard to hear, if he wishes to lead his people on to higher things. Do not misunderstand me. I have no thought of saying that because what is preached is unpalatable it must therefore be the true gospel. That of course does not follow; but those things which we all need must inevitably be difficult to assimilate at first. We clergy must then preach according to the light that has been given us with the hope of leading men on to the goal which we all desire. To ask that a priest or bishop modify or emasculate his preaching of the gospel, as some would do, is to strike at the one ground of hope that we have for continued upward progress in the Christian faith. It is because we clergy hold responsible positions in the Church that we must be ready to speak out on vital questions and expect others to do the same, and thus protect the right of fearless conscientious preaching both for ourselves individually and for those whose views may be exactly opposite.[1]

With this statement of his beliefs, both Bishop Jones and the Convocation seemed prepared to let matters rest. The report of the Committee on the Bishop's Address, offered no resolutions either supporting or attacking the Bishop's statement,[2] and no other resolutions concerning the war were introduced. A somewhat suspicious and guarded truce was declared in the Missionary District.

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[1] "The Bishop's Annual Address," J.C. - 1917, pp. 29-31.

[2] "Committee on the Bishop's Address," J.C. - 1917, p. 50.

BISHOP JONES AND THE PEOPLE'S COUNCIL

The truce came to an abrupt end on July 21, 1917, when the Churchman published its lead editorial entitled "A Shameful Document." The document to which the editorial referred was a press release issued by the People's Council of America. After quoting some of the more provocative statements from the press release, the editorial went on to say:

> In spite of the fact that a bishop and clergyman whom our church holds in high esteem appears as sponsor of the movement, along with Mr. Eugene Debs, we solemnly assert that any one who, having read the document just received at this office, permits his name to be used in connection with the work of the People's Council is very careless of his reputation. . . . We are sure that all the persons whose names appear in the announcement of the People's Council are not desirous of helping this pernicious and disloyal activity. On the other hand, we recognize names that heretofore willingly or without evil intention, have given considerable comfort to the enemy.[1]

The editorial concluded: "We cannot believe that the clergymen of the Episcopal Church who are aiding the People's Council know in what treasonable camps the sentiments that we have quoted are bred."[2]

Like many of the emergency pacifist organizations of its day, the People's Council was a rather ad hoc organization which seemed to grow up almost spontaneously as old alliances collapsed and others were formed to meet immediate needs. The "Lusk Committee" report tried to trace the Council's complicated lineage by saying that it was:

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[1] "A Shameful Document," The Churchman, Vol. 116 (July 21, 1917), p. 69.

[2] Ibid.

> . . . the outgrowth of the First American Conference of Democracy and Terms of Peace. Similarly the Conference was a reorganization of the 1917 Emergency Peace Federation, and the Emergency Peace Federation an outgrowth of the American Neutral Conference Committee, which in turn was a development of the Ford Peace Party, this a result of the original Lochner-Schwimmer Emergency Peace maneuvers of 1914.[1]

Among noteworthy members of the People's Council were: Louis Lochner, Executive Secretary; David Starr Jordan, Treasurer; Eugene V. Debs; Morris Hillquit; James H. Maurer; Benjamin Schlesinger; and clergymen: Richard W. Hogue, Jenkin Lloyd Jones, Judah L. Magnes, Irwin St.John Tucker, Norman Thomas, Howard Melish, Fred A. Moore, Lindley Gordon, and Paul Jones.[2]

The tactics of the People's Council were quite straightforward. One of their main efforts was to support the work of David Starr Jordan who set up his headquarters in Washington, D.C., and offered a course he described as "university extension for statesmen." Simply put, his was an educational and lobbying effort directed at sympathetic Representatives and Senators. These "courses" were quite well attended, but seem to have had little impact on the course of events.[3]

The other thrust of the People's Council was to organize groups of support around the country. These efforts were mildly successful, particularly in the northern Midwest.[4] These organizational efforts were to culminate in a mass rally scheduled for the first week of September 1917, in Minneapolis. On August 27, however, Governor Burnquist of Minnesota issued a proclamation forbidding the People's Council from holding its rally anywhere in the state, on the grounds that the "sheriff has advised me that said convention and meeting, if held in his opinion, would result in bloodshed, rioting and loss of life."[1] The Governor went on to say that in his opinion such a meeting could "have no other effect than that of aiding and abetting the enemies of this country."[2]

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[1] New York State Senate. Report of the Joint Legislative Committee - Investigation Seditious Activities. Revolutionary Radicalism: Its History, Purpose and Tactics. Part I, Vol. 1, p. 1051.

[2] Ibid., pp. 1051-1052.

[3] Ibid., pp. 1052-54.

[4] Ibid., pp. 1058 and 1064.

Efforts were made to stage the rally in Fargo, North Dakota, and Hudson, Wisconsin, neither of which were successful. The meeting was finally held in Chicago on September 2, 1917. The "Lusk Committee" report said, "the forces gathered, held several mild meetings, issued a mild bulletin, and were finally dispersed by order of the Governor of the State of Illinois."[3]

With this meeting, the People's Council slipped from sight. While a subsequent effort was made to revive the Council in 1919 to oppose American intervention in Russia, the People's Council had an active life span of four months, June - September, 1917.

The People's Council appears to have had little or no effect upon the course of American foreign policy. However, the stinging editorial in The Churchman, with its very thinly veiled reference to Bishop Jones as an adherent of the Council, was sufficient to shatter the very delicate truce which existed between Bishop Jones and his opponents in the Missionary District of Utah.

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[1] Ibid., p. 1075. [2] Ibid. [3] Ibid., p. 1076.

Whether stung by the editorial in The Churchman or not, Bishop Jones took to the offensive. The issues of The Witness of August 4 and 11, 1917, contained long articles by Bishop Jones defining and defending his position. In addition, The Witness reprinted the section of Bishop Jones' Annual Address, which has been cited above.

Not only did The Witness provide a forum for Bishop Jones, they also praised him for his courage in speaking out against the tide of popular sentiment. Their introduction to Bishop Jones' second article stated:

> We submit for the consideration of our readers the following article by the Bishop of Utah, not because we agree with all of its contentions, but because it stresses the other side of the question and we believe that the other side should be considered.
>
> There is no condition of mind so dangerous and so narrow as that which puts its fingers in its ears and shouts, "Traitor!" or "Crucify him!" Such a cause is beyond hope. Personally I believe it takes greater courage to adopt the attitude of Bishop Jones than it does to go with the crowd. And moreover, we believe that a man of Bishop Jones' self-denial is worthy of attention.[1]

In his articles, Bishop Jones made several points. First and most important, his continued belief that war is an evil which is condemned by Christ's Gospel of love and brotherhood. Bishop Jones argued that even the proponents of the war must have some doubt as to its Christian propriety, "or we would not be assured so often that this is a war to end war with the implied admission that war is an evil to be got rid of."[2]

Having argued that pacifism is the message of the Gospel, Bishop Jones went on to challenge those who viewed such pacifism as a good and lofty ideal, which, however, must temporarily be set aside in the face of the immediate crisis. Jones answered this argument with a question: "It may be asked, of what use are ideals unless we are to work for them, and what is the function of the Church if it is not to uphold its ideals before the world?"[1] For the Bishop, it was precisely the task of the Church to stand for this ideal, and especially to stand for it during the present crisis. Again, he asked: "Was there ever a time when the world needed more of the preaching of Christian love and service?"[2] He concluded by saying, "There is a real danger lest in the stress of the present moment we render unto Caesar the things that be God's."[3]

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[1] "The Defense for Bishop Jones of Utah," The Witness, Vol. 1 (Aug. 11, 1917), p. 5.

[2] Ibid.

Second, having defended again his understanding of the Gospel's message of love, forgiveness, and pacifism; Bishop Jones sought to further buttress his position by demonstrating that his views were in complete accord with those of the Episcopal Church, as expressed in the Pastoral Letter of the House of Bishops in 1916; and with the pre-war views and goals of President Wilson.

In accordance with the Pastoral Letter of 1916, Bishop Jones contended,

> . . . that it is the Church's duty (1) "To place supreme reliance upon spiritual forces" in overcoming the present evils; (2) "To work for the clearer recognition of the brotherhood of men"; (3) To work for the promotion of social justice and "the extension of true democracy to industrial matters"; and (4) To work for international organization for the maintenance of world peace.[4]

Bishop Jones found that these goals were quite similar to those announced by President Wilson. First that this was a war to end war and also a war for democracy. The Bishop continued:

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid. [3] Ibid.

[4] "Bishop Jones Explains His Attitude Toward the War," The Witness, Vol. 1 (Aug. 4, 1917), p. 3.

> With those purposes I am in most hearty accord. President Wilson's great speech of January 22, which he has since re-endorsed, and his address to the Russian people show that he is desirous of reaching a peace which shall be securely founded upon just principles, with regard for the integrity of small nations, backed up by international organization so that democracy will be safeguarded.[1]

Bishop Jones contended, therefore, that not only were his views supported by a correct reading of the Gospels, but also by the teachings of the Episcopal Church and by the stated policies and objectives of President Wilson.

Finally, Bishop Jones went on to point out that not only were his principles in harmony with these sources, but so were those of the People's Council. ". . . as a matter of fact, that organization has as its objective just those things enumerated above which both the Church and the President have expressed themselves as being in favor of."[2]

The Bishop concluded:

> I have taken a somewhat prominent part in this movement because I believe it represents a real service to the country and a service which I can give with no reserves of conscience. . . and in working for those things I feel sure that I will be doing the most useful things both for the cause of Christ and for the service of my country.[3]

Having defended the goals and principles of the People's Council in print, Bishop Jones also sought to further its work in Utah. On July 30, 1917, he presided at a meeting of the People's Council at Unity Hall in Salt Lake City, at which Mary Ware Dennett was the principle speaker.

The meeting was attended by over three hundred people, among whom was Chauncey P. Overfield, a vestryman of St. Mark's Cathedral.[4]

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid. [3] Ibid.

[4] State of Utah, County of Salt Lake, City of Salt Lake, Deposition of Chauncey P. Overfield. Taken October 13, 1917. p. 1.

According to a deposition given by Mr. Overfield and filed with the House of Bishops, near the close of the meeting, Mr. Overfield rose to ask of Bishop Jones "who, at the time was wearing the clerical vest customary with clergymen of the Church," to "define his appearance at the meeting: whether in an individual capacity or as representative of the Protestant Episcopal Church."[1] Mr. Overfield also asked to be allowed to state the position of "the great majority of Episcopalians in Utah with relation to the war."[2]

According to Mr. Overfield, the Bishop "declined to make the desired differentiation," and limited Mr. Overfield to three minutes in which to state his case. A story covering the events of the meeting appeared in the next issue of the Salt Lake Tribune. The paper chastised the meeting organizers for the fact that "although the affair was advertised as an open meeting, only those in sympathy with the movement were permitted to take an active part in either the decisions or organization."[3] The question of the right of a Bishop to speak as a representative of the Church on moral issues had again been raised in Salt Lake.

In the midst of these events in Salt Lake City, Bishop Jones wrote a lengthy reply to the editorial criticising the People's Council, which had appeared earlier in The Churchman.

In response to this editorial, "A Shameful Document," Bishop Jones picked up the same themes he had adopted in his articles in The Witness. Again he argued that "practically every one of the expressed objectives of the People's Council has been endorsed by the General Convention of the Church, or in the words of President Wilson."[1]

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid.

[3] "Bishop Asked to Define His Action," Salt Lake Tribune, July 31, 1917, p. n.a.

Bishop Jones went on to enumerate the six goals of the People's Council: first, "to secure an early, democratic and general peace in harmony with the principles outlined by new Russia . . ."; second, "to urge international organization for the maintenance of world peace"; third, "to induce our Government to state concretely the terms upon which it is willing to make peace"; fourth, "to work for the repeal of conscription laws"; fifth, "to safeguard labor standards"; and sixth, "to preserve and extend democracy and liberty in the United States."[2]

Bishop Jones concluded:

> The People's Council is working for a just peace and the extension of democracy. The Churchman may properly differ with the Council in the method of working those things out, but it is unworthy of it to condemn as shameful a movement whose aims are those which the Church has endorsed.[3]

In editorials and letters to the editor, the debate about the People's Council raged for several months in The Churchman. As has been stated above, the People's Council was an ad hoc and diverse lot, and from the distance of sixty years it is impossible to reconstruct precisely how each member of the Council interpreted each of these six objectives. Nor is such a reconstruction essential to our purposes.

While the merits of the goals of the People's Council are not essential, the debate which they engendered is significant for two reasons. First, the continued discussion of these issues throws more light on the specific goals of Bishop Jones. Second, the debate in The Churchman, much of which was reprinted in the Salt Lake newspapers, brought Bishop Jones name to prominence throughout the Church, and continued to feed the growing controversy and acrimony in his Missionary District. In short, the merits of Bishop Jones' arguments and those of his opponents are not, for our purposes, as important as the force and persistence with which he stated these views, and the reaction which they elicited.

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[1] Paul Jones, "A Shameful Document," The Churchman, Vol. 116 (Aug. 11, 1917), p. 183.

[2] Ibid. [3] Ibid.

To follow the various twists and turns of the debate over the People's Council, we must briefly depart from the chronological structure we have been following.

Bishop Jones' response was followed three weeks later by a letter to the editor of The Churchman, by Ralph Adams Cram, an architect of Boston, Massachusetts. In his letter, Mr. Cram described the People's Council as "constructively pro-German, and potentially treasonable."[1] Mr. Cram went on to argue that,

> The six objects of the People's Council enumerated by the Bishop of Utah are expressed in a few words: all are capable of varied interpretations; it is probable that not more than one of them is interpreted by the majority of its members in a sense that would be endorsed by General Convention, or has been endorsed by the President.[2]

Mr. Cram went on to pose a long and detailed series of questions designed to clarify the stand of the People's Council in regard to their six goals. Most of the questions posed by Mr. Cram were phrased in such a way as to cast doubt on the patriotism and loyalty of the People's Council.[3] The only objective of the Council with which he could agree was their position favoring international organization for the maintenance of world peace.[1]

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[1] Ralph Adams Cram, "The People's Council," letter to the Editor of The Churchman, Vol. 116 (Sept. 1, 1917), p. 281.

[2] Ibid. [3] Ibid., pp. 281-282.

Mr. Cram's letter was followed in the next issue by one from William M. Walton. Where Mr. Cram had been somewhat judicious and in search of clarification, Mr. Walton was more direct. He viewed the People's Council as paid propaganda agents of the German government, and concluded

> Nor can there be doubt as to the baleful influence of unbridled propaganda of this sort and the absolute necessity for prompt action in its suppression? The sparks of such sentiment have too much weak and imflammable material around in which to kindle flame.[2]

On September 29, Bishop Jones' reply to Mr. Cram's letter appeared in The Churchman. Each of Mr. Cram's questions was answered in some detail. Of particular interest for this paper, and for the people of Utah at that time, was Bishop Jones' response to Mr. Cram's questions concerning the desire of the People's Council to "work for repeal of the conscription laws."[3]

Bishop Jones' answer is interesting in itself; it also seems to indicate that one of his primary objections to American involvement in the war was the method by which this involvement came about. It will be remembered that at the rally at Unity Hall on the night of March 27, 1916, at which Bishop Jones was the principle speaker, a resolution was passed protesting against the entrance of the United States into war unless "the matter be determined by a referendum of the people."[1] No such referendum ever took place, therefore, Bishop Jones came to view the repeal of the Conscription law and the response of the people to its repeal, as a means by which such a referendum could take place. He argued:

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[1] Ibid., p. 281.

[2] William M. Walton, "A Shameful Document," letter to the Editor of The Churchman, Vol. 116 (Sept. 8, 1917), p. 314.

[3] Paul Jones, "The People's Council" letter to the Editor of The Churchman, Vol. 116 (Sept. 29, 1917), p. 408.
See also "Jones Replies to Cram's Criticism," Salt Lake Tribune, Sept. 30, 1917,p. n.a.

> I believe that the immediate repeal of the Conscription Act, if we can suppose the impossible, would be a salutary thing for the country. As a result of such repeal either the people would be so stirred to indignation that millions of volunteers would be forthcoming, which would put the war on a higher moral level, or the acquiescence of the people in the repeal and the consequent abandonment of the war would clearly indicate their aversion to the present struggle. In either case the real attitude of the people would be ascertained, which is a matter of first importance in a free country.[2]

In their issue of October 6, the editors of The Churchman reentered the fray. While lauding Bishop Jones' courage, the editorial sharply criticized his "audacity":

> What strikes us in the attitude of Bishop Jones and some other pacifists is their audacity. Liberty of opinion is certainly an inalienable right in a democracy. Liberty of speech is not such a right. We may not like it, but the surrender of privilege is the price we pay for things we value. The fact confronts us that we cannot all say what we think in this critical hour.[3]

To The Churchman the insistance of the pacifists on a full scale debate upon the morality of war displayed a stubbornness which approaches "mental derangement."[4] They argued that "nobody except the pacifist has time or desire for such a debate now.[5]"

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[1] "Bishop Jones' Speech," p. 2.

[2] Paul Jones, "The People's Council," p. 408.

[3] "Bishop Jones' Reply," The Churchman, Vol. 116 (Oct. 6, 1917), p. 423.

[4] Ibid. [5] Ibid.

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> We affirm that this is not the time to debate pacifism, not because we fear that free speech might result in a verdict against the government, but because sane people can do only one thing at the present time, and that is to fight. . . . We think there is no Gospel warrant for non-resistance, but that interesting debate can, without damage to the nation, be postponed until after the war.[1]

While the editorial in The Churchman was measured and rather circumspect in its tone, it marked a subtle, yet deeply significant change in the debate. Heretofore, Bishop Jones and Mr. Cram, and various other individuals on both sides, had been debating the merits of American participation in the war, the goals which such participation sought to win, and the means by which these goals were to be pursued.

In its editorial, The Churchman declared that these issues were no longer relevant. The price of pursuing this debate, no matter how "interesting" was a price which America could no longer afford to pay. To even raise these questions was now unpatriotic. According to The Churchman, it was now "disloyal to impede" by this continued debate "the working of a law passed for public safety."[2]

As had happened earlier in Utah,[3] the parameters of the debate had now been effectively and inalterably changed. The issue no longer concerned the morality of American participation in the war. The issue was now to be the loyalty and patriotism of those who even raised the question. The debate and the eventual fate of Bishop Jones would not hinge on the merits of his pacifist arguments; the issue would be determined on other grounds: first, the right of a Bishop to speak officially on issues of public policy; and second, the loyalty of a citizen who would even raise these issues during a time of national emergency. The overriding and decisive issue was no longer pacifism; it became, instead, the issue of freedom of conscience and the right of a Bishop to express his conscientious convictions.

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid.

[3] See page 173 above.

Two letters in the October 13 issue of The Churchman make this transition quite apparent. The first, by W. Henderson Watts, Rector of St. Mary's Church, Haledon, New Jersey, described Bishop Jones' letter as containing "treasonable sentiments."

> That it is written by a bishop makes it all the worse. It seems to me to be about time for the House of Bishops of this American Church to openly repudiate the most un-American attitude and expressions of the Bishop of Utah and any other of our clergy that may be unfortunate enough to be in the same "U-boat."[1]

The other letter, from Henry F. Peake, a vestryman of the Church of Zion and St. Timothy in New York, followed the lines of an earlier letter which he had written directly to the Presiding Bishop, The Rt. Rev. Daniel S. Tuttle. In the earlier letter, Mr. Peake had asked if there was any way to "compel this person [Bishop Jones] to resign his position in the Church."[2] He went on to say that in light of Bishop Jones' statements in his letter of September 29, it "would appear that at least he should be immediately arrested and placed in a detention camp for the period of the war."[3]

Mr. Peake repeated these sentiments in his letter to The Churchman, and went on to say that Bishop Jones' letter:

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[1] W. Henderson Watts, "The People's Council" letter to the Editor of The Churchman, Vol. 116 (Oct. 13, 1917), p.481.

[2] Henry F. Peake, Letter to Rt. Rev. Daniel S. Tuttle, October 3, 1917, p 2.

[3] Ibid.

> . . . contained seditious language, as has recently been clearly set forth by the Department of Justice of the United States. I wish to notify you that if any more such seditious language is published I shall take steps through the Post Office Department, under the law recently enacted by Congress, which I hope will lead to the barring of the United States mails to the circulation of The Churchman.[1]

Mr. Peake went on to say:

> There is no propaganda in the country at the present time which is more dangerous than that which seeks to question the proper authority of the Conscription Law, and when a paper like The Churchman spreads such propaganda and gives it standing by printing such articles as that by this man Jones, it is an intolerable outrage, and in the light of recent statements by the Department of Justice, I believe it to be a crime.[2]

Although The Churchman would continue to receive and publish letters concerning Bishop Jones and the People's Council, events had by now overtaken the debate. As we shall see, by mid-October the House of Bishops had met and appointed a special committee to look into the whole matter of Bishop Jones' continued tenure in Utah. In concluding this brief excursus, it should again be noted that in the course of this debate, the issue at question was radically changed. What began as a debate on the merits of the goals of the People's Council quickly became a debate about the loyalty of Bishop Jones and his right to speak out as a Bishop in opposition to the policy of the government.

While this debate developed in the pages of The Churchman, more controversy was brewing in Utah. The People's Council rally of July 31, continued to spark disagreement within the District. Various letters supporting or attacking Bishop Jones appeared in the Salt Lake papers.[3]

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[1] Henry F. Peake, "The People's Council" letter to the Editor of The Churchman, Vol. 116 (Oct. 13, 1917), p. 481.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Charles E. Rice, "Defends Bishop Jones: letter to the Editor of Salt Lake Tribune July 31, 1917, p. n.a.
J. H. Paul, "American People's War" letter to the Editor of Salt Lake Tribune, Sept. 11, 1917, p. n.a.

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At a People's Council rally in Salt Lake City held on September 2, 1917, Bishop Jones himself re-entered the fray. In his speech, Bishop Jones recounted the unsuccessful efforts of the People's Council to hold its national meeting in Minneapolis, and lauded Mayor Thompson of Chicago for allowing the meeting to be held in his city.[1] Bishop Jones said that he was "glad that someone in authority had stood for free speech and the consitutional right of a peaceful body to hold a quiet assembly."[2]

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[1] "Bishop Jones Lauds Chicago Mayor's Stand," Salt Lake Herald-Republican, Sept. 3, 1917, p. n.a.

[2] Ibid.

BISHOP JONES AND THE COUNCIL OF ADVICE

September 1917 marked a definite change in the debate about Bishop Jones. Heretofore, the debate had taken place in public forums with each side trying to gain public acceptance for its beliefs. While the argument had often become rather heated, there seemed a tacit acceptance, at least in public, that Bishop Jones would remain the Bishop of Utah. In September this understanding broke down. Bishop Jones' opponents apparently came to the conclusion that the only effective means by which the Church in Utah could continue to grow and be respected was by the immediate removal of the Bishop. As long as Bishop Jones remained in charge and continued to publicly espouse his pacifist views, the work of the Church would be irreparably damaged. The only means by which such damage could be alleviated was by the removal of Bishop Jones.

On September 13, 1917, J. Walcott Thompson, Junior Warden of St. Mark's Cathedral Salt Lake City, and member of the Council of Advice of the Missionary District of Utah, sent a telegram to Bishop Arthur S. Lloyd, President of the Board of Missions of the Domestic and Foreign Missionary Society. In his telegram, Mr. Thompson asked Bishop Lloyd if the Bishop might not be able to stop over in Salt Lake for a day or two on his way to the Provincial meeting in Boise, because "several churchmen desire to counsel with you on a matter of great importance to the

District."[1] Bishop Lloyd responded by telegram that he would not be able to come to Salt Lake because he had "been obliged to abandon plan of attending Boise synod."[2]

Despite the fact that he could not come in person, Bishop Lloyd wrote to both Mr. Thompson and Bishop Jones, and enclosed copies of both letters to each. In his letter to Mr. Thompson, Bishop Lloyd said that he "was both glad and sorry" that he could not come to Salt Lake: sorry that he could not come, yet glad because "I do not know what to say or do with regard to the matter."[3]

In his letter, Bishop Lloyd went on to say:

> This man [Bishop Jones] is so fine, and I know whatever the appearance may be--I read some clippings which criticized him pretty severely--there never was a cleaner-minded man, or one with more single purpose for what is right and for what he believes is Christian. And just because I have no doubt of this I have been hurt all the more because I have not the least idea as to how to proceed in order to help my friend escape what seems to me an obsession which is all the more distressing because inevitably it must seem to identify him with the people who would damage our country in the hour of its peril and when its faith in God compels it to stand for all that makes life worth living.[4]

Bishop Lloyd concluded by suggesting that the good men of Utah come together to pray that God will do "the thing that men will never be able to accomplish--that is to help our friend to see and discriminate."[5]

In his letter to Bishop Jones, Bishop Lloyd said that he knew very little about Bishop Jones' views except that "you have declared yourself as against war because you believe it is your obligation as a Christian. . . . I cannot think of this except as an obsession."[1] Bishop Lloyd then asked:

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[1] Telegram J. Walcott Thompson to Arthur S. Lloyd, September 13, 1917, Archives, Diocese of Utah, Salt Lake City.

[2] Telegram Arthur S. Lloyd to J. Walcott Thompson, September 14, 1917, Archives, Diocese of Utah, Salt Lake City.

[3] Letter Arthur S. Lloyd to J. Walcott Thompson, September 28, 1917, Archives, Diocese of Utah, Salt Lake City.

[4] Ibid. [5] Ibid.

> Is there anything I can do that will induce you to take the matter up again and consider whether or not your conviction does not rest on a partial view of the case? I know this will offend unless you appreciate my motive, and I have to risk it not only for the Church's sake--for now, if ever, is the time when every one of us must be faithful to the Church--but because of my regard for you I would like it if I could be of the least use.[2]

Despite Bishop Lloyd's inability to attend, the Synod did meet in Boise and the District of Utah was well represented. At that meeing Dean William W. Fleetwood, of St. Mark's Cathedral, introduced a resolution "pledging the bishops and clergy to whole-hearted allegiance to country and flag and to do all in their power to save the world for democracy."[3]

In an editorial lauding Dean Fleetwood's resolution, the Salt Lake Tribune said:

> It is natural and proper that Dean Fleetwood should take the lead in voicing the patriotism of the members of his church. Naturally he and practically all other members of the Episcopal church in Utah, laymen and clergy, have felt that the words and attitude of Bishop Jones have advertised the Utah Episcopalians unfavorably throughout the nation. . . . If any cloud rests upon the church in Utah as a result of the Bishop's peace views it is only fitting that the members should seek to dispel it.[4]

To emphasize its belief that Bishop Jones stood virtually alone in his opposition to the war, the editorial concluded: "We know very well that the bishop speaks only for himself and that he has but a handful of sympathizers in his diocese."[1] It is difficult to know how the Salt Lake Tribune determined that Bishop Jones had the support of "but a handful of sympathizers", but the effect of the editorial must have been to paint Bishop Jones into an evermore shrinking corner. Whether or not this was the intent of the editorial is impossible to determine--perhaps it was meant simply to publicly defend the "loyal" members of the Church--but the effect was to portray Bishop Jones as a solitary figure with a pacifist obsession which was shared by virtually no one else in the District.

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[1] Letter from Arthur S. Lloyd to Paul Jones, September 29, 1917, Archives, Diocese of Utah, Salt Lake City.

[2] Ibid.

[3] "Dispelling a Cloud", Salt Lake Tribune, (Sept. 25, 1917), p. n.a.

[4] Ibid.

At the same time that the Synod was meeting in Boise, Bishop Jones received a letter from Bishop Tuttle, the Presiding Bishop of the Church. In his letter, Bishop Tuttle suggested that it would be wiser for Bishop Jones to postpone any further discussion of his pacifist views until the war was concluded.

> Let me submit to your thoughtful consideration that under these circumstances the Saviour's call may well come home to you: "Be ye wise as serpents." And in the exercise of wisdom which He commands, is there not a call to you to forego for a time your activities in pacific and sociological lines, postponing them till the war and the nation's peril be over and past.[2]

In response to Bishop Tuttle, Bishop Jones said that he truly wished that he could agree with Bishop Tuttle's advice and "still be true to what I believe to be the highest ideals of my faith."[3] He said that he realized that his understanding of the Gospel was quite different than that of most of the Bishops of the Church, but that he must still be true to his own understanding as it had come to him through prayer and study. Bishop Jones said:

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Quoted in Homer Neville Tinker, "The Case of Bishop Jones, Christian," The Churchman, Vol. 148 (Aug. 1, 1934), p. 15.

[3] Letter from Paul Jones to Daniel S. Tuttle, September 28, 1917, p. 1, Archives, Church Historical Society, Austin, Texas.

> But while I realize that that same attitude may put certain obstacles in the way of the Church's work which has been entrusted to me at the present time, I can't but feel that in the end it will mean more for the solid foundation of the work on the true Christian basis. Did I not feel that, of course I should not follow it for a moment.[1]

Bishop Jones further argued that he must continue to speak out, not only for himself, but "for hundreds and perhaps thousands of people in the Church"[2] for whom he was the only spokesman in the Church.

> Many of these people are heartsick because they feel that the Church is not being true to her Divine Commission of preaching the love of God among men, and I feel that I have a duty to them if nothing more, to make them feel that there is still a place in the Church for those who believe that that is the meaning of the Gospel.[3]

He closed by assuring Bishop Tuttle that he would try to keep from doing anything which might bring the Church into disrepute, and that he looked forward to further discussion on this matter with Bishop Tuttle at the House of Bishops' meeting in Chicago.

How Bishop Tuttle came to write Bishop Jones cannot be known--it may have been in response to a request from a churchman in the District, or an expression of Bishop Tuttle's continuing concern for his first diocese. However, as of September 1917, both the Presiding Bishop and the President of the Board of Missions had written to Bishop Jones, almost pleading with him to desist from any further public expression of his pacifist views. Bishop Jones declined to heed their advice.

On October 1 an event took place in Los Angeles which rendered all such pastoral advice moot. The headlines in the Salt Lake papers read: "Swarms of Police Chase Bishop Jones"; "Our Chased Bishop"; and "Paul Jones Flees Deck of Burning Peace Ship."

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid. [3] Ibid.

While the picture painted by the headlines was quite vivid, the facts of the incident are somewhat more difficult to ascertain. Two accounts of the events which took place in Southern California on the night of October 2 appeared in the Salt Lake Tribune, the first on October 3 and the second on October 4. Unfortunately, these two accounts cannot be fully reconciled. They differ as to the location at which the incidents took place, the names of the participants, and the point in the proceedings at which Bishop Jones left.

This latter point is particularly significant. The first articles conveyed the impression that Bishop Jones had been an active and central participant in all the events of the day. By implication, therefore, the Bishop was portrayed as supporting all the points made by a wide variety of speakers.[1] The second article conceded that Bishop Jones was not in fact present at all the various meetings because "the proceedings had become too outspoken for the Utah prelate."[2] Rather than conceding this demonstration of discretion on the part of Bishop Jones, the paper offered a rather invidious comparison to his "illustrious ancestor":

> Unlike his illustrious ancestor who said, "I have just begun to fight," the Rt. Rev. Paul Jones, Bishop of the Episcopal diocese of Utah and a "delegate" to the much harried Christian pacifist convention here, appears to have deserted the burning deck and given his co-laborers in the work of getting (German) peace for the United States the entire responsibility and pleasure of martyrdom at the hands (and fists) of the Pasadena police, federal operatives in southern California, and outraged citizens generally.[3]

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[1] "Swarms of Police Chase Bishop Jones," Salt Lake Tribune, (Oct. 3, 1917), p. n.a.

[2] "Paul Jones Flees Deck of Burning Peace Ship," Salt Lake Tribune, (Oct. 4, 1917), p. 1.

[3] Ibid.

To add to the confusion concerning the events in Southern California, when Bishop Jones returned to Salt Lake on October 6, he called a news conference and issued his own statement recounting the events. His statement agrees with neither of the earlier reports.[1]

Trying to reconcile the three accounts as well as possible is rather difficult, but a rough outline seems possible. First, Bishop Jones and his wife had gone to Los Angeles for a brief vacation and to bring home their two year old daughter who had been staying with her maternal grandmother. While in Los Angeles, Bishop Jones received an invitation to address and participate in the discussion of a group of Christian pacifists. This group had no connection with the People's Council. While Bishop Jones had not gone to Los Angeles with the intention of participating in these meetings, he accepted their invitation.[2]

According to the newspaper, Bishop Jones had been for sometime under surveillance by secret service operatives.[3] Bishop Jones also said that there were secret service men present at the meetings, but said that "no objection was made by the secret service men present to anything that was said."[4] According to a secret service man quoted by the Tribune, however, the pacifist group was "consciously or unconsciously an instrument of a sinister pro-German propaganda."[5]

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[1] "Not Morally Bound to Aid Government," Salt Lake Tribune, (Oct. 7, 1917), p. n. a.

[2] Ibid.

[3] "Swarms of Police Chase Bishop Jones," p. n. a.

[4] "Not Morally Bound to Aid Government," p. n. a.

[5] "Swarms of Police Chase Bishop Jones," p. n. a.

Both the articles in the Tribune, and Bishop Jones agreed that because local officials would not allow the group to meet in any public buildings, the meetings were held in private residences in Eagle Rock and Pasadena. The first meeting was held at the home of Mrs. Anna C. Scheffler.[1] The number of people attending the meeting was not reported, but among those present, in addition to the hostess and Bishop Jones, were the Reverend Messrs. Floyd Hardin, Robert Whitmer and H. H. Story; Arthur E. Heeb, George H. Greenfield, and Sydney Strong. The first three--Hardin, Whitmer and Story--had been arrested two days earlier for pacifist statements, and were now free on bail awaiting their trial.[2]

What precisely went on within the meetings was not reported; although Bishop Jones described them as "quiet and harmonious, given to the discussion of aspects of the question of the conflict between war and Christianity."[3] What transpired outside was very well reported. The mayor of Eagle Rock, J. S. France, led a delegation of men "determined that no streak of yellow should be left upon the name of their fair city by the friends of the Kaiser."[4] The band of forty men advanced on the house singing "The Star Spangled Banner," interspersed at regular intervals with their shouting "We're red, white and blue, not yellow."[5]

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid., and "Paul Jones Flees Deck of Burning Peace Ship." Robert Whitmer is variously reported as Robert "Whitmer" or Robert "Whitaker."

[2] "Not Morally Bound to Aid Government," p. n. a.

[4] "Swarms of Police Chase Bishop Jones," p. n. a.

[5] Ibid. It is interesting to note that although the headlines say "swarms of police," there is no mention of the police in the body of the story. No mention is made in any of the articles of police interference or

Due to the clamor and commotion, the meeting was disbanded and the group drove to the home of Miss Edith Reggs. As the Tribune described the ensuing events:

> The exit was greeted with a roar by the assembled townspeople. At the new meeting place an improvised programme was carried out, but with a very soft pedal upon all remarks concerning the government and its war preparations.[1]

These two meetings held on the night of October 2 would seem to be those to which Bishop Jones referred in his statement. After these meetings the Bishop left for San Diego. The Christian pacifists, however, tried again to hold their meeting the following day--this time at the home of Mrs. Effie A. Bent in South Pasadena.[2]

Shortly after the meeting had begun, a "large and vigorous delegation of wearers of the United States army uniform" marched into Mrs. Bent's home and broke up the meeting. The contingent of "home guardsmen" led by Captain Donald Fry, grabbed the fifteen men at the meeting "rudely by the neck and shoved them into autos, convoyed them to the border of the municipality and told them never to return."[3] The Tribune added: "A number of women attending the meeting were not molested, but they were told that further attempts to meet would not be tolerated."[4]

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of any attempted arrests. In his biography of Bishop Jones, Howard Melish maintains that after the Bishop spoke at the meeting, he left; and then "swarms of police broke into the meeting and arrested the leaders." (Melish, Paul Jones, p. 30.) Melish offers no documentation to support this statement. The only passing references he makes are to the two stories in the Tribune on Ocober 3 and 4, and aside from the headline, which I believe to be inaccurate, they make no mention of police or of arrests.

[1] "Paul Jones Flees Deck of Burning Peace Ship," p. 1.

[2] Ibid. [3] Ibid. [4] Ibid.

At this point, even the most ardent of the pacifists seems to have lost heart, and no further efforts were made to reconvene their sessions. The Tribune speculated in its headline that the pacifists "may meet in Salt Lake in near future." Bishop Jones said in his statement, however, that he knew of no such plans.[1]

The foregoing has been an attempt to recount as accurately as possible the events which took place in Los Angeles on October 2 and 3. If Bishop Jones' statement is accurate, and it does seem to fit with the other newspaper accounts, the meetings were rather mild. None of the accounts even implies that any action was taken or even contemplated that would have impeded or obstructed the war effort. While the rhetoric may have been somewhat spirited, the meetings were held in private homes and were not designed to incite violence or civil disobedience. What minor violence did ensue was the work of those who opposed the pacifists.

In the final analysis, the "truth" of the accounts of these events is largely irrelevant. What matters is how these events were portrayed; and more importantly, how they were perceived by the people in Utah, and especially Salt Lake.

On this score, the headlines implied more than the stories that followed.

> "Swarms of Police Chase Bishop Jones - War Veterans Keep Christian Pacifist on Run in California"[2]

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[1] "Not Morally Bound to Aid Government," p. n. a.

[2] "Swarms of Police Chase Bishop Jones," p. n. a.

> "Paul Jones Flees Deck of Burning Peace Ship - Bishop of Utah, Scenting Trouble, Leaves Harried Pacifists to Their Fate in Pasadena; Meeting of Colleagues Broken up by Police and Citizens; Speakers Escorted from House where German Banner was Displayed and Advised to 'Keep Going'; May Meet in Salt Lake in Near Future."[1]

To anyone who read the headlines, they would have been left with a vivid impression that future denials and clarifications could not dispel. Bishop Jones would have been seen leading a group of disloyal and probably pro-German pacifists in their efforts to thwart the objectives of their government. And at the moment when the good people of Southern California rose up in patriotic anger at these meetings, Bishop Jones fled to save his own skin, leaving his erstwhile allies to their fate.

In an ediorial on October 4, before the Bishop had returned and had an opportunity to offer his account of the events, the Tribune summed up the current mood toward Bishop Jones in Utah:

> That eminent prelate and pacifist, the Right Reverend Paul Jones, Bishop of the Episcopal Diocese of Utah, is trailing the fair name of the state in the dust and along the oiled roads of southern California. Swarms of police and secret service operatives are engaged in the delectable task of pursuing him and his co-laborers from hall to hall and house to house. Obviously the bishop is regarded as a sinister instead of a merely silly influence. When he gets out of breath he should settle down to the quiet life and permit the poetesses, pacifists, cranks and the canting canterers to go their shoddy and squalid way without his aid and comfort.[2]

The editorial went on to suggest that Bishop Jones could "do more good by tending to his flock"[3] than by continuing his political actions. While this suggestion may well have been sincere and well intentioned, such a solution was no longer possible. The events in southern California had caused such an outrage among some members of the Episcopal Church in Utah that a compromise was no longer possible. For them, Bishop Jones had to go.

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[1] "Paul Jones Flees Deck of Burning Peace Ship," p. 1.

[2] "Our Chased Bishop," Salt Lake Tribune, (Oct. 4, 1917), p. n. a.

[3] Ibid.

On October 4, 1917, the Council of Advice of the Missionary District of Utah met to formulate a response to the events which had taken place in Southern California.[1] All the members of the Council were present; they were: the Very Rev. William W. Fleetwood, Dean of St. Mark's Cathedral, Salt Lake City; the Rev. J. Herbert Dennis, Rector of St. Paul's Church, Salt Lake City; the Rev. J. M. Bulkey, Minister of St. Mary's Church, Provo; the Hon. Morris L. Ritchie, Judge of the District Court in Utah, and Senior Warden of St. Mark's Cathedral, Salt Lake City; J. Walcott Thompson, attorney and Junior Warden of St. Mark's Cathedral, Salt Lake City; and George M. Marshall, Professor at the University of Utah, and member and Secretary of the Vestry of St. Paul's Church, Salt Lake City.[2]

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[1] In his excellent series of articles about Bishop Jones which appeared in The Churchman (Vol. 148, No. 14-17), Homer Neville Tinker reports that this meeting took place on October 8. The original notes of the meeting, taken by the secretary, George Marshall, the hand-written first draft of the letter and the typed copy sent to Bishop Jones are all dated October 4. While this matter of four days is not crucial to the outcome of the events, it is interesting nonetheless. Bishop Jones did not return to Salt Lake until October 6 and his version of the events in Southern California did not appear in the Salt Lake papers until October 7. Therefore, if the meeting had taken place on October 8, the members of the Council would have read both sides of the issue before they acted. Because this crucial meeting was held on October 4, however, the only information available to them were the two articles which appeared on October 3 and 4, which were rather inflammatory, and which, according to Bishop Jones, were highly inaccurate.

[2] It will be remembered that in April 1917, the Rev. Maxwell Rice circulated a petition in support of Bishop Jones among the clergy of the District. While a majority signed the document, not one clergyman in Salt Lake City signed. Supporters of Bishop Jones would later argue that the Bishop enjoyed great support throughout the District, and that it was only a small minority of the District, centered in Salt Lake City, that

On a motion offered by the Rev. Dennis, seconded by Mr. Thompson, and unanimously adopted, the Council approved the draft of a letter to be sent by the Council to Bishop Jones calling upon him to resign as Bishop of Utah.[1] The substance of the letter lay in the second of its three paragraphs:

> It is unnecessary at this time to rehearse the various steps which have led to this action of your Council of Advice. Your affiliation with various seditious organizations, the shame and embarrassment experienced by the flock committed to your Episcopal care through your persistent promulgation of unpatriotic doctrines, your steadfast refusal to heed the advice and remonstrances of your brother Bishops and your clergy and laity in this matter, and the injurious consequences of your course upon the life of the Church in this state as well as elsewhere, have convinced your Council of Advice that your usefulness as a Bishop of this Church in Utah is at an end. The Council is further convinced that even though the war in which our country is now engaged should be brought to an immediate conclusion or though your attitude should be reversed, you would be unable to regain the respect and confidence of loyal Americans not only within the Church but outside, without which no Bishop can be acceptable or successful in the prosecution of his work.[2]

If, in such a disagreement, there is an invisible line beyond which compromise is no longer possible, then that line had now surely been crossed. For the Council of Advice, the only satisfactory means by which the conflict could be resolved was by the resignation of Bishop Jones.

Upon his return to Salt Lake, Bishop Jones wrote a letter in response to the Council's demand for his resignation. In his letter, Bishop Jones gave no definite indication as to whether or not he would

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wanted him to resign. The validity of this contention is impossible to measure accurately. It is interesting to note, however, that of the six members of the Council of Advice, five were from the two Salt Lake City parishes--St. Mark's Cathedral and St. Paul's Church.

[1] Missionary District of Utah, Minutes of Meeting of Council of Advice, Meeting of 4 October 1917.

[2] Council of Advice to Bishop Jones, 4 October 1917. Archives, Diocese of Utah, Salt Lake City.

accede to the Council's demand, rather he sought clarification and specific examples of his conduct and actions which had led to the Council's decision.[1] He listed ten areas in which he asked for their response:

> (1) Please state just what steps have led up to this action of the Council of Advice.
> (2) Please state the names of the organizations to which I belong which you consider seditious.
> (3) Upon what facts do you base the charge that the flock committed to my care has experienced shame and embarrassment through any actions of mine?
> (4) Please state what unpatriotic statements I have made and the occasions on which I have made them.
> (5) Inasmuch as I have often been misquoted and misrepresented in certain newspapers, I ask whether you heard me make the unpatriotic statements referred to in your last answer, and if not, upon what grounds you charge me with responsibility for them?
> (6) I have received considerable advice, and I ask that you will state what the particular instances of advice and remonstrance, by whom given and when, to which you refer in your charge that I have steadfastly refused to heed them.
> (7) What is the course to which you refer that I have taken that has resulted in injury to the life of the Church and in what particulars is that course incompatible with the religion of Jesus Christ?
> (8) Please state what injury has been done to the life of the Church in this state and elsewhere by any such course that I have taken.
> (9) Upon what facts do you base the inference that I have lost the respect and confidence of loyal Americans in or out of the Church?
> (10) Please state what the condition of the Church in Utah is which you refer to as serious.[2]

It is impossible to know specifically what Bishop Jones' purpose was in this letter seeking clarification. Perhaps he simply wanted more information; perhaps he believed that if the full and accurate record of his actions were laid before the Council they might withdraw their demand for his resignation; perhaps he was seeking to construct the foundation for a later debate; or perhaps this was his way of saying that he would not resign purely at the wish of the Council. Which of these alternatives was in the Bishop's mind cannot be known. It is clear, however, the Council interpreted his questions as a show of defiance.

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[1] Bishop Jones to Council of Advice, Ocober 8, 1917. Archives, Diocese of Utah, Salt Lake City.

[2] Ibid.

In an undated letter to Bishop Jones, George Marshall, speaking for the Council replied that:

> . . . this is no time for academic discussion and that in their opinion, if you have been able to travel over your jurisdiction, to read the public press, to listen to the counsel of your co-workers, to read the solemn request of their Council that you resign and yet not be able to answer each of the ten questions you ask us to answer, we feel that it would be useless for us to do so.[1]

Also on October 8, Bishop Jones sent a letter and questionnaire to 180 persons in the District of Utah whose names appeared in the Journal of the Convocation for that year.[2] This would have represented approximately 12% of the communicants of the District. In his letter Bishop Jones appended a full copy of the Council's letter of October 4, and asked the recipients for a statement as to their knowledge of "any grounds which may exist to substantiate the charges."[3] Bishop Jones also said that "the serious nature of the matter requires that you answer fully and frankly and promptly the enclosed questionnaire."[4] He particularly wanted their responses quickly so that he might take them with him to the House of Bishops' meeting scheduled for October 17-19, in Chicago. The last section of the letter was the questionnaire itself, which contained nine questions based upon those which the Bishop had sent to the Council of Advice.[5]

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[1] Council of Advice to Bishop Jones, undated. Archives, Diocese of Utah, Salt Lake City.

[2] Bishop Jones', "Questionnaire," October 8, 1917. Archives, Diocese of Utah, Salt Lake City.

[3] Ibid. [4] Ibid. [5] Ibid.

The Archives in Austin and Salt Lake contain only a very few of the responses. However, in a series of articles which he wrote to The Churchman in 1934, Homer Neville Tinker tabulated the responses which were then apparently still available. According to his figures, of the 180 questionnaires which the Bishop mailed, 114 were completed and returned. Of the 114, 40 (35% of the total) agreed with the Council of Advice that Bishop Jones should resign; 51 (45% of the total) opposed the action of the Council; and 23 (20% of the total) could not be classified in either category.[1]

A further analysis of the figures provides another interesting insight. Of those who responded and who lived outside the Salt Lake City area, only 5 (10%) agreed with the Council, while 36 (70%) supported the Bishop. Within Salt Lake City, 35 (56%) stood by the Council and 15 (24%) opposed it in favor of Bishop Jones.[2] To go one step further, of the replies received from St. Mark's Cathedral and St. Paul's Church, 31 (75%) agreed with the Council's call for Bishop Jones' resignation; 4 (10%) did not approve, and six (15%) could not make up their minds.[3]

A brief comment on the status and power of St. Mark's Cathedral and St. Paul's Church is in order, and ought not to be relegated to a footnote. For the year 1917, St. Mark's Cathedral reported a total of 385 communicants, and St. Paul's Church reported 300. Their combined total of 685 communicants represented 47% of the 1461 communicants of the District. On the financial side, the disbursements of these two parishes totalled $10,322, or 57% of the $17,851 expended by the District.[1] Clearly they were the two largest and most prosperous parishes in the District.

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[1] Homer Neville Tinker, "The Case of Bishop Jones, Christian," The Churchman, Vol. 148 (Aug. 15, 1934).

[2] Ibid. [3] Ibid.

Such status conferred great power on these churches. Those who supported Bishop Jones, however, argued that their power was out of all proportion to their actual status. There does appear to be truth in this allegation. The most important organization in the District was the Council of Advice, and of its six members, five were from St. Mark's and St. Paul's. For two churches whose combined communicants represented less than half the people in the District to control five-sixths of the seats on the Council does seem somewhat disproportionate.

Bishop Jones' supporters also argued that it was not the District as a whole, but these two parishes that decided that the Bishop ought to resign. The figures cited above tend to bear out this assertion. One further breakdown of the responses makes the point even more clearly. Of the 114 responses received, 40 supported the Council of Advice in its demand for Bishop Jones' resignation. Of these 40 "anti-Jones" votes, 31 came from St. Mark's and St. Paul's. To turn it around, excluding these two parishes, of the 114 responses, only 9 (8% of the total) felt Bishop Jones should resign.

The responses from the clergy and "regular women workers" show the same pattern. Of the fifteen clergy who responded, four approved of the Council's action, eleven did not.[2] Of the four who supported the Council, it would appear safe to assume that three of them were: Dean Fleetwood of St. Mark's, the Rev. Mr. Dennis of St. Paul's, and the Rev. Mr. J. M. Bulkey of St. Mary's, who as members of the Council had voted to call for the Bishop's resignation. If these three are excluded, only one of the remaining twelve clergymen of the District did not support the Bishop.

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid.

Finally, of the six "regular women workers on the staff" only one "failed to make a definite statement of loyalty to the Bishop and regret the action of the Council."[1]

Based on this information, it seems justifiable to say that the opposition to Bishop Jones was centered in these two Salt Lake City parishes, and that they were the driving force behind the demand for his resignation. It also appears that despite the newspaper accounts of the activities in Southern California, Bishop Jones enjoyed wide support in the District, and that the majority of the clergy and people in his District did not feel that he ought to resign.

While these figures in no way mitigate the right of these two parishes and their supporters to seek the resignation of their Bishop, it does seem clear that the charges of the Council of Advice that Bishop Jones' actions had "injurious consequences . . . upon the life of the Church in this state," and that he had lost "the respect and confidence" of his fellow Churchmen, do seem somewhat overdrawn. No such injurious consequences or lack of confidence were apparent to the majority of churchmen outside Salt Lake City.

While Bishop Jones was busy circulating his questionnaire throughout the District, his opponents were equally active. On October 5, the Council of Advice drafted a letter which it sent to every Bishop of the Episcopal Church. Their letter began:

> The persistent activities of Bishop Paul Jones of the Missionary District of Utah in various seditious societies and his sympathies

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[1] Ibid.

> with organizations whose purposes are likely to harass and impede the war plans of America, have so irritated, not to say exasperated, the community here and have so humiliated the members of the Church that, except for mere perfunctory executive routine, he can no longer successfully perform the duties of his high office in Utah.[1]

The letter went on to say that in light of this situation, the Council of Advice had called upon Bishop Jones to resign his office. "This action will receive approval practically, we think actually, of every vestryman of the three completely organized and self-supporting parishes in the District and of the members of the local Mission committees."[2]

The letter concluded by saying that if Bishop Jones refused or delayed to accede to the Council's request, "the House of Bishops at their meeting on October 17 will be asked to recall Bishop Jones from the Episcopal jurisdiction of the Missionary District of Utah. . . ."[3]

To this letter the Council appended a brief biography of each member of the Council, "a few clippings from recent issues of Salt Lake City papers," and a chronology of actions and speeches by Bishop Jones which they considered unpatriotic.[4]

Later copies of the letter also contained copies of resolutions adopted by the Vestries of St. Mark's and St. Paul's which also called for the Bishop's resignation. The opening paragraphs of these letters clearly display the increasing level of emotion and rhetoric which had begun to dominate the issues of the Bishop's continued tenure in office.

The resolution unanimously adopted by the Vestry of St. Mark's on October 8 began:

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[1] Council of Advice to the Rt. Rev. Daniel S. Tuttle, October 5, 1917. Archives, Church Historical Society, Austin, Texas.

[2] Ibid. [3] Ibid. [4] Ibid.

> WHEREAS, Elihu Root, ex-Secretary of State has said in substance--before the decision to make war, men may range themselves upon one side or the other of the question; but after the decision in favor of war, the country has ranged itself, and the only issue left for the individual citizen is whether he is for or against his country. From that time on arguments against the war in which the country is engaged are enemy arguments. Their spirit is the spirit of rebellion against the government and laws of the United States. Their effect is to hinder and lessen that popular support of the Government in carrying on the war which is necessary to success. They encourage the enemy. The purpose and effect of what they do is so plain that it is impossible to resist the conclusion that the greater part of them are traitors at heart to the United States and are willfully seeking to bring about the triumph of the enemy. . . .[1]

The resolution adopted unanimously by the Vestry of St. Paul's Church on the same day, began on a similar emotional level,

> The Board of Vestrymen of St. Paul's Church, Salt Lake City, believe that a Bishop of the Church who, by speech or action, would in any way, obstruct the efforts of the Government to destroy the German menace to all that civilization and Christianity stand for, or who even refuses or withholds the most vigorous support within his power to the United States in its present peril, is thereby unfitted for leadership in the Church in any American community.[2]

Both resolutions went on to express their unanimous approval of the Action of the Council of Advice in calling upon the Bishop to resign. Copies of these resolutions were also sent to every Bishop in the Episcopal Church.

At the same time, the Rt. Rev. Daniel S. Tuttle, Bishop of Missouri and Presiding Bishop of the Church--and also the first Bishop of the Missionary District of Utah--was also beginning to take a more active role in the controversy. On October 6 Bishop Tuttle wrote to Bishop Lawrence of Massachusetts and the Chairman of the Episcopal Church's War Commission. In his letter, Bishop Tuttle enclosed a copy of Bishop Jones' response to the Presiding Bishop's letter of September 19, in which Bishop Tuttle had suggested that Bishop Jones be a bit more restrained in his public utterances against the war. He also enclosed a copy of a new letter which he was sending to Bishop Jones:

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid.

> I interpret your letter to me to mean that you are conscientiously unwilling to refrain from giving expression to your pacifist convictions and unwilling to withdraw from active association with "Peace" societies, during the continuance of the present war between the United States and Germany.
> Is my interpretation correct?
> After reading this letter please wire me (Collect) "Yes" or "No."[1]

Bishop Tuttle went on to inform Bishop Jones that if the answer was "yes," Bishop Tuttle would at once "forward a copy of your letter to me of September 28" to Bishop Lawrence and the War Commission, "requesting them to present the whole matter to the House of Bishops (or the Bishops in Council) at Chicago with a recommendation of such action as they may deem it wise to be taken."[2] If Bishop Jones' answer was "no," Bishop Tuttle assured him that he would take no further action, "until advised by you."[3]

Four days later, October 10, Bishop Tuttle received his answer from Bishop Jones. The telegram read:

> I think you may take yes for an answer it comes close enough to it. I do not believe that the message of the Gospel of Christ was altered by the entrance of our country into war and that is the message I was commissioned to preach.[4]

Bishop Tuttle forwarded this telegram to Bishop Lawrence and the War Commission, and renewed his request that the Commission be prepared to present the matter of Bishop Jones' pacifism to the Special meeting of the House of Bishops to be held in Chicago.[1]

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[1] Bishop Tuttle to Bishop Lawrence, October 6, 1917, Archives, Church Historical Society, Austin, Texas.

[2] Ibid. [3] Ibid.

[4] Telegram from Bishop Jones to Bishop Tuttle, October 10, 1917, Archives, Church Historical Society, Austin, Texas.

Word of the Council of Advice's demand that Bishop Jones resign was not long in reaching the newspapers in Salt Lake. The Council and the Bishop met privately on the night of October 9. The morning edition of the Tribune contained an article entitled: "Episcopal Council Has Secret Session." The article reported that those who attended the meeting had been pledged to secrecy.[2] However, the article went on to report:

> . . . that it is understood that at last night's meeting of the council of advice, Bishop Jones was made acquainted with the displeasure his course with reference to the world war and the conduct of the American government had aroused among members of his communion in Utah and that it was suggested that he resign as the better way out of a disagreeable situation. This acton, it is reported, was urged for the sake of both the bishop and his church people.[3]

The article went on to say that "the general public might be acquainted with the council's action today."[4]

Indeed they were, the morning edition of the Tribune headlined on the front page: "Paul Jones Is Asked To Resign His Bishopric."[5] Despite the banner headline, the article itself was quite well balanced and fair. It began by stating that Bishop Jones has been "asked to resign his position," and that this demand was made by "his council of advice, the vestrymen of St. Paul's church, and the dean, wardens and vestrymen of St. Mark's cathedral parish."[6]

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[1] Bishop Tuttle to Bishop Lawrence, October 20, 1917, Archives, Church Historical Society, Austin, Texas.

[2] "Episcopal Council Has Secret Session," Salt Lake Tribune, (Oct. 10, 1917), p. 5.

[3] Ibid. [4] Ibid.

[5] "Paul Jones Is Asked to Resign His Bishopric," Salt Lake Tribune, (Oct. 11, 1917), p. 1.

[6] Ibid.

> In their conviction that Bishop Jones had forfeited his right to be leader of the diocese by his alleged unpatriotic attitude and his membership in associations not in sympathy with the national struggle for human rights and democracy, the vestrymen at two meetings held last Monday night went on record unanimously condemning him for the stand he has taken towards the government of the Uited States. His recent participation in the conferences held in Los Angeles and South Pasadena under the auspices of the Christian Pacifists is said to have moved the church officials to summary action.[1]

The article also said that the members of the Council of Advice already believed that Bishop Jones would not accede to their request and would take the matter to the House of Bishops. To prepare for this eventuality, they had contacted Bishop George C. Hunter of the Diocese of Nevada to ask him to represent them at the meeting. While Bishop Hunter had not yet replied to their request, the Tribune reported that "he is said to be heartily in favor of the movement."[2] If Bishop Hunter could not serve, a "Utah clergyman will be chosen to represent the vestry in their action against Bishop Jones."[3]

There followed a long, detailed, and even-handed account of the history of the disagreement between the Bishop and St. Mark's and St. Paul's. The resolution of the Council of Advice, and the resolutions of the vestries of St. Mark's and St. Paul's were reprinted in full, as was the text of the questionnaire which Bishop Jones had mailed to various churchmen in the District. The article also pointed out that "in face of all the charges brought to light by the vestry, Bishop Jones is not without friends," and proceeded to quote three of his supporters in his defense.[4] The article concluded by saying that Bishop Jones was not yet prepared to reply to the charges and "will wait upon the replies of his parishioners to his questionnaire before making a statement."[5]

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid. [3] Ibid. [4] Ibid., p. 2. [5] Ibid.

THE HOUSE OF BISHOPS - 1917

On October 11, the same day the article appeared in the Tribune, the Council of Advice drafted its formal petition to the House of Bishops. The petition, addressed to the members of the House of Bishops, began: "We venture to address you in regard to a most painful situation which confronts the Church in Utah."[1]

In the lengthy petition which followed, it is well to note that the issue dividing the Council of Advice and their Bishop has once again changed. The disagreement is not over the merit or morality of Bishop Jones' pacifist views; nor is the issue concerned any longer with the right of Bishop Jones to speak out on these issues. The issue has now become the effect of the pronouncement of these views on the work of the Church in Utah.

The assumption upon which the petition of the Council of Advice lay was that if the continued expression of Bishop Jones' pacifist convictions was injurious to the prestige and work of the Church, then he ought to be replaced. The validity of this proposition was assumed to be self-evident by the Council of Advice.

It is equally significant that during the four months of debate and discussion that followed, virtually no one called this assumption into question. Bishop Jones, most of his supporters, the House of Bishops, and the special committee formed by the House to investigate the matter accepted this as the moral basis on which the issue would be resolved. The more profound and basic question--whether a Bishop has the right and/or responsibility to speak out on matters of conscience regardless of the consequences, real or imagined, to his diocese--went unasked.

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[1] Council of Advice, Missionary District of Utah, Petition to the House of Bishops, October 11, 1917, Archives, Church Historical Society, Austin, Texas. (The cover page bears the date of October 17, 1917; this is the date on which the petition was formally presented, not the date upon which it was written.)

To return to the petition, the Council of Advice proceeded to put its case to the House of Bishops. Their petition argued that since the day America declared war on Germany, "the Bishop of Utah has persistently maintained an attitude which is *construed* by the citizens of this State, including an overwhelming majority of the people of the Church, to be one of hostility to the United States Government."[1]

The Council contended that by both his own public statements and his membership in "various organizations *generally regarded* as seditious," Bishop Jones "shares the popular condemnation aroused by their attitude, to the serious injury of the Church in Utah."[2]

> Of equal significance has been the Bishop's *silence* in connection with the war. While leaders of every other religious organization in the State have lost no opportunity to aid, by word or deed, the patriotic efforts of the people of the State, Bishop Jones has consistently refrained from identifying himself with any patriotic movement or demonstration whatever. We have waited in vain for a single word from him of interest in, or sympathy with, the present supreme concern of our country.[3]

The Council concluded this section of their petition by saying:

> These, and a multitude of other circumstances of a similar nature, have exasperated the citizens of Utah, and the people of the Church, and have created *an atmosphere* of hostility which bodes ill for the Church.
>
> He has ceased to be in any real sense a leader of his flock and is openly repudiated on every hand. The Church has become an *object of suspicion* and Church people throughout the State

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[1] Ibid. (Italics mine). [2] Ibid. (Italics mine).

[3] Ibid., pp. 1-2.

> are covered with shame and confusion. The outlook for the future appears very dark, because so deep seated and widespread is the opposition towards himself, that it is difficult to see how he can possibly regain his lost influence.[1]

The petition also included a complete copy of the letter asking for the Bishop's resignation which the Council had unanimously adopted on October 4. It also cited the resolutions adopted by the vestries of St. Mark's and St. Paul's which demanded the same action.

The petition said that:

> These various bodies were further moved to their action by increasing criticism of the Church at large, that, an ecclesiastical organization, which would maintain in a position of power a man who uses the weight and opportunity of his high office to disseminate unpatriotic and dangerous doctrines, itself shares in the implication of disloyalty.[2]

In their petition the Council pointed out that on numerous occasions "representative clergymen and laymen . . . both individually and collectively," have offered counsel to the Bishop "urging upon his attention the menace to the Church of the increasing hostile public opinion, and his primary duty to his flock and the church at large."[3] This counsel was not heeded.

Seeing no other alternative, the Council of Advice "respectfully but urgently" petitioned the House of Bishops to grant to them "such relief in our present distress, as, in your judgment, shall seem meet and proper."[4] The petition was signed by George Marshall, Secretary of the Council of Advice, and attested by Dean Fleetwood, the President of the Council.[5]

If, as it now appeared, the main point of the Council's case against Bishop Jones was that the Bishop's public statements were having a seriously detrimental effect on his District, the evidence to support this charge was somewhat insubstantial. Their petition is couched in rather vague phrases such as: "construed . . . to be one of hostility," "an atmosphere of distrust," the outlook for the future "appears very dark," and "the implication of disloyalty." Such vaguely worded complaints are difficult to prove, but they are even more difficult to disprove.

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[1] Ibid., p. 2 (Italics mine). [2] Ibid., p. 3 (Italics mine).

[3] Ibid., p. 5 (Italics mine). [4] Ibid. [5] Ibid.

This is not to imply that the concern of the Council was not totally genuine. There is no evidence to suggest that their actions were motivated by anything other than a sincere concern for the welfare of the Episcopal Church in Utah. To the Council and its supporters, the increasing publicity and notoriety attendant upon Bishop Jones' activities must have appeared to bode ill for the future of their Church. The fact that they were centered primarily in Salt Lake City where the publicity was the heaviest and the editorials were the most outspoken would have made the danger all the more threatening.

An examination of the official reports of the Missionary District which were presented in January of the following year, tends to demonstrate, however, that the concern of the Council of Advice was at least somewhat premature. The date of reporting was moved from May back to January, the figures, therefore, are for only two-thirds of a year. During this period the total number of communicants dropped by only fifteen, from 1,461 to 1,446.[1] While the number of child baptisms dropped by almost 50%, the number of adult baptisms remained constant; and the total number of baptized persons increased from 3,384 to 3,603.[2] Financially

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[1] JC - 1918, p.56.

[2] Ibid.

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the District enjoyed an extremely successful year. Total disbursements for the eight months were $14,453.01, which would equal a gain of 25 percent if continued at the same rate for twelve months."[1]

These figures would appear to demonstrate that Bishop Jones' notoriety had no detrimental effect upon his District. The Council might well have argued that his early departure, December 20, 1918, forestalled any further damage to the District. Such an argument cannot be proven either way. It is clear, however, that the damage to the District to which the Council pointed with great alarm in its petition had not and did not take place.

In the days immediately preceeding the meeting of the House of Bishops in Chicago, Bishops Tuttle, Lloyd and Lawrence were inundated with letters arguing for or against Bishop Jones. Some of the letters were rather outlandish,[2] some merely reiterated old arguments, but a few offered new information.

On October 10, the Rev. Maxwell W. Rice, Vicar of All Soul's Church, Garfield, wrote the Presiding Bishop on Bishop Jones' behalf. Mr. Rice made several important points in his letter. First, he recounted the events which led him to circulate a petition in support of Bishop Jones among the clergy of the District, and informed the Presiding Bishop that with the exception of Dean Fleetwood and the Rev. Mr. Dennis, all but two of the clergy of the District had signed the petition.[1] One of those who did not sign had not received a copy of the petition; the other, "Rev. Lewis of Logan expressed himself as willing to sign if the Bishop wanted him to."[2] Mr. Rice concluded: "Thus the clergy in the District in April (though some differed violently from the Bishop's attitude toward the war) expressed their agreement as a whole on this matter of the Bishop's right to express his opinions publicly as a Bishop."[3]

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[1] Report of the Committee on the State of the Church, JC - 1918, p. 49.

[2] One letter had a particularly interesting suggestion that Bishop Jones be transferred to ". . . another missionary diocese. The trouble about this is that he might create similar trouble elsewhere, and the people of the new cure might complain even more strongly than we are doing. However there is one missionary district where he might effect his works, and where his peculiar opinions would do but little harm, and that is the jurisdiction of Cape Palmas and parts adjacent in West Africa." (L. S. Austin to Bishop Williams, October 3, 1917, Archives, Church Historical Society, Austin, Texas.)

Mr. Rice went on to say that once the petition had been circulated, the matter of Bishop Jones' right to speak had dropped from public concern, so that he had not felt any need to push the matter further.

> Now that the situation which I had hoped might remain closed has been reopened in more serious form, I think it only right to inform you that except for the two city parishes of St. Mark's and St. Paul's the District is loyal to our Bishop, though most of us are against him on this question of the war. His stand can hardly be said to be injuring the work throughout the state except as the action of the two parishes may react on the state. But people outside the city are beginning to realize that the Bishop is not supported in his anti-war attitude by the city parishes and that bad feeling has been aroused. Garfield is as near the city influences as any of our missions, yet no one could truthfully say that this work is being injured by his stand. The city parishes need not have suffered as much as they have from his attitude had they not called forth division in their midst by the bitterness of their attack.[4]

This letter is important for two reasons: first, it showed that the majority of the clergy in the District supported Bishop Jones' right to speak out on the issue of the war; and second, it offered evidence that, at least in one mission, the work of the Church in Utah had not been damaged to the degree which the Council of Advice believed. It should also be noted that this evidence favorable to Bishop Jones was in the hands of the Presiding Bishop one week before the meeting.

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[1] Maxwell W. Rice to Bishop Tuttle, October 10, 1917, Archives, Church Historical Society, Austin, Texas.

[2] Ibid. [3] Ibid. [4] Ibid.

Mr. Rice concluded his letter by saying:

> He commands our respect, for he has a right to. . . . In a democracy even in time of war a certain conscientious minority have the right to make themselves heard. For they instill a deeper loyalty and respect for conscience and do not weaken our undertaking as much as would the silencing them by deposition or imprisonment. I would not care to write in his defense did I not think that his conscientiousness had a salutary effect on the Church in making us think the issue over more carefully and therefore more deeply establish our purpose. Furthermore I know him to be thoroughly loyal to the Church and to what he considers the highest good of his country. I believe that he has every right to remain our bishop.[1]

On October 12, the Rev. Stephen C. Clark, Deacon in charge of St. Luke's, Park City, wrote to Bishop Lawrence in the same vein. With Mr. Rice, he contended that Bishop Jones' public statements had not injured the work of the Church:

> . . . I am firmly convinced that his actions are not hurting the work of the District, in the way that certain charges brought against him would indicate, and that his resignation as Bishop would be decidedly detrimental to the work of the District in the long run. Speaking only for my own work, I have not been able, upon careful investigation, to find a single person in Park City who has left the Church, or even ceased in attendance temporarily, because of the Bishop's peace utterances. . . . And I learn from a number of other clergy in the District that they have found the same conditions in their work.[2]

These two letters do not represent a statistically significant sampling, but they do offer evidence that there was a good deal of support for Bishop Jones in his District. They also throw doubt on the contention of the Council of Advice that Bishop Jones' continued tenure was doing irreparable damage to the District. Most importantly, these letters demonstrate that there was disagreement within the District itself as to the wisdom of removing Bishop Jones.

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Stephen C. Clark to Bishop Lawrence, October 12, 1917, Archives, Church Historical Society, Austin, Texas.

Against this background of growing tension, the House of Bishops met in Special Session at St. James' Church, Chicago, from October 17th to 19th.

At the outset of the meeting, the Presiding Bishop, the Rt. Rev. Daniel S. Tuttle, presented several communications, petitions and memorials that they might be referred to committees for study and recommendation. Among those which he presented was a "Memorial from the Council of Advice to the Missionary District of Utah, in reference to the pacifist attitude of the Bishop of Utah in relation to the present war, and petitioning that he be relieved of further Episcopal duty in that District. . . ."[1]

The House of Bishops voted to refer this memorial to a Special Committee of three Bishops appointed by the Presiding Bishop. The three Bishops chosen by the Presiding Bishop were: Bishop Boyd Vincent, Bishop of Southern Ohio; Bishop Edwin Stevens Lines, Bishop of Newark; and Bishop Arthur Seldon Lloyd, President of the Board of Missions.[2] No further action was taken on this matter during the first day of the session.

The House of Bishops reconvened the next morning. Bishop Jones who was not present at the first session, arrived and took his seat at the meeting. The committee appointed the previous day by the Presiding Bishop reported that it recommended and moved "that the House go into Council" to discuss the situation in the District of Utah.[3] The motion was adopted, "and the Bishops went into Council."[4]

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[1] "Special Meeting of the House of Bishops, October 17-19, 1917," JGC - 1919, p. 475.

[2] Ibid. [3] Ibid., pp. 479-80. [4] Ibid., p. 480.

The Bishops meeting "in Council" is in many ways the equivalent of an executive or closed session. The powers, responsibilities, and strict confidentiality which appertain to such a meeting are thoroughly defined in the Rules of Order.

> The body known as the Bishops in Council, as an assemblage of Catholic Bishops, and considering and acting upon matters of duty or responsibility resting on them as a portion of the universal Episcopate, may be convened at any time, suitable notice being given by the Presiding Bishop or the Chairman of the House of Bishops.[1]

At such a meeting, "only members of the House of Bishops and elected officers of the Council shall be present."[2] In Council, the Bishops are governed by the following rules:

> 1. Such meetings shall be for mutual counsel and consideration only.
> 2. In such meetings no resolutions shall be adopted except to adjourn, to rise, to report to the House of Bishops, to recommend to the House of Bishops, to take order for the giving out of information, or to commit; Provided, that no Committee or Commission of the Council shall be clothed with any power beyond the promotion of considerations, the preparation of reports, or the furthering of recommendations, to be submitted by the Council to the House of Bishops for action of the latter.[3]

To put it a bit more simply, the Council is for discussion, debate and recommendation only. It cannot of itself take binding action. It may only report to the House of Bishops, who must decide and vote publicly.

To facilitate open and frank discussion, all proceedings of the Bishops in Council are held in strict confidence.

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[1] "Rules of Order - House of Bishops," Constitution and Canons for the Government of the Protestant Episcopal Church, General Rule XXIII, p. 169. Bound as part of JGC - 1919.

[2] "Rules of Order," Rule XXII, p. 169.

[3] "Rules of Order," Rule XXIV, p. 169.

> Words spoken by any one in Council shall be held by all as strictly confidential, and no proceedings shall be made known to others than Bishops, save by order of the Council.[1]

Therefore, no reconstruction of the debate which took place in Council is possible.

Several months later, however, the text of the prepared statement which Bishop Jones delivered to the House of Bishops was reprinted in The Social Preparation. Bishop Jones' statement began on a conciliatory note as he reiterated his loyalty to the United States:

> In the first place, let me say that I, as a loyal citizen, am wholeheartedly for this country of ours, in which all my hopes and ideals and interests are bound up. I believe most sincerely that German brutality and aggression must be stopped, and I am willing, if need be, to give my life and what I possess, to bring this about.[2]

Nonetheless, Bishop Jones could not renounce or modify his pacifist principles. Despite his respect for those who differed with him, and in spite of the knowledge that he occupied an "unpopular and decidedly minority point of view," Bishop Jones "had been led to feel that war is entirely incompatible with the Christian profession."[3]

> If we are to reconcile men to God, to build up the brotherhood of the kingdom, preach love, forbearance and forgiveness, teach that ideals are worth more than all else, rebuke evil, and stand for the good even unto death, then I do not see how it can be the duty of the Church or its representatives to aid or encourage the way of war, which so obviously breaks down brotherhood, replaces love and forbearance by bitterness and wrath, sacrifices ideals to expediency, and takes the way of fear instead of that of faith. I believe that it is always the Church's duty to hold up before men the way of the cross; the one way our Lord has given us for overcoming the world.[4]

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[1] "Rules of Order," Rule XXIII, p. 169.

[2] Paul Jones, "Statement Presented by Bishop Jones to a Committee of the House of Bishops, October 18, 1917." Reprinted in The Social Preparation, Vol. 5 (April 1918), p. 5.

[3] Ibid., pp. 5-6. [4] Ibid., p. 6.

Bishop Jones contended that the Allies had rightly faulted Germany for "exalting the supremacy of the State over religion and morals and everything else."[1] But, he added, "I believe that that is the path we are laying out for ourselves in exalting obedience to the State without regard to whether Christianity seems to stand in the way."[2]

Because Bishop Jones loved the Church and believed "that it holds within it the promise of salvation for the world," he could not "acquiesce in any course which I believe involves the forsaking of its divine mission through a contradication of the teaching of its master."[3] And he added: "because I love my country, I must feel that the way of Christ is the only true way for it to go."[4]

Bishop Jones' conscientious decision to continue to speak out for his pacifist convictions was for him much more than a mere academic question of free speech.

> It goes too deep for that. Nor have I any desire to be considered a martyr. The matter is too important for superficial, foolish acting, or any efforts at self-advertising; and in whatever I have preached and said and done I have tried, though not always successfully, to exercise such restraint and judgment that I might win rather than antagonize people. But there are limits beyond which a conscientious man cannot go, however much he may desire the approval of his fellow men.[5]

Against this background, Bishop Jones proceeded to consider three courses of action which had been recommended to him. First, he said that he had been told that in a time of national crisis such as this, no one should hold opinions which seem to conflict with the policy of government, and that if one did hold such opinions, they should quickly change them so "as not to embarrass the government."[6] To this proposal,

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid. [3] Ibid., p. 7.

[4] Ibid. [5] Ibid. [6] Ibid.

Bishop Jones responded that where the issue is as fundamental as the morality of warfare, to heed such advice would necessitate his renouncing the very things which he believed he had been ordained to preach. Bishop Jones concluded: "I am sure that a body of Christian leaders such as this would never advise me to throw overboard lightly my deepest convictions simply because they are embarrassing or contrary to a governmental policy."[1]

The second course of action which had been recommended was that although he could retain his own personal convictions, he should at this time of national emergency, as a loyal American citizen, notwithstanding these convictions, "aid in carrying out that policy which embodies the will of the majority."[2] To this suggestion, Bishop Jones responded:

> The suggestion is not only an insult to the sincerity of my personal conviction but it is asking me to betray my country and my Church by doing what I am convinced will do them grievous harm. To ask a man who is devoting his life to the teaching of Christianity, to take part in something which he believes to be directly opposed to the spirit of Christianity and subversive to its principles, is distinctly immoral.[3]

The third suggestion which had come to Bishop Jones was that although he had a right to his personal convictions and could not rightly be expected to act contrary to them, he could, at least, remain silent until the war was over. Bishop Jones said that he approached this suggestion more cautiously, for he realized that such a course "does not always involve moral turpitude."[4] But in the end he was forced to reject this suggestion as well.

> As perhaps some of you have said, that no red-blooded man who loves his country can be indifferent to its call at this time and

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[1] Ibid., pp. 7-8. [2] Ibid., p. 8.

[3] Ibid. [4] Ibid.

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> must do his bit wherever his service will count, so I believe that no red-blooded man who believes that war is unchristian can be indifferent to that higher loyalty, and must do what he can to work for the ideals which he believes to be supreme.[1]

Having rejected each of these three suggestions, Bishop Jones concluded that in all good conscience he was compelled to continue to speak out forcefully in defense of his Christian ideals.

> As I believe, then, that the adoption of the way of Christ would be the best thing possible for this land we love and through it for all the world, I must, with all the wisdom God has given me, and with all the earnestness which I possess, try to reach men with that message in the terms in which I can express it. If you believe that the Church and the nation are better off without my message, I am quite ready to accede to your judgment, but as long as I represent the Church as I do now, it seems to me that I would be apostate to my high commission did I take any other course. And if I have misinterpreted the meaning of the Gospel, I shall be glad to be set right.[2]

Apparently Bishop Jones' forceful and uncompromising statement had some effect for, having "risen from Council", the Bishop of Pittsburg, the Rt. Rev. Cortlandt Whitehead, presented the following report:

> Having heard a statement by the Bishop of Utah in which he denied the correctness of many of the statements attributed to him with
>
> (1) A declaration of his loyalty to the Government of the United States, and
> (2) His expression of willingness to sever his connection with societies that might bring his loyalty into question,
>
> The Bishops In Council recommend to the House of Bishops that on the above conditions, accepted by the Bishop of Utah, the House advise the Bishop of Utah to remain at his post confident in the support of his brethren.[3]

Such a resolution, had it been adopted, may not have represented a total vindication of Bishop Jones, but it would have surely been a defeat for the Council of Advice. The report of the Bishops in Council was not acted upon by the House. Rather it was referred to a new committee of three Bishops appointed by the Presiding Bishop. This new special committee consisted of Bishop Arthur Crawshay Alliston Hall, Bishop of Vermont; Bishop Charles Palmerston Anderson, Bishop of Chicago; and Bishop Frederick Focke Reese, Bishop of Georgia.[1] To this committee was also referred a motion offered by Bishop Reese:

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[1] Ibid., [2] Ibid., p. 9.

[3] JGC - 1919, p. 481.

> Resolved, That the Committee just appointed be instructed to make a further investigation of the matter at its discretion, in accordance with the request of the Bishop of Utah.[2]

It is at this point that Bishop Jones' most sympathetic biographer, John Howard Melish, begins to cry "foul." He described the events just reported by saying:

> This wise and fair report was, however, referred to a special committee of three, two of whom formerly had been British subjects, men of a different spirit from the original committee. One of them moved that the committee just appointed be instructed to make further investigation into the matter at its discretion.[3]

Melish's description is true, but it is also somewhat misleading. Two of the members of this new committee were at one time in their lives British subjects. Bishop Hall of Vermont was born on April 12, 1847, in Binfield, Berkshire, England, and was educated at Oxford. His first cure in the United States was at Church of the Advent, Boston, beginning in 1874.[4] Bishop Anderson of Chicago was born in Ontario, Canada, on September 19, 1865. He was ordained Deacon and Priest in the Church of Canada, and his first cure was in Beachburgh, Ontario. He became Rector of Grace Church, Oak Park, Illinois in 1891.[5]

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid.

[3] Melish, Jones, pp. 31-32.

[4] Stowe's Clerical Directory of the American Church, 1917 ed., s.v. "Hall, Rt. Rev. Arthur Crawshay Alliston."

[5] Ibid., s.v. "Anderson, Rt. Rev. Charles Palmerston."

Melish's syntax would seem to suggest that it was one of these two Bishops who offered the resolution calling for a further investigation. As has been reported above, that resolution came from Bishop Reese of Georgia.

Despite this slight flaw, Melish raises an important but, unfortunately, unanswerable question: After investigating the matter once in committee, debating the matter in Council, and presenting a resolution to the House, why did the Bishops send it back to a new committee to start all over again?

After the noon recess, the House reconvened. Bishop Hall presented the report of the Special Committee.

> The Committee found it impracticable to make any further investigation of the letters and papers connected with the subject.
>
> The Committee considers that its duty was limited to recasting for adoption by the House the recommendation reported from the Bishops in Council. The Committee recommends the adoption of the following Minute:
>
> Resolved, The House of Bishops has received a representation from the Council of Advice of the Missionary District of Utah concerning reported sayings and actions of its Bishop, with a request for relief under the conditions created thereby.
>
> Having considered the request and having heard a statement from the Bishop of Utah, in which he denied the correctness of several statements attributed to him with a declaration of his loyalty to the Government of the United States, and his expressed intention to sever his connection with societies that might bring his loyalty into question;
>
> The House of Bishops on these assurances given by the Bishop of Utah, advised the Bishop to continue at his post confident in the support of his brethren.
>
> Resolved, That this Minute be communicated by the Presiding Bishop to the Council of Advice as the reply of the House of Bishops to its communication.[1]

Bishop Leonard of Ohio offered an amendment to the first resolution to strike the words "confident in the support of his brethren." The amendment was adopted.[2] Bishop Reese of Georgia then offered a substitute motion to replace the first resolution as amended. His substitute read:

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[1] JGC - 1919, p. 482.

[2] Ibid.

> Resolved, That the Bishop of Utah be advised, with the affectionate interest of his brethren, to take a leave of absence from his jurisdiction pending an investigation, as requested by him, of the facts alleged as to his utterances and actions in a communication addressed to this House from the Council of Advice of his Missionary District.[1]

Bishop Reese's substitute motion was then adopted, and the Bishops adjourned for the day.

Bishop Jones' fortunes had suffered several setbacks as the day continued. The initial report of the Bishops in Council, while not a total vindication for him, was predominantly favorable. That report, however, had not been officially adopted. When it was presented again by the second committee, the support which it had contained for Bishop Jones was slowly whittled away. Bishop Leonard's motion to strike the words "confident of the support of his brethren" had deprived the resolution of most of its support; and the substitute which was finally adopted was a clear setback. The attitude of the House of Bishops toward the situation in Utah had changed markedly during the day. Unfortunately, there is nothing in the Journal nor in the Archives which adequately explains this transition.

During the morning session of the next day, October 19, Bishop Irving Johnson, the Bishop Coadjutor of Colorado, moved that the House reconsider the resolution which it had adopted the day before advising Bishop Jones to take a leave of absence from his District.[2] The House agreed to do so, and on motion offered by Bishop Lawrence of Massachusetts, the House established another committee to look into the matter once again. This new committee consisted of Bishop Lines of Newark; the Rt. Rev. Beverly Dandridge Tucker, Bishop Coadjutor of Southern Virginia; the Rt. Rev. John Gardner Murray, Bishop of Maryland; the Rt. Rev. James Ridout Winchester, Bishop of Arkansas; and the Rt. Rev. William Theodotus Capers, Bishop of West Texas.[1] Immediately thereafter, the House adjourned for lunch.

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid., p. 486.

During the recess, Bishop Jones wrote a letter to the Presiding Bishop. In the letter, he stated:

> As the Council of Advice of the Missionary District of Utah has written to the House of Bishops through you questioning my loyalty to my country, saying that my usefulness as Bishop of Utah is ended, and asking for relief; I am taking the liberty of requesting that you, with such other Bishops as you may call to your aid, inquire into the whole subject and advise me in the process, so that I may govern my action thereby.
>
> Meanwhile, I ask that you will grant me leave of absence from the District.[2]

Bishop Jones' letter provided a convenient means by which the House could deal with this problem. Immediately after the recess, the Bishop Coadjutor of Southern Virginia presented the committee's report:

> In view of a statement presented to the Presiding Bishop by the Bishop of Utah, it will not be necessary to make any recommendation to the House of Bishops, except to ask the House to adopt the following Resolutions, which are needed to enable the Presiding Bishop to carry out a plan for the settlement of the present difficulties in the Missionary District of Utah.
>
> 1. Resolved, That the House of Bishops requests the Presiding Bishop to call a Commission of such Bishops as he may select to enquire into the whole matter, so that the Bishop of Utah may govern his action by their advice.
>
> 2. Resolved, That the Presiding Bishop be respectfully requested to grant the leave of absence asked in his statement by the Bishop of Utah.[3]

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Bishop Jones to Bishop Tuttle, October 19, 1917, Archives, Church Historical Society, Austin, Texas.

[3] JGC - 1919, p. 487.

Both resolutions were adopted, as was another offered by Bishop Weller of Fond Du Lac to send a copy of Bishop Jones' letter and the resolutions just adopted to the Council of Advice.[1]

This final action, while formally correct, was somewhat superfluous, for the Council of Advice was keeping itself fully informed and did not need formal notification of the Bishops' actions. At 3:24 p.m. on October 19, a group of Bishop Jones' opponents sent an urgent telegram to the House of Bishops, "sent on the personal guarantee of the local manager of the Telegraph Company that same would be delivered in Chicago before 5 p.m. of its date."[2]

> Press dispatches state Bishops consider Bishop Jones indiscreet rather than disloyal and that he will remain as Bishop of Utah. Our protest goes deeper. His usefulness is at an end. Either he must withdraw or the District of Utah for many years will be irreparably injured and disgraced.
>
> We can send one thousand telegrams if evidence of this kind is desired. But we are assuming that the deliberate judgment of Council of Advice and vestries is sufficient. We are hoping that the church may be shielded from open scandal rather than suffer from the untold and inevitable consequences of retaining him as Bishop of Utah.
>
> We are loyal citizens of a democracy and disloyalty and autocracy are hateful to us.
>
> We represent the overwhelming majority of Utah Churchmen. Failure to take drastic action will show lack of appreciation of the seriousness of the situation not to Bishop Jones alone but to the church in Utah.
>
> If he now assures you of his loyalty it is contrary to his previous acts and utterances and inconsistent therewith. His retention as Bishop of Utah will result disastrously.[3]

This telegram was signed by George Marshall, representing all the members of the Council of Advice, and by Morris Ritchie, Chancellor of the District; J. Walcott Thompson, member of the Board of Missions;

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Telegram, Council of Advice et al. to House of Bishops, October 19, 1917. Original draft and copy, Archives, Diocese of Utah, Salt Lake City.

[3] Ibid.

William Fleetwood, Dean of St. Mark's Cathedral; J. H. Dennis, Rector of St. Paul's Church; W. T. Gunter, Vestryman; J. B. Scholefield, Treasurer of the Convocation; C. P. Overfield, Vestryman; J. M. Callow; J. A. Reeves, Warden; and John A. Houghton, former Warden.[1]

Despite the guarantee of the telegraph company, the telegram was not received in Chicago until 6:50 p.m.,[2] several hours after the House had adjourned "without day." It had no impact, therefore, upon the deliberations of the House. The urgent and rather strident tone of the telegram may have had some impact on Bishop Tuttle. He appointed himself as Chairman of the Commission authorized to investigate the situation further. The other two members were: Bishop Harry Sherman Longley, Bishop Coadjutor of Iowa, and Bishop George Herbert Kinsolving, Bishop of Texas.[3]

Before their adjournment, the House of Bishops adopted a Pastoral Letter which had been drafted by Bishop Tuttle, Bishop Lawrence of Massachusetts, and Bishop Hall of Vermont. The first two paragraphs of the letter read:

> Our nation is at war in behalf of justice, liberty and humanity. When these are in danger, the Church's station is at the front.
>
> When the nation has with solemn deliberation entered war, voices which have spoken for neutrality, non-resistance or pacifism are silenced. We hate war, and shrink from its horrors, but we who enjoy the privileges of civil liberty won by the blood of our fathers must, when they are endangered, defend them at the

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Telegram, Council of Advice, et al. to House of Bishops, October 19, 1917. Two copies of the telegram were received in Chicago, one marked received at 6:50 p.m., the other marked received at 11:38 p.m., Archives, Church Historical Society, Austin, Texas.

[3] Homer Neville Tinker, "The Case of Bishop Jones, Christian," The Churchman, Vol. 148 (Sept. 1, 1934), p. 11.

> cost of our blood. In the overthrow of injustice and inhumanity is the only hope of permanent peace. Loyalty demands of every citizen unconditional consecration to the service of the nation.[1]

The chain of events which would lead one voice which had "spoken for neutrality, non-resistance or pacifism" to be silenced was now well under way. All the motives which activated the three primary participants in this process--the Council of Advice, the House of Bishops, and Bishop Jones--cannot be fully known, but it is only proper to point out that each had acted openly and within the prescribed limits of its authority.

The Council of Advice had a perfect right, and perhaps a responsibility, to petition the House of Bishops for relief from a situation which it believed to be inimical to the future of the Church in Utah. The accuracy of their perception of the harm which Bishop Jones' outspoken views were doing to the District is questionable; as is the implicit assumption in their argument that such damage was sufficient cause for the Bishop's removal. The validity of this assumption, and the implicit notion of the nature and purpose of the Church will be examined later. It is sufficient at this point to observe that the Council acted in full accord with the Constitution and Canons of the Church in petitioning the House of Bishops for relief.

The reaction of the House of Bishops is more difficult to understand or evaluate. The difficulty lies in the fact that almost all the discussion and debate on the question of Bishop Jones took place "in Council," and therefore no record of it is available. This is particularly unfortunate because of the radical change which took place during the sessions. The first resolution urged Bishop Jones "to remain at his post confident in the support of his brethren." By the end of the meeting of the House, the Bishops had accepted Bishop Jones' request for a leave of absence and had appointed a new committee to reinvestigate the whole matter. While the first resolution would not have been a total vindication for Bishop Jones, the action finally adopted by the House was certainly a major setback for him. There is no way to know what forces brought about this dramatic change, or why it took so many committees and hearings to reach this conclusion.

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[1] "Pastoral Letter - 1917," JCG - 1919, p. 503.

Like the Council of Advice, however, the House of Bishops had acted within its proper authority. It received the petition from the Council, listened to Bishop Jones' response and acted within the provisions of the Canons.

For his part, Bishop Jones fulfilled and exceeded his canonical responsibilities. Had he so desired, Bishop Jones could have simply defied the Council of Advice and his brother Bishops. Had he chosen to do so, there would have been little that could have been done to punish him. His salary could not be diminished without his consent.[1] While the House of Bishops had the power to transfer Bishop Jones to another Missionary District, it is highly unlikely that such an attempt would have succeeded.[2] The only other option which would have been available to the House would have been to bring a presentment against Bishop Jones which would then lead to an official trial. The process for the presentment and trial of a Bishop is set out in Canons 25 through 30. That the House of Bishops would have exercised this option seems highly unlikely for two reasons: first, no charge of sufficient magnitude to warrant a trial was ever made against Bishop Jones, and second, the process is so complex that the war would have ended long before any verdict could have been reached. Therefore, Bishop Jones could have simply stood his ground and defied both the Council and the House to take any action against him.

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[1] Canon 57, Article V, Section I.

[2] Canon 10, Section 3.

It is to Bishop Jones' credit that he refused to adopt such a stance. Rather, in his letter to Bishop Tuttle, he requested a leave of absence and that the Presiding Bishop appoint a committee to thoroughly investigate the situation, "so that I [Bishop Jones] may govern my action thereby."[1] This last phrase is particularly significant. Bishop Jones was under no canonical obligation to accept whatever report or recommendation this committee might make. He voluntarily bound himself to accept its recommendation. At any point in the proceedings he could have withdrawn this voluntary consent and adopted a defiant attitude. Again, it is to his credit that once he made this pledge, Bishop Jones never revoked it.

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[1] Bishop Jones to Bishop Tuttle, October 19, 1917, Archives, Church Historical Society, Austin, Texas.

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THE COMMISSION

The first meeting of the Commission which had been charged with the responsibility of fully investigating the situation in the Missionary District of Utah was set for the first Sunday in November, in Davenport, Iowa. At the meeting of the House of Bishops, Bishop Tuttle and Bishop Kinsolving had agreed to meet in Davenport on this date to participate in the installation of Bishop Longley as Coadjutor of Iowa. Bishop Jones contended that it was because of this pre-arranged meeting that Bishop Tuttle had chosen Bishop Kinsolving and Bishop Longley to assist him on the Commission. Bishop Jones believed that since these three Bishops had arranged to meet anyway, they simply decided to add the case of Bishop Jones to their agenda. As Jones put it,

> . . . the commission was not appointed because of any special fitness for their work, and they expect to do their work up in a few hours in the midst of the various ceremonies connected with the installation.[1]

Both the Council of Advice and Bishop Jones asked Bishop Tuttle to move the meeting to Salt Lake City. In his telegram, Bishop Jones said:

> Would urge that commission go to Utah if at all possible. It might appear that Commission had not given due consideration to gravity of the situation if they decide simply on the basis of a few papers. Am sending questionnaire and all related papers to Bishop Longley.[2]

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[1] Homer Neville Tinker, "The Case of Bishop Jones, Christian," The Churchman, Vol 148 (Sept. 1, 1934), p. 11.

[2] Telegram from Bishop Jones to Bishop Tuttle, October 30, 1917, Archives, Church Historical Society, Austin, Texas.

On November 2, Bishop Tuttle wired Bishop Longley that Bishop Tuttle's son, Herbert, was dying in Texas; and that he could not come to Davenport. As a result the meeting was re-scheduled for St. Louis on November 7.[1]

In the same telegram, the Presiding Bishop went on to say: "Tell Fleetwood and Thompson when they come from Salt Lake to come to St. Louis on the seventh."[2] There is no record of how or by whom Dean Fleetwood and Mr. Thompson were invited to participate in the proceedings of the Commission. It is even more important to note that Bishop Jones was not invited to appear before this meeting.

In the few weeks between the adjournment of the House of Bishops and the meeting of the Commission, now re-scheduled for November 7, the Council of Advice was quite busy gathering evidence to buttress its case against Bishop Jones. These efforts were focused in two main areas.

First, a letter was sent by members of the Council to the various mission stations in the District, seeking to ascertain "just what the feeling is at those stations regarding the activities of Bishop Jones."[3] The letter asked two related questions:

> Will you give me a statement, your own and that of any other people of your City that you feel would represent the feeling of your locality, of facts that you know as to the activities and statements of Bishop Jones, and also as to just what the atmosphere

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[1] Telegram from Bishop Tuttle to Bishop Longley, November 2, 1917, Archives, Diocese of Utah, Salt Lake City.

[2] Ibid.

[3] The draft of the letter is dated October 25, 1917. It is addressed: "Dear _______," and is not signed. Judging by references to the letter in the responses, a copy of the letter was addressed and signed by one member of the Council, and he sent it to those clergymen whom he knew best. Archives, Diocese of Utah, Salt Lake City.

> or feeling of the City is regarding Bishop Jones and the action taken by the Council of Advice and the House of Bishops.[1]

While these questions appear rather unbiased on their face, the direction in which the Council hoped to lead the responses was implied in the sentence which immediately followed: "We know that it is a hard thing for any of you to act against a friend, especially one who has been so fine a friend as Bishop Jones, but this is a time when personal feelings must be put in the background and the good of the Church in the District and the needs and good of the nation brought forward."[2] To the Council, at least, it seemed clear that continued loyalty to Bishop Jones was inimical to the welfare of the Church and the nation. The letter closed by asking each church to respond as promptly as possible so that the information could be presented to the Commission appointed by the House of Bishops.[3]

Despite the somewhat leading phraseology of the letter, the responses were almost uniformly in support of Bishop Jones and in opposition to the action taken by the Council of Advice. The only letters in opposition to Bishop Jones were from a Mr. Hubert Richards and a Mr. A. P. Reid, both of Springville, Utah.[4]

Eschewing the formal letter of the Council, Dean Fleetwood wrote personally to Mr. John S. Lewis, a vestryman of the Church of the Good Shepherd, Ogden. In his letter, Dean Fleetwood said:

> This is not, as you seemed to feel, a local matter. What we, the Council of Advice, have done here was not done because we were

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid. [3] Ibid.

[4] Hubert Richards to J. B. Scholefield, October 30, 1917, Archives, Diocese of Utah, Salt Lake City.

A. P. Reid to the Advisory Board of the Episcopal Church in Utah, October 27, 1917, Archives, Diocese of Utah, Salt Lake City.

> residents of Salt Lake City, but because as Churchmen, interested in the work of the Church throughout the State, we felt that something had to be done, and we are not anxious to be thought to be disloyal to our Government at this critical time.[1]

In response to this letter, the Vestry of the Church of the Good Shepherd adopted the following resolution:

> At a meeting of the Vestry Tuesday evening a majority was present to consider the evidence submitted by yourself as President of the Council of Advice, regarding action taken against the Right Reverend Bishop Paul Jones for alleged seditious and unpatriotic utterances in various addresses made by him, and his affiliation with various pacifist gatherings.
>
> This matter was thoroughly discussed, and I have been authorized to write and advise you that the evidence submitted was not of sufficient weight for us to concur in action taken by the Council of Advice without the presence of the Bishop to defend himself; I am, therefore, returning papers to you without comment.[2]

The letter was signed by George W. Parlow, Secretary of the Vestry.

This letter is significant for several reasons. First, the Church of the Good Shepherd was the third largest church in the Diocese and the only self-supporting parish outside Salt Lake City. The refusal of this parish to join in the efforts of the Council of Advice to remove Bishop Jones gives further credence to the contention that the anti-Jones faction had little support outside the city.

Second, while the letter said only that the evidence was "not of sufficient weight" for the vestry to concur in the action of the Council, the effect of the vestry's action was to repudiate the action of the Council. The Council was extremely anxious to collect as much support as possible to present to the Commission. Good Shepherd's demurral effectively closed off this avenue of possible support.

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[1] Dean Fleetwood to John S. Lewis, October 29, 1917, Archives, Diocese of Utah, Salt Lake City.

[2] George W. Parlow to Dean Fleetwood, October 31, 1917, Archives, Diocese of Utah, Salt Lake City.

Third, attached to the formal decision of the vestry was Mr. Lewis' personal response to the questionnaire circulated by Bishop Jones. Mr. Lewis' responses make it clear that he for one was in complete disagreement with the actions of the Council. Two replies are particularly interesting. To the question: "please state what injury has been done to the life of the church, to your knowledge, by any such course on the part of the Bishop of Utah?", Mr. Lewis replied: "None."[1] The questionnaire asked: "Please state whether you believe a serious condition to exist in the church in Utah, and if so, what that condition is?" Mr. Lewis replied: "I do not and can see no reason why the church is seriously injured."[2]

In their effort to broaden the basis of their opposition to Bishop Jones, the Council had met with a firm rebuff from the Church of the Good Shepherd and from Mr. Lewis.

The Council received a similar rebuff from Maxwell W. Rice, Vicar of All Souls' Church, Garfield. All Souls' was the largest mission congregation in the District. Mr. Rice was quick to acknowledge that Bishop Jones was not particularly popular in Garfield. According to him, the causes of the Bishop's unpopularity were three: "his membership in the People's Council, his treatment by the press, and the action of the Council."[3]

Mr. Rice went on to say, however, that "personally there seems to be nothing against him, rather a deep respect for his character, even by those who dislike his point of view."[1] As to the Bishop's pacifist views, Mr. Rice contended that the Bishop's stand against the war had not weakened the resolve of those who saw the war as a just endeavor.

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[1] John S. Lewis, Response to Bishop Jones' Questionnaire, no date, Archives, Diocese of Utah, Salt Lake City.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Maxwell W. Rice to Dean Fleetwood, October 29, 1917, Archives, Diocese of Utah, Salt Lake City.

> He, Bishop Jones, simply denies that war can ever be a Christian activity, inasmuch as he thinks it contradicts almost every Christian principle and defeats its own ends. In stating this publicly, is he weakening our allegiance to the war? I think not! He has had this effect on me, of making me go deeper for the meaning of war, and going into it with a more Christian purpose than I otherwise should have done. This is probably his effect on others.[2]

Mr. Rice concluded that although he disliked Bishop Jones' point of view in regard to the war, it would "lower the Church to put him out of office as we would an unpopular politician."[3] For these reasons, Mr. Rice refused to join the Council of Advice in its efforts to force Bishop Jones' resignation.

A similar unsympathetic reponse to the actions of the Council of Advice came from Mr. J. Wesley Twelves, Vicar of St. Paul's Church and Lodge, Vernal. Mr. Twelves told the Council that he had recently interviewed all the communicants and others who frequently attended that church as to their feelings on the matter of Bishop Jones, and that he had also talked with quite a few outside the church, "so that what I say, I say from actual conversation and not from any idea or inference that I may make on my own."[4]

On the basis of these interviews, Mr. Twelves could not find "but one person in the community who thoroughly agrees with the Bishop, on the other hand I do not know of one person who heartily condemns the

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid. [3] Ibid.

[4] J. Wesley Twelves to William F. Bulkey, October 27, 1917, Archives, Diocese of Utah, Salt Lake City.

Bishop."[1] The general feeling was one of "admiration for him in this particular instance."[2] On the basis of this type of reaction, Mr. Twelves could find no reason sufficient to force the Bishop's resignation.

Having defended Bishop Jones, Mr. Twelves went on to raise some question about the propriety of the Council's own actions:[3]

> Regarding the feeling of the people toward the action taken by the Council of Advice, I would say that a few people said that perhaps it would settle the whole question if the Bishop would resign as they suggest. But the majority of the people here have a great feeling of love and respect for the Bishop and all that they can say is that it is a great shame. Of course there are people here as there are in Salt Lake City who do not like the Bishop and this is simply an opportunity to show their hatred, this is not due to anything that the Bishop has done. A large number of people outside the Church have an idea that the Council of Advice is a body which controls the appointment and actions of the Bishops and that they having asked for his resignation, therefore, it must be that he is in the wrong. Naturally I have corrected them and informed them that the body is simply his own appointed advisory board. This has thrown a different light on the matter and some have felt that the action of the Council of Advice was rather presumptuous.[4]

Mr. Twelves concluded by saying: "There is nothing that either myself or others connected with the Church would want to see less than Bishop Jones' resignation."[1]

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid. Mr. Twelves was particularly upset that the Council had implied, apparently without any factual evidence, that a "rival Lodge" would be started by opponents of Bishop Jones to compete with St. Paul's.

> "Your inference or rather suggestion that if I could show that a rival Lodge is to be started here in Vernal, 'it would tend greatly to show the detrimental influence the Bishop's views are having on the Church' is beyond me. I think the Bishop has been unjustly treated enough--but this makes me wonder when it will stop and what possibly may be resorted to in the future is hard to tell. There is no movement to start a rival Lodge that I or any others know anything about.
>
> ". . .to bring a matter of this sort into the Bishop's actions is preposterous and I am more than surprised to think it possible of any member of the Council of Advice.
>
> "May I ask you to further state your reasons for so doing."

[4] Ibid.

Another reply in the same vein came from Edwin T. Lewis, Vicar of St. John's House, Logan. According to Mr. Lewis, the Jones "affair has been one of passing interest and surprise but of absolutely no influence or effect whatever."[2] He concluded his letter to the Council by saying: "Bishop Jones' usefulness here in Logan is certainly not seriously impaired."[3]

Even among the churches of Salt Lake City, support for the Council and its actions was not unanimous. A letter from Hoyt E. Henriques, Vicar of St. John's, Salt Lake, showed his unwillingness to join the campaign to oust the Bishop. In his letter, Mr. Henriques conceded that there were some at St. John's who found the Bishop's stand totally unacceptable.

> Several people have given as their reason for non-attendance at St. John's, a dislike for a body tolerating a head such as the Bishop is alleged to be. In the Bishop's questionnaire, I mentioned this class, but calling the excuse offered, the Alleged reason.[4]

In particular, both the Warden (and organist) of St. John's, and "the largest subscriber" to the parish's expenses had both threatened to quit, but "in both cases I [Mr. Henriques] was able to smooth the affair over."[5]

Mr. Henriques concluded by saying:

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Edwin T. Lewis to the Council of Advice, October 29, 1917, Archives, Diocese of Utah, Salt Lake City.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Hoyt E. Henriques to J. W. Thompson, November 2, 1917, Archives, Diocese of Utah, Salt Lake City.

[5] Ibid.

> Personally, I feel that there has always been an attitude of antagonism against the Bishop by certain Church people of Utah. Some of this antagonism is well based and other is not. I believe his stand has injured the position of the Church in Utah, but I do not think it beyond the possibility of recovery, even if he remains our head. In my letter to him I suggested that the matter might blow over if he could see his way clear to keep silent, if he couldn't retract.[1]

The Council of Advice had sent its letter to the various missions and parishes throughout the District hoping to gain additional support and evidence for its efforts to force the resignation of Bishop Jones. In this endeavor the Council had clearly failed. Based on the letters preserved in the Archives, the churches in the District were not convinced that the Bishop had irreparably damaged his District or that he should be removed from office. In fact, most of the responses expressed the feeling that although Bishop Jones' pacifist position was regrettable, his removal would do even greater damage to the District. In sum, the attempt of the Council to gain support for its actions had the opposite effect. The responses it elicited add further credence that the effort to force the removal of Bishop Jones was centered almost exclusively in the two Salt Lake parishes of St. Mark's and St. Paul's, and that most of the charges against the Bishop were almost entirely without substance.

While the Council garnered little additional support from the other parishes and missions of the Diocese, it had more success on another front. The Council, apparently through Dean Fleetwood, solicited letters of support from private individuals in Salt Lake and Ogden. The word "solicited" is used advisedly since many of the letters began with the words "in response to your request" or words of a similar nature. There are almost a dozen of these letters in the Archives, all dated between

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[1] Ibid.

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October 22 and November 4. All the letters were written on the official letterhead of the firm or institution by whom the author was employed. These "coincidences" would at least seem to imply that this was an organized effort to gain support for the Council's actions rather than a spontaneous outpouring of indignation against Bishop Jones.[1]

The efforts of the Council of Advice to gain broader support for its actions was only a partial success. The Council was unsuccessful in broadening the base of its efforts to include the missions and parishes of the rest of the District. The Council did have some success, however, in collecting many letters opposing Bishop Jones from private individuals in Salt Lake and Ogden.

These materials were collected by Dean Fleetwood and Mr. Thompson and carried by them to the meeting of the Commission, now scheduled for November 7, in St. Louis.

For his part, Bishop Jones had earlier planned to spend the two months following the House of Bishops' meeting in the East, hoping to collect approximately $15,000 to continue the work of the Church in Utah. Following the meeting of the House, Bishop Jones wrote to Bishop Tuttle saying that as his status was now somewhat ill-defined, he, Bishop Jones, felt obliged to cancel these fund-raising engagements.[1]

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[1] Charles F. Grout to Dean Fleetwood, October 31, 1917.
David Moore Lindsay to J. W. Thompson, October 31, 1917.
James H. Devine to Dean Fleetwood, October 31, 1917.
H. W. Rowe to Dean Fleetwood, October 31, 1917.
C. A. Day to Dean Fleetwood, October 31, 1917.
G. H. Lermit to Dean Fleetwood, October 31, 1917.
Mrs. R. B. Harkness to Dean Fleetwood, November 1, 1917.
J. M. Callow to Bishop Tuttle, November 1, 1917.
E. Gayford to Bishop Tuttle, November 1, 1917.
C. Stimpson to Dean Fleetwood, November 2, 1917.
E. O. Howard to Dean Fleetwood, November 3, 1917.
And others, all to be found in the Archives, Diocese of Utah, Salt Lake City.

In his letter, Bishop Jones thanked the Presiding Bishop for acceding to his request and "calling the other Bishops to your aid in looking into the situation in Utah."[2] He went on to say that he had sent the "Questionnaire replies and such other documents that I had, which might help you, to Bishop Longley by registered mail; and I am ready should you desire my presence to meet with you at any time.[3]

As to the meetings of the Commission itself, the record is, unfortunately, very sketchy. No "minutes" were kept, nor is there a record of the evidence presented. There are only three sources of information regarding these proceedings: first, the articles which appeared in the St. Louis newspapers;[4] second, the two official reports of the Commission;[5] and third, a long and detailed letter which Bishop Jones wrote to Bishop Lawrence describing the proceedings from his point of view.[6]

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[1] Bishop Jones to Bishop Tuttle, October 31, 1917, Archives, Church Historical Society, Austin, Texas.

[2] Ibid. [3] Ibid.

[4] "Socialist Bishop Arrives to Face Trial Committee," St. Louis Star, December 12, 1917.
"Bishop Jones Will Resign on Request," St. Louis Globe Democrat, December 12, 1917.
"Bishop Asked to Resign Has Not Changed Views." St. Louis Post-Dispatch, December 13, 1917.

[5] "Report of Commission in re Bishop Jones of Utah," December 12, 1917, Archives, Church Historical Society, Austin, Texas.
"Report of Commission in re Case of Bishop Jones of Utah," December 12, 1917, Archives, Church Historical Society, Austin, Texas.

[6] Bishop Jones to Bishop Lawrence, January 2, 1918. Reprinted in its entirety in "The Case of Bishop Jones, Christian," The Churchman, Vol. 148 (Sept. 1, 1934), p. 11.

The original meeting scheduled for Davenport, Iowa, was rescheduled for November 7 in St. Louis. The "Report of the Commission" has very little to say as to what took place at that meeting. It says only that after chosing Bishop Longley as its secretary, the Commission "spent the day in examining the complaints submitted by the Council of Advice of the Missionary District of Utah, and others, among whom were Dean Fleetwood and Mr. Walcott Thompson of Salt Lake City, who appeared personally and gave testimony."[1]

This official description, while accurate in itself, overlooks three important facts. First, it fails to mention specifically that Bishop Jones was not invited and did not attend this meeting. In his correspondence with Bishop Tuttle, Bishop Jones had stated his willingness to meet with the Commission at any time. This offer was not accepted.

Second, the "Report" does mention that Dean Fleetwood and Mr. Thompson appeared before the Commission and "gave testimony". It fails, however, to provide any justification as to why these men were invited. The Commission had earlier declined to go to Salt Lake to gather evidence, but no explanation is offered as to why only these two men were allowed to appear before the Commission. This somewhat questionable decision is further complicated by the fact that no record was kept of what specific charges these gentlemen brought against Bishop Jones, nor of what evidence they presented to support these charges.

In this regard, one area of particular concern comes immediately to mind. One of the principal charges which the Council of Advice had made against Bishop Jones was that his pacifist activities had done great and potentially irreparable damage to the work of the Church in Utah. The means by which the Council sought to gain broader support for this charge from the various parishes and missions around the District have been documented above. This effort had been predominantly unsuccessful, as the letters from John S. Lewis, Maxwell W. Rice, J. Wesley Twelves, Edwin T. Lewis and Hoyt E. Henriques demonstrate. One may assume that the Council was totally forthright in its presentation and provided all the information at its disposal, including these letters, to the Commission. Without a record of all the evidence and documents which were presented, however, this assumption cannot be proven.

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[1] "Report of Commission in re Case of Bishop Jones of Utah," p. 1.

It should also be noted that when Bishop Jones met with the Commission on December 12, he specifically asked the Bishops to show him the list of specific charges and the evidence which the Council provided to support them. No such list was provided; instead, as Bishop Jones described it: "Bishop Longley told me in a few words what the Council had told them, apparently nothing more than the vague general charges which they had written to the House of Bishops."[1]

Without a more complete record, there is no way of knowing the content of the Council's presentation, or whether that presentation included all the evidence, both pro and con, which the Council had at its disposal.

Third, at the suggestion of Bishop Longley, Bishop Jones had sent to him by registered mail, "the replies to a questionnaire which I [Bishop Jones] had sent to one hundred and eighty church people in the district, in regard to the issues involved, together with notes of such sermons of mine as had been criticized and the texts of addresses made in public during the previous months."[1]

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[1] Bishop Jones to Bishop Lawrence, January 2, 1918.

Unfortunately, these papers reached Des Moines on November 3, after Bishop Longley had left for Davenport; and Bishop Longley had not made arrangements to have them forwarded. Therefore, at its initial meeting the Commission did not see any of the evidence submitted in his own defense by the Bishop.[2]

These three factors do not, of themselves, demonstrate that the proceedings of the Commission were unfair or partial. The questions which they raise may be questions of style and appearance rather than of fact. It is unfortunate, however, that without a more complete record of the proceedings, these questions cannot be fully answered. The "Report" states only that "this Commission met in the City of St. Louis, Missouri, on December 7, 1917, and listened to evidence oral and written pertaining to the condition of the Church in Utah, and adjourned to December 12."[3]

The Commission was scheduled to reconvene at 10 a.m. on December 12. Bishop Jones arrived the night before, but "declined to make any comment until after the hearing."[4] Bishop Tuttle and Bishop Kinsolving arrived on time, but Bishop Longley wired Bishop Tuttle that his train from Iowa was running about eight hours late; and he did not arrive until 4:30 that afternoon.[5]

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid.

[3] "Report of Commission in re Bishop Jones of Utah," p. 2.

[4] "Socialist Bishop Arrives," page n.a.

[5] Ibid.

Despite Bishop Longley's absence, Bishop Tuttle and Bishop Kinsolving met through the morning, and according to Bishop Jones, they "prepared the main part of their final report."[1] If Bishop Jones' statement that the main part of the report was written by Bishop Tuttle and Bishop Kinsolving on the morning of the twelfth, it is extremely significant and casts grave doubts upon the objectivity and impartiality of that report. To support his contention that this is in fact what happened, Bishop Jones described the situation in a letter to Bishop Lawrence.

> I can make this statement without hesitation because, although I was in another part of the house while they were deliberating, it was impossible to help overhearing what Bishop Kinsolving said to Bishop Tuttle, and when I came down to luncheon, Bishop Tuttle was writing out on paper what he later read as the report of the committee.[2]

If this is the process by which the report was written, its objectivity is questionable on two bases. First, Bishop Jones had sent all the evidence which he had gathered in his defense to Bishop Longley; but because of delays in transit, this material was not available at the first meeting of the Commission in November. This evidence was still in the possession of Bishop Longley. His delay in arriving in St. Louis, unavoidable as it was, meant that the Commission could not have seen this material until at least 4:30 that afternoon. And if, as Bishop Jones contended, the report was written on the morning of the twelfth, that report was written solely on the basis of the information provided by the Council of Advice, and without any consideration of the evidence provided by Bishop Jones. Whether by design or innocent inadvertance, the evidence upon which the Commission reached its decision was strictly one-sided.

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[1] Bishop Jones to Bishop Lawrence, January 2, 1918.

[2] Ibid.

Bishop Longley arrived at 4:30. The three Bishops met together for less than three-quarters of an hour.[1] In this short time, Bishop Tuttle and Bishop Kinsolving apparently reviewed the information brought by Bishop Longley, and then read him the report which they had drafted.[2]

Having agreed on their report and recommendations, the Commission asked Bishop Jones to appear before them. The two reports of the Commission describe this interview in very vague terms. One report said that the Commission "had the Bishop of Utah in personal presence before them, and they asked and answered questions of him and he asked and answered questions of them."[3] The other report said that the Bishop of Utah came before the Commission "whenever occasion demanded."[4]

Bishop Jones described the interview in more specific terms.

> Then they summoned me to appear before the commission. Bishop Tuttle immediately proceeded, without any questioning of me, to read their final report. I interrupted him long enough to ask to be allowed to hear what evidence or charges the Council of Advice had brought in, inasmuch as . . . the Council of Advice refused to supply me with that information. Bishop Longley told me in a few words what the Council had told them, apparently nothing more than the vague general charges which they had written to the House of Bishops. Then Bishop Tuttle read through their report asking me for any comment on the different paragraphs.[5]

The reports of the Commission, and the description of the meeting by Bishop Jones are not necessarily contradictory. Bishop Jones was personally present "whenever occasion demanded"; and he did ask and answer questions of the Commission, and they of him. However, if Bishop

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid.

[3] "Report of Commission in re Bishop Jones of Utah," p. 2.

[4] "Report of the Commission in re Case of Bishop Jones of Utah," p. 1.

[5] Bishop Jones to Bishop Lawrence, January 2, 1918.

Jones' description is accurate, and there is no evidence to contradict that description, his participation was purely formal. The decision had already been reached; he was merely being asked for his reaction.

Again, there is at least the appearance of unfairness. The documents which Bishop Jones had assembled in his defense were not even seen by the Commission until after they had drafted their report and recommendations, and then these documents were reviewed for less than three-quarters of an hour. Bishop Jones was not allowed to address the Commission in his own defense until after they had reached their decision, and even then he was not allowed to mount a full-scale defense--he was allowed only to offer his reaction to the report.

Despite this substantive flaw in the proceedings, the Commission came to the "unanimous conviction" that

> . . . the utterances and associations of the Bishop of Utah had impaired his influence for promoting the peace and welfare of the Church in Utah to such a degree as virtually to destroy it. Therefore, the appointed Commission, after thoughtful consideration of the facts presented to it and after having given audience to the Bishop of Utah in person appearing before it, was constrained to pronounce as its judgment and advice in the matter that the Bishop of Utah should resign his office as such Bishop.[1]

At the meeting of the House of Bishops, Bishop Jones had asked his brethren for their advice. That advice had now been given. The Commission appointed by the House to investigate the matter had unanimously recommended that he resign. In an interview with the St. Louis Post Dispatch, Bishop Jones said "he would comply with the request for his resignation."[2]

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[1] "Report of Commission in re Bishop Jones of Utah," p. 2.

[2] "Bishop Asked to Resign," page n.a.

This announcement by Bishop Jones must have come as a great relief to the Presiding Bishop and the other members of the Commission. For in the same article, the Presiding Bishop admitted that "he did not know what action the House of Bishops would take in case Bishop Jones should refuse to resign."[1] It should also be noted that Bishop Jones was under no legal or canonical obligation to accede to this request. The power of the Commission was strictly advisory. They could not force him to resign. The choice belonged solely to Bishop Jones. For the good of the Church, he chose to resign.

In departing, however, Bishop Jones filed a series of questions with the Commission, and asked for their written responses which were incorporated into the second draft of the official report. That report begins with three introductory paragraphs setting forth the history of the Commission; it then presents and answers the questions posed by Bishop Jones. This report is rather lengthy, but it is crucial to the proper understanding of the situation. It is, therefore, reproduced in its entirety, with the exception of the first three paragraphs.

> The Bishop of Utah submitted to the Commission some questions as follows, asking for written answers:
>
> 1. Question. Does the Commission find that the allegations of the Council of Advice are justified, -
>
> (a) That I have been affiliated with seditious organizations?
>
> Answer. The Commission does not charge seditious organizations, but does say questionable organizations in respect of loyalty to the Government.
>
> (b) That I have persistently promulgated unpatriotic doctrines?
>
> Answer. The Commission is not satisfied that you have persistently promulgated unpatriotic doctrines; but the evidence shows that on occasions you have promulgated such doctrines.

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[1] Ibid.

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(c) That I have injured the life of the Church in Utah and elsewhere?

Answer. Yes, it seems to the Commission that you have injured the life of the Church in Utah and elsewhere.

2. Question. Does the Commission find that I have exceeded my prerogatives in coming to the conclusions I have in regard to war and Christianity?

Answer. The Commission is of the opinion that in our free country, you are not to be officially restrained in your maintenance of opinions which you hold as an individual; but it also thinks that weighty responsibility attaches to pronouncements by a bishop, and that thoughtfulness and reticence on his part are exceedingly desirable.

3. Question. Does the Commission believe that I should accede to the request of the Council of Advice and resign?

Answer. Yes

Commenting on the statement made by the Bishop of Utah to a Committee of the House of Bishops, October 18, 1917, the Commission would say:

(1) The underlying contention of the Bishop of Utah seems to be that war is unchristian.

With this general statement the Commission cannot agree. And, specifically, it thinks that the present war with Germany in which our country is involved, being, as it is, for liberty and justice and righteousness and humanity among nations and individuals, is not an unchristian thing. This Church in the United States is practically a unit in holding that it is not an unchristian thing. In the face of this unanimity, it is neither right nor wise for a trusted Bishop to declare and maintain that it is an unchristian thing. If the compelling force of conscientious conviction requires such utterance, fairness demands that it be not made by a Bishop of this Church. The making of such an Episcopal proclamation should be preceded by the withdrawal of the maker from his position of Episcopal leadership.

(2) In principles the Bishop of Utah seems to be at one with this Church and with the American Government.

Witness his words in the statement referred to above: "As a loyal citizen, I am wholeheartedly for this country of ours, in which all my hopes and ideals and interests are bound up. I believe most sincerely that German brutality and aggression must be stopped, and I am willing, if need be, to give my life and what I possess, to bring that about. I want to see the extension of real democracy in the world, and am ready to help that cause to the utmost; and finally, I want to see a sound and lasting peace brought to the world as a close to the terrible convulsion in which the nations are involved."

It is in methods only that he differs. The Government, and the Commission thinks it may fairly claim, the Church in

> the immense preponderance of its membership, think that by vigorous prosecution of the present war against Germany the "sound and lasting peace" desired may be secured. The Bishop of Utah thinks otherwise, and so expresses himself as to methods and he thinks himself conscientiously bound so to express himself. The Commission thinks such expression should not come from an Episcopal representative of this Church.
>
> (3) It seems abundantly manifest that an end has come to the usefulness of the Bishop of Utah in his present field, and that no earnestness of effort on his part would suffice to regain it.
>
> Therefore, the appointed Commission, after thoughtful consideration of the facts presented to it and after giving audience to the Bishop of Utah, in person appearing before it, is constrained to pronounce as its judgment and advice in the matter that the Bishop of Utah ought to resign his office as such Bishop, said resignation to take effect within three months from this day; to wit, on or before March 12, 1918.
>
> The Commission instructs its Secretary to communicate these, its findings, to the Presiding Bishop with the request that the Presiding Bishop will send them under a covering letter of his own to the Bishop of Utah.
>
> The Commission has not been unmindful of the risk of establishing a dangerous precedent in yielding to requests which desire the removal of a Bishop from his Diocese or District where Canonical charges are not involved.
>
> It, therefore, desires to place on record that the advising of this action should not be interpreted as a precedent; but that it seems necessary at this time of an excited condition of public opinions.
>
> Daniel S. Tuttle, Bishop of Missouri
> George H. Kinsolving, Bishop of Texas
> Harry S. Longley, Coadjutor Bishop of Iowa, Secretary[1]

The findings of the Commission may be summarized briefly in this manner: First, the Commission could not find sufficient evidence to support the charge that Bishop Jones had willfully or consistently associated with seditious organizations or given voice to unpatriotic statements. The Commission could report only that he had associated with "questionable organizations" and that "on occasions" he had promulgated unpatriotic doctrines.[2]

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[1] "Report of Commission in re Case of Bishop Jones of Utah," pp. 1-3.

[2] Ibid., p. 1.

Second, the Commission agreed that both Bishop Jones and the Church shared a common loyalty to the United States. The difference between the Bishop and his Church was "in methods only."[1] The difference between Bishop Jones and the Commission was not over the issues of Bishop Jones' loyalty to his government, it dealt solely with the means by which the nation was to be preserved and peace acquired.

Therefore, the recommendation of the Commission that Bishop Jones resign was based solely on two somewhat questionable conclusions. First, the Commission maintained that if Bishop Jones felt conscientiously bound to give voice to his pacifist beliefs, he should have done so as a private individual and not as one who exercises Episcopal authority in the Church. To repeat the words of the report: "The Commission thinks that such expression should not come from an Episcopal representative of this Church."[2] This conclusion rests upon a debatable understanding of the nature and responsibility of the Church, and the role of the Episcopate in this structure. These questions will be examined in the last section of this paper.

Second, the Commission recommended that Bishop Jones resign because they believed that he had "injured the life of the Church in Utah and elsewhere."[3] In the words of their report, the Commission concluded that "it seems abundantly manifest that an end has come to the usefulness of the Bishop of Utah in his present field, and that no earnestness of effort on his part would suffice to regain it."[4]

This conclusion is also somewhat questionable, as are the procedures which led the Commission to this conclusion. If the facts and chronology developed in this paper are accurate, this conclusion was reached almost solely on the basis of information provided by the Council of Advice. Certainly they were agreed that Bishop Jones' usefulness had come to an end. The survey distributed by Bishop Jones to 180 churchmen in the District, and the letters in support of Bishop Jones sent to the Council by the parishes and missions outside Salt Lake tell a radically different story. These two sources provide considerable support for the opposite view: that Bishop Jones had not damaged the work of the Church in Utah, and that many people in the District greatly desired that he remain their Bishop.

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[1] Ibid., p. 2. [2] Ibid., p. 3. [3] Ibid., p. 1. [4] Ibid., p. 3.

Unfortunately, the Commission did not see this information at its first meeting on November 7, nor did they consider it at their final meeting on December 12, until after they had already drafted their report and recommendations. This failure on the part of the Commission to consider all the evidence on both sides of the question casts grave doubts upon the accuracy of their conclusions. Therefore, the findings of the Commission are undermined by a questionable theoretical assumption concerning the nature and function of the Church, and by an incomplete data base.

Once the Commission had reached its decision that Bishop Jones should resign, events in Utah proceeded rapidly. The next day, December 13, Bishop Tuttle sent a copy of the Commission's report to George Marshall, the Secretary of the Council of Advice.[1]

On December 17, Bishop Jones wrote to the Council. In his letter, Bishop Jones said that he had received the report of the Commission, and that "it is my intention to send in my resignation in accordance with that advice, for I have no desire to remain in the position under the conditions which now exist."[1]

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[1] Bishop Tuttle to George Marshall, December 13, 1917, Archives, Diocese of Utah, Salt Lake City.

Under the Canons of the Episcopal Church, however, Bishop Jones' resignation would not become effective until it had been accepted by a two-thirds vote of the House of Bishops.[2] Such a meeting had not yet been scheduled, so Bishop Jones asked the Council of Advice to "accept an appointment as ecclesiastical authority of the District of Utah with full responsibility for the maintenance and conduct of the work from January 1st, 1918, until the House of Bishops accepts my resignation."[3]

The next day, December 18, the Council of Advice met in Salt Lake City. All the members were present, and they unanimously adopted the following resolution:

> RESOLVED, That the Bishop of Utah be advised that the Council of Advice is willing to accept appointment as ecclesiastical authority of the Missionary District of Utah, beginning on January 1, 1918, to hold the same until his resignation shall be accepted by the House of Bishops.[4]

Bishop Jones received the official copy of this resolution on December 20, and immediately sent his official authorization to the Council of Advice for them to act as the ecclesiastical authority of the District.[1]

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[1] Bishop Jones to the Council of Advice, December 17, 1917, Archives, Diocese of Utah, Salt Lake City.

[2] Canon 13, Section 7, paragraph iii. Bishop Tuttle persistently cited the wrong Canon in this regard. The official copies of Bishop Jones' letter of resignation which the Presiding Bishop sent to each Diocese of the Church cited Canon 13, Section 7, paragraph i. This Canon applies to Diocesan Bishops, the acceptance of whose resignation requires only a majority vote. The resignation of a Missionary Bishop requires a vote of not less than two-thirds of those present.

[3] Jones to Council of Advice.

[4] Minutes, Council of Advice, December 18, 1917, Archives, Diocese of Utah, Salt Lake City.

On the same day, Bishop Jones sent his official letter of resignation to the Presiding Bishop. As he said in his accompanying personal letter to Bishop Tuttle, he had delayed in sending his resignation to the Presiding Bishop only until he could get a reply from the Council as to whether they would accept responsibility for the District. Bishop Jones' letter of resignation set no date upon which it would become effective, for this would depend upon the meeting of the House of Bishops, and he "did not want to handicap you [the Presiding Bishop] in fixing the time for that meeting."[2]

The following is the text of Bishop Jones' letter of resignation:

> Having received the report of the Commission authorized by the House of Bishops to inquire into the whole subject of my loyalty and my usefulness as Bishop of Utah, in which report the Commission unanimously advises me to resign, I, therefore, acting on that advice, hereby tender you my resignation as Missionary Bishop of Utah to take effect whenever it is accepted. This action is taken with the distinct understanding that there are no charges against me touching my good character or integrity, for if there be any such, I insist upon a trial on them.
>
> My reason for submitting this resignation is not merely to comply with the advice of the Commission to which I had previously pledged myself.
>
> The Commission speaking, I take it, for the House of Bishops, maintains, 1st, that war is not an unchristian thing and that no Bishop may preach that this war is unchristian, and 2nd, that a Bishop should not express the opinion that peace can be secured otherwise than by the prosecution of the war when the Government and the preponderance of the membership of the Church believe otherwise.
>
> These conclusions I cannot accept; for I believe that the methods of modern international war are quite incompatible with the Christian principles of reconciliation and brotherhood, and that it is the duty of a Bishop of the Church, from his study of the word of God, to express himself on questions of righteousness, no matter what opinion may stand in the way.

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[1] Bishop Jones to the Council of Advice, December 20, 1917, Archives, Diocese of Utah, Salt Lake City.

[2] Bishop Jones to Bishop Tuttle, December 20, 1917, Archives, Diocese of Utah, Salt Lake City.

> I had hoped that, notwithstanding the "excited condition of public opinion" referred to by the Commission, there might be room in the Church for a difference of opinion on the Christianity of warfare and ways of attaining peace, and that, if so, it was preeminently the duty of one supposed to be a leader of the Church to voice his convictions on subjects. But the Commission makes it perfectly clear in its report that a Bishop should resign before venturing to differ from others on such a Christian problem, or to express opinions at variance with the Government. To me that seems evidently to mean that the Bishops of the Church should be followers and not leaders, and I have no desire to remain in such an anomalous position.
>
> I have, therefore, authorized the Council of Advice of the District to act as Ecclesiastical Authority of the same with full responsibility for the maintenance and conduct of the work from the first of January, 1918, until my resignation shall be acted upon, and I have for the same period offered myself to the General Board of Missions for any work they may wish to delegate to me.[1]

On the same day on which he submitted his letter of resignation, Bishop Jones wrote to Mr. John W. Wood of the General Board of Missions, offering his services "in any capacity for which you may think me useful, whether in the office or in any field, except in connection with Utah."[2] Bishop Jones added: "I trust that there may be some place where I can be of real service."[3]

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Bishop Jones to John W. Wood, December 20, 1917, Archives, Diocese of Utah, Salt Lake City.

[3] Ibid.

REACTION

In rapid succession the Church periodicals carried first the report of the Commission and then Bishop Jones' letter of resignation.[1] The publication of these two documents set off a chain of reaction within the Church. This reaction took, many different forms. The Churchman, The Living Church, The Southern Churchman, and The Witness each published editorials on the subject, and each, in turn, had its "Letters to the Editor" page flooded with responses. Many individuals wrote directly to the Presiding Bishop or to the House of Bishops to express their sentiments. Others signed petitions which were sent to the House. The Social Preparation devoted an entire issue to its defense of Bishop Jones and printed a petition of its own for sympathizers to send to the House of Bishops.

The Church periodicals were generally agreed that Bishop Jones' resignation ought to be accepted, but that the wording of the Report of the Commission should not be accepted. The Churchman put it succinctly:

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[1] "Bishop Jones Resigns from District of Utah," The Churchman, Vol. 117 (Jan 5, 1918), pp. 18-19.

"Bishop Jones of Utah is Asked to Resign," The Witness, Vol. 1 (Dec. 22, 1917), p. 1.

"Bishop Jones of Utah Tenders His Resignation," The Witness, Vol. 1, (Jan. 5, 1918), p. 1.

"Resignation of the Bishop of Utah," The Living Church, Vol. 58 (Jan. 5, 1918), p. 341.

"Report of the Commission in re Case of Bishop Jones of Utah," The Southern Churchman, Vol. 83 (Dec. 22, 1917), p. 9.

"Bishop Jones' Letter of Resignation," The Southern Churchman, Vol. 83 (Jan. 26, 1918), p. 7.

> There is apparently only one thing to be done with that resignation [of Bishop Jones]. But we sincerely hope that the House of Bishops in the action which they may take in the case will not repeat the unfortunate phraseology of the report of their committee appointed to act in the matter. The wording of that report has given grave anxiety and not a little chagrin to many people.[1]

In its first editorial on the subject, The Living Church was unconcerned by the Report of the Commission, and strongly defended the decision of the Commission that Bishop Jones should resign. In arguing their case against Bishop Jones continuing in office, The Living Church said:

> When this country enters into war it is of the utmost importance that a bishop should be a force for righteousness. To maintain that his country is animated by evil motives, when he cannot prove his charge, is to bear false witness against his neighbor on a colossal scale. To be uninterested in the promotion of international justice and righteousness between nations, at a time when every energy of his own country is pledged to that end, is not to be excused by any plea that he is standing for the correction of evils at home. The Christian religion pledges him to both, and in the awful crisis of the present day it is a crime to prefer peace to justice or to put any other consideration ahead of that work in which his country is engaged.[2]

Bishop Jones would have disagreed with each of the charges brought against him by The Living Church, but from their standpoint Bishop Jones had brought this tragedy on himself and should now be "relieved of his jurisdiction, 'for the good of the service,' as the like necessity is expressed in the army."[3] They concluded that Bishop Jones "has thrown away an opportunity to serve, at a time when Church and State need well-balanced men almost more than they were ever needed before."[4]

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[1] "The House of Bishops," The Churchman, Vol. 117 (Jan. 19, 1918), p. 81.

[2] "Bishop Jones," The Living Church, Vol. 58 (Dec. 29, 1917), p. 289.

[3] Ibid., p. 290. [4] Ibid.

As for the Report of the Commission, its wording did not, at this point, trouble The Living Church in the least. They agreed with the Commission that "as for the Church in Utah it is right that its well-being should be treated as of prior importance by the bishops of the commission rather than that one bishop should be retained in the position to which he had been chosen."[1]

Three months later, The Living Church had had some second thoughts regarding the phrasing of the Commission's report. Having taken official cognizance of the fact that a Memorial was being circulated in opposition to the Commission's report, The Living Church reluctantly agreed that "the answers of the commission of bishops to questions submitted by Bishop Jones were unfortunate in several respects."[2] On the other hand, they argued that "the questions submitted by the Bishop of Utah left much to be desired."[3] The editorial went on to imply that Bishop Jones' questions had been designed to embarrass the Commission.

> If it is any satisfaction to a junior bishop to feel that he has effectually trapped his most dignified seniors, who are among the wisest bishops in the Church, whether or not he did so intentionally, that satisfaction must undoubtedly accrue to the Bishop of Utah.[4]

In the final analysis, The Living Church argued, both the questions submitted by Bishop Jones and the answers offered by the Commission were irrelevant.

> The questions of Bishop Jones and the answers of the commission of bishops are a personal and private interchange of views. It is unfortunate that they have been published. We shall trust that

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[1] Ibid.

[2] "The House of Bishops and the Bishop of Utah," The Living Church, Vol. 58 (March 9, 1918), p. 624.

[3] Ibid. [4] Ibid., p. 625.

> the House of Bishops will answer just one question in the matter, altogether removed from the series of episcopal questions and answers: Shall the resignation of the Bishop of Utah be accepted?[1]

The Living Church believed that the answer to this question was obvious: "Men who cannot or will not help in this crisis must be cast aside as moral failures."[2] Therefore, while The Living Church had some minor problems with the wording of the Commission's report, they strongly urged that Bishop Jones' resignation be promptly accepted.

The Witness viewed the situtation from a slightly different perspective. First, they rehearsed the events which had led to the calling of the Commission and to its decision. The editorial rightly pointed out that it was on Bishop Jones' initiative that the Commission was formed to offer him advice, and that it was he alone who bound himself to accept their advice.

> It was still perfectly competent for the Bishop of Utah to decline to act upon their advice, by reconsidering his intention to ask that advice. There was no compulsion, except his own determination, that he should ask their advice or take it when given (except only that he himself had said that he would be governed by it).[3]

Therefore, for The Witness, the only question to be answered by the House of Bishops at their meeting was whether "it shall sustain his [Bishop Jones'] good judgment in asking the advice of that body, or in taking that advice when given."[4]

Where others saw great difficulties in the Commission's report, The Witness did not. Where others saw a question of freedom of speech,

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid.

[3] "The Bishop of Utah," The Witness, Vol. 2 (Feb. 9, 1918), p.5.

[4] Ibid.

The Witness saw the issue in terms of "good taste and common sense."[1] The editorial offered a hypothetical analogy: "a Missionary Bishop might lose his influence in a jurisdiction by eating with his knife, or wearing unusual vestments in Church."[2]

> The matter might be referred to his brethren by himself, and they might tell him that it would be expedient for him to resign--inasmuch as presumably the office of a Bishop is to exert an influence for good in his jurisdiction.[3]

Based on this analogy, The Witness argues:

> There is no stricture of the liberty of speech of any Bishop in this action of the committee, other than when one has offended the canon of good taste in his official utterances, his usefulness is over and it will help the work of the Church if he takes the advice of his brethren and resigns.[4]

The Witness believed that Bishop Jones had offended the canons of good taste and common sense in his pacifist utterances and should resign. For The Witness that was the only issue involved.

The editorial in The Southern Churchman was quite similar to those which appeared in the other Church periodicals. The editorial recognized that the Commission's report had been subjected to some criticism, and conceded that some of this criticism was well-founded.

> It is not too much to say that in more than one particular it lays itself fairly open to such animadversions. It takes the form of an argument rather than that of a decision, and some of the points made leave much to be desired in the way of clearness of statement as well as relevancy to the question at issue.[5]

The Southern Churchman contended that the issue was not Bishop Jones nor his opinions, "nor yet his right to hold his opinions, or holding to preach them."[6] The issue was rather, holding these opinions as he did, should he remain Bishop of Utah, "or whether the welfare of the Church in that jurisdiction and a due regard for her consistency in teaching and harmony in action required his resignation or removal."[1]

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid. [3] Ibid. [4] Ibid.

[5] "House of Bishops in Session," The Southern Churchman, Vol. 83 (April 13, 1918), p. 4.

[6] Ibid., p. 5.

The Southern Churchman believed that Bishop Jones ought to resign. The editorial further expressed the hope that the House of Bishops would announce their decision to accept Bishop Jones' resignation "very simply, with no discussion of the unwisdom of pacifism, the desirableness of reticence, the condition of public opinion or the limitations of Episcopal freedom of speech in time of war."[2] In other words, The Southern Churchman appeared to believe that the House of Bishops could best allay the animadversions of the Commission's report by simply ignoring the questions which prompted the criticism.

The editorials of the major Church periodicals had come to very similar conclusions. Each recognized that there were certain flaws in the report of the Commission which could lead to the creation of some potentially dangerous precedents if not corrected. Each expressed the hope that these difficulties would be overcome, either by re-drafting the report or by sidestepping the questions entirely. All the periodicals agreed that Bishop Jones had destroyed his usefulness in the Missionary District of Utah, and that his resignation ought to be accepted by the House of Bishops.

Only one Church periodical disagreed. The Social Preparation, "The Official Organ of the Church Socialist League," of which Bishop Jones was the President, came to his defense. The Social Preparation devoted its entire April, 1918, edition to articles and letters supporting Bishop Jones, calling upon the House of Bishops to reject the report of its Commission and to retain Bishop Jones as the Bishop of Utah.

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid.

The first page of the issue featured a petition--"A Protest and Communication"--which supporters of Bishop Jones were urged to sign and forward to the House of Bishops. The petition itself did not specifically call for the retention of Bishop Jones, rather it sought to address the flaws in the Commission's report. On the issue of Bishop Jones' continuance in Utah, the petition said:

> Recognizing to the full the difficulty of retaining in a diocese a Bishop unacceptable to that diocese, we do not protest against the resignation of Bishop Jones from the ecclesiastic jurisdiction of Utah, though to us, as to the Committee, the precedent seems serious.[1]

The authors of the petition believed, however, that they had to protest against the arguments advanced by the Commission. They particularly objected to the contention of the Committee "that current majority opinion is a sufficient standard for Episcopal recall, and that the Church is practically a unit in holding that war is not unchristian."[2] If such an argument were to be accepted, it would, in their belief, lead to the following consequences:

> 1. The reduction of the historic Episcopate to an agency for voicing, not the Gospel, but the world's dicta of safe belief.
> 2. The imposition on the whole ministry of a temptation to bend to popular clamor rather than stand unshaken as ordained prophets of Christ's Word.
> 3. The automatic exclusion from the Church of new, unpopular, but possibly progressive thought, ideas and principles. Young men with reform ideas would not be inclined to enter the ministry; social workers more than ever would remain outside the Church.
> 4. The deplorable result of a secularized Church which would be an appendage to the world, not its light and leaven.[3]

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[1] "A Protest and Communication," The Social Preparation, Vol. 5. (April, 1918), p. 1.

[2] Ibid. [3] Ibid.

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To avert these dangerous consequences, the petition appealed to the House of Bishops for a definite expression on their part, "to the effect that the opinions of the Committee from which such conclusions are drawn and from which such results may tend, do not represent the principles of 'this Church'".[1]

While the circulation of The Social Preparation was rather small, this petition gained wide coverage throughout the Church. Many were signed and sent to the House of Bishops, as will be shown later in this chapter.

There followed an editorial encouraging people to sign the petition or to send letters or telegrams directly to the House of Bishops.[2] The Social Preparation also reprinted the entire text of Bishop Jones' address to the House of Bishops on October 18, 1917.[3]

In his article, "Garnishing the Tombs and Varnishing the Truth," Richard W. Hogue, a non-parochial Episcopal priest in Baltimore, attacked the Commission's report on an almost line by line basis. Bishop Jones had asked the Commission if they believed he had "affiliated with seditious organizations" or "promulgated unpatriotic doctrines." The Commission replied that he had affiliated with "questionable organizations, and had "on occasions" promulgated such doctrines.

The Reverend Mr. Hogue characterized the Commission's response by saying:

> Meeting his [Bishop Jones'] direct questions with indirect and qualifying answers they compromise (themselves) with the term "questionable" organizations (a very proper term since it is at

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid.

[3] "Statement Presented by Bishop Jones to a Committee of the House of Bishops, October 18, 1917," The Social Preparation, Vol. 5 (April, 1918), pp. 5-9.

> least "questionable" whether they have any accurate knowledge of the organizations hinted at). They also state that he has "on occasion promulgated unpatriotic doctrines." Manifestly, the case against the Bishop falls down--certainly so far as evidence of deliberate purpose or sustained effort on his part.[1]

Bishop Jones had asked the Commission if they felt he had exceeded his prerogatives in coming to the conclusions he had in regard to war and Christianity. The Commission replied that "weighty responsibility attaches to pronouncements by a Bishop, and that thoughtfulness and reticence on his part are exceedingly desirable." This statement by the Commission thoroughly enraged Mr. Hogue.

> Do I read it aright? Am I blind in not discovering the profoundly spiritual and spiritually sound appeal of these "Apostles of the lowly Jesus" who said something about those who exalt themselves and about the meek? What do they hold up before him as the guiding motive? "The weighty responsibility of the pronouncements by a Bishop"? Yes, that is it and all of it, with the brave consistent conclusion that therefore "reticence" (mark the good word) "on his part is exceedingly desirable." Dear little cautious Luther! Sweet little silent Savanarola! Poor old safe and sane Paul! Timid and time-serving Christ! No wonder unpopularity, martyrdom, death were your lot! Unmindful of the "weight" of your official positions you did not allow yourself to be weighted down to reticence about the truth of God as you saw it and the convictions of your souls as you felt them. Had you lived today and were you Bishops (forgive the thought) would you again be on trial before those who garnish the tombs and varnish the truths of the prophets? I do not assert that you would. I am only asking.[2]

Mr. Hogue concluded his article with this statement:

> "An excited condition of public opinion" enthroned as the dictator to human thought, the despot of men's consciences, the autocrat over the Church of the Living God, before whom bow even bishops under "the weighty responsibility of their pronouncements" and to whom is sacrificed the pure-hearted, big souled fearless prophet of God's truth as he sees it and shepherd of God's flock as he recognizes them in all men everywhere.[3]

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[1] Richard W. Hogue, "Garnishing the Tombs and Varnishing the Truth," The Social Preparation, Vol. 5 (April, 1918), p. 9.

[2] Ibid., p. 11. [3] Ibid., p. 12.

The Social Preparation also reprinted an article by the Rev. Shirley C. Hughson, O.H.C., which had appeared earlier in The Living Church,[1] and a copy of Bishop Jones' farewell statement to his Missionary District.[2]

These were followed by another editorial, this one written by Jacob Iris, entitled "Bishop Jones and the Committee of Three." Where Mr. Hogue's article had been stinging and blunt, this editorial was more measured, yet equally firm. It was Mr. Iris' contention that the real issue at stake was not Bishop Jones' pacifism; but his socialism. He argued that for years the "vested interests in Utah" had been trying to "get something" on Bishop Spalding. They had failed to do so, and had resorted to petty tricks and embarrassments. With Bishop Spalding's untimely death, they redoubled their efforts against his episcopal and socialist successor, Bishop Jones.

Having failed to win over or discredit Bishop Jones on economic issues, the Bishop's lack of support for the war provided a pretext for renewed attacks.

> This was the capitalists' opportunity. They had been unable to silence Spalding, or up to this time embarrass Jones. They would seize on the shibboleth of patriotism to his undoing. In time of war, patriotism reaches a species of social insanity, closing people's minds to reason. Sufficient animus to Spalding's socialist activity lingered, subconsciously, together with resentment of Jones being a socialist, to facilitate such a course. There were not lacking men to give a willing ear to such a suggestion, disguised under the cloak of patriotism, and craftily presented as patriotic duty. To this end, therefore, certain of the "best"

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[1] Shirley G. Hughson, "The Case of Bishop Jones," The Social Preparation, Vol. 5 (April, 1918), pp. 12-14.

[2] "Bishop Jones's Farewell to Utah," The Social Preparation, Vol. 5 (April, 1918), p. 15.

Churchmen and "leading" members of the Episcopal Church in Salt Lake City asked Bishop Jones to resign.[1]

According to Mr. Iris, Bishop Jones had taken the statesmanlike action of referring the entire matter to the House of Bishops for their advice and counsel. Unfortunately for Bishop Jones, the House of Bishops had not responded in a similarly statesmanlike manner.

> Entrusted by their spiritual peers with adjusting a situation in Bishop Jones' jurisdiction arising from his attitude towards the war, the case demanded their best statesmanship. Instead, they showed neither the restraint of wisdom nor the tact of diplomacy. Egged on by their panic-stricken patriotism and with a frenzied fear of the "spirit of the times" they must lacerate still deeper, the wounds of tens of thousands of peace loving hearts the world over, of whom Bishop Jones is but a living type. Their audacious assumption of voicing the unanimous feeling of "this (Episcopal) Church" was the least of their offenses. Their temerity in declaring war to be a Christian institution outdoes the Pope's assumption that all divine wisdom is compressed into his pronouncements. For no Pope has declared war a Christian institution.[2]

Mr. Iris described the Commission's report as having "deliberately exalted expediency above principle" and as practically advising "Bishop Jones to stultify his conscience."[3] These conclusions, he maintained, had "shocked the serious minded in the Church by advocating the prostitution of the ideals of Christ to the transient demands of the moment."[4]

Mr. Iris concluded by saying that the House of Bishops would in all probability accept Bishop Jones' resignation, but also pleading with the Bishops to find another jurisdiction for Bishop Jones.

Of the various Church periodicals, therefore, the only one which came to Bishop Jones' defense was The Social Preparation. Even they recognized, however, that the House of Bishops would accept Bishop Jones' resignation. They did hope that the Bishops would at least reject the language of the Commission's report.

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[1] Jacob Iris, "Bishop Jones and the Committee of Three," The Social Preparation, Vol. 5 (April, 1918), p. 17.

[2] Ibid., p. 16 [3] Ibid., p. 18. [4] Ibid.

The publication of the Commission's report and Bishop Jones' response unleashed a flood of letters. Some were sent to the various Church publications, others were sent to various Bishops, others were sent directly to the House of Bishops. More than sixty years after the events, it is impossible to know how many letters were written or petitions signed. Of those many letters and petitions, all that remain are those which were published in the "Letters to the Editor" columns of the Church periodicals, and those which somehow found their way into the Archives.

No scientific sampling or statistical analysis is possible. Those presented here are only a few representative types, or letters from prominent churchmen. They do not purport to represent the attitude of the Church as a whole.

Among all the letters and petitions, one stands out for its eloquent simplicity. The letter was addressed to the House of Bishops and was signed by G. W. Dunlap, the priest-in-charge of Trinity Mission, Escondido, California. Mr. Dunlap had previously been a "helper" in the Missionary District of Utah.[1] The entire letter simply read: "In the name of the 'Prince of Peace,' I protest against the action of the Commission in the Bishop Jones matter."[2] While many other letters voiced a similar protest, their arguments were often more intricate and scholarly.

One of the first letters criticizing the Commission's findings came from Edward S. Drown, Professor of Systematic Divinity at the Episcopal

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[1] Stowe's Clerical Directory of the American Church, 1917 ed., s.v. "Dunlap, George W."

[2] G. W. Dunlap to the House of Bishops, April 3, 1918, Archives, Church Historical Society, Austin, Texas.

Theological School. The letter was published in The Churchman. Like Mr. Hogue and others, Mr. Drown found the Commission's response to Bishop Jones' first two questions, regarding "seditious organizations" and unpatriotic statements, to be extremely vague and not the least bit convincing.[1]

His most basic criticism focused on the Commission's injunction of episcopal reticence during this period of "an excited condition of public opinion."

> Is there not here an opening for a monstrous tyranny? If Bishop Jones has offended against the law of the land, he may be convicted of and punished for that offense. But until he is so convicted he has a right to hold and teach views that are not inconsistent with the doctrines of the Church.[2]

Mr. Drown concluded with the hope that the House of Bishops would carefully review the whole matter, and that "this report will not lightly be regarded as expressing the mind of the Church."[3]

The Living Church published a letter by a colleague of Mr. Drown's, Dr. George Hodges, the Dean of the Episcopal Theological School. Dean Hodges was equally disturbed by the lack of clarity in the Commission's report, and summarized its conclusions in this manner:

> It proposes the removal of a bishop not only in the absence of any canonical offense, but with reference to "an excited condition of public opinion." And it advises bishops in general, if they hold any like unpopular doctrines, to maintain a prudent position of "thoughtfulness and reticence."[4]

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[1] Edward S. Drown, "Bishop Jones and the Special Commission," The Churchman, Vol. 117 (Jan. 5, 1918), p. 30.

[2] Ibid. [3] Ibid.

[4] George Hodges, "A Bishop's Resignation," The Living Church, Vol. 58 (Jan. 12, 1918), p. 364.

Dean Hodges referred to the case of Bishop Hopkins of Vermont. During the Civil War, Bishop Hopkins had, with a remarkable lack of reticence, defended slavery as Biblically sanctioned; defended the South's Constitutional right to secede; and advocated submitting the whole matter to the Supreme Court. As Dean Hodges described it:

> Bishop Hopkins broke all the cautious canons of "reticence"; he not only "occasionally" but "persistently" promulgated unpatriotic doctrines; and this he did in the face of "an excited condition of public opinion." But he continued as Bishop of Vermont. If any Commission of bishops had ventured to advise him to resign his bishopric, they would have entered immediately into one of the most dramatic and picturesque experiences of all their episcopal lives.[1]

From Dean Hodges' point of view, Bishop Jones' only offense was an exaggerated and unwarranted confidence in the wisdom of the House of Bishops and its Commission. "For which it is proposed to visit him with capital punishment!"[2]

The editors of The Living Church could not accept Dean Hodges' analogy. They argued that there was one "important difference" between the two Bishops; "The latter, as Bishop of Vermont, had a vested right to a permanent tenure in his bishopric. A Missionary Bishop has no such vested right."[3]

They maintained that the Jones case was more properly analogous to a dispute between a rector and his vestry. According to the Canons such a situation might be investigated by the standing committee, who might then recommend that the relationship be terminated "without imputing breach of the moral law or of ecclesiastical standing to either party."[4]

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid.

[3] "Dean Hodges and the Bishop of Utah," The Living Church, Vol. 58 (Jan. 12, 1918), p. 367.

[4] Ibid.

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The Living Church conceded that it was "unprecedented in this country for this precedent to be applied to a bishop."[1] They argued, however, that "precedents hardly apply to the unprecedented conditions of this present day."[2] The Living Church maintained that the Commission had rightly cut through all the red tape of precedent and technicality, and acted for the good of the Church. Returning to what was now becoming a familiar theme, the editorial concluded: "The good of the service was the only question adjudicated. Why raise further questions now?"[3]

Both Mr. Drown and Dean Hodges followed up their published statements with personal letters to the Presiding Bishop. Mr. Drown included a copy of the letter he had sent to The Churchman and reiterated his concern that "certain statements made by the Commission imply principles which are dangerous to the Church, and which I feel sure were not so intended by the members of the Commission."[4] Mr. Drown continued:

> That a bishop should be required to withdraw "from his position of Episcopal leadership" before expressing any views that are contrary to a prevailing unanimity of opinion would seem seriously to impair any possibility of moral leadership on the part of the bishops of the Church.[5]

He concluded by expressing the hope that the House of Bishops would act in such a manner so as not "to imperil the freedom and leadership of the bishops and other ministers of the Church."[6]

In his letter to the Presiding Bishop, Dean Hodges included a petition signed by twelve members of the Cambridge Club of California. The central paragraphs of the petition read:

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid. [3] Ibid.

[4] Edward S. Drown to Bishop Tuttle, March 20, 1918, Archives, Church Historical Society, Austin, Texas.

[5] Ibid. [6] Ibid.

> Therefore, we on our part, wish to declare our belief that the acceptance of these principles embodied in the Commission's report, even in an isolated case, seriously threatens the future leadership of the Episcopate; and that no matter what the question at issue, the free expression of conscientious conviction on the part of a Bishop must be allowed without let or hindrance, so long as there be no grounds for civil or canonical charges.
>
> We respectfully urge, therefore, that the House of Bishops specifically repudiate these statements of its Special Commission.[1]

This formal petition was followed by another letter signed by six more members of the Cambridge Club who endorsed the position of the petition.[2]

The Churchman also published a letter from Vida D. Scudder. In her published letter she spoke of the "profound distress caused me by the action in regard to Bishop Jones."[3] As one who supported the war, she felt that the religious majority was "doubtless enthusiastic for the war."[4] But, she argued that the Church should "do some shepherding of the minority whose patriotism, equally ardent, takes another form."[5]

At the suggestion of Bishop Lawrence, Professor Scudder forwarded a letter and petition on Bishop Jones' behalf to Bishop Tuttle. The petition read in part:

> However large the majority endorsing war, an honorable and Christian minority is outraged by the attempt to make such an

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[1] Petition from the Cambridge Club of California to the House of Bishops, March 6, 1918, Archives, Church Historical Society, Austin, Texas. The Petition was signed by: Warner F. Gookin, Thomas C. Campbell, Alan Taylor, Donald K. Johnston, W. L. Clark, Ralph Harper, Charles Hastings Brown, Smith O. Dexter, Howard Key Bartow, Harry Beal, John W. Suter, and Gabriel Farrell.

[2] Petition from the Cambridge Club of California to the House of Bishops, March 1, 1918, Archives, Church Historical Society, Austin, Texas. This petition was signed by: Louis C. Sanford, Edward L. Parsons, Charles P. Deems, William A. MacClean, C. O. Tillotson, and W. E. Hayes.

[3] Vida D. Scudder, "Bishop Jones and Reaction on the Church," The Churchman, Vol. 117 (Jan. 12, 1918), p. 65.

[4] Ibid. [5] Ibid.

> endorsement the official attitude of the Church of Christ. We feel grave danger in the present tendency to achieve factitious unity and advantage in the conflict we are waging, by this assumption. Such assumption may be the easiest road to national efficiency, but we submit that it is unworthy of the Christian mind, which should be both courageous and veracious.[1]

The letter closed with the question: "What can we do to preserve at once our loyalty to our Master, to our nation, and to our beloved Church?"[2]

The petition was signed by eleven churchwomen, but, Professor Scudder added, "We could have covered pages with them, had we taken the time."[3]

On January 26, 1918, The Living Church published a letter from Shirley C. Hughson, Superior of the Order of the Holy Cross. Father Hughson described the situation in these words:

> The position in which the Church now finds herself is that one of her bishops, a man against whom no charge either civil or ecclesiastical has been laid, has been pilloried before the world by an Act of Attainder, and advertised as one who is unfit to continue to exercise his office as a bishop in the Church of God.[4]

Father Hughson's reading of the Commission's report led him to the conclusion that the only grounds upon which Bishop Jones had been told to resign was the Commission's belief that once the civil government had come to the conclusion that the war against Germany was just, "no expression to the contrary should come from an episcopal representative of this Church."[5]

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[1] Vida D. Scudder to Bishop Lawrence, February 6, 1918, p. 2, Archives, Church Historical Society, Austin, Texas.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Vida D. Scudder to Bishop Tuttle, February 6, 1918, Archives, Church Historical Society, Austin, Texas.

[4] Shirley C. Hughson, "The Case of Bishop Jones," The Living Church, Vol. 58 (Jan. 26, 1918), p. 438.

[5] Ibid.

Father Hughson found this conclusion totally unacceptable.

> It is difficult to imagine a more intolerable set of propositions, and if our bishops, missionary or otherwise, should agree to them, on that day they would place their necks under the yoke of a moral and intellectual serfdom which would forfeit them the respect of all honest men.[1]

Such propositions were contrary to the history and teaching of the Church. According to Father Hughson, the history of the Church is replete with examples of courageous Bishops who "used the prestige of their high office as a lever to move men and governments towards the establishment of justice and the protection of the poor, the oppressed and the outcasts."[2] He argued that even when such Bishops had acted in error, "they have nevertheless been honored for the spirit of courage and self-sacrifice with which they stood for what they believed to be right."[3]

Against this background, Father Hughson expressed his deep regret that Bishop Jones had decided to accept the Commission's advice and resign his jurisdiction. "If Bishop Jones had peremptorily refused to resign, and demanded a fair and open investigation on the merits of his case, he would have inaugurated a work of far-reaching usefulness to the Church at large."[4] Father Hughson closed by expressing his hope that the bishops "will decline to accept a resignation forced under such conditions and on such grounds."[5]

The Living Church which had earlier decided against publishing any further letters regarding Bishop Jones, "because of the delicacy of the matter,"[6] not only published Father Hughson's letter, but responded to it in its Editorial. The Living Church agreed "that the commission of bishops have been unhappy in some of the expressions they have used."[1] They argued, however, that this case did not involve the "right" of free speech, but the responsibility with which that right was exercised.

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid. [3] Ibid. [4] Ibid. [5] Ibid.

[6] "Father Hughson's Letter," The Living Church, Vol. 58 (Jan. 26, 1918), p. 424.

> A Christian must accept responsibility for his words; nothing is more impressed upon us in Scripture than this. A priest, a bishop, has a responsibility greater in ascending scale than a layman . . . "Free speech" is a legal right, subject to marked limitations. But rights are matters for civil courts, and responsibilities and duties are matters for the Church to determine.[2]

The Living Church believed that the Commission was within its rights to criticize the manner in which it felt Bishop Jones had discharged this responsibility. And in the final analysis, The Living Church argued, these questions were peripheral. "The one question that interests us between Bishop Jones and the missionary district of Utah is the well-being of the church."[3] In response to this question, The Living Church continued to maintain that Bishop Jones' resignation ought to be accepted for the "good of the service."

Father Hughson had expressed the hope that the House of Bishops would refuse to accept Bishop Jones' resignation. Edward L. Parsons, the Rector of St. Mark's Church, Berkeley, and future Bishop of California, was more realistic in his appraisal of the situation. In his letter to the Presiding Bishop, he conceded "that under the conditions which have now been created and especially in view of his own request the House of Bishops can do other than accept Bishop Jones' resignation from the jurisdiction in Utah is hardly to be expected. . . ."[4] But in so doing, he expressed the hope that the House of Bishops would not "commit itself to the acceptance of the opinions expressed by the Commission."[1]

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid. [3] Ibid.

[4] Edward L. Parsons to Bishop Tuttle, March 30, 1918, Archives, Church Historical Society, Austin, Texas.

> If our bishops dare not speak the truth against the majority, what can the rest of us do? What would Christianity be today if Athanasius and all the other leaders of minorities had been afraid? We pray that the House of Bishops, whatever action they may have to take in regard to Bishop Jones, will give us, as interpreting that action, a statement upon these questions worthy of the noblest Christian leadership.[2]

Many other letters were received by the Presiding Bishop, the House of Bishops, and the Church periodicals expressing opposition to the Commission's report. Some of the authors felt that Bishop Jones' resignation should be accepted, others hoped that the House of Bishops would decline to accept it; all agreed that the Commission's report posed a grave threat to the independence and ethical stature of the Episcopate.[3]

There were several letters which took the opposing point of view. In his letter to The Churchman, Evan H. Martin supported the action and report of the Commission, and concluded by saying:

> This is no time for neutrality or pacifism, "he that is not with me is against me." To oppose resistance to such a foe as Prussia today is to give aid and comfort to the enemy, and what short is that of treason?[4]

Other correspondents were equally irate. In a letter to The Southern Churchman, Wallace Carnahan declared that "no bishop of the

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid.

[3] See also: A. L. Byron-Curtiss, "The Memorial to the House of Bishops," The Living Church, Vol. 58 (March 23, 1918), p. 705. Don Frank Fenn to the House of Bishops, April 3, 1918. Kenneth R. Forbes to Bishop Tuttle, March 20, 1918. Kenneth L. Guthrie to Bishop Gailor, March 22, 1918. Frank C. Grant to the House of Bishops, March 28, 1918. Petitions signed by: William E. Soule, Henry Goddard Leach, Ralph Wood Kenyon, Hubert Nilson, David Covell, and fifteen students of Nashota House.

[4] Evan H. Martin, "Why We Must Fight," The Churchman, Vol. 117 (Feb. 23, 1918), p. 275.

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Anglican Communion ever has so much deserved deposition as Bishop Jones."[1] In a personal note to the Presiding Bishop, the Rev. Mr. Carnahan added:

> I earnestly hope our Bishops may present Bishop Jones for trial on the charge of disloyalty to the Country; if they do not, I fear the Church may seem to condone treason.[2]

A letter addressed to the House of Bishops from the Rector, Junior Warden and members of the Vestry of the Parish of the Chapel of the Comforter, New York City, expressed similar outrage:

> This Parish deplores the fact that any members of the Protestant Episcopal Church should be so utterly lacking in a sense of decency, and should so completely have failed to understand the teaching of Christ, as to support the outrageous behaviour of Bishop Paul Jones. We hope and pray that this will prove to be an occasion when the Church will refuse to compromise with evil, and when utter condemnation will be extended to that which represents the worst elements in our national character.[3]

Not all of the letters which supported the findings of the Commission were as strident in their opposition to Bishop Jones.[4] For these correspondents, such as Lewis Ostenson, the basic question was whether Bishop Jones' usefulness in Utah had come to an end. And, on this question, Mr. Ostenson was prepared to accept the conclusions of the Commission:

> On the Committee of Investigation were some Bishops who were specially well qualified to come to a right decision. If the usefulness

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[1] Wallace Carnahan, "The Bishop Jones Case," The Southern Churchman, Vol. 83 (March 16, 1918), p. 6.

[2] Wallace Carnahan to Bishop Tuttle, April 3, 1918, Archives, Church Historical Society, Austin, Texas.

[3] Ernest T. Hargrove to the House of Bishops, April 4, 1918, Archives, Church Historical Society, Austin, Texas.

[4] James F. Plummer to Bishop Tuttle, Easter Even, 1918; and Edward H. Cleveland to the House of Bishops, April 6, 1918, Archives, Church Historical Society, Austin, Texas.

> of the Bishop of Utah has come to an end in Utah, then that would seem to decide the case.[1]

The reaction to the Commission's report fell into four broad categories: first, those who felt that the House of Bishops should refuse to accept Bishop Jones' resignation and should reinstate him as Bishop of Utah; second, those who were prepared to concede that the House of Bishops would accept Bishop Jones' resignation, but strongly objected to the wording and implications of the Commission's report; third, those who believed that Bishop Jones had exhausted his usefulness in Utah, and that his resignation should be accepted for the good of the Church, regardless of the somewhat nettlesome wording of the report; and fourth, those who felt that Bishop Jones was thoroughly disloyal, and that the Commission's report was correct and well justified. The national Church periodicals supported the third position, the majority of the letters and petitions appeared to support the second.

While this debate was going on throughout the country, it was also continuing within the Missionary District of Utah itself. Maxwell Rice, the Rector of All Soul's, Garfield, wrote to The Churchman arguing that "it was not unreasonable to suppose that much the same interests that opposed Bishop Spalding were now trying to silence Bishop Jones under the hue and cry of patriotism."[2] Mr. Rice argued that such a course of action was completely unfair to Bishop Jones and would set an extremely dangerous precedent for the Church. He said that "to remove the right and responsibility from the clergy and bishops of speaking according to their Christian conscience would render the Church to that extent contemptible."[1]

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[1] Lewis Ostenson, "The Bishop Jones Case," The Southern Churchman, Vol. 83 (March 23, 1918), p. 6.

[2] Maxwell W. Rice, "Oppose Bishop Jones Under Cloak of Patriotism, The Churchman, Vol. 117 (Jan. 26, 1918), p. 14.

> There seem to be other legitimate courses open. One would be to prove him guilty of something for which he should be deposed from all office and leadership in the Church. Or else clear him on the ground that the charges are not proven or are not valid grounds for such procedure. Or transfer him in an honorable way to some other jurisdiction on the ground that elsewhere there is greater opportunity for his work in the Church. Because I know him to be as sincere a Christian as one can find, I believe the Church ought to adopt the second and possibly also the third of these suggestions.[2]

Three weeks later, The Churchman published a response to Mr. Rice's letter from C. P. Overfield of St. Mark's, Salt Lake City. Mr. Overfield argued that those who disagreed with Bishop Jones should not be considered his enemies:

> Speaking for myself, I am not an enemy of Bishop Jones and never expect to be, but I recognize the duty of the Church in this crisis, and this applies to Bishop Jones as well. To think of his returning to the Episcopate of Utah is foolish.[3]

The debate over the future of Bishop Jones continued in Utah, as it did around the rest of the nation.

On January 30-31, the Convocation of the Missionary District of Utah met in Convocation at St. Mark's Cathedral. Bishop Jones was not present at the Convocation, but his official report was read into the record by the Secretary, the Rev. Mr. Hoyt Henriques. In his report, Bishop Jones described in great detail the progress and growth of the Missionary District during his tenure. He expressed particular pleasure in the expansion of the Church's work in eastern Utah, and among Japanese immigrants. Bishop Jones' report concluded with these words:

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid.

[3] C. P. Overfield, "Not Bishop Jones' Enemy," The Churchman, Vol. 117 (Feb. 16, 1918), p. 241.

> I do not care to criticize the action taken by the Council of Advice. No doubt the Council acted according to its best judgment, and time will show the wisdom or folly of that judgment. I regret the necessity of taking leave of the many friends throughout the district whose loyal service has made the work successful; but, after all, where I serve the Church is of small importance, so long as I can make my life count in the cause of Christ. I am more concerned at the remarkable conclusions expressed by the Commission of the House of Bishops, which I think must call forth vigorous protests from people who love the Church, no matter what their attitude on the war question may be. Expediency may make necessary the resignation of a bishop at this time, but no expediency can ever justify the degradation of the ideals of the episcopate which these conclusions seem to involve. In the earnest hope that the future of the district may be rich in service and achievements, I bid you Godspeed.[1]

So ended the Episcopate of the Rt. Rev. Paul Jones, Bishop of the Missionary District of Utah.

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[1] "Bishop Jones's Farewell to Utah," The Social Preparation, Vol. 5 (April, 1918), p. 14.

THE HOUSE OF BISHOPS - 1918

The meeting of the House of Bishops which would act upon the resignation of Bishop Jones was scheduled to convene on April 10, 1918, at the Cathedral of St. John the Divine, New York City. In advance of the meeting, however, the Bishops directly involved in the "Bishop Jones Case" were quite busy strengthening their case.

On February 20, Bishop Kinsolving wrote to Mr. Thompson of the Council of Advice. He informed Mr. Thompson of the coming meeting of the House of Bishops, and then said:

> Our action will be subjected to some criticism and as we will be called upon to defend ourselves, I would like to be sure of certain facts. The papers submitted to us are in the keeping of our secretary, and it would be difficult for me to have access to them at present. Therefore I write to you and ask you please to tell me briefly and tersely the salient points made by your Council of Advice in asking for the resignation of Bishop Jones. Of course I recall in a general way the reasons assigned, but I want the exact facts.[1]

Bishop Kinsolving closed this curious letter by saying: "I have been amazed at the silliness of the criticisms of our Commission, but I am sure the House of Bishops will be of sound mind and right judgment."[2]

Mr. Thompson replied promptly to Bishop Kinsolving's appeal, and repeated some of the salient facts in the Council's case against Bishop Jones. Mr. Thompson summarized his position by saying: "He has resigned and he cannot come back here, that's a cinch as we westerners may be permitted to say."[1]

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[1] Bishop George Kinsolving to J. Walcott Thompson, February 20, 1918, Archives, Diocese of Utah, Salt Lake City.

[2] Ibid.

Perhaps stimulated by Bishop Kinsolving's letter, the Council of Advice met and adopted unanimously a long resolution which it sent to the Presiding Bishop. The resolution traced the history of the dispute between Bishop Jones and the Council, and the reasons which led the Council to petition the House of Bishops to remove Bishop Jones from the District of Utah.[2] The petition concluded:

> NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED by the Council of Advice of the Missionary District of Utah -
> First, That, in the judgment of the Council, the developments since said resignation was requested have emphasized the correctness of their judgment and the wisdom of their action and that the welfare of the Church in the District of Utah still, and even more convincingly, demands that the said resignation be accepted by the House of Bishops;
> Second, That the Council respectfully petitions the House of Bishops to elect, at its impending session, a strong loyal man from without the District, to be the Bishop of Utah and expresses the earnest hope that his coming may be hastened that the welfare of the District may be wisely guided and preserved.[3]

While Bishop Kinsolving and the Council of Advice were busy buttressing their case, the Presiding Bishop was equally active. In a letter to Bishop Gailor of Tennessee, Bishop Tuttle outlined his strategy for the meeting of the House of Bishops.

In consultation with Bishop Gailor, Bishop Tuttle redrafted the report of the Commission. He deleted all the sections relating to the three questions Bishop Jones had posed to the Commission, and all references to the right or responsibility of a Bishop to speak out on controversial issues. The new report traced the history of the Committee--its creation by the House of Bishops, its first meeting on November 7, and its meeting with Bishop Jones on December 12--and then said:

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[1] J. Walcott Thompson to Bishop Kinsolving, February 27, 1918, Archives, Diocese of Utah, Salt Lake City.

[2] Resolution adopted by the Council of Advice of the Missionary District of Utah, March 29, 1918, Archives, Church Historical Society, Austin, Texas.

[3] Ibid.

> Such examination resulted in the unanimous conviction on the part of the Commission that the utterances and associations of the Bishop of Utah had impaired his influence in promoting the peace and welfare of the Church in Utah to such a degree as virtually to destroy it.
>
> Therefore, the appointed Commission after thoughtful consideration of the facts presented to it and after giving audience to the Bishop of Utah, in person appearing before it, was constrained to pronounce as its judgment and advice in the matter that the Bishop of Utah should resign his office as said Bishop, said resignation to take effect within the period of three months; to wit, on or before March 12, 1918.[1]

It was the Presiding Bishop's plan to present this as the official report of the Commission, in place of the earlier report which had set off such a reaction. As he explained the strategy to Bishop Gailor:

> My mind is--at the opening of the Session--after new Bishops introduced--and the (illegible) if any, and appointment of Assistant Secretary, I will as Presiding Bishop communicate to the House the text of the tendered resignation of Bishop Jones. Then I will ask you kindly to take the Chair. Then, if you call for "Committees," I will rise in my place of Bishop of Missouri, and present the above report. Then the House will have nothing but the "resignation" and the above "report" before it.[2]

Bishop Tuttle also told Bishop Gailor that he was writing to Bishop Jones saying that he, the Presiding Bishop, would present Bishop Jones' resignation to the House and would also "present a short report."[3] He also said that he would remind Bishop Jones that "he has the right to withdraw his resignation if he so wishes--only if so mind I hope he will do so as early as possible so that I can remove this much from the Agenda of the House."[4]

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[1] Bishop Tuttle to Bishop Gailor, March 2, 1918, Archives, Church Historical Society, Austin, Texas.

[2] Ibid. [3] Ibid. [4] Ibid.

Bishop Tuttle's strategy was somewhat transparent. The Report of the Commission had set off a storm of controversy. Bishop Tuttle hoped to allay that controversy by substituting a less controversial report. At best, however, this strategy could be only partially successful because Bishop Jones' letter of resignation contained within it his response to the arguments and conclusions of the first report. There was, therefore, no way for the House of Bishops to avoid these issues entirely.

On the morning of April 10, 1918, the House of Bishops convened in New York City. The Presiding Bishop presented to the House the letter of resignation of Bishop Jones dated December 20, 1917.[1] Bishop William Capers of West Texas immediately moved that the resignation of Bishop Jones be referred to a Special Committee "for consideration and report as soon as possible."[2] In place of this resolution, Bishop Frederick Burgess of Long Island offered a substitute to defer consideration of the matter until the Report of the Commission had been presented to the House. This substitute resolution was adopted.[3]

The Presiding Bishop then presented the Report of the Commission. It is essential to point out that this report is the report to which Bishop Tuttle referred in his letter of March 2 to Bishop Gailor.[4] This was not the report which contained Bishop Jones' questions to the Commission and the Commission's responses. The Presiding Bishop also presented the resolution adopted at the March 29, 1918, meeting of the Council of Advice which reaffirmed their request for Bishop Jones' resignation.[5] He also presented "communications from certain petitioners in regard to the resignation of the Bishop of Utah."[1]

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[1] JGC - 1919, p. 491.

[2] Ibid. [3] Ibid.

[4] The original Report was presented later, see page 295, note 4.

[5] Ibid.

These materials were referred by the Presiding Bishop to a Special Committee to consider the matter. The Committee consisted of: Bishop Charles Anderson of Chicago, Bishop Reginald Weller of Fond du Lac, Bishop Edwin Lines of Newark, Bishop Richard Nelson of Albany, Bishop Charles Williams of Michigan, and Bishop Frederick Reese of Georgia.[2]

Later the same day, Bishop Longley presented "a descriptive list of memorials, petitions, protests, etc.," which the Committee had received in regard to the question of accepting the resignation of the Bishop of Utah.[3] The Journal also reports that: "on motion, the Committee included in its Report a copy of the letter which it addressed to the Bishop of Utah, and on which his resignation was based."[4]

Now, finally, the House had before it all the documents relating to Bishop Jones' resignation. Bishop Tuttle had initially only presented the House with the edited version of the report, the resolution of the Council of Advice, the "communications from certain petitioners," and Bishop Jones' letter of resignation. Now the House had the original report of the Committee, the report which set off the controversy, and at least a "descriptive list" of all the other letters, petitions and protests. Bishop Tuttle's effort to narrow the focus of the debate had failed.

On April 11, the House met to choose a Bishop for the Philippine Islands. At noon the House went into Council, presumably to discuss the resignation of Bishop Jones. They adjourned for lunch at one o'clock, reconvened at two o'clock and went back into Council.[1] When the Council rose, the Chairman presented the following Report:

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[1] Ibid., p. 492. [2] Ibid. [3] Ibid., p. 495. [4] Ibid.

> The Committee which was appointed to consider the matter of the resignation of the Missionary Bishop of Utah recommends that the Bishops in Council report the following declarations and Resolutions for adoption by the House of Bishops.
> RESOLVED, That the House of Bishops declares its belief that the Government of the United States has obeyed the law of moral necessity in seeking to stop a war of deliberate aggression by the only means which are known to be effective to such an end.
> RESOLVED, That the House of Bishops believes that any member of this House is entitled to the same freedom of opinion and speech as any other citizen of the United States, but that in the exercise of this liberty he should be guided by a deep sense of the responsibility which rests upon one who occupies a representative position.
> RESOLVED, That the House of Bishops is unwilling to accept the resignation of any Bishop in deference to an excited state of public opinion, and therefore declines to adopt the Report of the Special Commission or to accept the resignation of the Bishop of Utah for the reasons assigned by him in his letter of December 20, 1917.[2]

Each of these three Resolutions was adopted by the House of Bishops.[3]

At first blush this may appear to have been a victory for Bishop Jones. It was not. For this "victory" came at an extremely high price for Bishop Jones, as the next entry in the Journal bears witness:

> The Presiding Bishop presented the resignation of the Right Rev. Dr. Paul Jones, Bishop of the Missionary District of Utah, as follows:
>
> "April 11, 1918
>
> "Right Rev. D. S. Tuttle, D.D.,
> "Presiding Bishop
>
> "Right Rev. and Dear Sir:
>
> "I desire to present to you my formal resignation as Bishop of the Missionary District of Utah."
>
> "Faithfully yours,
> "Paul Jones"
>
> The Bishop of Vermont [Bishop Arthur Hall] offered the following Resolution:

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[1] Ibid., pp. 496-497. [2] Ibid., p. 497. [3] Ibid.

> RESOLVED, That with full recognition of the right of every member of this House to freedom of speech in political and social matters, subject to the law of the land; nevertheless in view of Bishop Jones' impaired usefulness in Utah under present conditions, recognized by himself, the House of Bishops accepts the resignation of the Bishop of Utah as now presented.
>
> Which was adopted.
>
> The Presiding Bishop taking the Chair for that purpose, pronounced the resignation of the Right Rev. Dr. Paul Jones, as Bishop of the Missionary District of Utah, to be completed in accordance with Canon 13, Section V.[1]

The "case" of Bishop Jones had finally come to a conclusion. The House of Bishops had rejected the report of the Committee which had caused such a great controversy concerning the rights and responsibilities incumbent upon those who would speak in the name of the Church. The principles of free speech and social responsibility had been proclaimed in an official Resolution, but the man who embodied those principles and gave them life had been sacrificed as the price of defending those principles. Paul Jones was no longer the Bishop of the Missionary District of Utah, and would never again hold an episcopal jurisdiction within the Church.[2]

With this action of the House of Bishops, Bishop Jones and the controversy which surrounded him dropped quickly from public view. The Living Church reported the action of the House virtually without comment.[1] The Churchman did offer one last editorial on the subject, which read in part:

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[1] Ibid., pp. 497-498.

[2] When his resignation was accepted, Bishop Jones moved to Maine, where his friend Bishop Brewster offered him a position as missionary in charge of twelve stations with headquarters in Brownsville Junction. In 1919, he moved to New York and became the Executive Secretary of the Fellowship of Reconciliation. He served in that post until 1929. (John Howard Melish, Paul Jones, New York: Fellowship of Reconciliation, 1942, pp. 36-43). From there he became Pastor of Antioch College, a post at which he served until his death in September, 1941. (Paul Jones, pp. 44-45.) There were periodic attempts to place Bishop Jones in a new episcopal jurisdiction, but each attempt failed.

> The House of Bishops in its method of dealing with the Report of the Commission of Bishops appointed to take action in the case of Bishop Jones has brought relief to a good many troubled minds. They have acted fearlessly and as we think wisely. First, they have declared their belief in the rightness of America's participating in the war. They have shown no pacifist leanings. Second, they have defended the right of free opinion and speech in civic matters insofar as such freedom is consonant with the law of the land. Third, they have repudiated the inference that an excited public mind is the arbiter of opinion in the Church.
>
> It must also be added that Bishop Jones deserves respect for the dignity with which he has conducted himself through this trying experience . . . . With modesty and simplicity he placed his case in the hands of his brother bishops and awaited their judgment. So the case ends.[2]

Over thirty years later, James Thayer Addison would offer a somewhat different evaluation. After recounting the three-fold Resolution adopted by the House of Bishops, he said:

> Jones then offered his resignation without giving any reasons for it; and seizing the opportunity for face-saving thus generously extended to them, the House accepted the resignation, while repeating their affirmation about freedom of speech. They could not resist the chance to enjoy the credit of a verbal defiance of public opinion and at the same time the credit of bringing peace and satisfaction to the missionary district of Utah.[3]

In fairness to the House of Bishops, Addison added one more sentence, which serves as an appropriate conclusion to this chapter:

> Only those who have not lived through a war will find it easy to blame them.[4]

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[1] "House of Bishops in Session," The Living Church, Vol. 58 (April 20, 1918), p. 831.

[2] "The House of Bishops and Bishop Jones," The Churchman, Vol. 117, (April 20, 1918), p. 513.

[3] James Thayer Addison, The Episcopal Church in the United States 1789-1931. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1951), p. 309.

[4] Ibid.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

PARAMETERS AND PREJUDICES

The question of the proper relationship of church and state has a great many facets and poses complex and difficult questions. The attempt to formulate a coherent theoretical response to these questions, and the means by which to implement this theory in terms of concrete actions and policies has occupied many of the greatest minds of western civilization. Merely to recount, let alone critically evaluate, the myriad of proposed alternatives would lead far beyond the scope of this inquiry.

In its broadest outlines, the on-going relationship of church and state in the United States is, at one and the same time, both complimentary and contradictory. From one perspective, the goals, objectives and programs of both the church and the state may be viewed as complimentary. In such a relationship of mutual aid, each provides the other with "goods", in the broadest sense, and "services" which aid the other in the fulfillment of its purposes. From the opposite perspective, the relationship may appear as contradictory, wherein the church and state appear as competitors for the loyalty expected of its members by the other.

From the standpoint of the state, the "goods" provided to it by the church have included both education and philanthropy. For instance, schools founded and supported by the churches long constituted an indispensible component of the educational system of the nation, particularly before the advent of state supported public education, and still comprise an integral part of that system.[1]

In a similar vein, the churches provided the means by which the tremendous influx of immigrants were educated and assimilated into the American culture.[2] The churches also sought by many means to inculcate into its members an understanding of stewardship and civic responsibility which provided the moral basis of an expanding capitalist economy and a democratic government.[3] In these ways the churches have educated their members in their duties and responsibilities as citizens of the state.

The churches' philanthropic endeavors, while viewed by the churches as the natural fulfillment of the Christian obligations of stewardship and charity, have also been of great value to the state. These philanthropic activities have included: direct social services, such as hospitals, orphanages, food, clothing and housing for the poor; special projects directed at specific groups, such as youth work and the care of the elderly; and rehabilitation work with convicts, alcoholics, and drug addicts. While these programs were valuable in their own right, they also tended to undergird the state by the amelioration of social and economic conditions, which had they not been assuaged would have greatly weakened or undermined the stability of the society.[4]

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[1] See Frederick Rudolph, The American College and University: A History (New York: Vintage Books, 1962).

[2] See Sydney E. Ahlstrom, A Religious History of the American People (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), especially chapters 31, 44 and 45.

[3] See Paul C. Nagel, This Sacred Trust: American Nationality, 1798-1898 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971).
Winthrop S. Hudson, ed., Nationalism and Religion in America (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1970).

[4] See Henry F. May, Protestant Churches and Industrial America (New York: Octagon Books, 1963).

For its part, the state has provided the churches with many services and benefits. A list of these services would include: tax exemption for church property,[1] indirect governmental aid to church welfare projects,[2] governmental chaplaincies and religious services,[3] Sunday closing laws,[4] governmental observances of religious holidays,[5] indirect financial aid to parochial schools and released time arrangements.[6]

In a more general sense, the state has provided the churches with a climate of political stability and freedom deemed essential by the churches for the accomplishment of their goals.

In many ways the relationship of church and state in America has been complimentary, each providing the other with great benefits and working together toward a shared vision of the nation's future. In the view of some scholars, this complimentary relationship has become so powerful and pervasive that the separate identities of church and state have been melded into one common American civil religion.[7]

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[1] Anson Phelps Stokes, Church and State in the United States, 3 vols. (New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1950), II: 680.
Leo Pfeffer, Church, State and Freedom (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967), pp. 210-218.

[2] Stokes, Church and State, II: 80-100.
Pfeffer, Church, State, pp. 718-726 and 196-202.

[3] Stokes, Church and State, III: 109-139.
Pfeffer, Church, State, pp. 247-251.

[4] Stokes, Church and State, III: 153-175.
Pfeffer, Church, State, pp. 270-286.

[5] Stokes, Church and State, III: 176-178.
Pfeffer, Church, State, 268-269.

[6] Stokes, Church and State, II: 488-641.
Pfeffer, Church, State, pp. 321-605.

[7] See Robert N. Bellah, "Civil Religion in America" in Religion in America, ed. William G. McLoughlin and Robert N. Bellah (Boston:

From the opposite perspective, however, the relationship of church and state may appear competitive or contradictory. The loyalty and allegiance which one institution expects of its members may well impinge upon the loyalty expected of its members by the other.

If one wished to examine this conflict from the perspective of the state, the material to be studied would be voluminous. It would include: the philosophical and legal antecedents of the Constitution; the provision of the First Amendment requiring that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . ."; federal and state laws and programs enacted pursuant to this provision; and court decisions and opinions interpreting the First Amendment and its applicability to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment. This enormous undertaking has already been successfully completed by Stokes[1] and Pfeffer.[2]

If, however, one were to adopt the perspective of the church, the problems are more complex. First, there is no such entity as "the church" in America. One is immediately confronted with a plethora of denominations, sects, cults, and splinter groups, all of whom claim in one form or another to be, or at least to represent and speak for, "the church." Confronted by this confused panorama, some scholars have endeavored to examine the attitude of all the churches toward a certain

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Beacon Press, 1968), pp. 3-23.

Robert N. Bellah, The Broken Covenant: American Civil Religion in Time of Trial (New York: Seabury Press, 1975).

Sidney E. Mead, The Nation with the Soul of a Church (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1975).

Sidney E. Mead, The Old Religion in the Brave New World (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977).

[1] Stokes, Church and State.

[2] Pfeffer, Church, State.

issue, hoping to discover therein, certain ideas or attitudes which the churches hold in common, on the basis of which they could legitimately discuss the attitude of "the church." The Rise of the Social Gospel in American Protestantism, by C. Howard Hopkins;[1] Protestant Churches and Industrial America, by Henry F. May;[2] Religion in Twentieth Century America, by Wallace Schneider;[3] and Preachers Present Arms, by Ray H. Abrams,[4] are all excellent examples of this type of inquiry.

Rather than attempt such an ecumenical inquiry, this paper has been limited to the perspective of the Episcopal Church. Having limited this inquiry to the Episcopal Church, other problems arise. These difficulties have been discussed in Chapter 2, "Who Speaks for the Church?"

To summarize, this paper is an attempt to address the question of the proper relationship between the church and the state. The church in this study is the Episcopal Church, and it is from the viewpoint of that Church and its response to this question that the relationship has been studied. Second, it is the "contradictory" or limiting side of the relationship which has been the focus of this inquiry--to what extent does loyalty to the Church and its teachings limit the loyalty and support a person can rightfully give to the state, and what happens when these loyalties come into conflict? In the view of the Episcopal Church, what are the limits, if any, on the religious freedom of conscience and action of a churchman who feels compelled as a Christian to oppose the policies of his government? Based on the experience of the Episcopal Church during World War I, as presented in the preceding two sections of this paper, these are the questions which shall now be examined.

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[1] C. Howard Hopkins, The Rise of the Social Gospel in American Protestantism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940).

[2] Henry F. May, Protestant Churches and Industrial America.

[3] Wallace Schneider, Religion in Twentieth Century America (New York: Atheneum, 1963).

[4] Ray H. Abrams, Preachers Present Arms (Scottdale, Pennsylvania: Herald Press, 1969).

It should be noted that this potential conflict between a person's loyalty to his church and its teachings, and his loyalty to his government arises most often in the most extraordinary and traumatic circumstances, such as when a nation is engaged in a war. Such was the case in World War I.

In such a situation, the stakes may become extremely high. From its standpoint, the state may well believe that its very existence is at stake, and that its survival depends upon national unity and the voluntary submission of individual convictions to the immediate needs of the state. For the conscientious churchman who opposes the war, however, the support or at least the submission which the state believes is essential, may appear utterly incompatible with the Christian obligations of love, universal brotherhood, and reconciliation. His Christian convictions may compel him to challenge the government at precisely those points which it considers essential to its survival. Given the fact that both parties may believe that their existence and integrity are at stake, emotions and passions may drive reason and tolerance aside.

However, it is precisely in such an emotionally charged crisis situation that a cogent and forceful defense of the moral and legal guarantees of the freedom of religious conscience is desperately needed. To use a perhaps overly dramatic analogy: the true test of a dam is not its beauty or symmetry when viewed on a quiet summer day; the test of a dam is whether or not it can hold back the flood waters of a terrible winter storm. If it fails to do so, the damage is done. So also it is only in those periods of crisis that the real boundaries of religious liberty are ascertained.

It seems clear from the evidence presented in the preceding chapters that the structures created by the Episcopal Church to protect the conscientious dissent of Bishop Jones and his fellow pacifists were insufficient for the task. They were forced to remove themselves from positions of official responsibility and authority in the church.

The arguments advanced by Bishop Jones' opponents against his taking a public stand against the foreign policy of the United States fell into three categories. First, it was argued that before Bishop Jones spoke out in opposition to the war, it was incumbent upon him to make it clear that these were only his personal views and not the conclusions of an official Episcopal representative of the Church. Second, others argued that while it may have been permissible for the Bishop to question American foreign policy while the nation was still officially neutral, it was unpatriotic and potentially disloyal of him to do so once the nation was officially at war. They believed that once war had been declared, the Bishop should have supported the country's new policy, or if he could not conscientiously go that far, he should at least remain silent. Third, still others maintained that despite Bishop Jones' "personal" views, he should have remained silent, because to speak out would risk public ire and potentially damage the work of the Church.

Each of these arguments will be examined in three ways. First, were Bishop Jones' opponents willing to accept these same strictures on the expression of their beliefs when these beliefs conflicted with the policy of the government? Second, do these arguments accurately reflect the beliefs of most Episcopalians on this issue? Third, are these objections theologically and ethically valid?

Before conducting this examination, however, it is only fair to be explicit about some of the prejudices of the author. It is incumbent upon the church, it is an essential part of her nature, that she preach the word of God. This truth must be preached regardless of whether or not the world or the state chooses to heed it. If she is to be true to her calling, the church must be able to echo the words of Micaiah: "As the Lord lives, what the Lord says to me, that I will speak."[1]

This obligation incumbent upon the church to preach the word of God on both theological and ethical matters is not contingent upon the ability or the willingness of the state to accept it. The fact that Jehoshaphat and the King of Israel chose to ignore the prophecy of Micaiah did not in any way relieve Micaiah of the obligation to preach it.

Ezekiel makes the same point:

> And at the end of seven days, the word of the Lord came to me: Son of man, I have made you a watchman for the house of Israel; whenever you hear a word from my mouth, you shall give them warning from me. If I say to the wicked, "You shall surely die," and you give him no warning, nor speak to warn the wicked from his wicked ways, in order to save his life, that wicked man shall die in his iniquity; but his blood I will require at your hand. But if you warn the wicked, and he does not turn from his wickedness, or from his wicked way, he shall die in his iniquity; but you will have saved your life.[2]

The church must, therefore, proclaim the word of God regardless of the consequences.

This obligation is not fully discharged, however, by the mere proclamation of the word. The church must find or create ways by which

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[1] I Kings 22:14

[2] Ezekiel 3:16-19

God's word may reach peoples' lives powerfully and change them. For example, if the church believed that a particular governmental policy were unjust, she is obligated to say so as clearly and forcefully as she can. This, however, does not exhaust her responsibility. She must find ways to bring this message home to her members, to help them to ameliorate the destructive consequences of this policy and to change it.

This is primarily a process of education and conversion. While official statements are required, and sometimes helpful, they are by themselves insufficient to the task. As valuable as such statements may be, they tend to float like clouds in the air and have little impact on the lives of the individual members of the church.

The real work of education and conversion of individual Christians most often takes place in parishes. It is here that the priest, as the representative of the church, can interpret the church's teachings in a manner which speaks to the lives of his parishioners. It is here that the relationship of trust and confidence can be established which allows people to question their ideas and formulate new ones. It is here that individuals and groups can find and create ways to translate their Christian beliefs into constructive action.

Therefore, after considering the objections raised by Bishop Jones' opponents, the closing chapter of this paper will offer a context within which, the author believes, the teachings of the Church may be transformed into effective tools of education and conversion within a parish.

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THE ISSUES

It is essential that the issues in the debate which led to the resignation of Bishop Paul Jones of Utah be fully understood. Bishop Jones was a socialist and a pacifist. In holding these beliefs, Bishop Jones differed markedly from the great majority of the Episcopal Church. These beliefs were not, however, unique to Bishop Jones. Bishop Charles Williams of Michigan and Vida Scudder held economic views strikingly similar to those of Bishop Jones, and the Rev. John Nevin Sayre shared the Bishop's ardent pacifism. It was not the content of Bishop Jones' beliefs which led to his resignation, rather it was his conscientious refusal to desist in the proclamation of his beliefs which motivated the House of Bishops to accept his resignation. The Church appears to have been prepared to allow Bishop Jones to continue to hold his socialist and pacifist beliefs. What the Church could not accept was that these views be promulgated and supported by an official Episcopal spokesman of the Church.

The "Report of the Commission" explicitly makes this point in two different places. The Commission stated that "the underlying contention of the Bishop of Utah seems to be that war is unchristian,"[1] and that this was a conclusion with which "the Commission cannot agree."[2] The Report went on to say that the Commission believed that "this Church in the United States is practically a unit in holding that it is not an unchristian thing."[1] They, therefore, concluded:

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[1] "Report of Commission in re Case of Bishop Jones of Utah," p. 2.

[2] Ibid.

> In the face of this unanimity, it is neither right nor wise for a trusted Bishop to *declare* and *maintain* that it is an unchristian thing. If the compelling force of conscientious conviction requires such *utterance*, fairness demands that it be not made by a Bishop of this Church. The making of such an *Episcopal proclamation* should be preceded by the withdrawal of the maker from his position of Episcopal leadership.[2]

The Commission went on to state its belief that Bishop Jones was completely loyal to the United States.

> It is in methods only that he differs. The Government, and the Commission thinks it may fairly claim, the Church in the immense preponderance of its membership, think that by vigorous prosecution of the present war against Germany the "sound and lasting peace" desired may be secured. The Bishop of Utah thinks otherwise, and so *expresses* himself as to methods and he thinks himself conscientiously bound so to *express* himself. The Commission thinks such *expression* should not come from an Episcopal representative of this Church.[3]

It was, therefore, Bishop Jones' conscientious insistence that he speak out publicly and officially in defense of his beliefs which led to his resignation, not the content of his beliefs themselves. To borrow a classical distinction, Bishop Jones' socialist and pacifist beliefs were the necessary, but not the sufficient cause of his resignation.

This argument that an Episcopal spokesman of the Church ought to refrain from the public advocacy of policies contrary to those supported by a majority of the Church was elaborated along three distinct, but related lines. First, Bishop Jones' opponents argued that if he was compelled by his conscience to continue to speak out in opposition to the war, then he ought to make it perfectly clear that his views were purely personal and were not the "official views" of an Episcopal spokesman of the Church. Second, others maintained that while it may have been

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid. (Italics mine) [3] Ibid. (Italics mine)

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permissible for the Bishop to advocate pacifism while the nation was neutral, now that the United States was officially at war with Germany, any further pacifist utterances were at least unpatriotic and potentially even disloyal and seditious. They were prepared to allow Bishop Jones to continue to hold his pacifist beliefs, but contended he ought not to advocate them publicly, either as a Bishop or as an individual. Third, when Bishop Jones declined to remain silent about his beliefs, others argued that he should be removed from his jurisdiction because the public proclamation of his minority views were deeply injurious to the work of the Church.

The first of these three arguments arose in response to a speech which Bishop Jones delivered to a gathering of the Socialists of Salt Lake City on the night of March 27, 1917. In his remarks, Bishop Jones attacked those who had spoken at a rally held the previous night in support of American participation in World War I.

In his address, Bishop Jones said that as far as he could determine,

> No adequate reasons were presented by any of the representatives of the state or federal governments for entering into war. There was nothing but an emotional appeal and the people were carried off their feet. There was no appeal for democracy or for suffering humanity in Europe.[1]

The meeting concluded with the adoption of a resolution "protesting against the entrance of the country into war unless the matter be determined by a referendum of the people."[2]

Reaction to the Bishop's statement was swift in coming. Hugh A. McMillin, a vestryman of St. Mark's Cathedral, issued the following statement for publication in the Deseret News.

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[1] "Bishop Jones' Speech," p. 2.

[2] Ibid.

> It should be thoroughly understood by the people of Salt Lake that Bishop Paul Jones, who addressed a session of Socialist-Pacifists last night, that the bishop was speaking merely as an individual, and not in any way as a bishop of the church. . . . I wish the people of this community to know that the thinkers and loyal Americans in the church do not stand behind him in his remarks and would like the Bishop, for the good of the church whom he has been sent to guide, through no choice of its members, to publicly acknowledge over his signature, that his remarks were made as a private individual and that they were intended to cast no insult to the members of the church which he is supposed to have ordained his life to serve.[1]

That same afternoon, March 28, the Dean, Wardens, and Vestry of St. Mark's Cathedral met in special session. At the close of their meeting, they issued a unanimous public statement. This statement sought to establish two facts: first, that the pacifist views of Bishop Jones were not shared by the vast majority of the members of the church; and second, that Bishop Jones' views were not binding upon the church and should not be attributed to the church or to any of its individual members.[2] Their statement concluded with a pledge of support to the President:

> We call upon our President to use his lawful powers to protect the rights, the lives and the liberties of our people on land and sea, and we pledge him thereto our loyal support.[3]

In addition to this public statement, the Dean, Wardens, and Vestry also unanimously adopted the following resolution which was sent to Bishop Jones:

> Resolved, "That the Vestrymen having noticed with keen regret your recent utterances in reference to the present national crisis and particularly the fact that the public press largely attributes your opinions to the Episcopal Church, respectfully request that you issue a statement over your signature to the effect in sub-

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[1] Ibid.

[2] "Churchmen Avow Loyalty - Decry Bishop Jones' Views," p.n.a.

[3] Ibid.

> stance that your opinions are those of an individual and should not by reason of your official position in the Church, be attributed to the Episcopal Church nor to any member thereof."[1]

In a literal sense, the members of St. Mark's Cathedral were at least partially correct. The opinions of an Episcopal bishop are neither legally or morally binding upon the members of the church. By the same token, neither do the opinions of a Bishop necessarily represent the majority of the members of the church. If this was the extent of the clarification which they sought from the Bishop they were correct in their interpretation of the polity of the Episcopal Church.

As the record demonstrates, and as Bishop Jones correctly deduced, however, their request went beyond this simple clarification. What they sought was a disclaimer from Bishop Jones stating that his beliefs concerning the war were purely personal and did not represent his "official" views as a Bishop of the Episcopal Church.

In such a situation, a person's perceptions are often more important and more "real" than the facts themselves. For despite the canonical fact that a Bishop's statements are not binding on the churchmen in his Diocese, for many Episcopalians and for most non-Episcopalians, the Bishop is the personification of the Church in his Diocese. His views on public issues are regarded by many as the teaching of the Church. This great weight accorded the public statements of a Bishop is not established by Canon, it is a product of the prestige of the Episcopal office and the character of the office holder.

What the gentlemen of St. Mark's Cathedral wanted, or in fact demanded, was that Bishop Jones publicly divest himself of this great power latent in his office. There are at least two reasons why Bishop Jones may have chosen not to do so. First, such a statement would have meant disarming himself of his most effective and powerful weapon in his conscientiously motivated attempt to keep America out of the war. Second, it is entirely possible that even had the Bishop made the type of statement which they desired, it would have proved utterly meaningless. To the Mormons, the fine distinction of a Bishop speaking as a private individual and not as a Bishop may well have appeared as a distinction without a difference.

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[1] Vestry of St. Marks's Cathedral to Bishop Jones, March 28, 1917.

Most importantly, Bishop Jones declined to make the statement which the people of the Cathedral demanded because he believed that such a statement would contradict the vow which he took when he was consecrated a Bishop. In a letter of reply to the Vestry of St. Mark's, Bishop Jones said:

> At the time of my consecration, I promised to exercise myself in the Holy Scriptures, and call upon God by prayer for the true understanding of the same. No mention was made of calling upon St. Mark's Vestry for guidance. I also promised to banish and drive away from the Church all erroneous and strange doctrines contrary to God's Word, not necessarily those contrary to the preferences of St. Mark's Vestry. As my stand in the matter of the war is based upon what I believe to be the clear teaching of the Scriptures, you can understand that I feel no necessity to make the statement you request.[1]

Bishop Jones made a very similar point in his pamphlet entitled Christian Loyalty:

> As a Christian Bishop charged with the responsibility of leadership, I would be deserving only of contempt did I remain silent in the present crisis, when the Christian standards of judgment are apparently being entirely ignored. . . . Only when Christian men and women and churches will be brave enough to stand openly for the full truth that their consciences are beginning to

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[1] Bishop Jones to H. A. McMillan, March 30, 1917.

> recognize, will the terrible anachronism of war between Christian nations be done away.[1]

Based upon his understanding of the responsibilities and obligations which his office entailed, Bishop Jones refused to issue the statement desired by his opponents. This conviction was shared by the vast majority of the clergy in Bishop Jones' Missionary District.

In April 1917, the Rev. Maxwell W. Rice of All Souls', Garfield, drafted and circulated the following petition among the clergy:

> We, the undersigned clergy of the Episcopal Church in Utah, wish to correct a current impression that the Bishop of Utah was using more than his proper rights in speaking officially in public on the question of war. While we may not agree with Bishop Jones in regard to his view on this subject, we do emphatically assert that he is not only within his rights but that it is his duty as bishop to speak his convictions on subjects of such vital moral and spiritual consequences to the welfare of our country. We hereby record our disapproval of any attempt to curtail this privilege which the Episcopal Church grants at the consecration and ordination of its bishops and clergy.[2]

With the exception of Dean Fleetwood of St. Mark's Cathedral and the Rev. Mr. Dennis, Rector of St. Paul's Church, Salt Lake City, all but two of the clergy of the Missionary District endorsed the petition.[3] One of these two had not received a copy of the petition, the other said he would sign if "the Bishop wanted him to."[4] Bishop Jones was not, therefore, alone in his decision to decline to offer the type of public disclaimer sought by the people of the Cathedral. He was supported in this decision by an overwhelming majority of the clergy in his Missionary District.

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[1] Paul Jones, "Christian Loyalty," (April 13, 1917), p. 4.

[2] Quoted in Homer Neville Tinker, "The Case of Bishop Jones, Christian," The Churchman, Vol. 148 (July 15, 1934), p. 11.

[3] Maxwell W. Rice to Bishop Tuttle, October 10, 1917.

[4] Ibid.

It should also be noted that the clarification which the gentlemen of St. Mark's sought from the Bishop was one which the supporters of American involvement in the war were unwilling to make themselves. At the meeting of the Synod held in Boise during September, 1917, Dean Fleetwood of St. Mark's Cathedral introduced a resolution "pledging the *bishops* and *clergy* to wholehearted allegiance to country and flag and to do all in their power to save the world for democracy."[1] In his resolution, the Dean apparently did not feel the need to make it explicitly clear whether the support which was being pledged was that of private individuals or of official representatives of the church.

Further, an extensive search of the literature of the period did not uncover one instance in which a clergyman who supported the war prefaced his opinions with the statement that the views which he expressed were only his personal convictions and ought not to be construed as the teaching of a clerical representative of the church.

In fact, once the United States had declared war upon Germany, the leaders of the church took every opportunity to "officially" enlist the church in the support of the government. The Presiding Bishop, the Rt. Rev. Daniel S. Tuttle, concluded his "Message" on the war with this statement:

> It is a time, it seems to me, when we of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States should "gather to the colors" equally with our young men who are pressing to the firing line; and, in our degree and kind and way, with thought and act and sympathy and prayer, as God may appoint, should respond as they to registration and conscription that, under Him, Right may indeed prevail as Might for the safety of nations and for the protection of the sons of men in ways and works of peace.[2]

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[1] "Dispelling a Cloud," *Salt Lake Tribune* (Sept. 25, 1917), p.n.a. (Italics mine).

[2] Daniel S. Tuttle "The Presiding Bishop's Message on the War," *The Living Church*, Vol. 57 (July 14, 1917), p. 3; also in *The Witness*, Vol. 1 (July 21, 1917), p. 1.

The Pastoral Letters of 1917 and 1918 were equally strident in their pledge of support for the government. The Pastoral of 1917 began with these two sentences: "Our nation is at war in behalf of justice, liberty and humanity. When these are in danger, the Church's station is at the front."[1] The opening paragraph of the Pastoral of 1918 read:

> The House of Bishops, meeting in the City of New York, while the great battle which may determine the course of Christian civilization is in progress, declares the unwavering loyalty of the Church, and urges all the clergy and laity to continue to render their entire and zealous obedience to the requests of the Government.[2]

Given the polity and Canons of the Episcopal Church, it was accepted as completely proper and appropriate for a Bishop, in this case the Presiding Bishop, or the Bishops of the Church together, in the case of the Pastoral Letters, to issue such a statement of the Church's ethical position. No one questioned the propriety or legitimacy of these statements. Nor did anyone argue that these statements were legitimate only because, or to the extent that, they agreed with official government policy. It was accepted without any question that "official" representatives of the Church ought to speak out plainly on such momentous ethical issues.

This conclusion, which is based upon a rather extensive survey of the literature of the period, also appears to be born out by the results of a survey conducted in 1952 for the Department of Christian Social Relations of the National Council of the Protestant Episcopal Church by the Bureau of Applied Social Research of Columbia University.[3] The results of the almost 1800 questionnaires which were returned were ably analyzed by Messrs. Glock, Ringer, and Babbie.[1]

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[1] JGC - 1919, p. 503.

[2] JGC - 1919, p. 505.

[3] Charles Y. Glock, Benjamin B. Ringer, and Earl R. Babbie, To Comfort and to Challenge (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), p. vii.

It should be noted that this material is being used with certain reservations. Not the least of these is the fact that the author is neither a trained sociologist or statistician. There is also the question as to whether the results obtained in a survey conducted in 1952 accurately reflect in any way the positions and beliefs of Episcopalians during the period of World War I.

There is no way in which this question can be answered conclusively. There is, however, some tangential and limited evidence to suggest that the attitudes of Episcopalians concerning the propriety of "church" statements on public issues may be fairly stable. The first was a study entitled: The Episcopal Church Today as Seen by Clergymen and Laymen, conducted in 1964 by the Opinion Research Corporation for the Episcopal Church Foundation.[2] The results of this study were based on personal interviews with 201 Episcopal priests and 308 Episcopal laymen.[3] The second was a parish survey of the members of St. Philip's in the Hills Episcopal Parish, Tucson, Arizona, conducted by the author in the Spring of 1976. Of the 1500 questionnaires distributed in this survey, 622 were completed and returned.[4]

Taken together, these two surveys tend to support the results obtained in 1952 and to suggest at least a certain stability in the attitudes and beliefs of Episcopalians on this question. Nonetheless, a great deal of care must be used in the application of this data.

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[1] Ibid., p. 222.

[2] The Episcopal Church Today as Seen by Clergymen and Laymen, (Princeton, New Jersey: Opinion Research Corporation, 1964), p. ii.

[3] Ibid., p. i.

[4] "St. Philip's in the Hills Episcopal Church - Parish Long Range Plan," p. 5.

There is another problem in seeking to interpret the data collected in 1952, in that three of the most significant questions, in terms of this paper, contain a certain irreducible ambiguity. The people questioned were asked to respond as to whether they "agreed," "disagreed," or were "uncertain" concerning these three statements: one, "Aside from preaching, there is little the Church can do about social and economic problems"; two, "The Church should stick to religion and stay out of politics"; and three, "It is proper for the Church to state its position on political issues to the local, state, and national government."[1]

The problem here is with the word "Church". There is unfortunately no way of knowing precisely what definition of the word "Church," those people questioned had in their minds when they responded to these statements. It would appear safe to assume, however, that official messages by the Presiding Bishop, Pastoral Letters, and joint resolutions of the House of Bishops and the House of Deputies would qualify for most Episcopalians as instances, among others, of the "Church" speaking on public issues.

It would also appear plausible to argue that at least the Vestry of St. Mark's believed that most Episcopalians would naturally consider a statement by their Bishop as an expression of the opinions of the "Church." Had they not made this assumption, there would have been no reason for them to demand the public disclaimer of Bishop Jones which they did.

It would seem reasonable to conclude, therefore, that for most

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[1] Glock, To Comfort and to Challenge, pp. 120-122.

Episcopalians, when asked to respond to the three statements presented in the questionnaire, their functional definition of the "Church" included the public statements of Bishops and priests.

The first statement to which they were asked to respond was: "Aside from preaching, there is little the Church can do about social and economic problems."[1] Perhaps the most interesting aspect of this question is the assumption upon which it is based. It was assumed by those who designed the questionnaire, and apparently the assumption was not questioned by the respondents, that the church had a prima facie right and obligation at least to preach about these issues.

If "preaching" were to include the publication of the Bishop's views in writing as well as their oral delivery to a congregation, then that is virtually all that Bishop Jones did in his efforts to prevent American involvement in the war. And if the results obtained in 1952 are in any way applicable to the Episcopal Church in 1914-1918, and it is the author's contention that they are, then it would seem fair to conclude that most Episcopalians assume that Bishops will clearly and publicly state their beliefs on social and economic issues. This contention is further buttressed by the fact that there was virtually no objection raised against the public statements of those Bishops and priests who favored the war. The assumption which underlies this question, and the general acceptance of the right of those churchmen who supported the war to publicly express their beliefs, seems to indicate that Episcopalians expect such statements on social and economic questions from the leaders of their church.

In fact, the results of the questionnaire indicate that most Episcopalians expect that the Church will go beyond mere preaching. Ninety-six percent of the Bishops and priests, and eighty-six percent of the laymen questioned, disagreed with the statement that aside from preaching, there is little the Church can do about social and economic problems.[1] While the questionnaire did not define what the Church might do beyond preaching about these issues, it seems clear that preaching is the minimum response which Episcopalians expect of their Church.

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[1] Ibid., p. 120.

Similarly, when asked to respond to the statement that "the Church should stick to religion and stay out of politics," ninety-four percent of the Bishops, ninety-seven percent of the priests, and seventy-eight percent of the parishioners disagreed.[2] As the authors of the study concluded: "Most Episcopalians agree that the Church has a worthwhile contribution to make in the realm of public affairs and that it should be concerned about making its position known."[3]

When asked to respond to the statement whether "it is proper for the Church to state its position on political issues to the local, state, and national government," the results were less uniform. Seventy-two percent of the priests agreed, twenty percent did not. Forty-six percent of the parishioners agreed, forty-two percent did not.[4] A further question sought to define the types of areas where such statements were acceptable and where they were not. Based on the responses to these two questions, the authors of the report concluded:

> Judging from this evidence, it would appear that the Church can expect the most support from its members when it deals with issues which are manifestly the business of the Church. Somewhat less, though still substantial support is forthcoming to uphold the Church's right in dealing with moral issues, particularly those on which there is consensus regarding the correct stand to be taken. The figures indicate that the Church can expect considerably less support when it ventures into the economic realm.[5]

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid. [3] Ibid. [4] Ibid., p. 121. [5] Ibid., p. 122.

The issue of the morality of American participation in the First World War would certainly fall into one of the first two areas.

To pursue the results and analysis of this survey beyond this point would lead far beyond the confines of this study. Based on these results, and the fact that virtually no objection was raised when those who favored American involvement in the war spoke out "officially" in favor of their beliefs, it seems clear that in refusing to issue the statement demanded by the Vestry of St. Mark's, Bishop Jones was acting well within the parameters of his office. Most Episcopalians appear to expect that their Bishops will speak out clearly and plainly on such important public issues.

The demand of the Vestry of St. Mark's that Bishop Jones state publicly that his views on the war were only his personal sentiments and did not represent the views of an official Episcopal representative of the Church poses an even more basic problem--that is the integrity of the Christian spokesman and his image of the world.

As the "Bayne Report" pointed out, "every Churchman, ordained or unordained, in a sense speaks and acts for the Church in every situation.[1] While the obligations and responsibilities of a student in a confirmation class are far different from those of a Bishop in his diocese, each speaks and acts for the church.

Not only are they all spokesmen for the Chruch, every facet of their life is a response, adequate or otherwise, to the call of Christ. In the services of Holy Baptism and Confirmation, and the Ordination of Deacons, Priests, and Bishops, the Prayer Book continually reaffirms the commitment of all Christians to seek and serve Christ in all persons.

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[1] Theological Freedom and Social Responsibility - Report of the Advisory Committee of the Episcopal Church (New York: The Seabury Press, 1967), pp. 14-15.

It is the author's understanding of the faith of the Episcopal Church that that faith does not permit the division of life into isolated compartments marked "religious" and "secular." Rather, every aspect of a Christian's life is religious in that it is a response to God's love. It is, therefore, the obligation of a Christian to bring this love to bear upon every facet and aspect of his life.

By the same token, it is the goal of the Christian to live in such a manner that every action is an expression of this one faith. As every aspect of one's life is "religious" in this sense, so all the actions and decisions which constitute a life ought to be the expression of one unifying and integrating faith.

To use a rather sermonic example, which may be somewhat out of place in an academic paper such as this, a person ought not to act as a businessman from nine to five; a father from seven to ten; a Democrat on election day, and a Churchman on Sunday. The goal of a Christian is that his activities and decisions in all these times and places be the expression of his Christian faith.

This is precisely the type of integrity and wholeness which the demand of the Vestry of St. Mark's would have denied to Bishop Jones. What they were asking was that in some situations he act as a Bishop and speak in that context and with that authority, and that in other areas he define himself purely as an individual and a private citizen. Had the Bishop acceded to their request, it may well have proved potentially destructive to himself, and would have set a dysfunctional example for the people committed to his care.

The Vestry of St. Mark's requested that Bishop Jones issue a public statement to the effect that his views on the war were purely his personal beliefs and ought not to be considered as representing the official Episcopal views of the Church. Bishop Jones rightly refused to do so. This request by the Vestry of St. Mark's was unjustified for three reasons. First, they and virtually all the other Episcopal supporters of the war were unwilling to preface their statements favoring the war with such an explanation and disclaimer. Second, their request was contrary to the views and expectations of most Episcopalians who were prepared to expect statements on vital public issues from their Bishops. Third, their request contradicted the basic teachings of the Episcopal Church concerning the integrity of belief and action of a Christian.

While Bishop Jones was himself a thoroughgoing pacifist, his short-term goal of keeping the United States out of the First World War was, in fact, an official policy of the nation from the outbreak of the war until April 6, 1917, when the United States Congress officially declared war on Germany. This declaration represented an extremely rapid and radical change in American policy. For despite the long chain of events and the increasingly militant and effective preparedness movement, President Wilson had been reelected only six months previously largely based upon the popular support for the slogan "He kept us out of War."

This shift in American policy left Bishop Jones in a very visible and vulnerable position. When America was still officially neutral, Bishop Jones may well have appeared as a somewhat over-zealous supporter of an idealized form of Christian neutrality which went somewhat beyond the bounds of what was thought to be politically and diplomatically possible. His pacifist beliefs may have been more rigorous than those deemed necessary in the name of a strictly "political" neutrality, but his beliefs were in harmony with those of the Administration and the nation.

With the formal declaration of war, however, the policy of the nation and the beliefs of Bishop Jones were suddenly diametrically opposed. The nation was now engaged in a war which Bishop Jones could not conscientiously support. It must be remembered, however, that it was the policy of the Administration, and not the conscientious beliefs of Bishop Jones which had changed.

Prominent Episcopalians in Utah and throughout the nation were now confronted with a grave problem. Before America had entered the war they had appealed to Bishop Jones to state publicly that his pacifist beliefs were purely personal and did not represent the "official" beliefs of an Episcopal spokesman of the Church. This the Bishop had rightly refused to do. Now they had to try to find some way to deal with a Bishop of the Church who publicly opposed the official policy of his government.

Having failed to persuade the Bishop to issue the disclaimer they sought, they then hoped to convince him that if he could not conscientiously support the government's decision, he should at least refrain from publicly oppposing this policy and remain silent. They believed that Bishop Jones' continued public opposition to the war would damage the Church and perhaps even imperil the nation.

The first to voice this appeal was the Rt. Rev. Daniel S. Tuttle, the Presiding Bishop. In a letter dated September 28, 1917, he appealed to Bishop Jones:

> Let me submit to your thoughtful consideration that under these circumstances the Saviour's call may well come home to you: "Be ye wise as serpents." And in the exercise of wisdom which He commands, is there not a call to you to forego for a time your

> activities in pacific and sociological lines, postponing them till the war and the nation's peril be over and past.[1]

Bishop Tuttle's appeal for restraint was picked up by the national church periodicals, and expanded to include all pacifists who felt obliged to speak out against the war. For The Churchman and The Living Church the issue was the proper balance between the right of free speech on the one hand, and the survival of the nation on the other.

The passage of the Espionage Act of 1917 demonstrated that the government had weighed the competing values of freedom of speech and national survival and had found in favor of the latter.[2] While none of the church periodicals commented upon this legislation specifically, they did offer general support for the government's decision.

In an editorial of September 22, 1917, The Churchman clearly stated its approval:

> No sacrifice of the war comes harder to the American than does that of free speech. Our pacifist friends are taking very hard this infringement of the rights of some of our people whose purpose seems to the Government to be hostile to an effective conduct of the war. . . . They seem to be more deeply concerned over the sacrifice of free speech among a few citizens of doubtful loyalty than over the suppression of the enemy. . . . The American tongue will not be asked to endure very long an infringement on its rights. Democracy is not going to suffer from this temporary restriction and a little rest will prove wholesome to the tongue.[3]

Like the editors of The Churchman, The Living Church agreed that in this time of crisis, freedom of speech must be subordinated to the need of the nation for complete unity in the prosecution of the war:

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[1] Quoted in Homer Neville Tinker, "The Case of Bishop Jones, Christian," The Churchman, Vol. 148 (Aug. 1, 1934), p. 15.

[2] Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Free Speech in the United States (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1942), p. 39.

[3] "The Tongue's Right," The Churchman, Vol. 116 (Sept. 22, 1917), p. 358.

> When, therefore, men who by their utterances cause embarrassment to the government, in its present duty to make war, defend themselves by relying upon the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech, they forget that this principle may require correlation with some other principle. . . . Freedom of speech, like every other sort of freedom in God's universe, must be modified by one's duty toward God and toward his neighbor. It is not an absolute right. It is a principle that must, at times be made secondary while some other principle becomes primary.[1]

The Living Church did, however, distinguish between two types of criticism, one which was justifiable, one which was not. The latter type of criticism included any questioning of the motives or intentions of the United States' participation in the war. The Living Church was particularly enraged by any "allegation that the United States entered into war (a) to preserve capitalism, or (b) to protect the investments of the great investors in Anglo-French securities."[2] For this type of criticism, The Living Church had no sympathy whatever, and anyone who uttered such statements "deserves the execration of his fellow-man--and gets it."[3] They went on to say:

> No sort of appeal to the right of freedom of speech can absolve that man from the crime of rendering aid and comfort to the public enemy in time of war. Nor are we interested in inquiring whether that is his intention, or only incidental to a warped mental perspective such as alone could make the allegation even possible. To stand before God and the world in this awful day of war and declare that the American people have taken their stand by reason of evil motives is the crowning act of infamy that turns a man into a traitor.[4]

There was another type of criticism which The Living Church was prepared to support. Into this acceptable category fell The Living Church's own criticism of the Department of Food Administration:

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[1] "Free Speech and Responsibility," The Living Church, Vol. 57 (Oct. 27, 1917), p. 283.

[2] Ibid. [3] Ibid. [3] Ibid., p. 824.

> . . . for starting a plan requiring the cooperation of the organizations of the Church and then abandoning it without the slightest word of explanation to those who were trying loyally to carry out the plan, and failing even to answer letters relating to it.[1]

The editors believed that this type of criticism was permissible and even valuable because it was designed to "point out faults of administration in the hope that these may be corrected. . . ."[2]

While it is somewhat unclear into which of these two categories the continued pacifist statements of Bishop Jones would have fallen, they certainly seem closer to the former than the latter. For while Bishop Jones was not primarily concerned with the motives which led to American intervention, he was, as a Christian pacifist, concerned to bring that American participation to an end, and not desirous of simply making America a more effective combatant. Therefore, The Living Church's final denunciation of those who criticized American policy would probably have included Bishop Jones:

> He who maligns the motives of his country in entering into war is a traitor to his country and to his God. He who puts obstructions in the way of the government in winning the war is guilty of sedition. These may no more rely for their defense upon the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech than the burglar, caught in the act of robbery, can plead "liberty" as his justification.[3]

The Pastoral Letter of 1917 supported the same conclusion in almost equally strident terms:

> Our nation is at war in behalf of justice, liberty and humanity. When these are in danger, the Church's station is at the front.
>
> When the nation has with solemn deliberation entered war, voices which have spoken for neutrality, non-resistance or pacifism are silenced. We hate war, and shrink from its horrors, but we who have enjoyed the privileges of civil liberty won by the blood of our fathers must, when they are endangered, defend them at the cost of our blood. In the overthrow of injustice and inhumanity is the only hope of permanent peace. Loyalty demands

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid. [3] Ibid.

> of every citizen unconditional consecration to the service of the nation.[1]

To this point, the church periodicals and the Pastoral Letters were simply giving their support to the principle that there were situations, such as the one in which the United States then found itself, when the constitutional guarantee of free speech must give way before the greater good of the nation's survival. In an editorial of October 6, 1917, The Churchman applied this principle directly to Bishop Jones.

After lauding Bishop Jones' courage, the editorial proceeded to take direct issue with the Bishop's continued pacifist statements:

> What strikes us in the attitude of Bishop Jones and some other pacifists is their audacity. Liberty of opinion is certainly an inalienable right in a democracy. Liberty of speech is not such a right. We may not like it, but the surrender of privilege is the price we pay for things we value. The fact confronts us that we cannot all say what we think in this critical hour.[2]

What particularly irritated The Churchman was that the pacifists, "with a stubbornness that seems to us to approach mental derangement" refuse to face the facts.[3] The facts being, for The Churchman, that "nobody except the pacifist has time or desire for such a debate now."[4]

> We affirm that this is not the time to debate pacifism, not because we fear that free speech might result in a verdict against the Government but because sane people can do only one thing at the present time, and that is to fight. There isn't time to convince the academic pacifist who thinks he has Gospel authority for non-resistance. When a race instinct runs counter to our interpretation of a disputed text one had better think twice before one deserts the instinct. We think there is no Gospel warrant for non-resistance; but that interesting debate can, without damage to the nation, be postponed until after the war.[5]

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[1] JGC - 1919, p. 503.

[2] "Bishop Jones' Reply," The Churchman, Vol. 116 (Oct. 6, 1917), p. 243.

[3] Ibid. [4] Ibid. [5] Ibid.

Lest anyone misinterpret The Churchman's stance, they repeated their conclusion:

> As to the question whether men ought ever to fight, we must dismiss that academic problem with the assertion that just now we propose to fight to defend them as well as ourselves that we may make our land a worthy place for self-respecting people to call their country.[1]

In its editorial, The Churchman was actually making two distinct, although related, points. The first is the implicit notion that to be effective, the ethical obligation of the Christian faith must coincide, or at least parallel, the pre-existing beliefs of the people to whom the Church is preaching. In the editorial cited above, the operative sentence is: "When a race instinct runs counter to our interpretation of a disputed text one had better think twice before one deserts the instinct."[2] That was no off-hand remark as evidenced by a statement in an editorial which had appeared in The Churchman almost two years before:

> Religion must be taught in terms which men can understand and follow. Any religion which goes counter to that which a man knows in his heart will fall on deaf ears. Any Church which teaches such a religion will have little influence on the world.[3]

To accept The Churchman's premises would be to undermine completely the teaching of the Old Testament prophets, and the witness of many of the great martyrs of the Church. The scope of this inquiry does not permit any full-scale analysis of the Old Testament prophets,[4] but one brief excursus seems obligatory.

I Kings 22:2-28 tells of the deliberations of Jehoshaphat and Ahab as they prepared to go forth into battle at Ramoth-gilead. Having determined between themselves to go to war, Jehoshaphat and Ahab sought confirmation of the wisdom of their decision from the "prophets" of the Court. Four hundred prophets were summoned, and they were asked whether the Kings should go against Ramoth-gilead or not. And they all answered: "Go up; for the Lord shall deliver it into the hand of the King."[1]

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid.

[3] "The Attitude of Christian Men Toward National Armament," The Churchman, Vol. 112 (Dec. 25, 1915), p. 814.

[4] See Gerhard Von Rad, Old Testament Theology, Vol. II (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1965).

Seemingly not content with the unanimous benediction of their plan, Ahab asked Jehoshaphat if there was not yet another prophet of whom they might inquire. Jehoshaphat replied there was one, Micaiah, the son of Imlah, but that he hated Micaiah because Micaiah never prophesied good concerning the King.

The messengers sent to summon Micaiah warned him that the other four hundred prophets had all spoken well of the proposed assault and adjured Micaiah to do the same, to which Micaiah replied: "As the Lord liveth, what the Lord saith unto me, that will I speak."[2]

When he arrived at the Court, Micaiah at first confirmed the prophecy of the four hundred, then warned by the King that he wanted only the truth, Micaiah told them that the Lord had told him that the Kings would be defeated at Ramoth-gilead. Enraged by this authentic prophecy, Ahab had Micaiah thrown in jail until he and Jehoshaphat should return victorious from the battle.

The reaction of Ahab and Jehoshaphat to the word of the lone prophet who spoke out against their planned endeavor was not unlike that of The Churchman and The Living Church. They believed that once the nation had decided to engage in war it was the proper function of the Church to support the policy of the government. The four hundred prophets who supported the Kings would probably have agreed that a religion which "goes counter to that which a man knows in his heart will fall on deaf ears."[1]

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[1] I Kings 22:7.

[1] I Kings 22:14.

It may well be true that a religion which speaks out against what people feel, may find little public support. But this does not ethically absolve the spokesmen of the religion of their responsibility to preach the word of God, regardless of the response which it receives. It is the function of a true religion to point beyond mere culturally accepted norms to a higher level of transcendent truth. In his description of Micaiah, Reinhold Niebuhr makes this point explicitly.

> One is that there was, even in this early tribal religion, an occasional apprehension of the profound religious truth that God is not simply the sum total of the highest social values, and that therefore the word of God must frequently be spoken against the community and king, and not for them. It was this insight which the later eighth-century prophets elaborated, so that their religion ceased to be the religion of a tribe and became the revelation of the will of a transcendent God, spoken to and against all nations. We do not know whether Micaiah had any adequate test for distinguishing between the ultimate word of God and human prejudices. Perhaps he did not have. We only know that he honestly believed in such a word and felt himself in possession of it.[2]

Therefore, the first contention of the editors of The Churchman and The Living Church that to be effective, the ethical obligations of the Christian faith must coincide, or at least parallel, the pre-existing beliefs of the people to whom the Church is preaching, would appear to be without Biblical justification.

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[1] "The Attitude of Christian Men," p. 814.

[2] Reinhold Niebuhr, Beyond Tragedy (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1965), pp. 81-82.

Their second argument appears to have been that in a democracy, especially, when the nation has legally and constitutionally decided upon a particular policy, it is certainly unpatriotic, and potentially disloyal for anyone to question that policy or to oppose it. This argument may be developed in either of two parallel ways.

One argument was put forth by Bishop Lines of Newark. In an article in The Churchman, he argued that,

> . . . any man who has been willing, with a perfectly cheerful conscience, to sit down and enjoy the blessings of liberty, peace and prosperity in a free and reunited country--blessings which have been won for him by previous wars and blood of others--has no ground for conscientious objection to a succeeding war necessary to preserve these very blessings for him and the rest of mankind.[1]

This argument is not as simply transparent as it might at first appear. Ethically, the knowing acceptance of the benefits of someone else's action does create a *prima facie* obligation to reciprocate.[2]

Bishop Jones and the other pacifists may have answered this argument in at least two ways. First, Bishop Jones may well have believed that his continued outspoken opposition to the policy of the nation was, in fact, a service to the nation. From his perspective, the course upon which the nation had embarked was inimical to the goals and Christian principles upon which the nation was founded. As a loyal citizen, he felt obligated to use every legal means at his disposal to try to reverse this course which he believed would irreparably damage the nation which, as a recipient of its protection and benefits, he was obligated to protect. It was precisely through his oposition that Bishop Jones believed he was serving his country.

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[1] Edwin S. Lines, "The Conscientious Objector," The Churchman, Vol. 116 (Aug. 18 1917), p. 211.

[2] W. D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1946), p. 21.

Second, Bishop Jones could have argued that the implicit contract which existed between himself and the government was one which had specific limitations. The limitations of what the government may legitimately require of its citizens are set forth in the Constitution. This "contract" specifically proscribes any attempt by the Government to curtail the right of free speech by its citizens.

This guarantee of the First Amendment is not absolute. It has been made more specific by Congressional action and interpreted by Supreme Court decisions. Had Bishop Jones violated his "contract" with the government by stepping beyond the bounds of the Constitutional protection of free speech, he could have been prosecuted by the government. Because the government had found no such grounds upon which to bring prosecution, Bishop Jones seemed justified in his belief that he had not abrogated the implicit contract between the government and its citizens. As Professor Drown of the Episcopal Theological School said:

> If Bishop Jones has offended against the law of the land, he may be convicted of and punished for that offense. But until he is so convicted he has a right to hold and teach views that are not inconsistent with the doctrines of the Church.[1]

From the standpoint of the government, if not that of the church periodicals, Bishop Jones' opposition remained within the parameters of acceptable conduct on the part of a loyal citizen.

The more general argument of Bishop Jones' opponents was that in this hour of national crisis, if Bishop Jones could not support the government's policy, he should at least remain silent. Before turning to Bishop Jones' response to this argument, it should be pointed out again, that those who supported American participation in the war had not seen fit to apply it to themselves.

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[1] Edward S. Drown, "Bishop Jones and the Special Commission," The Churchman, Vol. 117 (Jan. 5, 1918), p. 30.

From the outbreak of the war in August 1914 until April 1917, the United States was officially neutral. Yet those Episcopalians who wanted America to come to the aid of Great Britain did not refrain from speaking out in favor of their beliefs, despite the fact that these beliefs were in opposition to the policy of the government.

As early as his Thanksgiving Day sermon of 1914, the Rev. William T. Manning, Rector of Trinity Parish, was actively agitating for a radical change in American policy.[1] In his opposition to the neutral policy of the government, he received support from the Rev. Randolph E. McKim, and the Rev. Ernest M. Stires.

None of these gentlemen seemed the least inhibited by the fact that the policies they advocated were directly contrary to the policy of the government. In fact, in an article in the July 1, 1916, issue of The Living Church, Mr. McKim went so far as to argue that it was the duty of a citizen to directly challenge the policy of the government:

> May not the American people learn from this example over the water that the words and actions of our politicians should be very keenly scrutinized? That their motives should be carefully weighed? That the people should investigate for themselves the real condition of the country; and should study the state of the world and judge for themselves what are the dangers to which the country is exposed? And should they not, if necessary, in defiance of the counsel of politicians, demand that thorough and adequate preparation should be made by land and sea against any possible invasion?[2]

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[1] William T. Manning, "Thanksgiving Day Sermon," The Southern Churchman, Vol. 79 (Dec. 12, 1914), p. 5.

[2] Randolph H. McKim, "A Lesson in Preparedness from Recent English History," The Living Church, Vol. 55 (July 1, 1916), p. 316.

Surely this is an example of a citizen directly opposing the official policy of the government, yet no critic arose to enjoin Mr. McKim to cease and desist. Nor did Mr. McKim believe that he was in any way violating the implicit contract which existed between himself and the government, or that he was detracting from the loyalty which the government might rightly expect of its citizens.

Bishop Jones, however, was quite prepared to answer in his own defense. In his address to the 1917 meeting of the House of Bishops, he directly responded to the advice contained in Bishop Tuttle's letter, that although he had a right to his personal convictions and could not rightly be expected to act contrary to them, he could at least remain silent until the war was safely over.

Bishop Jones said he approached this suggestion cautiously, for he realized that such a course "does not always involve moral turpitude."[1] But in the end he was forced to reject the Presiding Bishop's advice.

> As perhaps some of you have said, that no red-blooded man who loves his country can be indifferent to its call at this time and must do his bit wherever his service will count, so I believe that no red-blooded man who believes that war is unchristian can be indifferent to that higher loyalty, and must do what he can to work for the ideals which he believes to be supreme.[2]

For Bishop Jones, his continued determination to speak out forcefully in opposition to a policy which he regarded as unchristian was a question of loyalty. He felt an obligation of loyalty to his fellow pacifists who looked to him as their spiritual leader and most effective spokesman.

In his response to Bishop Tuttle's letter, Bishop Jones argued that he must continue to speak out, not only for himself but "for hundreds and perhaps thousands of people in the Church" who looked to him for comfort and support.

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[1] Paul Jones, "Statement Presented by Bishop Jones to a Committee of the House of Bishops, October 18, 1917," reprinted in The Social Preparation, Vol. 5 (April 1918), p. 8.

[2] Ibid.

> Many of these people are heartsick because they feel that the Church is not being true to her Divine commission of preaching the love of God among men, and I feel that I have a duty to them if nothing more, to make them feel that there is still a place in the Church for those who believe that that is the meaning of the Gospel.[2]

Even more importantly, it was Bishop Jones' loyalty to his Christian conscience and his ordination vows which compelled him to continue to voice his pacifist beliefs. In his address to the Convocation of the Missionary District of Utah in 1917, Bishop Jones made his position perfectly clear.

> The Episcopal Church has been divinely guided, I believe, in placing the large emphasis on conscience. It has made no rules for its members and it does not expect its priests to tell the people what they must do; but it has rightly felt that real character can be achieved only when the individual conscience is stirred to seek the attainment of a certain ideal. That puts the burden on the priest of striving to stir the sluggish consciences, and leaves it to the layman to respond or not to the impulse given. It means too, that the earnest priest will often preach unpleasant things, hard to hear, if he wishes to lead his people on to higher things. Do not misunderstand me. I have no thought of saying that because what is preached is unpalatable it must therefore be the true gospel. That of course does not follow; but those things which we all need must inevitably be difficult to assimilate at first. We clergy must then preach according to the light that has been given us with the hope of leading men on to the goal which we all desire. To ask that a priest or bishop modify or emasculate his preaching of the gospel, as some would do, is to strike at the one ground of hope that we have for continued upward progress in the Christian faith. It is because we clergy hold responsible positions in the Church that we must be ready to speak out on vital questions and expect others to do the same, and thus protect the right of fearless conscientious preaching both for ourselves individually and for those whose views may be exactly opposite.[3]

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[1] Paul Jones to Daniel S. Tuttle, September 28, 1917, Archives, Church Historical Society, Austin, Texas, p. 1.

[2] Ibid.

[3] *J.C. - 1917*, p. 13.

As a conscientious pacifist and as a Bishop of the Episcopal Church, Bishop Jones rightly believed that he had no alternative but to continue to speak out in defense of his beliefs and to try, thereby, to change the policy of the American government. To have done otherwise would have been to betray his own conscience and to repudiate his ordination vows.

Bishop Jones' opponents first demanded that he publicly state that his pacifist views were purely his personal convictions and were not the "official" views of an Episcopal spokesman for the Church. Based upon his proper understanding of the role and responsibilities of a Bishop in the Episcopal Church, Bishop Jones declined to issue such a statement. When America entered the war, his opponents sought to convince him that if he could not conscientiously support the government in this endeavor, he could at least remain silent and not speak out in opposition. As a Christian and a Bishop, Bishop Jones felt that he must continue to speak out against a war which he believed to be unchristian.

With America now at war, and having failed to persuade the Bishop on either of these two points, his opponents demanded that he resign from his jurisdiction because they believed that his continued presence and outspokenness would do irreparable damage to the Church in Utah.

This argument was made most forcefully in the "Petition from the Council of Advice of the Missionary District of Utah to the House of Bishops." The petition read in part:

> These, and a multitude of other circumstances of a similar nature, have exasperated the citizens of Utah, and the people of the Church, and have created an atmosphere of hostility which bodes ill for the Church.
>
> He [Bishop Jones] has ceased to be in any real sense a leader of his flock and is openly repudiated on every hand. The

> Church has become an object of suspicion and Church people throughout the State are covered with shame and confusion. The outlook for the future appears very dark, because so deep seated and widespread is the opposition towards himself, that it is difficult to see how he can possibly regain his influence.[1]

When the House of Bishops responded to this petition by appointing a special committee to fully investigate the matter, the members of the Council of Advice protested strongly that this proposed course of action was not sufficient. They believed that only the prompt removal of Bishop Jones could restore the Missionary District. In their telegram to the House of Bishops, they stated:

> Press dispatches state Bishops consider Bishop Jones indiscreet rather than disloyal and that he will remain as Bishop of Utah. Our protest goes deeper. His usefulness is at an end. Either he must withdraw or the District of Utah for many years will be irreparably injured and disgraced.[2]

This final argument which the Council of Advice mustered against Bishop Jones proved convincing to the three-man commission appointed to investigate the situation in Utah. In their unanimous report, Bishops Tuttle, Kinsolving, and Langley stated their "unanimous conviction" that

> . . . the utterances and associations of the Bishop of Utah had impaired his influence for promoting the peace and welfare of the Church in Utah to such a degree as virtually to destroy it.[3]

In response to the unanimous recommendation of the Commission that he resign, Bishop Jones addressed a series of questions to the Commission in the hope of further elucidating the grounds upon which their conclusion was based. When the Bishop inquired if the Commission had been convinced that he had "affiliated with seditious organizations" or "persistently promulgated unpatriotic doctrines," the Commission could only respond that he had affiliated with "questionable organizations and that he had "on occasions" promulgated such doctrines.[1]

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[1] Council of Advice, Missionary District of Utah, Petition to the House of Bishops, October 11, 1917, Archives, Church Historical Society, Austin, Texas, p. 2.

[2] Telegram, Council of Advice et al. to House of Bishops, October 19, 1917, Archives, Diocese of Utah, Salt Lake City.

[3] "Report of Commission in re Bishop Jones of Utah," December 12, 1917, Archives, Church Historical Society, Austin, Texas, p. 2

When, however, Bishop Jones asked if he had "injured the life of the Church in Utah and elsewhere," the Commission responded directly: Yes, it seems to the Commission that you have injured the life of the Church in Utah and elsewhere."[2] The Commission finally concluded that:

> It seems abundantly manifest that an end has come to the usefulness of the Bishop of Utah in his present field, and that no earnestness or effort on his part would suffice to regain it.[3]

The Commission, therefore, recommended that Bishop Jones resign his jurisdiction within three months.[4] This conclusion was reaffirmed in the edited version of the Report which was submitted to the House of Bishops on April 10, 1918.[5]

This argument also proved convincing to both the press in Utah and to at least two of the national church periodicals. In an editorial of October 12, 1917, the Salt Lake Herald Republican opined that Bishop Jones is expected to lead the Church in Utah, but that he cannot do so "if he drives from him, by fanatical personal prejudice, the very people who constitute the church."[6] The editorial concluded:

> His advisers demand his resignation, which would seem the more respectable way for the man whose personal views mean more to

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[1] "Report of Commission in re Case of Bishop Jones of Utah," December 12, 1917, Archives, Church Historical Society, Austin, Texas, p. 1.

[2] Ibid., p. 3. [3] Ibid. [4] Ibid. [4] Ibid.

[6] "Ceases to Be Useful," Salt Lake City Herald Republican, October 12, 1917, p.n.a.

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> him than the future of his diocese. Bishop Jones can retain his position in the face of the demands which been urged upon him, but he cannot retain the power and influence which alone can make his administration successful. Without them he cannot have the sympathy of his flock and without that he is of little value to his church.[1]

In its editorial concerning the Report of the Commission, The Living Church concurred in their decision that Bishop Jones should now be "relieved of his jurisdiction, 'for the good of the service,' as the like necessity is expressed in the army."[2] They were saddened to conclude that Bishop Jones "has thrown away an opportunity to serve, at a time when Church and State need well-balanced men almost more than they were ever needed before."[3]

In a similar vein, The Southern Churchman contended that the real issue involved in the debate over Bishop Jones' continued tenure in Utah was not the Bishop's pacifist opinions, "nor yet his right to hold his opinions, or holding to preach them".[4] The issue was rather, holding these opinions as he did, should he remain Bishop of Utah, "or whether the welfare of the Church in that jurisdiction and a due regard for her consistency in teaching and harmony in action required his resignation and removal."[5] The Southern Churchman concluded that these considerations made Bishop Jones' prompt resignation absolutely necessary.[6]

It would appear, therefore, that the real issue which compelled the Church to ask for and accept Bishop Jones' resignation was not his refusal to publicly state that his pacifist convictions were purely his personal views and not the "official" views of an Episcopal spokesman for the Church; neither was the issue the Bishop's continued outspoken support of his pacifist beliefs. The issue which brought about the resignation of Bishop Jones was the conviction that his continued presence and public defense of pacifist convictions would irreparably damage the work of the Church in Utah.

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[1] Ibid.

[2] "Bishop Jones," The Living Church, Vol. 58 (Dec. 29, 1917), p. 290.

[3] Ibid.

[4] "House of Bishops in Session," The Southern Churchman, Vol. 83 (April 13, 1918), p. 5.

[5] Ibid. [6] Ibid.

It is somewhat ironic that of the three issues raised against Bishop Jones, this is the one which would prove decisive. For of the three issues, this was the one which could be empirically tested.

In fact this is precisely what the Council of Advice attempted to do to buttress their case against Bishop Jones. On October 25, 1917, a letter was sent from a member of the Council to the Rectors and Vicars of the various parishes and missions in the District. The letter asked each recipient:

> Will you give me a statement, your own and that of any other people of your City that you feel would represent the feeling of your locality, of facts that you know as to the activities and statements of Bishop Jones, and also as to just what the atmosphere or feeling of the City is regarding Bishop Jones and the action taken by the Council of Advice and the House of Bishops.[1]

While this request may seem unbiased, the direction in which the authors hoped to lead the responses was made somewhat clearer in the sentence which immediately followed:

> We know that it is a hard thing for any of you to act against a friend, especially one who has been so fine a friend as Bishop Jones, but this is a time when personal feelings must be put in

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[1] Draft of a letter dated October 25, 1917. It is addressed: "Dear_______," and is not signed. Archives, Diocese of Utah, Salt Lake City.

> the background and the good of the Church in the District and the needs and good of the nation brought forward.[1]

Clearly, what the members of the Council were trying to do was to gather evidence which would support their contention that Bishop Jones' continued tenure in Utah would seriously injure the Church. This endeavor failed. The responses were almost uniformly in support of Bishop Jones and in opposition to the action taken by the Council of Advice. The only letters which supported the Council were from Mr. Hubert Richards[2] and Mr. A. P. Reid,[3] both of Springville, Utah.

The Council was rebuffed by: the Vestry of Good Shepherd, Ogden;[4] the Rev. Maxwell W. Rice, Vicar of All Souls' Church, Garfield;[5] the Rev. J. Wesley Twelves, Vicar of St. Paul's Church and Lodge, Vernal;[6] the Rev. Edwin T. Lewis, Vicar of St. John's House, Logan;[7] and the Rev. Hoyt E. Henriques, Vicar of St. John's Salt Lake City.[8]

The Council had sent out its letter hoping to gain additional support for its contention that Bishop Jones ought to be forced to resign.

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Hubert Richards to J. B. Scholefield, October 30, 1917, Archives, Diocese of Utah, Salt Lake City.

[3] A. P. Reid to the Advisory Board of the Episcopal Church in Utah, October 27, 1917, Archives, Diocese of Utah, Salt Lake City.

[4] George W. Parlow to Dean Fleetwood, October 31, 1917, Archives, Diocese of Utah, Salt Lake City.

[5] Maxwell W. Rice to Dean Fleetwood, October 29, 1917, Archives, Diocese of Utah, Salt Lake City.

[6] J. Wesley Twelves to William F. Bulkey, October 27, 1917, Archives, Diocese of Utah, Salt Lake City.

[7] Edwin T. Lewis to the Council of Advice, October 28, 1917, Archives, Diocese of Utah, Salt Lake City.

[8] Hoyt E. Henriques to J. W. Thompson, November 2, 1917, Archives, Diocese of Utah, Salt Lake City.

This endeavor had clearly failed. Based on a study of the responses which were preserved in the Archives, the parishes and missions of the District were not convinced that the Bishop had irreparably damaged the Church in the Missionary District, or that he should be removed from office. In fact, most of the responses expressed the belief that although Bishop Jones' pacifist convictions were regrettable, his removal would do even greater damage to the Church.

Further evidence that Bishop Jones' pacifist statements and activities had not damaged the work of the Church in Utah may be found in an examination of the annual reports of the Missionary District.

	Parishes & Missions	Communicants	Baptisms	Confirmations	Disbursements
1914	24	1426	160	62	$16,513.68
1915	23	1434	197	99	19,838.85
1916	27	1445	175*	69*	18,671.45
1917	27	1461	147	105	17,851.21
1918	27	1446	85	44	14,452.01**
			(128)	(66)	(21,679.51)
1920	24	1420	92	39	36,945.32***

Notes:

* At the time of the reports, two of the three parishes and one mission congregation had not yet reported their Baptisms and Confirmations for the year.

** The date of the annual report had been changed in 1918, so the figures represent only two-thirds of a year. If they are projected for the full year, Baptisms would have been 128; Confirmations would have been 66; and total disbursements $21,679.51.

*** In 1920 the accounting procedures used to compile the amount of total disbursements were changed to include the income and disbursements of Diocesan institutions, such as hospitals and schools which had not previously been included.

This evidence clearly disproves the contention of the Council of Advice and the House of Bishops that Bishop Jones' outspoken pacifist convictions had damaged the Church in Utah. It had not. In 1918, when

Bishop Jones resigned, he left behind three more missions in the District than had been there when he was consecrated. The number of communicants had increased. While the number of baptisms had decreased, he had confirmed more people in 1918 than he had in his first year as Bishop. And the Missionary District had prospered financially. This is especially true, when one considers the various bond drives and charitable appeals which were conducted during the war, and which would have placed a heavy burden on the financial resources of the Episcopalians in Utah.

Nor did the resignation of Bishop Jones bring about a sharp upturn in the fortunes of the District. In 1920, the District reported fewer parishes and missions, fewer communicants, fewer baptisms and fewer confirmations than it had in 1916. As these figures do not demonstrate that Bishop Jones had damaged the Church in Utah, neither do they show that his removal and replacement had a positive effect.

Bishop Jones' opponents believed that his continued presence and outspoken opposition to the war was doing serious damage to the Church, and that he ought, therefore, to be removed. It was on the basis of this contention that the Commission called for, and the House of Bishops accepted, his resignation. In point of fact, the argument was simply not true.

The argument of the Council of Advice was factually untrue. It was also based on a highly questionable theological assumption. They appear to have assumed that it was the obligation of a Bishop to build up the Church in some way which could be empirically or statistically verified.

Virtually every priest or Bishop feels a distinct pressure to make his parish or diocese "grow." Growth in this sense is usually defined in terms which can be numerically measured, such as the number of members or communicants, the number of baptisms and confirmations, and the parish budget. Whether they would theologically accept this standard or not, most priests feel that they receive their "report card" twice a year: once when the annual fund drive is complete, and once when the annual report is compiled.

Because "growth" in these terms can be measured, this is the standard which appears generally to be accepted as the yardstick of how well the priest or Bishop is fulfilling his responsibilities. This would appear to have been the standard which the Council of Advice used as the basis for their unfounded contention that Bishop Jones was damaging the Church in his Missionary District.

Within the past twenty years several excellent books have been published which challenge the value and validity of this standard of growth.[1] An examination of their varied arguments would lead far beyond the scope of this paper. One radically different view of the Church and its ministry deserves at least a brief mention as a complete contrast to this commonly accepted notion of "growth."

This is the idea of the saving remnant. As Von Rad convincingly argues, the origins of the concept of the remnant are not to be found in "the religious or cultic sphere, but in civil life."[2]

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[1] See Harvey Cox, The Secular City (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1965).

Glock, et al, To Comfort and to Challenge.

Charles Y. Glock, Rodney Stark, Religion and Society in Tension (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1965).

James D. Smart, The Cultural Subversion of the Biblical Faith (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1977).

William Stringfellow, An Ethic for Christians and other Aliens in a Strange Land (Waco, Texas: Work Books, Publishers, 1973).

Gibson Winter, The Suburban Captivity of the Churches (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1962).

[2] Von Rad, Theology of the Old Testament, Vol. II, p. 22.

> At the time when the concept came into being, warfare aimed in principle at total annihilation. Very often, however, the enemy was not utterly wiped out, and in such cases a remnant remained. . . . In general the fate of a remnant was wretched. If it managed to escape dispersal, or eviction, or death from starvation, it was still condemned to complete political insignificance. Sometimes of course, a remnant became the nucleus of a people's rebirth. A remnant which remains therefore can be a stricken nation's badge of hope, and because of this, was always carefully watched by other nations.[1]

The concept of a remnant is, therefore, highly ambivalent. Negatively, it implies the dire straights of a few remaining survivors of a crushed and oppressed people: "As the shepherd snatches from the mouth of the lion a pair of legs or an ear of his sheep, so the Israelites who dwell in Samaria shall escape."[2] There is, however, a positive significance to the concept of a remnant. In several places in the "J" material the idea of a remnant appears in this vein:

> Noah and his sons are simply a remnant preserved: Lot and his family are the same, a remnant escaped from Sodom: Jacob divided his possessions in such a way that, if the worst came to the worst, the company which was left might be a "remnant which escaped": and in a solemn hour Joseph declared to his brethren that the reason why Jahweh had led him in the strange way he had was "in order to preserve a remnant on earth and to keep you alive as a great remnant which escaped.[3]

The author of "J" used the concept of a remnant to "explain Jahweh's paradoxical designs in history."[4] To this, Elijah added the idea that Jahweh would also preserve such a remnant "from calamities which are still to come and which Jahweh himself is to bring about."[5]

It was in this more "positive" sense that the later prophets picked up the concept of the remnant as the basis of the future hope of Israel. The travails and tragedies which beset the nation came to be viewed as "a discipline, a purge by which Yahweh would remove the dross in the national character, leaving a chastened and purified people.[1]

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[1] Ibid., pp. 21-22.

[2] Amos 3:12.

[3] Von Rad, Theology of the Old Testament, Vol. II, p. 22.

[4] Ibid. [5] Ibid.

The remnant became the subject of the hope for Israel's future.[2] It would emerge from its ordeal purified and turned completely toward God.[3] Even though the remnant would be scattered among the nations, God would call them, and reunite them and return them to the land of the fathers.[4]

Here is offered a radically different picture of the people of God, or the Church. Here the criteria of success are certainly not the number of communicants or the record of annual disbursements. The sole criterion is the quality of the religious and ethical life of the people and their faith in and reliance upon God.

If this is an acceptable alternative definition of the function and purpose of the Church, and Biblically it would appear to be, then the criticism raised against Bishop Jones is not only empirically unsupportable, it is irrelevant. Statistical growth ought not to be the sole, or even dominant, criterion of the Church's "success." She has an obligation to preach the Word of God, regardless of its impact on her membership roles or financial statements. By fearlessly preaching the Word of God as he understood it, Bishop Jones fulfilled his obligations as a Christian and a Bishop and sought to lead a small remnant in the Church in their efforts to proclaim the Word of God as they were given to understand it.

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[1] John Bright, A History of Israel (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1959).

[2] Isaiah 4:3 and 6:13.

[3] Isaiah 10:20-21.

[4] Isaiah 11:11, Micah 2:12, and Zechariah 8:6-12.

While it is questionable whether any of the members of the Advisory Committee of the Episcopal Church which issued the document entitled Theological Freedom and Social Responsibility, had ever heard of Bishop Paul Jones of the Missionary District of Utah, their conclusion certainly ratified his belief as to the true calling of the Church:

> God makes men free. It does not behoove His Church to try to hobble their minds or inhibit their search for new insights into truth. The Church not only should tolerate but should actively encourage free and vigorous theological debate, application of the Gospel to social wrongs, restatement of Christian doctrines to make them more intelligible to contemporary minds, and experimentation with new forms of worship and service. Any risks the Church may run by fostering a climate of genuine freedom are minor compared to the dangers it surely will encounter from any attempts at suppression, censorship or thought control. The Church can command the respect of modern man only if it has the confidence, courage and honesty to test its faith in the free marketplace of ideas. We believe that the historic Christian faith can stand that test, and are not afraid to have it subjected to the most searching scrutiny.[1]

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[1] Theological Freedom, pp. 31-32.

A "CONCLUDING NON-ACADEMIC POSTSCRIPT"[1]

The author of this study earns his living and tries to fulfill his calling as the priest in charge of Christian Education in a large suburban Episcopal Church in Tucson, Arizona. On one level the issues raised by the case of Bishop Jones seem quite remote from the day to day activities of a parish church. Viewed from a somewhat different perspective, however, these issues are immediately relevant to what happens in a parish.

For despite the best informational and educational efforts of the national Church and of the Bishops of the various dioceses, the real work of Christian Education takes place in local parishes. It is in the parish--in Church school classes, Confirmation classes, adult study classes, and through sermons and publications--that Christians are nurtured in their faith, learn of its history and doctrine, and apply that faith to the decisions of their lives. If the Christian faith is to be brought to bear on the ethical decisions which Christians make, this process must begin, and can be effectively carried out, in parishes.

What follows is not the outline of a detailed program for Christian ethical education in a parish. That is the work of people who are properly trained in educational philosophy and technique. Rather it is an attempt to provide the basis of a theoretical framework in which such education can most effectively take place.

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[1] With apologies to H. R. Niebuhr for his "Concluding Unscientific Postscript" in Christ and Culture (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1956).

This framework is adopted from John Westerhoff's excellent book, Will Our Children Have Faith?[1] Westerhoff begins with a definition of "faith" with which this author would heartily concur:

> Faith, as I have used the word, is a verb. Faith is a way of behaving which involves knowing, being, and willing. The content of faith is best described in terms of our world-view and value system, but faith itself is something we do. Faith is action. It results from our actions with others, it changes and expands through our actions with others, and it expresses itself daily in our actions with others.[2]

Westerhoff believes that given proper interactive experiences," our faith can expand through four distinct styles of faith.[3] These four styles of faith can be described as: first, experienced faith; second, affiliative faith; third, searching faith; and fourth, owned faith.[4]

He describes the relationship between these styles of faith using the analogy of a tree, and its rings. The first thing to be noticed is that "a tree with one ring is as much a tree as a tree with four rings."[5] A tree in its first year is a complete and whole tree, and a tree with three or four rings is not a better tree, but only an expanded tree.

> In a similar way, one style of faith is not a better or greater faith than another. Experienced faith, the first identifiable style is complete and whole faith. One seeks to act with other faithing selves in community and hence to expand into new styles of faith, not so as to possess better or greater faith, but only to fulfill one's faith potential.[6]

Second, a tree grows only if the proper environment is provided. Lacking this environment, growth is stunted until the proper environment does exist. Each tree, however, will grow in its own unique way and with its own individual characteristics.[7]

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[1] John H. Westerhoff III, Will Our Children Have Faith? (New York: The Seabury Press, 1976), p. 89.

[2] Ibid. [3] Ibid. [4] Ibid. [5] Ibid., p. 90 [6] Ibid. [7] Ibid.

> Similarly, we expand from one style of faith to another only if the proper environment, experiences, and interactions are present; and if they are not, then our expansion of faith is arrested. Of course no style of faith is natural to any particular age and everyone can expand into a new style providing the proper interaction with other faithing selves is present.[1]

Third, "a tree acquires one ring at a time in a slow and gradual manner."[2] The observer cannot see the expansion itself, but he does see the results. Neither can a ring be skipped, a tree does not expand from one ring to three. The same is true of faith: one expands slowly from one style to the next, "adding one style at a time in an orderly process over time."[3]

Fourth, as a tree continues to expand, it does not eliminate rings, but rather adds each ring to the ones before, always maintaining and sustaining the previous rings as it grows.[4] The same is true of faith:

> As we expand in faith we do not leave one style of faith behind to acquire a new style but, on the contrary, each new style is added to the previous ones. We do not outgrow a style of faith and its needs but expand it by adding new elements and new needs. Indeed, if the needs of an earlier style of faith cease to be met, persons have a tendency to return to that earlier style of faith. Once, however, these needs are again satisfied persons return to their farthest expanded style of faith.[5]

With this analogy as a backdrop, Westerhoff proceeds to describe the four styles of faith.

Westerhoff believes that "during the preschool and early childhood years, children typically act with "experienced faith."[6] In this period of a persons's life, faith is "learned" more through action and interaction than through words and pedagogical education. To offer one example, if a teacher tries to describe God to his students in terms of the word

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid. [3] Ibid. [4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid., pp.90-91. [6] Ibid., p.91.

"Father," but the child's experiences with his own father are negative, authoritarian or unloving, the student's concept of "God, the Father" will be deeply colored by his experience, and far less by the teacher's verbal description.

Westerhoff believes that:

> . . . to live with others in Christian ways, to put our words into deeds and our deeds into words, to share life with another, to be open to influence as well as to influence, and to interact with other faithing selves in a community of Christian faith is to provide the necessary environment for experienced faith.[1]

If these basic needs of experienced faith are met, people may begin to adopt an affiliative style of faith. Affiliative faith is characterized by three basic components. Each person needs to feel that he belongs to some identifiable community, and that his active participation makes a significant contribution to that community.[2] People need to feel that they are wanted, needed, accepted and important to the community. And while the form of a person's contribution may change with time, people have a lifelong need to feel wanted and needed.

The second characteristic of affiliative faith is "seen in the dominance of religious affections."[3] People need opportunities to "feel" their religious faith. As Westerhoff argues: "Opportunities for experiencing awe, wonder, and mystery, as well as chances to sing, dance paint, and act are needed by us all."[4] The "religion of the heart" often precedes that of the mind. Faith, at this stage of development is not merely intellectual assent to a set of doctrines; it is an emotional response to the feeling of belonging to a community.

The third characteristic of affiliative faith is a sense of authority.

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[1] Ibid., p. 93. [2] Ibid., p. 94. [3] Ibid. [4] Ibid., p. 95.

Westerhoff explains this concept in this way:

> What I mean by authority is a community's affirmation of a story and a way of life that judges and inspires its actions. I recall the many times our children told us that everyone else was doing something and we simply replied, "That's fine, but that is not the Westerhoff way." And then we would tell the story of how the Westerhoffs have acted through the years and why that way of life is important to us. Identity and authority go hand-in-hand.[1]

Identity and authority, do indeed, go hand-in-hand. One effective means by which a sense of community can be enhanced is by drawing very clear and sharp lines which circumscribe what constitutes acceptable behavior by members of the group. People then know who is a member and who is not, and the sense of community among those who are members is strengthened. Such an explicit set of criteria also provides a member with an accepted standard of conduct by which he may order his own life and by which he may evaluate and affirm his own allegiance and contribution to the group.

Westerhoff concludes:

> Throughout our lives, but particularly in the childhood and early adolescent years, we need to belong to and participate in an identity-conscious community of faith. We need to act in ways that nurture our religious affections. And we need to internalize, rehearse and personally own the story that undergirds the community's faith.[2]

If the needs of affiliative faith have been met sometime during late adolescence, persons may expand into searching faith.[3] This faith has three components. First, there is the action of doubt and/or critical judgment. As Westerhoff describes it:

> In order to move from an understanding of faith that belongs to the community to an understanding of faith that is our own, we need to doubt and question that faith. At this point the "religion of the head" becomes equally important with the religion of the heart, and acts of the intellect, critical judgment and inquiry into the meaning and purposes of the story and the ways by which the

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid., pp.95-65. [3] Ibid., p. 96.

> community of faith lives are essential. Serious study of the story, and engagement with historical, theological and moral thinking about life become important.[1]

The second characteristic of searching faith is an outgrowth of the first, the need to experiment with alternate understanding and ways, for people need to test their own tradition by learning about others.[2]

The third component is the need to commit oneself to persons and causes.[3] To an outside observer, people in this stage may appear fickle, "giving themselves to one ideology after another; sometimes in rapid succession and on occasion in contradiction."[4] But this is an essential part of the process of searching and testing. It is at this point in their lives that some people feel "forced out" of the Church. Since it is institutionally difficult for a community to create a support system for people of such rapidly changing allegiances, they feel deserted and unwanted. This is regrettable because it is precisely at this point in their lives that these people need to be encouraged to remain within the faith community.

Again, provided the needs of searching faith are met, a person may expand into an owned style of faith. This movement from experienced faith and affiliative faith through searching faith to owned faith, Westerhoff describes as conversion.

> Conversion experiences may be sudden or gradual, dramatic or undramatic, emotional or intellectual, but they always involve a major change in a person's thinking, feeling, and willing--in short, in their total behavior. Due to the serious struggle with doubt that precedes it, owned faith often appears as a great illumination or enlightenment, but in any case it can be witnessed in our actions and new needs. Now people most want to put their faith into personal and social action, and they are willing and able to stand up for what they believe, even against the community of their nurture.[5]

The second component of owned faith is the need to witness to that faith in both word and deed. People strive to eliminate any dissonance between their faith "as stated in their beliefs and their actions in the world."[1] Doubts to not completely disappear, but they are now dealt with in the context of one's owned faith. There is also the need to help other people to come to and find ways to express their owned faith. Before commenting on Westerhoff's model, it is necessary to examine two essential facets of the model. First, each person progresses through these stages of expansion at his own pace. Some move quickly, others never move beyond experienced or affiliative faith. Regardless of how rapidly one moves, or where one comes to rest, each of these stages is faith. Second, each step in the expansion model must rest on all the preceding steps. A person cannot leap from experienced faith to owned faith. By the same token, someone whose faith is owned, still must have his needs for experienced, and affiliative, and searching faith met. These needs are not left behind as a person's faith expands, they are an integral part of the person and must continually be ministered to and supported.

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid., p. 97. [3] Ibid. [4] Ibid. [5] Ibid., p. 98.

If Westerhoff's analysis accurately reflects the stages of potential expansion of the faith of a Christian, and in the experience of the author it does, then it has certain striking implications for the teaching mission of the Church. First, anyone who is trying to speak to the Church on ethical issues must be aware that he is simultaneously speaking to four distinct groups within his audiences, each with significantly different needs and goals.

There is an old "chestnut" in the field of homiletics to the effect that the task of the preacher is "to comfort the afflicted, and to afflict the comfortable." Anyone who has tried to carry this maxim into action knows how difficult a task it is; and is aware that, more often than not, the preacher ends up afflicting the afflicted and comforting those who are already quite comfortable.

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[1] Ibid.

If it is assumed that the faith of most priests and Bishops has expanded to the stage of owned faith, a perhaps not totally warranted assumption, such a person will inevitably encounter some serious problems in communicating with those at other stages of development. With those whose faith has grown to the level of searching faith, he will have a certain affinity. Their respective stages of growth touch and in places overlap. The priest or Bishop who calls them to commitment and action may often attract their devotion and zeal. The faith which he owns appears at least as a possible option for them which they may be willing to test out in their own lives.

With the person who has never had the needs of affiliative faith satisfied, however, the same priest or Bishop would have serious difficulties. The characteristic of owned faith--conversion and witness--may often appear as a direct threat to those whose faith is at the affiliative stage.

The case of Bishop Jones provides a helpful example. Westerhoff argues that people of affiliative faith have a great need to feel that they belong, and that they are making a significant and worthwhile contribution to the group. Bishop Jones' statements and actions would certainly have appeared puzzling or perhaps threatening to such people. The implication of his actions would seem to have been that the community of the Episcopal Church in Utah was not necessarily the most significant community in his life. For him, it may have appeared that the community of the Peoples' Council, the Church Socialist League and various pacifist groups was more significant. To those at the affiliative stage of faith expansion, this may have seemed to imply that their community was of a lesser significance and value. To such a person Bishop Jones' "neglect" of their community as potentially less significant would appear as a direct challenge to their sense of worth.

By the same token, it would have appeared clear to such a person that Bishop Jones did not necessarily accept the same standard they did by which to evaluate a member's contribution to the group. Bishop Jones believed that a person's contribution to the Church was rightly measured in terms of his loyalty to the ethical teachings of Jesus, not in terms of his participation in the institutional Church. For Bishop Jones, a person could be a loyal supporter of the Church, and still be less than a full committed Christian, unless he was willing to witness publicly to the ethical teachings of Christ. Again, this would be a very threatening message for someone of affiliative faith.

It would seem probable that for many churchmen in Utah, they soon acquired the feeling that they and the Bishop belonged to different communities. His more stringent standards of witness and membership would have appeared as a threat to the security of many churchmen. This would have been especially difficult for Episcopalians whose faith was at the affiliative stage. They would have been nurtured in the feeling of belonging to a rather close-knit family of which the Bishop was the head. To be suddenly confronted by a Bishop whom they perceived as rejecting that community may well have left them with feelings of being rejected, deserted, not needed or wanted.

The last characteristic of an affiliative faith is the great importance of authority. Here too, Bishop Jones' conscientiously motivated pacifist statements must have been extremely troubling. The authority in the Church to which people looked for a feeling of permanence and continuity was now radically divided. On one side stood the Council of Advice, the Presiding Bishop and the House of Bishops; on the other stood Paul Jones. To preserve their sense of identity and authority, one side must be right and the other wrong. As the conflict dragged on, this need for a clear-cut, final decision would have been magnified. The people may well have felt that they desperately needed one ultimate authority around whom they could rebuild their sense of identity with the group. One side would have to win; the other would have to lose. In this conflict, Bishop Jones lost.

Finally, in the relationship between a person with owned faith and a person whose faith is primarily experienced, issues are largely irrelevant. What is of primary importance is the feeling of warmth, concern, acceptance, and love that the person is able to convey.

Two other facets of Westerhoff's model need to be emphasized. The first is his contention that no one can skip a stage in the expansion of his faith. One can only grow from affiliative faith to owned faith through the middle stage of searching faith.

Second, Westerhoff contends that "typically, adults have had their faith arrested in the affiliative style."[1] This observation would appear to find support in the "Comfort Hypothesis" developed by the authors of To Comfort and To Challenge. As they stated it:

> The attributes which a society values most, it is also more likely to reward, Such rewards appear in different forms: money,

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[1] Ibid., p. 100.

> power, status, attention, a sense of belonging, and so forth. People who lack the valued attributes, are to some extent deprived of the concomitant rewards. The church then becomes an alternative source of rewards for those who cannot fully enjoy the fruits of secular society. Parishioners who feel outside the mainstream of society by virtue of being famililess find a surrogate family in the church. Elderly parishioners who may feel cast out of the youth-oriented secular society find acceptance within the church. Lower class parishioners are taught that secular status is ultimately irrelevant. Women who are denied serious consideration for the responsible positions in secular society find they can be very important to the life of the church. In sum, the church offers a refuge for those who are denied access to valued achievements and rewards in everyday American life.[1]

This description would appear to encompass many church members whose faith is at the affiliative stage.

If most members of the church have their faith "arrested in the affiliative stage," and if many of the leaders of the church, like Bishop Jones, feel conscientiously bound to call the church to claim her prophetic ministry, there exists a potential for real conflict. These two groups, one speaking from the stage of affiliative faith, the other from an owned faith, must find a common meeting ground. That common ground could be the area of searching faith. Those with an owned faith must be willing and able to reach back within themselves to speak again to searching faith. Those with an affiliative faith must find ways to reach beyond themselves into a faith which is willing to search for new answers.

What follows does not pretend to be a solution, it is merely offered as one potentially helpful device in bridging this gap. That device is the somewhat neglected ethical strategy of middle axioms.

In his book, Christian Ethics and Social Policy, John Bennett expressed his conviction that: "The Christian ethic guides us in determining the goals which represent the purpose of God in our time."[1] The goals are not to be thought of as absolute or all inclusive, but rather as "the next steps that our own generation must take."[2]

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[1] Glock et al., To Comfort and To Challenge, p. 107.

> The Kingdom of God in its fullness lies beyond our best achievements in the world, but God does have purposes for us that can be realized. To live for them is to live for the Kingdom now.[3]

Dr. Bennett contends that these proximate goals can best be defined by referring to the idea of "middle axioms."

> The use of that term in this context goes back to the writings of Dr. J. H. Oldham in preparation for the Oxford Conference in 1937. The term may not be a good one but it points to something that is distinctive and I shall use it for convenience. A "middle axiom" is more concrete than a universal ethical principle and less specific than a program that includes legislation and political strategy. Dr. Oldham says of "middle axioms": "They are an attempt to define the direction in which, in a particular state of society, Christian faith must express itself. They are not binding for all time, but are provisional definitions of the type of behavior required of Christians at a given period and in given circumstances." To agree on these "middle axioms" will still leave many pressing problems unsolved, but clarity about them will give both the Church and the individual Christian a sense of direction.[4]

The discussion of the proper formulation of "middle axioms" to guide the social policy of the Church may also provide the necessary bridge to link together Christians whose faith is at the affiliative stage with those whose faith is owned.

To formulate "middle axioms", there must first be discussion and agreement upon the basic ethical propositions, or guiding principles, essential to the Christian faith.

If such a discussion could take place on a continuing basis, both at the level of the national church and of the parish, several positive developments might ensue. First a discussion as to the nature of the most basic Christian ethical principles which ought to underlie all "middle axioms" and policy recommendations would enhance the feeling that all the participants were indeed members of the community of the Church. By emphasizing first, the areas of agreement and consensus, the sense of belonging and making a significant contribution to the community would be enhanced and ratified. When differences inevitably arise concerning "middle axioms" or policy recommendations, these differences would arise within the context of the community, now strengthened by a consensus, probably a rather rough consensus, as to those basic principles on which the members did disagree.

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[1] John C. Bennett, Christian Ethics and Social Policy (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1946), p. 77.

[2] Ibid. [3] Ibid. [4] Ibid.

Second, as such a discussion progressed it would soon become quite apparent that Christians hold and support a very broad range of potentially conflicting "middle axioms." This insight is valuable. If properly pursued, this could serve to expand rather than narrow the boundaries of the community. Many churchmen in different ages and countries have and do disagree strongly as to the formulation of the "middle axioms" most appropriate for their time and place. Yet, this disagreement can be carried on within the context of the church community. Complete, unquestioning allegiance to every facet of a particular social policy is not, or at least ought not to be, a requirement for continued membership in the community. The point ought to be that people can disagree strenuously about "middle axioms" and social policies, and still be accepted as members of the community.

Third, such a discussion ought to develop the principle that a person can be a "good" Christian and still question his faith and its ethical implications. Questions and doubts are not the enemy of faith, more often they are the means by which it grows and expands. Doubts and questions are a vital part of the Christian experience. By the acceptance of people's doubts and questions, those with owned faith can help to encourage those whose faith is affiliative to begin to search more deeply. By admitting their own doubts, they can meet them on a common ground.

In the midst of the controversy and acrimony of the Jones' case, none of this may have proven very helpful. Bishop Jones' opponents saw him as jeopardizing the very survival of the nation. Bishop Jones believed that those who would enlist the Church in the wartime service of the nation were endangering the soul of the Church. Between such poles, there may have been no common ground.

The process cannot be begun effectively in the midst of such a crisis. The work of the Church to help bring about the Kingdom now cannot wait for the next crisis. The basis for her constructive action on behalf of the Kingdom must go on every day. That is the work of God's children laboring together in the community of the parish. William Stringfellow defined the challenge:

> In the face of death, live humanly. In the middle of chaos, celebrate the Word. Amidst babel, I repeat, speak the truth. Confront the noise and verbiage and falsehood of death with the truth and potency and efficacy of the Word of God. Know the Word, teach the Word, nurture the Word, preach the Word, defend the Word, incarnate the Word, do the Word, live the Word. And more than that, in the Word of God, expose death and all death's works and wiles, rebuke lies, cast out demons, exorcise, cleanse the possessed, raise those who are dead in mind and conscience.[1]

Along with all other Christians, that is the work of a parish priest.

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[1] William Stringfellow, Ethic for Christians, pp. 142-43.

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